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FINALLY THE ARF HAS RESUMED ITS TRADITIONAL ROLE
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
www.asbarez.info/2009/05/08/fina lly-the-arf-has-resumed-its-traditional-role-2/
Ma y 8th, 2009
For close to a century, Armenians have lived with the psychological
and emotional trauma caused by the genocide. In addition, Armenians
have suffered the indignity of having their centuries-long occupation
of historic Armenia not only challenged, but their physical imprint
upon the land destroyed by their oppressors, and their right to
justice ignored or questioned.
The genocide took the lives of over 1.5 million innocent Armenian men,
women, and children. It caused the forced abandonment of Armenian homes
and lands, and the confiscation and destruction of Armenian churches
and the sacred lands where their deceased ancestors had rested for
centuries. The genocide stole the birthright of thousands of young
Armenian women who only survived by being forced to serve alien
masters. Today, Yerevan is on a path that seeks the normalization
of relations with a government that has maintained a century-long
policy of denying, rewriting, and obfuscating these horrific events
that have been recorded in the archives of history.
Ankara and Yerevan recently agreed to a "road map" to facilitate
negotiations that will lead to a normalization of relations. One
wonders how Yerevan can expect to achieve normalcy when it is apparent
that the Turkish leadership has no intention of recognizing the
Armenian Genocide (see "Why Would Turkey acknowledge the Armenian
Genocide," the Armenian Weekly, Feb. 10, 2006) or of changing its
position supporting the territorial integrity of its ally Azerbaijan
with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These are rational
assumptions since the Karabakhtsis and the Armenian people, both
within Armenia and throughout the diaspora can only speculate as to
the concessions to be given and the benefits to be received as the
result of these negotiations.
To date, the political leaders in Yerevan have either been unwilling
or unable to understand the potential dangers that are attached to
this process of normalization that far exceed the difficulties the
country is currently experiencing. One can only surmise the intense
external pressures being placed upon Yerevan to seek normalization
as it navigates the Machiavellian world of international politics.
Despite the emphasis on genocide recognition in the United States
Congress, as well as President Barack Obama's well-documented personal
views on the Armenian Genocide, his administration has turned its
back to the plight of the Armenian nation. Contrary to his stated
position of not wanting to do anything that may influence ongoing
negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, Obama's comments during
his recent visit to Turkey and the policy of his administration send
an entirely different message. His long-awaited message on the 94th
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was political verbiage at its
best. The politically naive leaders of the Diaspora in the United
States were deceived once again (see "Caveat Emptor When Shopping
for Normalization in the Turkish Marketplace," the Armenian Weekly,
March 25, 2009).
This headlong rush toward normalization since the meeting of
President Abdullah Gul and President Serge Sarkisian in Yerevan
received its first serious setback on April 27 when the ARF withdrew
its participation in Yerevan's coalition government. Although this
was not an unexpected development, it should have occurred months
earlier. By withdrawing their support of Sarkisian, the ARF announced
that it will "...be guided exclusively by...national interests and
goals when addressing the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations
and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict."
By assuming their role as the loyal opposition, the ARF has injected
itself into the normalization process, unfettered by the constraints
that hobbled it as a coalition partner. Sarkisian must realize
the serious consequences should he present any agreement as a fait
accompli. This would be a serious setback for the democratization
process in Armenia. The normalization of relations with Turkey
is a historic moment in contemporary Armenian history. The ARF, by
reassuming its traditional, role takes center stage in this process. It
becomes essentially the watchdog, the last line of defense, protecting
both the future of the country and of all Armenians. As the only
effective counterbalance to the present administration in Yerevan,
the ARF has put the administration on notice that it will monitor the
government's actions, propose alternative strategies, and publicly
evaluate the national security issues that may be adversely impacted
by the direction the negotiations appear to be going.
A baseline for determining the value of normalization is the
Turkish leadership's willingness to engage Armenia in resolving the
legitimate issues between the two countries that have existed for
nearly a century. One does not expect the slate to be wiped clean by
Turkish acquiescence to every issue that Yerevan, prodded by the ARF,
might propose. However, it is necessary that Turkey commits itself
to a good-faith effort to ameliorate conditions that have festered
for nearly a century. Absent that, there is no benefit to be gained
by normalizing relations. Presently there is no indication that the
leadership or those factions that influence the government, such as
the military, are willing to face these issues head-on. There is
no need to repeat the issues that must be addressed, but they are
summed up in the full meaning of Hai Tahd: recognition, restitution,
reparations, and rectification.
The Turkish offer to normalize relations, which Armenia's political
leaders seem so eager to accept, recasts Faust's bargain with the
devil as a victory. Contrary to Armenia's oft-stated objections,
Turkey still speaks of the preconditions necessary for normalized
relations. Ankara is engaged in a very astute diplomatic offensive that
began with Gul's visit to Armenia last year (see "Normalization Can
Never Be Worth Turkey's Asking Price," the Armenian Weekly, Dec. 6,
2008). Turkey has neither the need, and even less the desire, to
normalize relations with Armenia if the cost is genocide recognition
or Karabakh's de jure independence.
Ankara's goal is to carry on negotiations under conditions aided and
abetted by the United States that require Armenia to consider difficult
choices. It is a diplomatic offensive that, just prior to the announced
intervention of the ARF, was close to achieving its objective. For the
Turkish leaders it was a win-win situation. If their gambit succeeded
Armenia would have been checkmated. If Armenia refused to play the
game as Ankara defined it, Turkey would have burnished its image as
a country "willing to forget the past" and of reaching out to its
intransigent neighbor.
The "interested" nations and the "think tanks" that play academic
games solving crises eagerly encourage Armenia to come to terms
with Turkey. This was the end-goal of Turkey's present diplomatic
offensive-to pressure Armenia to accept compromises that are inimical
to its long-term interests. However, Turkey is no longer free to pursue
its diplomatic offensive unchallenged. The ARF has the organizational
structure, credibility, and experience gained during the past century
as Turkey's principal adversary in the international arena to augment,
redirect, and evaluate strategies that will protect the national
security and enhance the future of the Armenian nation.
What effect Russia and Iran have on these negotiations is best known to
Yerevan. However, there is no question that Russia would do whatever
it can to have Azerbaijani energy resources redirected through its
extensive pipeline system that supplies Europe. Fortunately, this runs
counter to Turkish-United States interests. For the present at least,
the United States is a more reliable ally for Turkey than Russia would
be. Also, Armenia is the only military foothold that Russia can depend
upon in the south Caucasus. For Russia to support Turkey to bring these
negotiations to a successful conclusion at Armenia's and Karabakh's
expense could be a dangerous game to play. A resurgent Turkey would
confront Russia in the south Caucasus supported by the United States,
the European Union, and their military component, NATO. Turkey would
have the necessary springboard to extend its influence into central
Asia where it would also confront Russia's head-on.
In 1991, the independence of Armenia was heralded by Armenians with
joy and expectation that finally their Armenia was on the threshold
of a new and promising era. A few years later, Artsakh (Karabakh) won
its independence from Azerbaijan in a devastating war for liberation,
and just recently Barack Obama, who had stated in no uncertain terms
during his presidential campaign that the Armenian Genocide was a
fact of history, was elected president. From these once promising
beginnings, the Armenian people are witness to bilateral negotiations
between Ankara and Yerevan that appear to lack any meaningful quid
pro quo for Armenia.
Although it is important that Armenia and Turkey normalize relations,
it cannot come about by the Sarkisian Administration sacrificing the
future security or potential of the Armenian nation. It cannot come
about by sacrificing Artsakh. And it cannot come about by sacrificing
Hai Tahd. That is the heavy burden that the ARF finally assumed on
April 27.
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
www.asbarez.info/2009/05/08/fina lly-the-arf-has-resumed-its-traditional-role-2/
Ma y 8th, 2009
For close to a century, Armenians have lived with the psychological
and emotional trauma caused by the genocide. In addition, Armenians
have suffered the indignity of having their centuries-long occupation
of historic Armenia not only challenged, but their physical imprint
upon the land destroyed by their oppressors, and their right to
justice ignored or questioned.
The genocide took the lives of over 1.5 million innocent Armenian men,
women, and children. It caused the forced abandonment of Armenian homes
and lands, and the confiscation and destruction of Armenian churches
and the sacred lands where their deceased ancestors had rested for
centuries. The genocide stole the birthright of thousands of young
Armenian women who only survived by being forced to serve alien
masters. Today, Yerevan is on a path that seeks the normalization
of relations with a government that has maintained a century-long
policy of denying, rewriting, and obfuscating these horrific events
that have been recorded in the archives of history.
Ankara and Yerevan recently agreed to a "road map" to facilitate
negotiations that will lead to a normalization of relations. One
wonders how Yerevan can expect to achieve normalcy when it is apparent
that the Turkish leadership has no intention of recognizing the
Armenian Genocide (see "Why Would Turkey acknowledge the Armenian
Genocide," the Armenian Weekly, Feb. 10, 2006) or of changing its
position supporting the territorial integrity of its ally Azerbaijan
with respect to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These are rational
assumptions since the Karabakhtsis and the Armenian people, both
within Armenia and throughout the diaspora can only speculate as to
the concessions to be given and the benefits to be received as the
result of these negotiations.
To date, the political leaders in Yerevan have either been unwilling
or unable to understand the potential dangers that are attached to
this process of normalization that far exceed the difficulties the
country is currently experiencing. One can only surmise the intense
external pressures being placed upon Yerevan to seek normalization
as it navigates the Machiavellian world of international politics.
Despite the emphasis on genocide recognition in the United States
Congress, as well as President Barack Obama's well-documented personal
views on the Armenian Genocide, his administration has turned its
back to the plight of the Armenian nation. Contrary to his stated
position of not wanting to do anything that may influence ongoing
negotiations between Turkey and Armenia, Obama's comments during
his recent visit to Turkey and the policy of his administration send
an entirely different message. His long-awaited message on the 94th
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was political verbiage at its
best. The politically naive leaders of the Diaspora in the United
States were deceived once again (see "Caveat Emptor When Shopping
for Normalization in the Turkish Marketplace," the Armenian Weekly,
March 25, 2009).
This headlong rush toward normalization since the meeting of
President Abdullah Gul and President Serge Sarkisian in Yerevan
received its first serious setback on April 27 when the ARF withdrew
its participation in Yerevan's coalition government. Although this
was not an unexpected development, it should have occurred months
earlier. By withdrawing their support of Sarkisian, the ARF announced
that it will "...be guided exclusively by...national interests and
goals when addressing the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations
and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict."
By assuming their role as the loyal opposition, the ARF has injected
itself into the normalization process, unfettered by the constraints
that hobbled it as a coalition partner. Sarkisian must realize
the serious consequences should he present any agreement as a fait
accompli. This would be a serious setback for the democratization
process in Armenia. The normalization of relations with Turkey
is a historic moment in contemporary Armenian history. The ARF, by
reassuming its traditional, role takes center stage in this process. It
becomes essentially the watchdog, the last line of defense, protecting
both the future of the country and of all Armenians. As the only
effective counterbalance to the present administration in Yerevan,
the ARF has put the administration on notice that it will monitor the
government's actions, propose alternative strategies, and publicly
evaluate the national security issues that may be adversely impacted
by the direction the negotiations appear to be going.
A baseline for determining the value of normalization is the
Turkish leadership's willingness to engage Armenia in resolving the
legitimate issues between the two countries that have existed for
nearly a century. One does not expect the slate to be wiped clean by
Turkish acquiescence to every issue that Yerevan, prodded by the ARF,
might propose. However, it is necessary that Turkey commits itself
to a good-faith effort to ameliorate conditions that have festered
for nearly a century. Absent that, there is no benefit to be gained
by normalizing relations. Presently there is no indication that the
leadership or those factions that influence the government, such as
the military, are willing to face these issues head-on. There is
no need to repeat the issues that must be addressed, but they are
summed up in the full meaning of Hai Tahd: recognition, restitution,
reparations, and rectification.
The Turkish offer to normalize relations, which Armenia's political
leaders seem so eager to accept, recasts Faust's bargain with the
devil as a victory. Contrary to Armenia's oft-stated objections,
Turkey still speaks of the preconditions necessary for normalized
relations. Ankara is engaged in a very astute diplomatic offensive that
began with Gul's visit to Armenia last year (see "Normalization Can
Never Be Worth Turkey's Asking Price," the Armenian Weekly, Dec. 6,
2008). Turkey has neither the need, and even less the desire, to
normalize relations with Armenia if the cost is genocide recognition
or Karabakh's de jure independence.
Ankara's goal is to carry on negotiations under conditions aided and
abetted by the United States that require Armenia to consider difficult
choices. It is a diplomatic offensive that, just prior to the announced
intervention of the ARF, was close to achieving its objective. For the
Turkish leaders it was a win-win situation. If their gambit succeeded
Armenia would have been checkmated. If Armenia refused to play the
game as Ankara defined it, Turkey would have burnished its image as
a country "willing to forget the past" and of reaching out to its
intransigent neighbor.
The "interested" nations and the "think tanks" that play academic
games solving crises eagerly encourage Armenia to come to terms
with Turkey. This was the end-goal of Turkey's present diplomatic
offensive-to pressure Armenia to accept compromises that are inimical
to its long-term interests. However, Turkey is no longer free to pursue
its diplomatic offensive unchallenged. The ARF has the organizational
structure, credibility, and experience gained during the past century
as Turkey's principal adversary in the international arena to augment,
redirect, and evaluate strategies that will protect the national
security and enhance the future of the Armenian nation.
What effect Russia and Iran have on these negotiations is best known to
Yerevan. However, there is no question that Russia would do whatever
it can to have Azerbaijani energy resources redirected through its
extensive pipeline system that supplies Europe. Fortunately, this runs
counter to Turkish-United States interests. For the present at least,
the United States is a more reliable ally for Turkey than Russia would
be. Also, Armenia is the only military foothold that Russia can depend
upon in the south Caucasus. For Russia to support Turkey to bring these
negotiations to a successful conclusion at Armenia's and Karabakh's
expense could be a dangerous game to play. A resurgent Turkey would
confront Russia in the south Caucasus supported by the United States,
the European Union, and their military component, NATO. Turkey would
have the necessary springboard to extend its influence into central
Asia where it would also confront Russia's head-on.
In 1991, the independence of Armenia was heralded by Armenians with
joy and expectation that finally their Armenia was on the threshold
of a new and promising era. A few years later, Artsakh (Karabakh) won
its independence from Azerbaijan in a devastating war for liberation,
and just recently Barack Obama, who had stated in no uncertain terms
during his presidential campaign that the Armenian Genocide was a
fact of history, was elected president. From these once promising
beginnings, the Armenian people are witness to bilateral negotiations
between Ankara and Yerevan that appear to lack any meaningful quid
pro quo for Armenia.
Although it is important that Armenia and Turkey normalize relations,
it cannot come about by the Sarkisian Administration sacrificing the
future security or potential of the Armenian nation. It cannot come
about by sacrificing Artsakh. And it cannot come about by sacrificing
Hai Tahd. That is the heavy burden that the ARF finally assumed on
April 27.