Instead of border opening, Armenia must require security blanket from
Turkey
It would be naive and dangerous to consider that on the other side of
Ararat there live people, who are looking forward to peace and
friendly relations with us.
21.05.2009 GMT+04:00
Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, that has been much spoken
about lately, simply does not exist. There are only various meetings
organized between diplomats, representatives of community and
others. Presidents of the two countries may once more meet within the
framework of the football match between the Turkish and Armenian teams
in Kayseri. And the entire normalization process will be concluded at
this. The whole intrigue is reduced to the plot of what to do: not to
pay attention to the powers that have made up their minds to reconcile
every state in the region in order to then launch a war for a new
repartition of influence spheres or to agree on the conditions
proposed.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Meanwhile, it is important to bear in mind that evil
peace is better than a good war. But there is also another danger for
Turkey and Armenia: the desire of Kurds to at any cost join hands with
Armenians, which would be a painless job with the boundary
open. According to Ankara's version, once the Armenian-Turkish, or -
to be more exact - the Armenian-Kurdish boundary is open, there will
begin the commerce of weapons, exchange of militants, and as a result
Armenia will share the fare of Northern Iraq. Turkey has thoroughly
counted this version, but it's difficult to say how official Yerevan
pictures this, since cases of information leak are more frequent in
Turkey than in Armenia. Under the conditions of total secrecy of
Armenian-Turkish negotiations and occasionally appearing `analytical'
surveys, it becomes difficult to judge how deeply Yerevan realizes the
`advantages' and the `charms' of the open border.
If we take as basis the pessimistic version, we can forecast that no
one in the world will stir a finger to help Armenia, like in 1915,
when, however, we drew no lesson. It would be naive and dangerous to
consider that on the other side of Ararat there live people, who are
looking forward to peace and friendly relations with us. Armenia may
simply drive herself into just another trap, similar to the one into
which the Dashnaks drove themselves in 1908, by supporting the Young
Turks who had actually given carte blanche for extermination of our
nation.
There is also a less pessimistic view: Armenia slowly dissolves in
Turkey or Kurdistan, undertaking nothing, but wants to survive. This
way leads if not to an instantaneous destruction, at least to a
complete assimilation in a maximum of a couple of generations. There
are still some Armenians living in the desolate villages of Western
Armenia. They remember their origins, but know no single word in
Armenian, and naturally, practice Islam. Alas, no optimistic view can
be expected in the current situation: we are few in number, we are
deserted, we have not finally formulated our national idea, and
lastly, we do not have a statesman, similar to Ataturk. It sounds
unpleasant, sad, but it is so.
Of no less importance is the economic factor. In all probability,
Armenia will gain outlet to the Black sea ports, such as to
Trabzon. But to what extent will the safety of loads and the security
of their attendants be guaranteed against the background of the splash
of nationalism and the caught-in-war regions of the Turkish and
Kurdish militants? It is difficult to picture a more incorrect and a
more inconvenient way, saturated with high prices for the transit. The
tariffs will definitely be established Turkey, and how she is able to
dictate her will can be easily seen by the example of Nabucco. It is
not even excluded that transportation through Georgia, under the
entire unpredictability of Georgian authorities and Russian pressure,
will cost considerably less than under the `open' Armenian-Turkish
boundary.
As a matter of principle, instead of normalization of diplomatic
relations and border opening, which, by the way, is of no value in
itself, Armenia must require security blanket from Turkey. And because
it is impractical to require safety from Ankara, Armenia has no choice
but to rely only on herself.
Turkey
It would be naive and dangerous to consider that on the other side of
Ararat there live people, who are looking forward to peace and
friendly relations with us.
21.05.2009 GMT+04:00
Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, that has been much spoken
about lately, simply does not exist. There are only various meetings
organized between diplomats, representatives of community and
others. Presidents of the two countries may once more meet within the
framework of the football match between the Turkish and Armenian teams
in Kayseri. And the entire normalization process will be concluded at
this. The whole intrigue is reduced to the plot of what to do: not to
pay attention to the powers that have made up their minds to reconcile
every state in the region in order to then launch a war for a new
repartition of influence spheres or to agree on the conditions
proposed.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Meanwhile, it is important to bear in mind that evil
peace is better than a good war. But there is also another danger for
Turkey and Armenia: the desire of Kurds to at any cost join hands with
Armenians, which would be a painless job with the boundary
open. According to Ankara's version, once the Armenian-Turkish, or -
to be more exact - the Armenian-Kurdish boundary is open, there will
begin the commerce of weapons, exchange of militants, and as a result
Armenia will share the fare of Northern Iraq. Turkey has thoroughly
counted this version, but it's difficult to say how official Yerevan
pictures this, since cases of information leak are more frequent in
Turkey than in Armenia. Under the conditions of total secrecy of
Armenian-Turkish negotiations and occasionally appearing `analytical'
surveys, it becomes difficult to judge how deeply Yerevan realizes the
`advantages' and the `charms' of the open border.
If we take as basis the pessimistic version, we can forecast that no
one in the world will stir a finger to help Armenia, like in 1915,
when, however, we drew no lesson. It would be naive and dangerous to
consider that on the other side of Ararat there live people, who are
looking forward to peace and friendly relations with us. Armenia may
simply drive herself into just another trap, similar to the one into
which the Dashnaks drove themselves in 1908, by supporting the Young
Turks who had actually given carte blanche for extermination of our
nation.
There is also a less pessimistic view: Armenia slowly dissolves in
Turkey or Kurdistan, undertaking nothing, but wants to survive. This
way leads if not to an instantaneous destruction, at least to a
complete assimilation in a maximum of a couple of generations. There
are still some Armenians living in the desolate villages of Western
Armenia. They remember their origins, but know no single word in
Armenian, and naturally, practice Islam. Alas, no optimistic view can
be expected in the current situation: we are few in number, we are
deserted, we have not finally formulated our national idea, and
lastly, we do not have a statesman, similar to Ataturk. It sounds
unpleasant, sad, but it is so.
Of no less importance is the economic factor. In all probability,
Armenia will gain outlet to the Black sea ports, such as to
Trabzon. But to what extent will the safety of loads and the security
of their attendants be guaranteed against the background of the splash
of nationalism and the caught-in-war regions of the Turkish and
Kurdish militants? It is difficult to picture a more incorrect and a
more inconvenient way, saturated with high prices for the transit. The
tariffs will definitely be established Turkey, and how she is able to
dictate her will can be easily seen by the example of Nabucco. It is
not even excluded that transportation through Georgia, under the
entire unpredictability of Georgian authorities and Russian pressure,
will cost considerably less than under the `open' Armenian-Turkish
boundary.
As a matter of principle, instead of normalization of diplomatic
relations and border opening, which, by the way, is of no value in
itself, Armenia must require security blanket from Turkey. And because
it is impractical to require safety from Ankara, Armenia has no choice
but to rely only on herself.