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Today's Zaman, Turkey
May 10 2009
`Turkey, Armenia should no longer be hostage to history'
European Stability Initiative experts Diba Nigar Göksel and
Gerald Knaus Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus from the
European Stability Initiative (ESI), a nonprofit research and policy
institute, have said both Turkey and Armenia have a chance to
marginalize extremist voices and enable a more reasonable debate to go
forward, as the border between them remains closed but signs of a
rapprochement have appeared.
In their recent report `Noah's Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and
the Debate on Genocide,' they explore the issue of `genocide,' which,
they said, is the single topic that poisons relations between Turks
and Armenians. `There are hardly any reputable scholars in the field
of genocide studies who doubt that what happened to the Armenians in
1915 constitutes genocide.
However, it is also clear that modern-day Turkey is not legally
responsible for genocidal acts committed nearly a century ago, and
that acknowledging the genocide would not bring into question the
established Turkish-Armenian border,' the report stated.
The report went on: `Armenians today face a choice: either treat
Turkey as an eternal enemy or re-engage with its western neighbor in
the hope of one day sharing a border with the European Union. ¦ For
their part, Armenians must accept that the recognition of the genocide
will never pave the way for challenging a territorial settlement that
has stood for nearly a century.'
For Sunday's Zaman, Göksel and Knaus gave more details about
the issue and the outlook of Turkish-Armenian relations.
You went to Armenia several times, lived there and talked with people
from every strata of Armenian society for the report. What was the
most striking part for you?
Göksel: Before traveling to Armenia, I had assumed that the
descendants of the Ottoman Armenians were all in the diaspora and that
the Armenians in Armenia had always been there. As a Turk, what
surprised me most was how high a proportion of the Armenians I met in
Armenia had come from different places in Turkey. Probably 80 percent
of the people I met in Armenian villages in the middle of nowhere
would be from [the eastern Turkish provinces of] MuÅ?,
Diyarbakır, etc. that made me see the magnitude of the problem.
You also talked with people with extreme views -- those who would
defend such ideas as defining the current border between Turkey and
Armenia illegal. Do you think this idea has a chance of survival in
Armenia?
Göksel: The people in Armenia who expressed rather radical
positions were quite polite to me. These were the same people who gave
presentations in town meetings in Armenia about having claims in
Anatolian land. But this is not the most important thing for most
ordinary people in Armenia.
What is the most important thing to them?
Göksel: For most of them, meeting a Turk for the first time and
being able to talk to her freely is more important. Just 10 minutes of
conversation changes the entire atmosphere, and we see that more
dialogue is really the only way to melt the ice -- except for the
people who come up with theories about land claims and
reparations. Ordinary people would not go out and demonstrate for
land.
But do you think some of the opinion leaders could influence the
public in a way to make that happen?
Göksel: As for land claims, no. As for 1915, Armenians believe
that it was genocide and that they should be able to tell the world
about it. This is a strong feeling. Expecting Armenians to give up
their beliefs or their agenda in that regard is not realistic.
So they support opening the border mostly because of economic
concerns?
Göksel: We found a great deal of fear in Armenia toward Turkey;
a suspicion about Turkey's intentions. This is also a result of being
isolated from each other for so long. There is also extreme curiosity
about what is happening in Turkey.
Are they questioning why Turkey wants to open the border?
Göksel: They question everything, from why Turkey restores the
Church of the Holy Cross, the Akdamar Church, on the island of Akdamar
[in the Turkish province of Van] to the real intentions of the Turkish
intellectuals who launched the `apology campaign.' There is general
skepticism about Turkey's efforts to reach out to Armenia -- so
Armenians wonder if it is a public relations act, a way to prevent
third countries' parliaments from passing genocide resolutions. A
great amount of change has also taken place since the early 2000s,
particularly as a result of increased contacts. More Turks go to
Armenia, and there are more civil society contacts. So the Armenian
view of a monolithic Turkey that is out to destroy Armenia is
definitely cracking.
Is the economy part of the debate?
Göksel: Part of Armenian society seems to think that an open
border with Turkey will solve Armenia's economic problems. Other
segments of society have started to see that maybe border closure
isn't the only problem and that the economy has some structural
problems, too. There is also another dimension, like being able to go
and visit the lands of their grandmothers, to see the places that
their grandmothers told them about. That's very high on the agenda. I
once told a waiter that `you can just fly to Ä°stanbul and do
that,' and he said, `Look, I have a family to feed, and I cannot
afford a plane ticket and then drive or travel to the east of Turkey.'
`Any Armenian politician would like to preside over the opening of the
border' Would a border opening be a victory for the Armenian
politicians?
Göksel: It has an economic and a symbolic meaning, as well as a
psychological and a political meaning. It would be a victory for any
Armenian politician to preside over the opening of the border.
Is there a chance that the current government of Armenia could be
toppled depending on the result of the upcoming mayoral election in
Yerevan?
Göksel: Former President Levon Ter-Petrossian will run for
mayor as a candidate of the Armenian National Congress. It will
largely be a symbolic act to demonstrate or challenge the election. It
could increase the pressure but not topple the government per se.
The Dashnak Party recently decided to leave the government. Do you
attach any significance to that?
Göksel: They are one of the four coalition partners. The
government can keep on functioning. Numbers don't prohibit that. It is
a blow in terms of legitimacy. It is thus all the more important that
the talks with Turkey yield results without much delay. It is too
early to say that the stability of the government has been threatened,
but it is a warning sign and shows the red lines when it comes to the
issue of genocide. It creates a politically fragile situation in
Armenia.
Knaus: One good thing is that you have the government and the
opposition united on the Turkey issue for the first time. The Dashnaks
had less than 14 percent in the last election, which was the best
result they ever had. It is important to realize that the two big
blocs, both Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian, want to improve relations
with Turkey.
Do you think supporters of Robert Kocharyan [former leader of the
break-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the former president of
Armenia] are a bigger threat to the stability of the government?
Knaus: If this dialogue [the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement] delivers
anything, [Armenian President Serzh] Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian will
be vindicated. Even though the political tension in Armenia has been
high in recent years, they have both been constructive. If this
delivers something in the next few months, it's really going to
isolate the hard-liners. It will also isolate those who, like
Kocharyan, did not believe anything would come out of the invitation
to [Turkish President Abdullah] Gül last year.
So do you think something needs to happen in the near future in this
process of rapprochement?
Knaus: The worst that could happen to this process is if Sarksyan and
others come out and say that they were naïve, that the Turks
were just playing a game because of Washington and that whatever the
Turks were saying was never genuine. If the process fails, it would
make the government vulnerable to attack. It would harm those in
Armenia in favor of opening the border. On the other hand, if the
border opens in a gradual way, if something concrete is achieved, it
would really isolate the hard-liners. Ter-Petrossian favored
rapprochement in the early '90s, but nothing happened. This then
allowed Kocharyan to say, `Look at what he did, and he got nothing in
return.'
There is a vision, interestingly best expressed by Ter-Petrossian in a
speech two years ago that Armenia as a society can only win if Turkey
continues on the road to EU membership, becoming more democratic and
prosperous. This would allow Armenia to move closer to the
West. Indeed, it would be good if the Armenian diaspora in France sees
that helping Turkey move towards the EU would be the best way to help
Armenia become a Western democracy. These are the kinds of arguments
that would be helpful for both sides. And as far as history is
concerned, the more people talk about what happened to the Armenians,
the more attention can be drawn to what happened to the Turks in the
late 19th and early 20th century. Then the Turkish argument about the
killings of Turks and the expulsions from the Balkans and Caucasus
will be discussed more openly as well. And nobody is any longer a
hostage to history.
`Turkey's extreme sensitivity on genocide surprising' In the report,
it seems like you are trying to make a case about the issue of
genocide in regards to perceptions about it in Turkey, right?
Knaus: We were surprised by the extreme sensitivity and nervousness
around this issue. Every year on the 23rd or 24th of April, all of
Turkey holds its breath and waits for what happens in Washington. You
get the feeling that depending on what words are being used in
Washington, there will either be a huge crisis with an ally or
everything will go back to normal -- until the situation repeats
itself the following year.
Why do you think that is the case?
Knaus: We asked this question and found three answers. One is that the
Turkish policymakers think that there was no genocide. They also say
that genocide recognition is a huge insult to Turkish honor and that
is anti-Turkish. But the paradox is that the countries that have
passed resolutions in the last few years are actually some of Turkey's
best allies. The German Parliament that passed a resolution in 2005
was the most pro-Turkish German Parliament in history. It was the time
of Fischer and Schroeder, who strongly backed Turkish accession to the
EU. Or take US President Barack Obama. He is very supportive of
Turkey, but still sticks to his beliefs.
So do you think there is a misconception on the side of Turkish
government about this?
Knaus: Turks see the radical Armenian forces and the Armenian diaspora
behind all of this. They also fear that this might single them
out. That is an argument we heard a lot in Turkey --that calling 1915
`genocide' would make the world equate Turks with Nazi Germany. That
isn't true. [The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia] ICTY called what happened in Srebrenica genocide, and
that's the prism through which the world looks at genocide
today. `Genocide' doesn't have to translate to `Holocaust.' If you
look at history and the current debate on genocide, you'll see that a
huge number of events in the 20th century alone are now considered
genocide. What German colonialists did in Africa in 1904, for example
-- in modern day Namibia -- is now being called the first genocide of
the 20th century. But Germany today, in all surveys, is one of the
most respected countries of the world. Acknowledging something that
happened a hundred years ago is neither a matter of singling out
Turkey or of damaging its honor.
What is the third argument?
Knaus: It's the fear of material repercussions. We understand why the
Turkish government thinks this way. Some of the Armenian organizations
pushing for recognition are doing so in order to achieve something
practical. But nobody -- not the German Parliament, not the French
Parliament, not the European Parliament, not America -- actually
believes that Armenian genocide recognition will lead to restitution,
compensation or territorial claims. There is no legal basis for
assuming this. In 2001, the French Parliament decided to call 1915
`genocide.' It's a law. But where are the court cases in France? If
recognition is meant to have practical consequences, why haven't there
been any? Some Armenian diaspora organizations are disappointed by
this.
There is a UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. Does it have any implications for Turkey?
Knaus: No. There is one thing the Turkish public hasn't heard enough
about, and that is the opinion by the International Center for
Transitional Justice commissioned by the Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission in 2003. These were leading legal experts
among nongovernmental organizations in New York. They said clearly
that the convention cannot be applied retroactively, that no claims
whatsoever can arise from Armenian genocide recognition. So it's not a
legal issue. The convention does not apply to events that took place
prior to 1948; it is not retroactive.
10 May 2009, Sunday
YONCA POYRAZ DOÄ?AN Ä°STANBUL
May 10 2009
`Turkey, Armenia should no longer be hostage to history'
European Stability Initiative experts Diba Nigar Göksel and
Gerald Knaus Diba Nigar Göksel and Gerald Knaus from the
European Stability Initiative (ESI), a nonprofit research and policy
institute, have said both Turkey and Armenia have a chance to
marginalize extremist voices and enable a more reasonable debate to go
forward, as the border between them remains closed but signs of a
rapprochement have appeared.
In their recent report `Noah's Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and
the Debate on Genocide,' they explore the issue of `genocide,' which,
they said, is the single topic that poisons relations between Turks
and Armenians. `There are hardly any reputable scholars in the field
of genocide studies who doubt that what happened to the Armenians in
1915 constitutes genocide.
However, it is also clear that modern-day Turkey is not legally
responsible for genocidal acts committed nearly a century ago, and
that acknowledging the genocide would not bring into question the
established Turkish-Armenian border,' the report stated.
The report went on: `Armenians today face a choice: either treat
Turkey as an eternal enemy or re-engage with its western neighbor in
the hope of one day sharing a border with the European Union. ¦ For
their part, Armenians must accept that the recognition of the genocide
will never pave the way for challenging a territorial settlement that
has stood for nearly a century.'
For Sunday's Zaman, Göksel and Knaus gave more details about
the issue and the outlook of Turkish-Armenian relations.
You went to Armenia several times, lived there and talked with people
from every strata of Armenian society for the report. What was the
most striking part for you?
Göksel: Before traveling to Armenia, I had assumed that the
descendants of the Ottoman Armenians were all in the diaspora and that
the Armenians in Armenia had always been there. As a Turk, what
surprised me most was how high a proportion of the Armenians I met in
Armenia had come from different places in Turkey. Probably 80 percent
of the people I met in Armenian villages in the middle of nowhere
would be from [the eastern Turkish provinces of] MuÅ?,
Diyarbakır, etc. that made me see the magnitude of the problem.
You also talked with people with extreme views -- those who would
defend such ideas as defining the current border between Turkey and
Armenia illegal. Do you think this idea has a chance of survival in
Armenia?
Göksel: The people in Armenia who expressed rather radical
positions were quite polite to me. These were the same people who gave
presentations in town meetings in Armenia about having claims in
Anatolian land. But this is not the most important thing for most
ordinary people in Armenia.
What is the most important thing to them?
Göksel: For most of them, meeting a Turk for the first time and
being able to talk to her freely is more important. Just 10 minutes of
conversation changes the entire atmosphere, and we see that more
dialogue is really the only way to melt the ice -- except for the
people who come up with theories about land claims and
reparations. Ordinary people would not go out and demonstrate for
land.
But do you think some of the opinion leaders could influence the
public in a way to make that happen?
Göksel: As for land claims, no. As for 1915, Armenians believe
that it was genocide and that they should be able to tell the world
about it. This is a strong feeling. Expecting Armenians to give up
their beliefs or their agenda in that regard is not realistic.
So they support opening the border mostly because of economic
concerns?
Göksel: We found a great deal of fear in Armenia toward Turkey;
a suspicion about Turkey's intentions. This is also a result of being
isolated from each other for so long. There is also extreme curiosity
about what is happening in Turkey.
Are they questioning why Turkey wants to open the border?
Göksel: They question everything, from why Turkey restores the
Church of the Holy Cross, the Akdamar Church, on the island of Akdamar
[in the Turkish province of Van] to the real intentions of the Turkish
intellectuals who launched the `apology campaign.' There is general
skepticism about Turkey's efforts to reach out to Armenia -- so
Armenians wonder if it is a public relations act, a way to prevent
third countries' parliaments from passing genocide resolutions. A
great amount of change has also taken place since the early 2000s,
particularly as a result of increased contacts. More Turks go to
Armenia, and there are more civil society contacts. So the Armenian
view of a monolithic Turkey that is out to destroy Armenia is
definitely cracking.
Is the economy part of the debate?
Göksel: Part of Armenian society seems to think that an open
border with Turkey will solve Armenia's economic problems. Other
segments of society have started to see that maybe border closure
isn't the only problem and that the economy has some structural
problems, too. There is also another dimension, like being able to go
and visit the lands of their grandmothers, to see the places that
their grandmothers told them about. That's very high on the agenda. I
once told a waiter that `you can just fly to Ä°stanbul and do
that,' and he said, `Look, I have a family to feed, and I cannot
afford a plane ticket and then drive or travel to the east of Turkey.'
`Any Armenian politician would like to preside over the opening of the
border' Would a border opening be a victory for the Armenian
politicians?
Göksel: It has an economic and a symbolic meaning, as well as a
psychological and a political meaning. It would be a victory for any
Armenian politician to preside over the opening of the border.
Is there a chance that the current government of Armenia could be
toppled depending on the result of the upcoming mayoral election in
Yerevan?
Göksel: Former President Levon Ter-Petrossian will run for
mayor as a candidate of the Armenian National Congress. It will
largely be a symbolic act to demonstrate or challenge the election. It
could increase the pressure but not topple the government per se.
The Dashnak Party recently decided to leave the government. Do you
attach any significance to that?
Göksel: They are one of the four coalition partners. The
government can keep on functioning. Numbers don't prohibit that. It is
a blow in terms of legitimacy. It is thus all the more important that
the talks with Turkey yield results without much delay. It is too
early to say that the stability of the government has been threatened,
but it is a warning sign and shows the red lines when it comes to the
issue of genocide. It creates a politically fragile situation in
Armenia.
Knaus: One good thing is that you have the government and the
opposition united on the Turkey issue for the first time. The Dashnaks
had less than 14 percent in the last election, which was the best
result they ever had. It is important to realize that the two big
blocs, both Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian, want to improve relations
with Turkey.
Do you think supporters of Robert Kocharyan [former leader of the
break-away republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and the former president of
Armenia] are a bigger threat to the stability of the government?
Knaus: If this dialogue [the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement] delivers
anything, [Armenian President Serzh] Sarksyan and Ter-Petrossian will
be vindicated. Even though the political tension in Armenia has been
high in recent years, they have both been constructive. If this
delivers something in the next few months, it's really going to
isolate the hard-liners. It will also isolate those who, like
Kocharyan, did not believe anything would come out of the invitation
to [Turkish President Abdullah] Gül last year.
So do you think something needs to happen in the near future in this
process of rapprochement?
Knaus: The worst that could happen to this process is if Sarksyan and
others come out and say that they were naïve, that the Turks
were just playing a game because of Washington and that whatever the
Turks were saying was never genuine. If the process fails, it would
make the government vulnerable to attack. It would harm those in
Armenia in favor of opening the border. On the other hand, if the
border opens in a gradual way, if something concrete is achieved, it
would really isolate the hard-liners. Ter-Petrossian favored
rapprochement in the early '90s, but nothing happened. This then
allowed Kocharyan to say, `Look at what he did, and he got nothing in
return.'
There is a vision, interestingly best expressed by Ter-Petrossian in a
speech two years ago that Armenia as a society can only win if Turkey
continues on the road to EU membership, becoming more democratic and
prosperous. This would allow Armenia to move closer to the
West. Indeed, it would be good if the Armenian diaspora in France sees
that helping Turkey move towards the EU would be the best way to help
Armenia become a Western democracy. These are the kinds of arguments
that would be helpful for both sides. And as far as history is
concerned, the more people talk about what happened to the Armenians,
the more attention can be drawn to what happened to the Turks in the
late 19th and early 20th century. Then the Turkish argument about the
killings of Turks and the expulsions from the Balkans and Caucasus
will be discussed more openly as well. And nobody is any longer a
hostage to history.
`Turkey's extreme sensitivity on genocide surprising' In the report,
it seems like you are trying to make a case about the issue of
genocide in regards to perceptions about it in Turkey, right?
Knaus: We were surprised by the extreme sensitivity and nervousness
around this issue. Every year on the 23rd or 24th of April, all of
Turkey holds its breath and waits for what happens in Washington. You
get the feeling that depending on what words are being used in
Washington, there will either be a huge crisis with an ally or
everything will go back to normal -- until the situation repeats
itself the following year.
Why do you think that is the case?
Knaus: We asked this question and found three answers. One is that the
Turkish policymakers think that there was no genocide. They also say
that genocide recognition is a huge insult to Turkish honor and that
is anti-Turkish. But the paradox is that the countries that have
passed resolutions in the last few years are actually some of Turkey's
best allies. The German Parliament that passed a resolution in 2005
was the most pro-Turkish German Parliament in history. It was the time
of Fischer and Schroeder, who strongly backed Turkish accession to the
EU. Or take US President Barack Obama. He is very supportive of
Turkey, but still sticks to his beliefs.
So do you think there is a misconception on the side of Turkish
government about this?
Knaus: Turks see the radical Armenian forces and the Armenian diaspora
behind all of this. They also fear that this might single them
out. That is an argument we heard a lot in Turkey --that calling 1915
`genocide' would make the world equate Turks with Nazi Germany. That
isn't true. [The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia] ICTY called what happened in Srebrenica genocide, and
that's the prism through which the world looks at genocide
today. `Genocide' doesn't have to translate to `Holocaust.' If you
look at history and the current debate on genocide, you'll see that a
huge number of events in the 20th century alone are now considered
genocide. What German colonialists did in Africa in 1904, for example
-- in modern day Namibia -- is now being called the first genocide of
the 20th century. But Germany today, in all surveys, is one of the
most respected countries of the world. Acknowledging something that
happened a hundred years ago is neither a matter of singling out
Turkey or of damaging its honor.
What is the third argument?
Knaus: It's the fear of material repercussions. We understand why the
Turkish government thinks this way. Some of the Armenian organizations
pushing for recognition are doing so in order to achieve something
practical. But nobody -- not the German Parliament, not the French
Parliament, not the European Parliament, not America -- actually
believes that Armenian genocide recognition will lead to restitution,
compensation or territorial claims. There is no legal basis for
assuming this. In 2001, the French Parliament decided to call 1915
`genocide.' It's a law. But where are the court cases in France? If
recognition is meant to have practical consequences, why haven't there
been any? Some Armenian diaspora organizations are disappointed by
this.
There is a UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide. Does it have any implications for Turkey?
Knaus: No. There is one thing the Turkish public hasn't heard enough
about, and that is the opinion by the International Center for
Transitional Justice commissioned by the Turkish-Armenian
Reconciliation Commission in 2003. These were leading legal experts
among nongovernmental organizations in New York. They said clearly
that the convention cannot be applied retroactively, that no claims
whatsoever can arise from Armenian genocide recognition. So it's not a
legal issue. The convention does not apply to events that took place
prior to 1948; it is not retroactive.
10 May 2009, Sunday
YONCA POYRAZ DOÄ?AN Ä°STANBUL