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  • Russia's New Foreign Policy

    RUSSIA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY
    By Leon Aron

    American Enterprise Institute
    http://www.aei.org/outlook/8990
    May 6 2009

    Never has there been a Russia less imperialist, less militarized,
    less threatening to its neighbors and the world, and more susceptible
    to the Western ideals than the Russia we see today.

    Few propositions about today's world can be stated with greater
    certainty: never in the four and a half centuries of the modern Russian
    state has there been a Russia less imperialist, less militarized,
    less threatening to its neighbors and the world, and more susceptible
    to the Western ideals and practices than the Russia we see today.

    Although obvious even to a person with only a cursory acquaintance
    with Russian history, this state of affairs results from a long
    series of complex, often painful, and always fateful choices made
    by the first post-Communist regime. Some of the most critical
    decisions were made between 1991 and 1996, when Russia was reeling
    from economic depression, hyperinflation, pain of market reforms,
    and postimperial trauma. Many a nation, even in incomparably milder
    circumstances, succumbed to the temptation of making nationalism the
    linchpin of national unity and cohesion at the time of dislocation
    and disarray. From Argentina to China, Malaysia, and Indonesia, in
    various degrees of crudeness and militancy, countries have recently
    resorted to the palliative of nationalism to dull the pain of market
    reforms or reversals of economic fortune.

    In Russia, too, retrenchment and truculence were urged by leftist
    nationalists inside and outside the Supreme Soviet and, since
    1995, by the "national patriotic" plurality in the Duma (the lower
    house of the Russian Parliament), which early in 1996 "annulled"
    the 1991 Belavezhskie agreements formalizing the dissolution of the
    Soviet Union. This deafening chorus is led daily by the flagships of
    Communist and nationalist media--Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossia and Zavtra,
    with a combined daily press run of more than half a million--and by
    the nearly 300 local pro-Communist newspapers.

    Yet even when the chance to propitiate the national patriots and to
    reap a political windfall by adopting a rigid and hostile stance was
    handed to President Boris Yeltsin on a silver platter, the Kremlin
    passed--as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    expansion. After much blustering, Yeltsin chose to sign the NATO-Russia
    Founding Act and to accommodate the United States and its partners
    rather than to repeat (even if rhetorically) the cold war. "It
    already happened more than once that we, the East and the West,
    failed to find a chance to reconcile," Yeltsin said in February 1997,
    when the final negotiations with NATO began. "This chance must not
    be missed." The leader of the national-patriotic opposition and the
    chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady
    Zyuganov called the founding act "unconditional surrender" and a
    "betrayal of Russia's interests."

    A Historic Disarmament

    This instance was emblematic of a broader strategy of post-Communist
    Russia. Between 1992 and 1995, Moscow implemented all Gorbachev's
    commitments and completed contraction of the empire inherited from
    the Soviet Union--a contraction remarkable for being undertaken in
    peacetime and voluntarily. On September 1, 1994, when the last Russian
    units left Germany, most troops had already been removed from Poland,
    Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In four years, Russia repatriated
    (frequently without homes for officers or jobs for their spouses)
    800,000 troops, 400,000 civilian personnel, and 500,000 family members.

    Even as Moscow publicly and loudly linked its retreat from Estonia
    to the granting of full civil and political rights to the ethnic
    Russians there, it quietly continued to withdraw. In two years,
    between the end of 1991 and the last months of 1993, the number of
    Russian troops in Estonia diminished from 35,000--50,000 to 3,000. The
    departure of the last Russian soldier from the Paldiski submarine
    training base in Estonia in September 1995 marked the end of Russian
    presence in East-Central Europe. The lands acquired and held during
    two and a half centuries of Russian and Soviet imperial conquests
    were restored to the former captive nations. Russia returned to its
    seventeenth-century borders.

    Unfolding in parallel was demilitarization, historically unprecedented
    in speed and scope. Reduction is a ridiculous euphemism for the
    methodical starvation, depredation, and strangulation to which Yeltsin
    has subjected the Soviet armed forces and the military-industrial
    complex. In a few years, the Russian defense sector--the country's
    omnipotent overlord, the source of national pride, the master of the
    country's choicest resources and of the livelihoods of one-third of the
    Russian population--was reduced to a neglected and humiliated beggar.

    Begun with an 80 percent decrease in defense procurement ordered
    by Yegor Gaidar in 1992, the decline in the share of the Russian
    gross domestic product spent on the military continued from at
    least 20 percent to 5 percent--7 percent today. Yeltsin promised to
    reduce it to 3 percent by the year 2000. According to Sergei Rogov,
    a leading Russian expert and the director of the USA and Canada
    Institute, the 1996 expenditures for organization and maintenance of
    Russian armed forces were at least 2.5 times lower than in 1990, for
    procurement and military construction 9 times, and for research and
    development 10 times. When, in May 1997, the government implemented
    an across-the-board spending cut ("sequestering"), defense was again
    hit the hardest: its already delayed funding was reduced by another
    20 percent.

    Along the way, the Russian army shrank from around 4 million in
    January 1992 to about 1.7 million by late 1996. In July 1997, Yeltsin
    signed several decrees mandating a reduction of the armed forces by
    500,000 men, to 1.2 million. A week later, the minister of defense,
    General Igor Rodionov, referred to himself as the "minister of a
    disintegrating army and a dying fleet."

    At the same time, Yeltsin promised what surely will be the coup
    de grâce of Russian militarism: the ending of the draft and the
    institution of an all-volunteer armed force of 600,000 by the year
    2000. Even though this plan almost certainly will take longer than
    three years to implement, a mere talk by the Russian leader about
    ending almost two centuries of conscription epitomized the distance
    that the new country put between herself and the traditional Russian
    (let alone Soviet) militarized state. In the meantime, following the
    Supreme Court's October 1995 decision that allowed local judges to
    rule on constitutional matters, Russian judges have thrown out dozens
    of cases brought by the army against the "deserters" who exercised
    their constitutional right to alternative civil service.

    The extent of the rout of the formerly invincible defense sector
    became evident in the twelve months following the 1996 presidential
    election. An often sick president fired two defense ministers, the
    head of the general staff, and the commanders of the paratroop and
    space forces, and he ordered the retirement of 500 generals from the
    immensely bloated Russian field officers corps.

    No other Russian or Soviet leader, not even Stalin, attempted to
    remove at the same time as many pillars of the national defense
    establishment for the fear of destabilizing the regime (to say nothing
    of risking one's neck). With the 40 million votes that he received
    on July 3, 1996, Yeltsin apparently felt no fear. Dictatorships and
    autocracies depend on the army's good graces; democracies (even young
    and imperfect) can afford to be far less solicitous.

    The Rationale of Disarmament

    Russia's historic disarmament results from political and economic
    democratization, not from a weak economy, as often suggested--as
    if national priorities are determined by economists and as if,
    throughout human history, economic rationale has not been invariably
    and completely overridden by fear, hatred, wounded national honor,
    messianic fervor, or a dictator's will. In our own century, where
    was a "strong economy" and excess wealth in the Soviet Union in the
    1930s and after World War II; in Vietnam between the 1950s and the
    1980s; in Cuba since the 1960s; in Ethiopia under Comrade Mengistu;
    in an Armenia fighting for Nagorny-Karabakh; in a Pakistan developing
    a nuclear arsenal; or in an Iraq starving its people to produce the
    mother of all weapons?

    No, the shrinking of the Russian military is due to the weakening of
    the Russian state's grip on the economy and to the constraints imposed
    on imperialism, aggressiveness, and brutality by public opinion,
    the free mass media, and competitive politics, which have forced
    the Kremlin to end the war in Chechnya. Tardy in bestowing on Russia
    its other blessings, Russian democracy has already made high defense
    expenditures and violent imperial projects quite difficult to sustain.

    Most fundamentally, Russian demilitarization is a consequence
    of rearranged national priorities, of a change in the criteria of
    greatness, and of society's gradual liberation from the state. Russia
    has abandoned the tradition of the unchallenged preponderance of
    the state's well-being and concerns, particularly in the matters
    of foreign policy and national security, over domestic economic
    and social progress. The vigilance against foreign aggression, the
    strength of the fortress-state, and the allegiance and sacrifice to
    it have been replaced in a new national consensus by the goals of
    societal and individual welfare, new civil and political liberties,
    and stabilization within a democratic framework.

    In June 1997, in a television address to the nation on the seventh
    anniversary of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia, Yeltsin
    said: "A great power is not mountains of weapons and subjects with
    no rights. A great power is a self-reliant and talented people with
    initiative.... In the foundation of our approach to the building
    of the Russian state . . . is the understanding that the country
    begins with each of us. And the sole measure of the greatness of our
    Motherland is the extent to which each citizen of Russia is free,
    healthy, educated, and happy."

    Unless this new consensus is extinguished by an economic catastrophe
    and a return to a dictatorship, Russian militarism is not likely
    to recur. For that reason, as stated in one of Ronald Reagan's
    magnificently vindicated theorems--nations mistrust one another not
    because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust one
    another--Russia, while far from a model of openness and consistency,
    is easier to trust today than at any other time in its history.

    The Chinese Angle

    This connection between democratization and national security
    policies makes the Russian case so different from the Chinese. For
    the same reason, one should not expect any time soon a reversal in
    the enormous Chinese military buildup and modernization, helped by a
    burgeoning economy and fueled by resurgent nationalism, with which
    China, unlike Russia, chose to anchor and unite the nation during
    its dizzying economic transformation.

    Historically, the key feature of a transition from a traditional to a
    modern society and from a village- to an urban-based economy was the
    "disposal" of surplus peasantry. Everywhere this process was attended
    with enormous societal convulsions, revolutions, violence, and cruelty
    (England showing the way.) For Russia, the problem was "resolved" by
    the terror of Stalin's collectivization and industrialization. For
    China, with its 800,000,000 peasants, the resolution is still
    ahead. The justified fear of instability felt by the Chinese political
    class, already anxious about the migration of millions of destitute
    peasants into the cities, is the single biggest impediment to Chinese
    democratization--and to the prospects of a Chinese demilitarization.

    China is relevant in another respect, as well. Of all the morbid
    fantasies about the innumerable facets of the alleged Russian menace,
    the prophecy of a coming Sino-Russian alliance directed against
    the United States is intellectually the most embarrassing one. What
    historical precedent is there to support such a forecast in the case
    of two giant nations that vie for regional superpowership, share
    nearly 3000 miles of border (much of it in dispute), and have for
    centuries competed for the huge underpopulated land mass to the east
    of the Urals? As with history's other pair of perennial combatants,
    Germany and France, such an accord will have to wait until both
    countries are stable and prosperous democracies--not in our lifetime
    and, alas, perhaps not in our children's, either. In any case, should
    it ever come to pass, an alliance of two democracies is unlikely to
    be anti-American.

    To be sure, there will be periods of rapprochements when, as today,
    Russia will sell its submarines and MIGs, and Chinese migrant workers
    and entrepreneurs will flood the Far East and Siberia, setting up
    Chinese language schools for their children and opening the best
    restaurants in Ekaterinburg, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk. Russia will
    attempt to play the Chinese card in its dealings with Washington--just
    as China, at the same time, will be using a Russian card in
    its relations with the United States, which will remain far more
    important to both than they will be to each other. Just as certainly
    a Sino-Russian truce will be followed by acrimonious and perhaps
    violent ruptures.

    Post-Soviet Space

    Along with finding its place and role in the post-cold war world,
    Russia also had to make some critical choices about the "post-Soviet
    political space," as the territory of the former Soviet Union has been
    referred to in Moscow since 1992. At that time, everyone--from the
    national patriots on the Left to the radical free marketeers on the
    Right--agreed on four things. First, a stable and prosperous Russia
    was impossible without a modicum of stability in the "post-Soviet
    space," which from Moldova to Tajikistan erupted in a dozen violent
    civil and ethnic wars. Second, some sort of mending of millions of
    ruptured economic, political, and human ties ("reintegration") was
    imperative if the entire area was to survive the transition. Third,
    with the "new world order" buried in the hills around Sarajevo, Russia
    could count on no one but herself in securing peace and stability in
    the area. Finally, Russia's preeminence as the regional superpower
    was not negotiable.

    Beyond this agenda, which still stands, the consensus dissolved into
    two sharply divergent objectives and strategies. One was aimed at
    making the post-Soviet space resemble the USSR as closely as possible
    and as quickly as possible. The cost--in money, world opinion,
    or even blood--was no object. All means were acceptable, including
    the stirring of nationalist and irredentist tendencies among the
    25-million-strong ethnic Russian diaspora in the newly independent
    states--just as Serbia did in Bosnia and Croatia. In this scenario,
    the regime in Moscow was urged at least to threaten recalcitrant
    states with the politicization of the ethnic Russian community and the
    "massive redrawing of borders" to join to the metropolis the areas
    heavily populated by ethnic Russians, especially northern Kazakhstan
    and eastern Ukraine. Advocated largely, but not exclusively, by the
    nationalist Left, this is an imperial, revanchist, and ideological
    agenda.

    In the other model, which might be called postcolonial, reintegration
    was given a far less ambitious content. Its advocates relied on the
    incremental pull of a privatized Russian economy and its democratic
    stabilization to do the job. Its time frame stretched over decades.

    Haltingly and inconsistently, Russia opted for the latter game
    plan. Even the April 1997 "union" with Belarus--which some American
    observers hastened to declare the beginning of Russia's inexorable
    march to the West--has been quietly but substantially diluted and
    slowed to a crawl, despite the Kremlin's rhetorical fanfare, the
    conjugal ardor of Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, and
    the exuberance in the Duma. Already, five months later, in September,
    First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov declared that "unity" between
    Russia and Belarus, with its Soviet-style economy and Lukashenka's
    dictatorship, would be just as impossible as a union between North
    and South Korea. A week later, ostensibly in retaliation for the
    jailing of a Russian journalist in Belarus, Yeltsin refused to grant
    permission for Lukashenka's plane to enter Russian air space.

    Regarding the maintenance of regional dominance, however, there
    ought to be no illusions: Russia is likely to deploy much the
    same combination of roguery, bribery, and diplomatic pressure that
    great land powers have used for millennia to assert control over
    a self-declared sphere of influence. Heading the list are economic
    and military assistance to friendly regimes and the denial of aid
    to neighbors deemed insufficiently accommodating. In the case of
    especially recalcitrant countries, support for all manner of internal
    rebellions is always an option. Given the economic and political
    fragility of most post-Soviet states, their dependence on Russian
    resources (especially energy), and their susceptibility to ethnic
    and civil strife, Moscow's stance could sometime make a difference
    between a young state's life and death.

    Relations with Neighbors

    While relentlessly probing for weaknesses, exploiting their neighbors'
    troubles, and taking advantage of openings to further its regional
    superiority, the postcolonial policy is constrained by a cost-benefit
    analysis. There is a wariness of open-ended, long-term, and expensive
    commitments in the "near abroad." Such considerations were anathema
    both to Russian "messianic" (the Third Rome) and, especially, to Soviet
    "ideological" (world socialism) varieties of imperialism.

    Most critically, Moscow has chosen not to cross the thickest lines
    in the sand: independence and sovereignty of the CIS nations. While
    "near," the Confederation of Independent States is still "abroad." In
    the end, this is the critical distinction between the imperial and
    the postcolonial modes of behavior in the region.

    This difference is akin to the one between twisting someone's arms and
    cutting them off. Much as observers may (and do) find both activities
    equally reprehensible, to the arms' owner the actual choice makes
    a great deal of difference. Unlike some American journalists and
    columnists, whom they quickly learned to overwhelm with complaints
    about Russia, the leaders of neighboring nations from "near" and even
    "medium" abroad know only too well the alternative to the arm-twisting
    postcolonial choice.

    Hence their wholehearted support for Yeltsin in his September-October
    1993 confrontation with the Left-nationalist radical supporters of
    the Supreme Soviet. The Czech President Václav Havel said October
    4 that the clashes in Moscow were not simply "a power struggle,
    but rather a fight between democracy and totalitarianism." In a joint
    statement Presidents Lennart Meri of Estonia, Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia,
    and Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania called the struggle in Moscow "a
    contest between a democratically elected President and antidemocratic
    power structures." Their Moldovan counterpart, Mircea Snegur, called
    the Supreme Soviet supporters "Communist, imperialist forces who want
    to turn Russia into a concentration camp." "In my thoughts I am on the
    barricades with the defenders of Russian democracy, as I was next to
    them in August 1991," Eduard Shevardnadze said in a message to the
    Kremlin on the late afternoon of October 3, 1993, when the outcome
    looked quite grim for Yeltsin. "Deeply concerned about the events
    in Moscow, I am again expressing my resolute support for President
    Yeltsin and his allies."

    Hence, with an almost audible sigh of relief, the neighboring countries
    welcomed Yeltsin's victory over Zyuganov in 1996. The tone of the
    greetings sent to the victor by the leaders of the new states far
    exceeded protocol requirements. "The future development of Ukraine
    depended on the results of the Russian election," President of Ukraine
    Leonid Kuchma said on July 4, 1996. Yeltsin's victory, he continued,
    was "a signal that Ukraine should press ahead with economic reform."

    For the proponents of the postcolonial choice, to which
    demilitarization of conflicts in the near abroad had always been
    central, 1997 was by far the most productive year. Following Yeltsin's
    near-miraculous resurgence after heart bypass surgery, Moscow moved
    to settle all hostilities in the region. Only in Nagorny Karabakh,
    over which Armenia and Azerbaijan had fought to a standstill, did
    Russia fail to make some progress.

    On May 12, Russia signed a peace accord with Chechnya, granting it all
    but an official recognition of independence. Within days, after two
    months of shuttle diplomacy by the Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov,
    Moldova's President Petru Lucinschi and Igor Smirnov, the leader of the
    self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic (a Russo-Ukrainian secessionist
    enclave on Moldova's border with Ukraine), signed in the Kremlin a
    memorandum that effectively affirmed Moldova's sovereignty over the
    area. The signing was attended by Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma as
    "coguarantors" of the agreement.

    In June, the Tajikistan regime, supported by Russia, and the Tajik
    Islamic opposition ended five years of a bloody civil war by signing
    in Moscow a Peace and National Reconciliation Accord. Primakov and his
    first deputy, Boris Pastukhov, reportedly continued mediation until
    the final agreement emerged two hours before the signing ceremony.

    The same month Abkhaz President Vladislav Ardzinba spent two weeks
    in Moscow with top mediators (Yeltsin's Chief of Staff Valentin
    Yumashev, Security Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin, and Defense
    Minister Igor Sergeev) to discuss an interim protocol, drafted by
    the Russian Foreign Ministery, for a settlement between Georgia and
    secessionist Abkhazia. In August, Ardzinba traveled to the Georgian
    capital, Tbilisi, for the first face-to-face meeting with Shevardnadze
    since the war began in 1992. In his weekly radio address at the end
    of August, Shevardnadze "expressed his appreciation" of Primakov's
    effort in arranging Ardzinba's visit.

    On September 4, in the presence of Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin
    the presidents of North Ossetia and Ingushetia (autonomous republics
    inside Russia) signed in Moscow an agreement settling a conflict over
    North Ossetia's Prigorodnyi Raion, which had festered since fighting
    broke out in November 1992. During the next two days, in the capital
    of Lithuania, Vilnius, Chernomyrdin held bilateral meetings with
    the presidents of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. At the end of the
    sessions, each of the presidents announced that his country would
    "soon" be able to sign border agreements with Moscow.

    Accord with Ukraine

    But by far the most momentous diplomatic coup of that busy year was
    the May 31 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between
    Russia and Ukraine signed by Yeltsin and Kuchma in Kiev on May 31. An
    accord between Europe's largest (Russia) and its sixth most populous
    (Ukraine) nations is just as central to the stability of the post-cold
    war European order as the French-German rapprochement engineered by
    Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer in 1958 was to the postÿWorld
    War II one. By the terms of the treaty, the two nations undertook
    to "respect each other's territorial integrity, confirm[ed] the
    inviolability of the existing borders, ... mutual respect, sovereign
    equality, a peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or
    its threat."

    The success of this settlement after five years of turbulent
    negotiations is more stunning because so much augured failure. First,
    the technical complexity of some issues bordered on intractability. One
    issue was the fate of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, on which both
    countries had legitimate claims. Another contentious point was the
    sovereignty over the beautiful and fecund island of Crimea, where
    ethnic Russians outnumbered Ukrainians by more than two to one. For
    almost two centuries a staple of Russian poetry and the most popular
    Russian resort, teeming with tsars' summer palaces and dachas of the
    best Russian painters, musicians, and writers, it was "given" to the
    Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954,
    when the end of the Soviet Union and an independent Ukraine seemed
    beyond the realm of the possible. Yet another political and emotional
    hurricane was touched off by the status of the port and naval base
    of Sevastopol, a symbol of Russian military valor. The defense of
    the city in the 1854-1855 Crimean War against the British and the
    French and in World War II against the Germans had earned Sevastopol
    an honorary designation of City-Hero.

    And then there were precedents of similar postimperial divorces,
    all attended by horrific bloodshed: England and Ireland, India and
    Pakistan, Bosnia and Serbia. In 1992, many a Western expert confidently
    predicted a war between Russia and Ukraine, some even an exchange of
    nuclear strikes.

    Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the recognition of Ukraine as a
    separate state was her unique place in Russia's historic memory and
    national conscience. Kiev was the birthplace of the first Russian state
    and its first baptized city, from which Christianity spread throughout
    Russia. No other part of the non-Russian Soviet Union was so pivotal
    to Russian national identity as Ukraine. In no other instance was
    the tempering of Russia's imperial tradition and instinct put to a
    harsher, more painful test than by an independent Ukraine.

    In the end, Russia gave up Crimea and Sevastopol and ceded to Ukraine
    the entire Black Sea Fleet. Some of Sevastopol's naval bays were to
    be leased, and half of the fleet rented by Russia from Ukraine, with
    the payments subtracted from Ukraine's enormous debt to Russia for
    gas and oil deliveries, estimated at the time of the treaty signing
    at $3-3.5 billion--perhaps the most generous, and least publicized,
    bilateral foreign assistance program in the world today.

    Revisionist or Not?

    The most fundamental choice that Russia had to resolve both on
    the world scene and in the post-Soviet space was the one between
    nonrevisionist and revisionist policies. The former seek advantage
    within the constraints of an existing framework accepted by the
    majority of the international community. The latter are aimed at
    undermining and changing the framework itself. Russia has chosen
    nonrevisionism. She may bemoan the unfairness of the score (and does
    so often and loudly), but she does not try to change the rules of
    the game.

    To be sure, the imperatives of history, geography, and domestic
    politics will cause Russia to be less than happy about much
    U.S. behavior in the world and to challenge it often. In poll after
    poll, a majority of Russians agree that the United States was "using
    Russia's current weakness to reduce it to a second-rate power." As
    de Gaulle said to Harry Hopkins, "America's policy, whether it was
    right or not, could not but alienate the French." Wherever the United
    States provides an opening by seeming either not to care much about
    an issue or, as in Iraq, to hesitate, Russia is likely to seize the
    opportunity to further its claim on being reckoned with as a major
    international player.

    Yet, as with France, the tweaking, the shouting, and the occasional
    painful kick in the shins must not be confused with anti-Americanism
    of the kind professed by the Soviet Union, Iran in the 1980s, or
    Iraq, Cuba, and Libya today. Russian truculence is not informed by
    ideology. It is not dedicated to a consistent pursuit of strategic
    objectives inimical to the truly vital interests of the United
    States, and it is not part of a relentless, antagonistic struggle to
    the end. Rather, it is pragmatic and selective. And when America's
    wishes are communicated at the highest level, forcefully, directly,
    and unambiguously, Moscow is likely to moderate opposition and even
    extend cooperation, as it did in Bosnia.

    But just as Francis Fukuyama's much misunderstood "end of history"
    was never meant to suggest the absence of lapses, reversals, lacunae,
    or lengthy and furious rear-guard battles, neither does the end of 75
    years of relentless Soviet revisionism spell the end of our Russian
    problem. Indeed, it may become worse before it becomes better. The
    reason is the "underinstitutionalization" of Yeltsin's foreign policy:
    the lack of organizational and personnel structures that could
    carry on the present policy in the absence of the impulse from the
    top. The new foreign and security policies of Russia have stemmed
    mostly from Yeltsin's domestic political and economic revolution,
    not from implementation of some long-term strategy or a conscious
    effort at restructuring the policy-making process.

    Yeltsin's Passion

    As every great and successful modern political leader, with a notable
    exception of de Gaulle, Yeltsin is a domestic leader. His interests,
    his instincts, and his passions, like Ronald Reagan's (unlike Nixon's,
    Carter's, or Gorbachev's), are engaged mostly (and most profitably) by
    his country's domestic politics. For that reason, Yeltsin never cared
    to establish a foreign policy alter ego (a Kissinger, Brzezinski,
    or Shevardnadze): a strategic thinker and confidant endowed with a
    great deal of power and independence.

    There have been only two exceptions, two areas of international
    relations that Yeltsin has firmly arrogated for himself. One is the
    relationship with the United States, which Yeltsin single-handedly
    salvaged by signing--against the advice and dire warning of virtually
    the entire political class--the Russia-NATO Founding Act.

    The other domaine réservé is the settlement with Ukraine, into
    which Yeltsin put enormous personal effort and which he pushed along,
    ignoring or evading dozens of stern resolutions by the Supreme Soviet,
    the Duma, and the Council of Federation (the upper house of the
    Russian legislature) and pretending not to hear fiery statements of
    the country's top political leaders, from his own ex-vice president,
    Aleksandr Rutskoy, to the perennial chairman of the Duma's Committee
    on Foreign Relations, Vladimir Lukin, to the mayor of Moscow, Yuri
    Luzhkov. After the treaty was signed, Ukrainian officials told
    reporters that "only Yeltsin had the political will and strength
    to drop Russia's residual claims on Ukraine" and that the Ukrainian
    leadership "prayed that Mr. Yeltsin would not die before doing so."

    Outside these two areas, Yeltsin considers foreign policy a distant
    second to his domestic agenda and is content to use it to accommodate
    the opposition rather than to expend his political capital. The choice
    of Primakov as foreign minister is characteristic: the man's announced
    objective of a multipolar world--without American hegemony but also
    without a challenge to the key postulates of the established order or a
    slide into a new cold war--made him the only key minister in Yeltsin's
    cabinet acceptable to all major political forces in the country.

    In the next two years, the pitfalls of such a modus operandi will
    become especially apparent. Until now, Yeltsin's unique place in
    Russian politics, his political weight, and the confidence that came
    from a landslide victory in 1996 kept the vector of Russian foreign
    policy pointed in the right direction. The president's inevitable
    physical decline and lame-duck status change a great deal. Like an old
    bulldozer--once mighty and responsive but now more and more awkward,
    slow, hard to handle, and with the motor nearly worn out--Yeltsin
    today clears the boulders deposited by the receded Soviet glaciers
    one at a time, with much screeching, creaking, and even retreats.

    Any worsening of Yeltsin's physical condition would further increase
    the policy-making impact of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
    Russian diplomatic corps--perhaps the most authentic and recalcitrant
    relic of the Soviet past among Russian institutions, a class whose fall
    from the pinnacle of Soviet society in terms of material stature and
    prestige can be compared only with that of the military. Predictably,
    Russian diplomats' zeal in defending the reformist regime often seems
    less than overwhelming.

    An additional toughness and shrillness in the tone of Russian foreign
    policy rhetoric in the next two years will come about because of
    domestic politics, as the Foreign Ministry will more and more look to
    please the undeclared contenders in the 2000 presidential election,
    all of whom seem far less impervious to nationalist temptation than
    Yeltsin. Russian behavior in the latest Iraq crisis, with Yeltsin,
    clearly disengaged, mouthing a bizarre line about World War III,
    is a foretaste of things to come.

    This must not take us by surprise. Seven years ago, an enormous
    and evil empire, which had deformed and poisoned everything and
    everyone it touched, broke to pieces. Yet its harmful rays, like
    light from a long-dead star, will continue to reach us for some
    time. The current Russian leaders came of political age and advanced
    under the empire. They cannot be counted on fully to fashion a world
    of which they know little. At best, in domestic politics, economy,
    and behavior in the world, they will forge a hybrid. If we are lucky
    (as we have been with Yeltsin), more than half the product will be
    new and benign, while the rest will be instilled with various degrees
    of malignancy. It is up to the next generation of leaders (with lots
    of good fortune) to turn the hybrid into a purebred.

    U.S. policy makers must be prepared to encounter the Soviet legacy in
    Russian foreign policy--such as relentless and often senseless spying
    or the sale of technology and weapons to nations hostile to the United
    States--and to counter them with unflinching resolve. What will never
    serve American interests, however, is the wholesale imposition of old
    stereotypes on a different new reality, remarkably auspicious in some
    of its key ingredients.

    Leon Aron is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
    Institute. Another version of this essay was published in the April 20
    Weekly Standard. For more information on the subject, see Leon Aron,
    "The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Post-Communist Russia and Its Domestic
    Context," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New Russian Foreign Policy,
    Council on Foreign Relations, May 1998.
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