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THE "ROAD MAP": STRATEGIC RATIONALE AND POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Gevorg Darbinyan
hetq.am/en/politics/armenia-turkey-5/
2 009/05/04 | 18:26
Feature Stories politics
The joint statement of the foreign affairs ministries of the Republic
of Armenian the Republic of Turkey and the Swiss Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs issued on April 22 sent shock waves through the
Armenian domestic political scene and the public sector.
Why were people in Armenia shocked?
Such a reaction was based on two primary reasons. First, that
statement was signed on the eve of the anniversary of the Armenian
Genocide which, in turn, signaled that the U.S. president would not
keep his promise and describe the events at the beginning of the 20th
century as genocide. Thus, Turkey clearly obtained a very important
tactical victory at the minimum: by indefinitely halting or freezing
the process leading towards the international recognition of the
genocide, a process that would have experienced a new impetus had
Obama used the proper term.
On the other hand, this statement was a carte-blanche for the Armenian
regime to remove its foreign legitimacy problem from the agenda in
the West. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden's telephone call to Serzh
Sargsyan and his expression of "praise" regarding the policies
of the Armenian president, as well as the statement of the press
spokesperson of France's Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
"welcoming the joint statement of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland on
the development of a roadmap for normalization of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan" affords the RoA regime a golden opportunity to
finally free itself from this complex.
Second, the signing of the tripartite statement was somewhat
unexpected. No one in Armenia was effectively informed about it. Just
three days after the statement had been publicized, RoA President
Serzh Sargsyan, at a session of the RoA Security Council, merely stated
that, "This statement is confirmation of our efforts directed towards
improving Armenian-Turkish relations." Such an evaluation permits
one to conclude that it is not merely the foreign minister who is
responsible for the signing of the statement as it is the president
of the republic himself and that it is the result of state policy.
However, the fact that such a watershed statement was signed in such an
unexpected fashion, and that neither the Security Council, the ruling
coalition members nor the national assembly were informed about it,
gives rise to a great deal of political and internal social mistrust
regarding the statement and the objectives it seeks to pursue and
to the actions of the Armenian authorities on the Armenian-Turkish
"front" in general. This mistrust, which clearly appears ready to
deepen, is much more dangerous than the statement itself. In this
context, the vulnerability of Armenia is well understood in Turkey
and Azerbaijan and they are trying to take advantage of it.
Consecutive traps of Turkish manipulations
Despite the fact that no interpretation on an official level has been
forthcoming regarding the statement's most key point, the "road map",
immediately after being published the Turkish press, in particular
the newspaper Sabah published a list of five principles allegedly
contained in the road map. These principles seemingly comprise a plan
of action or a program. Each of these five principles, taken on their
own, fully contradicts the interests of the Armenian side.
Immediately afterwards, it was officially reported that a telephone
conversation had taken place between the presidents of Turkey and
Azerbaijan, Abdullah Gul and Ilham Aliyev. Hurriyet reported that
President Gul, taking into account Azerbaijan's relations with
Turkey, told Aliyev that, "There is no difference of opinion in
our relations. All that is being done is being done for Turkey and
Azerbaijan." The two presidents agreed, according to Milliyet, not
to ratify decisions that would oppose each other's interests, on a
reciprocal basis. This means that Gul effectively convinced Aliyev
that the statement regarding the "road map" not only doesn't go against
the interests of Azerbaijan but that "it is being done for Azerbaijan".
These news streams, when coupled with the policy of keeping the
Armenian authorities off guard, turn into a real propaganda onslaught
against Armenia and a wonderful tool of information terrorism. It
is primarily directed at aggravating the internal social situation,
the onset of a new crisis of mistrust between the society and the
regime and, in the end, a further weakening of Armenia's position.
Armenia: an unwitting pawn or team player?
In this context, there are at minimum a few questions that the regime
in Armenia must answer as quickly as possible and in a manner that
is convincing and well-argued.
1. Preceding the signing of the statement, why didn't the government
of Armenia fail to organize a debate of the issue on a public or
at least political level, within the framework of the RoA National
Assembly? In other words, why did the signing of such an important
statement take place so unexpectedly?
2. What is the reason for not publishing the essence of that document
now?
3. The RoA Foreign Ministry proclaimed that the "road map" is a
framework for the on-going process. However, the parameters of the
framework haven't been elucidated. RoA President Sargsyan, during a
meeting of the Security Council just a few days ago, declared that in
the near future the public will be given the opportunity to familiarize
themselves with the document and that they will be convinced that it
is in our best interests. However there was no reaction forthcoming
regarding the veracity of the "road map" as published by Sabah. At
the very least, an assessment of this propaganda manipulation could
have been made, but this too was lacking.
4. Just how accurate is the reported precondition stipulated by
Turkey in the "road map" that Armenian must recognize the Treaty of
Kars? What is the official position of Yerevan regarding that treaty
and its signing?
5. To what extent are important issues for the Armenian side
incorporated in the "road map"? These include the confirmation of
the Armenian Genocide, independent of the creation of any committee,
the mandatory participation of Armenia in any regional communication
network plans and a guarantee for unrestricted border openings?
6. Does the Armenian government certify that an improvement of
Armenian-Turkish relations will not take place at the expense of
sacrificing Armenian interests when it comes to the settlement of
the Karabakh conflict and will it not serve as a precondition for
the settlement of the Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict?
7. If the problem wasn't to free Obama from the headache of using the
term "genocide", then why was the tripartite statement issues a mere
two days before April 24? Thus, can't it be inferred that Turkey and
the United States jointly used Armenia to pull their chestnuts out
of the fire?
In other words, what is being demanded of the Armenian government
is to formulate and present to the public, as soon as possible,
the perimeters of the essential principles for the normalization
of Armenian-Turkish relations. These will serve as a boundary that
Yerevan will never cross in terms of making further concessions. The
exposition of such principles is vital, in the first instance, so as
not to allow a new round of internal social and political tension,
the prerequisites for which already exist, in Armenia during this
complex and contradictory time.
A reshuffling of the political map?
Most noteworthy is the decision of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF) to pull out of the governing coalition. This
means that the ARF didn't receive adequate explanations from the
president of the republic to calm their concerns. For the most part,
the ARF's leaving the coalition will not upset the composition of
forces within the government because the other forces in the coalition
will continue to defend the policy line of Serzh Sargsyan regarding a
thaw in Armenian-Turkish relations. Generally speaking, none of the
three remaining coalition parties ever had a particular principled
position regarding the issue and this, contrary to the ARF, affords
them a wonderful opportunity to show off their skills of adaptability
and maneuvering.
Thus, in a purely political sense, a major reshuffling at the top
level is most unlikely. The influence on the public expectations
regarding the ARF stance will be much greater however. It can lead
to a new set of corrections in relations between Armenia and the
Diaspora. In addition, the SRF will be automatically thrust into
the opposition camp. Armen Rustamyan, a member of the ARF Bureau,
stated that in the event that the ARF quits the coalition the party
will enter the ranks of the constructive opposition.
This state of affairs especially fashions advantageous preconditions
for the creation of new, non-formal relations between the Heritage
Party and the ARF, especially if we take into account that these two
parties take a fairly conservative approach to the Armenian-Turkish
and Karabakh issues.
These two forces will be afforded the possibility to consolidate the
social and political potential in the national-conservative camp that
is presently unorganized and doomed to neglect. It has the potential to
transform these forces into a serious political factor and essentially
change the domestic political landscape. If we take into account the
new, more passive tactical approach of the radical opposition, then
it becomes clear that the level of political confrontation towards the
authorities becomes that more powerful. As to what these processes will
lead to is mostly dependent on the degree of open and frank dialogue
that the regime in Armenia will initiate in the coming days and weeks.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Gevorg Darbinyan
hetq.am/en/politics/armenia-turkey-5/
2 009/05/04 | 18:26
Feature Stories politics
The joint statement of the foreign affairs ministries of the Republic
of Armenian the Republic of Turkey and the Swiss Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs issued on April 22 sent shock waves through the
Armenian domestic political scene and the public sector.
Why were people in Armenia shocked?
Such a reaction was based on two primary reasons. First, that
statement was signed on the eve of the anniversary of the Armenian
Genocide which, in turn, signaled that the U.S. president would not
keep his promise and describe the events at the beginning of the 20th
century as genocide. Thus, Turkey clearly obtained a very important
tactical victory at the minimum: by indefinitely halting or freezing
the process leading towards the international recognition of the
genocide, a process that would have experienced a new impetus had
Obama used the proper term.
On the other hand, this statement was a carte-blanche for the Armenian
regime to remove its foreign legitimacy problem from the agenda in
the West. U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden's telephone call to Serzh
Sargsyan and his expression of "praise" regarding the policies
of the Armenian president, as well as the statement of the press
spokesperson of France's Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
"welcoming the joint statement of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland on
the development of a roadmap for normalization of relations between
Ankara and Yerevan" affords the RoA regime a golden opportunity to
finally free itself from this complex.
Second, the signing of the tripartite statement was somewhat
unexpected. No one in Armenia was effectively informed about it. Just
three days after the statement had been publicized, RoA President
Serzh Sargsyan, at a session of the RoA Security Council, merely stated
that, "This statement is confirmation of our efforts directed towards
improving Armenian-Turkish relations." Such an evaluation permits
one to conclude that it is not merely the foreign minister who is
responsible for the signing of the statement as it is the president
of the republic himself and that it is the result of state policy.
However, the fact that such a watershed statement was signed in such an
unexpected fashion, and that neither the Security Council, the ruling
coalition members nor the national assembly were informed about it,
gives rise to a great deal of political and internal social mistrust
regarding the statement and the objectives it seeks to pursue and
to the actions of the Armenian authorities on the Armenian-Turkish
"front" in general. This mistrust, which clearly appears ready to
deepen, is much more dangerous than the statement itself. In this
context, the vulnerability of Armenia is well understood in Turkey
and Azerbaijan and they are trying to take advantage of it.
Consecutive traps of Turkish manipulations
Despite the fact that no interpretation on an official level has been
forthcoming regarding the statement's most key point, the "road map",
immediately after being published the Turkish press, in particular
the newspaper Sabah published a list of five principles allegedly
contained in the road map. These principles seemingly comprise a plan
of action or a program. Each of these five principles, taken on their
own, fully contradicts the interests of the Armenian side.
Immediately afterwards, it was officially reported that a telephone
conversation had taken place between the presidents of Turkey and
Azerbaijan, Abdullah Gul and Ilham Aliyev. Hurriyet reported that
President Gul, taking into account Azerbaijan's relations with
Turkey, told Aliyev that, "There is no difference of opinion in
our relations. All that is being done is being done for Turkey and
Azerbaijan." The two presidents agreed, according to Milliyet, not
to ratify decisions that would oppose each other's interests, on a
reciprocal basis. This means that Gul effectively convinced Aliyev
that the statement regarding the "road map" not only doesn't go against
the interests of Azerbaijan but that "it is being done for Azerbaijan".
These news streams, when coupled with the policy of keeping the
Armenian authorities off guard, turn into a real propaganda onslaught
against Armenia and a wonderful tool of information terrorism. It
is primarily directed at aggravating the internal social situation,
the onset of a new crisis of mistrust between the society and the
regime and, in the end, a further weakening of Armenia's position.
Armenia: an unwitting pawn or team player?
In this context, there are at minimum a few questions that the regime
in Armenia must answer as quickly as possible and in a manner that
is convincing and well-argued.
1. Preceding the signing of the statement, why didn't the government
of Armenia fail to organize a debate of the issue on a public or
at least political level, within the framework of the RoA National
Assembly? In other words, why did the signing of such an important
statement take place so unexpectedly?
2. What is the reason for not publishing the essence of that document
now?
3. The RoA Foreign Ministry proclaimed that the "road map" is a
framework for the on-going process. However, the parameters of the
framework haven't been elucidated. RoA President Sargsyan, during a
meeting of the Security Council just a few days ago, declared that in
the near future the public will be given the opportunity to familiarize
themselves with the document and that they will be convinced that it
is in our best interests. However there was no reaction forthcoming
regarding the veracity of the "road map" as published by Sabah. At
the very least, an assessment of this propaganda manipulation could
have been made, but this too was lacking.
4. Just how accurate is the reported precondition stipulated by
Turkey in the "road map" that Armenian must recognize the Treaty of
Kars? What is the official position of Yerevan regarding that treaty
and its signing?
5. To what extent are important issues for the Armenian side
incorporated in the "road map"? These include the confirmation of
the Armenian Genocide, independent of the creation of any committee,
the mandatory participation of Armenia in any regional communication
network plans and a guarantee for unrestricted border openings?
6. Does the Armenian government certify that an improvement of
Armenian-Turkish relations will not take place at the expense of
sacrificing Armenian interests when it comes to the settlement of
the Karabakh conflict and will it not serve as a precondition for
the settlement of the Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict?
7. If the problem wasn't to free Obama from the headache of using the
term "genocide", then why was the tripartite statement issues a mere
two days before April 24? Thus, can't it be inferred that Turkey and
the United States jointly used Armenia to pull their chestnuts out
of the fire?
In other words, what is being demanded of the Armenian government
is to formulate and present to the public, as soon as possible,
the perimeters of the essential principles for the normalization
of Armenian-Turkish relations. These will serve as a boundary that
Yerevan will never cross in terms of making further concessions. The
exposition of such principles is vital, in the first instance, so as
not to allow a new round of internal social and political tension,
the prerequisites for which already exist, in Armenia during this
complex and contradictory time.
A reshuffling of the political map?
Most noteworthy is the decision of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF) to pull out of the governing coalition. This
means that the ARF didn't receive adequate explanations from the
president of the republic to calm their concerns. For the most part,
the ARF's leaving the coalition will not upset the composition of
forces within the government because the other forces in the coalition
will continue to defend the policy line of Serzh Sargsyan regarding a
thaw in Armenian-Turkish relations. Generally speaking, none of the
three remaining coalition parties ever had a particular principled
position regarding the issue and this, contrary to the ARF, affords
them a wonderful opportunity to show off their skills of adaptability
and maneuvering.
Thus, in a purely political sense, a major reshuffling at the top
level is most unlikely. The influence on the public expectations
regarding the ARF stance will be much greater however. It can lead
to a new set of corrections in relations between Armenia and the
Diaspora. In addition, the SRF will be automatically thrust into
the opposition camp. Armen Rustamyan, a member of the ARF Bureau,
stated that in the event that the ARF quits the coalition the party
will enter the ranks of the constructive opposition.
This state of affairs especially fashions advantageous preconditions
for the creation of new, non-formal relations between the Heritage
Party and the ARF, especially if we take into account that these two
parties take a fairly conservative approach to the Armenian-Turkish
and Karabakh issues.
These two forces will be afforded the possibility to consolidate the
social and political potential in the national-conservative camp that
is presently unorganized and doomed to neglect. It has the potential to
transform these forces into a serious political factor and essentially
change the domestic political landscape. If we take into account the
new, more passive tactical approach of the radical opposition, then
it becomes clear that the level of political confrontation towards the
authorities becomes that more powerful. As to what these processes will
lead to is mostly dependent on the degree of open and frank dialogue
that the regime in Armenia will initiate in the coming days and weeks.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress