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A VOUCHER TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
Sergei Markedonov
RIA Novosti
21:31 | 05/ 05/ 2009
MOSCOW
The Europeanization of the post-Soviet space has received new
incentives. On May 7, Prague will play host to the constituent summit
of Eastern Partnership to be attended by EU leaders and heads of six
republics of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) taking part in this program.
On the same day, another round of talks between Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev will
take place in the Czech capital. The project's initiators are pinning
special hopes on its results.
The initiative on Eastern Partnership was the result of Swedish and
Polish diplomacy last year. In effect, this was the first serious
public claim by New Europe to play the first fiddle in the European
orchestra. At that time, on the eve of its EU presidency, France
was the first to support this initiative. Originally, such European
grandees as Germany and Britain did not show much enthusiasm for
this idea. But the subsequent five-day war in the Caucasus caused
fears in Europe about "the empire's revival" and the consolidation of
"Russia's exclusive influence in Eurasia" (which the EU perceives as
a prerequisite of stronger authoritarian rule inside Russia).
It goes without saying that the Baltic countries and Poland were
particularly zealous in aggravating these phobias. They received
new arguments - the Kremlin's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia's independence, and the change of Russia's status
in the South Caucasus. Be it as it may, a thorough analysis of this
issue last December in Brussels produced a document, which defines
the main provisions and prospects of Eastern Partnership.
The draft joint Declaration of Eastern Partnership reads that this
program will be based on such fundamental values as democracy,
supremacy of law, respect for human rights, international law, and
the market economy. All these values are set against the principles of
19th century Realpolitik. But this is only on paper. Considering all
kinds of obstacles existing in reality, the project aims at creating
"preparatory courses", or Europe's "anteroom."
Eastern Partnership has already been compared with the EU's agreements
with Lithuania and Poland before the expansion of united Europe in
2004. However, there are some serious nuances and major differences
between these agreements and the current project. Post-Soviet
republics are not invited to join the EU, although their leaders are
naturally interpreting partnership as the doors to Europe flung wide
open. However, last January EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner
openly stated that Eastern Partnership did not provide for the
admission of post-Soviet states into the EU.
The EU as an institution is trying to save face. Political correctness
and adherence to propaganda do not allow it to reject post-Soviet
states out of hand. Today's EU ideology is similar to Soviet-style
progressivism, under which society can only move forward, from simple
to sophisticated, from bottom to top, from old to new. Therefore,
there is no alternative to Europe's expansion. It is beyond doubt,
and it only remains to argue about when it will take place. For this
reason, many new EU members (old-timers have very different opinions on
their membership) are particularly active in shaping unreasonably high
expectations in their partners. In this particular case, the matter
is not so much about grants and foreign financing that concern our
homebred, envious "patriots". The talk about fast Europeanization stems
from Soviet mentality, which is no weaker in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia
and Azerbaijan than it is in Russia. This is a way of thinking when
an idea (in this case, a markedly anti-Russian, European idea rather
than the communist one) is being elevated to the absolute, divorced
from reality, and denied thorough analysis. This approach leads to
the emergence of myths, overrated expectations, and practical mistakes.
Having decided that "Euro-Atlantic fraternity" has no alternative,
Tbilisi launched its attack on Tskhinval. As a result, Russian
tanks are now stationed 30 km (little more than 19 miles) from the
Georgian capital, while Georgia has lost control over the district
of Akhalgori and the Kodor Gorge. Its chances of retrieving Abkhazia
and South Ossetia are close to zero even within the borders of the
Soviet period, not to mention those of 1992-1994.
But Georgia is an extreme case. For the time being, other EU
partners are actively discussing "change of orientation," notably,
the renunciation of post-Soviet integration in favor of Europe.
Needless to say, the CIS is not a very effective structure. Its goals
are vague, and it lacks a vision of the future. However, this institute
of "civilized divorce" provides for the recognition of university
diplomas and visa-free travel for the Eastern partners. Anyone
who graduated from the Kharkov Pedagogical Institute, or Kishinev
University in 1983, has every chance to get a job on the vast expanses
of Russia. This is of real value provided by the CIS. What company in
Rome, Milan, Paris, or Frankfurt would accept diplomas of a medical
institute from Baku, a technical or pedagogical vocational school from
Yerevan, Kishinev, Odessa, Zhitomir, or Minsk? (The latter diploma
should also be supported by evidence of democratic transit).
Everything in the EU is going according to plan, just as things had
been running in Soviet times. The constituent summit will take place
on May 7. Later on, summits will be held on a regular basis, and the
Brussels bureaucracy will take charge of the project itself. As in
the case with NATO summits, there will reports about "progress," but
these "steps forward" are not likely to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, make Georgia more tolerant to the motives of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, or turn Transdnestr into "European Moldova."
It is clear that the partners' relations with Russia are not likely
to improve as a result of the project's implementation. Many in the
countries, which are waiting for "vouchers" to Europe, believe that
this project is aimed at reducing Russia's influence in Europe and
Asia. It is difficult to expect positive results when blind faith
and ideology prevail over knowledge and reality.
Sergei Markedonov is department head at the Institute of Political
and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Sergei Markedonov
RIA Novosti
21:31 | 05/ 05/ 2009
MOSCOW
The Europeanization of the post-Soviet space has received new
incentives. On May 7, Prague will play host to the constituent summit
of Eastern Partnership to be attended by EU leaders and heads of six
republics of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) taking part in this program.
On the same day, another round of talks between Armenian President
Serzh Sargsyan and his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev will
take place in the Czech capital. The project's initiators are pinning
special hopes on its results.
The initiative on Eastern Partnership was the result of Swedish and
Polish diplomacy last year. In effect, this was the first serious
public claim by New Europe to play the first fiddle in the European
orchestra. At that time, on the eve of its EU presidency, France
was the first to support this initiative. Originally, such European
grandees as Germany and Britain did not show much enthusiasm for
this idea. But the subsequent five-day war in the Caucasus caused
fears in Europe about "the empire's revival" and the consolidation of
"Russia's exclusive influence in Eurasia" (which the EU perceives as
a prerequisite of stronger authoritarian rule inside Russia).
It goes without saying that the Baltic countries and Poland were
particularly zealous in aggravating these phobias. They received
new arguments - the Kremlin's unilateral recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia's independence, and the change of Russia's status
in the South Caucasus. Be it as it may, a thorough analysis of this
issue last December in Brussels produced a document, which defines
the main provisions and prospects of Eastern Partnership.
The draft joint Declaration of Eastern Partnership reads that this
program will be based on such fundamental values as democracy,
supremacy of law, respect for human rights, international law, and
the market economy. All these values are set against the principles of
19th century Realpolitik. But this is only on paper. Considering all
kinds of obstacles existing in reality, the project aims at creating
"preparatory courses", or Europe's "anteroom."
Eastern Partnership has already been compared with the EU's agreements
with Lithuania and Poland before the expansion of united Europe in
2004. However, there are some serious nuances and major differences
between these agreements and the current project. Post-Soviet
republics are not invited to join the EU, although their leaders are
naturally interpreting partnership as the doors to Europe flung wide
open. However, last January EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner
openly stated that Eastern Partnership did not provide for the
admission of post-Soviet states into the EU.
The EU as an institution is trying to save face. Political correctness
and adherence to propaganda do not allow it to reject post-Soviet
states out of hand. Today's EU ideology is similar to Soviet-style
progressivism, under which society can only move forward, from simple
to sophisticated, from bottom to top, from old to new. Therefore,
there is no alternative to Europe's expansion. It is beyond doubt,
and it only remains to argue about when it will take place. For this
reason, many new EU members (old-timers have very different opinions on
their membership) are particularly active in shaping unreasonably high
expectations in their partners. In this particular case, the matter
is not so much about grants and foreign financing that concern our
homebred, envious "patriots". The talk about fast Europeanization stems
from Soviet mentality, which is no weaker in Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia
and Azerbaijan than it is in Russia. This is a way of thinking when
an idea (in this case, a markedly anti-Russian, European idea rather
than the communist one) is being elevated to the absolute, divorced
from reality, and denied thorough analysis. This approach leads to
the emergence of myths, overrated expectations, and practical mistakes.
Having decided that "Euro-Atlantic fraternity" has no alternative,
Tbilisi launched its attack on Tskhinval. As a result, Russian
tanks are now stationed 30 km (little more than 19 miles) from the
Georgian capital, while Georgia has lost control over the district
of Akhalgori and the Kodor Gorge. Its chances of retrieving Abkhazia
and South Ossetia are close to zero even within the borders of the
Soviet period, not to mention those of 1992-1994.
But Georgia is an extreme case. For the time being, other EU
partners are actively discussing "change of orientation," notably,
the renunciation of post-Soviet integration in favor of Europe.
Needless to say, the CIS is not a very effective structure. Its goals
are vague, and it lacks a vision of the future. However, this institute
of "civilized divorce" provides for the recognition of university
diplomas and visa-free travel for the Eastern partners. Anyone
who graduated from the Kharkov Pedagogical Institute, or Kishinev
University in 1983, has every chance to get a job on the vast expanses
of Russia. This is of real value provided by the CIS. What company in
Rome, Milan, Paris, or Frankfurt would accept diplomas of a medical
institute from Baku, a technical or pedagogical vocational school from
Yerevan, Kishinev, Odessa, Zhitomir, or Minsk? (The latter diploma
should also be supported by evidence of democratic transit).
Everything in the EU is going according to plan, just as things had
been running in Soviet times. The constituent summit will take place
on May 7. Later on, summits will be held on a regular basis, and the
Brussels bureaucracy will take charge of the project itself. As in
the case with NATO summits, there will reports about "progress," but
these "steps forward" are not likely to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, make Georgia more tolerant to the motives of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, or turn Transdnestr into "European Moldova."
It is clear that the partners' relations with Russia are not likely
to improve as a result of the project's implementation. Many in the
countries, which are waiting for "vouchers" to Europe, believe that
this project is aimed at reducing Russia's influence in Europe and
Asia. It is difficult to expect positive results when blind faith
and ideology prevail over knowledge and reality.
Sergei Markedonov is department head at the Institute of Political
and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.