Tweet
TURKEY HAS LONG AGO OVERGROWN THE LEVEL OF CAUCASIAN POLICY WHEN IT WAS IDENTIFIED ONLY WITH AZERBAIJAN
By David Stepanyan
ArmInfo
2009-05-25 17:49:00
Exclusive interview of Sergey Markedonov, Director of the Department
for Problems of Ethnic Relations at the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis in Moscow with ArmInfo
Mr.Markedonov, Armenia and Turkey have launched a political
dialogue. How deeply is it motivated by the parties?
Undoubtedly, I think today there is certain impartial
interest of Armenia as well as Turkey in establishing bilateral
relations. Naturally, Armenia has bigger reason in its aspiration
to establish relations with Turkey than Turkey does, since the
republic has no relations with the two out of four its neighbors,
i.e. two of the four windows to external world are closed for
Armenia. The rest two windows depend not so much on the dynamics of
the Armenian-Georgian or Armenian-Iranian relations, but on the game of
the global players. Armenia does not have direct border to Russia, and
it is natural that the Georgian window is connected with the dynamics
of the Russian-Georgian relations, which Armenia cannot affect so
much. As for Iran, Armenia's relations depend on the American-Iranian
relations which Armenia cannot affect either. So in its relations with
Iran and Georgia Armenia depends on additional external factors. In
this context, opening of the Armenian-Turkish=2 0border will allow
Armenia to diversify relations with Iran and Georgia, that is to say,
this will make it possible for the republic to make Armenia depend less
on Russia, making the agenda more complicated in the positive sense.
As regards Turkey, I think, that country has overgrown the level of
the Caucasian policy when it was identified only with Azerbaijan long
ago. Now Ankara tries to assume rather an interesting and attractive
Europe-Asia and Asia-Europe mediation niche.
Do you mean that Ankara is striving back to the policy of Ottoman
Porta?
No, I don't think that Turkey is trying to return to the policy of
Ottoman Porta though today Neo-Ottomanism is much spoken of since it
is certain violation of Turkey's closeness for the Middle East and the
Caucasus and an attempt to find a new role in the region, first of all,
in the context of its aspiration to the EU. Then start the political
problems that are still relevant today as well as what political
experts call a history policy. This is the Armenian Genocide problem,
indeed, and its interpretation. I think that many historians and
politologists are mistaken when considering Genocide of Armenia just as
a humanitarian catastrophe. In the meanwhile, recognition of the border
between Turkey and Armenia is also in question. The point is not just
the Kars Treaty, suffice it to mention, for instance, the Independence
Declaration of Armenia contain ing the idea 'Western Armenia' which is
unacceptable to Turkey, as well as using of the symbols of Ararat and
Lake Van. This naturally arouses Turkey's concern about origination of
restitution cases. In addition, there is also a certain precedent. It
is natural that in the case of Armenians Turkey may declare that the
Ottoman Empire and not the Turkish Republic committed the crimes,
whereas it was new Turkey that committed crimes against Greeks. In
this case a very dangerous precedent originates for Ankara. Actually,
in the whole Armenian-Turkish process the most important problem,
the headache for Armenia is the fact that progress of the relations
with Turkey is connected with the Karabakh conflict. It is obvious
that Armenia will not pay such a price for its relations with Turkey,
but the latter demands just this price. For this reason, we have got
a situation when the process is more important than its results, and
what the parties say turns to be more important than their specific
arrangements.
The situation with Turkey is more or less clear. What does this
declarative process make important to Armenia?
The most important to Armenia is to separate the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation from Nagorny Karabakh problem. Armenia must show that
its problems with Azerbaijan have nothing in common with Turkey.
The latest statement by Erdogan in Baku was different...
Yes, but, actually, you forget about another aspect of this
problem. Unfortunately, the greatest part of politicians and experts
are focusing on geopolitical combinations, and the interests of
the United States and Russia in the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. At
the same time there is a domestic political aspect both in Armenia
and Turkey since both states have good experience in terrorist
activity. In addition, I'd like to mention the situation in the Middle
East. Yitskhak Rabin was killed by Israeli and not Arab terrorists
and the major enemy of Mahmoud Abbas is Hamas i.e. own Palestinean
Movement and not Israel. Speaking of reconciliation of the two states
now, one should not forget about that. In this context, I can bring
also certain moments from the history of Armenia and Turkey, but I
will not do it for political reasons. At the same time the public in
the two states is not ready for reconciliation yet. Speaking of human
rights, progress etc., the USA and Europe can pat the shoulders of
Abdullah Gul and Serzh Sargsyan as long as they want. All this is
fine, but the public in Armenia and Turkey is not ready to do the
same in case of reconciliation of these two states.
Is the road-map a declarative document as well?
First of all, I have not seen the text of the road-map. Like many
others, I am informed only of interpretations. Nevertheless, it is
not for the first time that a roadmap is used. It was used in Middle
East, Dniester regi on, Cyprus and we see that it changed not so
much things. The word combination itself does not guarantee so much
that it will lead to the right road. The document just says that the
situation must be changed, but how to change it if there are people
from both sides interested in instrumentalization of the conflicts,
that built their political career and business on such basis.
What is the role of Turkey's aspiration for the EU in the
Armenian-Turkish relations?
The role is undoubtedly big. With Erdogan's coming to power, the
European vector became essential in the foreign policy of Turkey,
and the relations with the Americans worsened a little because
of Iraq. At the same time I doubt about the European prospects
of Turkey as European Union has already extended much, and it is
even too difficult for the structure to bear Romania and Bulgaria,
despite the progress presented to us. The European Union as well
as NATO have found themselves in a very hard situation after
such extensions. Transformation of the structure supposes not only
quantitative but also qualitative changes. Stemming from this I think
Turkey has few chances to join EU. By the way, this atmosphere of
overestimated expectations has rather an important negative role in
this process. Today the EU simply is not ready to receive any CIS
country, but at the same time it flirts with them and is forming
an atmosphere of high expectations that it is possible to resolve
problems by-passing Russia. This is wrong as it is impossible to
resolve anything by-passing Russia
What about the Eastern Partnership Project? Does it meet this logic?
The Eastern Partnership is already criticized for not involving Turkey
which is also among the partners striving for Europe. There is certain
ideology in it since it is a Polish-Swedish project. It is an attempt
to build a new infrastructure parallel to the Russian one.
EU's preferences to 6 CIS member-states are clear. What can Armenia
offer Europe besides immature democracy?
Europe can hardly offer something real. Actually, studying the
Eastern Partnership Project, we will see that it differs from
other similar projects very little. There is nothing fundamentally
new in it. There are no points facilitating the visa regime or
recognizing certificates. So, it is also a certain declaration of
intentions. Nevertheless, I admit that Europe is most of all concerned
about stability in all this. If there is no stability Europe will
get more and more new citizens, despite being overcrowded.
What do you think of competition between the USA and Russia in the
South Caucasus for the last years?
Both Russia and the USA have actually made many omissions. Russia
has an outdated imagination of the CIS. It thinks that the CIS will
be its geopolitical property forever. There can be no property in
geopolitics. It is necessary to fight for it and prove one's own
rights every day. As for the USA, it believes it is possible to push
something through the Caucasus by-passing Russia. This is not possible
either since Russia has its own interests especially when it is also
a Caucasian state. Nevertheless, I think that Moscow and Washington
find understanding and go on compromises in some issues related to the
Caucasus, for instance, the problems regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan,
the Karabakh conflict.
In the meanwhile, Georgia separates these states to the opposite parts
of the barricades. The point is how much the new Administration of the
US President will correct the approaches of the previous one. Obama
Administration has not said its last word yet, so it is senseless
making any forecasts so far. At the same time I do not think that
Georgia or Azerbaijan may join NATO in the short-term outlook since
even Macedonia that is involved in NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
has not received any invitation yet. Georgia and Azerbaijan is nothing
but a new headache for NATO.
Thank you
By David Stepanyan
ArmInfo
2009-05-25 17:49:00
Exclusive interview of Sergey Markedonov, Director of the Department
for Problems of Ethnic Relations at the Institute for Political and
Military Analysis in Moscow with ArmInfo
Mr.Markedonov, Armenia and Turkey have launched a political
dialogue. How deeply is it motivated by the parties?
Undoubtedly, I think today there is certain impartial
interest of Armenia as well as Turkey in establishing bilateral
relations. Naturally, Armenia has bigger reason in its aspiration
to establish relations with Turkey than Turkey does, since the
republic has no relations with the two out of four its neighbors,
i.e. two of the four windows to external world are closed for
Armenia. The rest two windows depend not so much on the dynamics of
the Armenian-Georgian or Armenian-Iranian relations, but on the game of
the global players. Armenia does not have direct border to Russia, and
it is natural that the Georgian window is connected with the dynamics
of the Russian-Georgian relations, which Armenia cannot affect so
much. As for Iran, Armenia's relations depend on the American-Iranian
relations which Armenia cannot affect either. So in its relations with
Iran and Georgia Armenia depends on additional external factors. In
this context, opening of the Armenian-Turkish=2 0border will allow
Armenia to diversify relations with Iran and Georgia, that is to say,
this will make it possible for the republic to make Armenia depend less
on Russia, making the agenda more complicated in the positive sense.
As regards Turkey, I think, that country has overgrown the level of
the Caucasian policy when it was identified only with Azerbaijan long
ago. Now Ankara tries to assume rather an interesting and attractive
Europe-Asia and Asia-Europe mediation niche.
Do you mean that Ankara is striving back to the policy of Ottoman
Porta?
No, I don't think that Turkey is trying to return to the policy of
Ottoman Porta though today Neo-Ottomanism is much spoken of since it
is certain violation of Turkey's closeness for the Middle East and the
Caucasus and an attempt to find a new role in the region, first of all,
in the context of its aspiration to the EU. Then start the political
problems that are still relevant today as well as what political
experts call a history policy. This is the Armenian Genocide problem,
indeed, and its interpretation. I think that many historians and
politologists are mistaken when considering Genocide of Armenia just as
a humanitarian catastrophe. In the meanwhile, recognition of the border
between Turkey and Armenia is also in question. The point is not just
the Kars Treaty, suffice it to mention, for instance, the Independence
Declaration of Armenia contain ing the idea 'Western Armenia' which is
unacceptable to Turkey, as well as using of the symbols of Ararat and
Lake Van. This naturally arouses Turkey's concern about origination of
restitution cases. In addition, there is also a certain precedent. It
is natural that in the case of Armenians Turkey may declare that the
Ottoman Empire and not the Turkish Republic committed the crimes,
whereas it was new Turkey that committed crimes against Greeks. In
this case a very dangerous precedent originates for Ankara. Actually,
in the whole Armenian-Turkish process the most important problem,
the headache for Armenia is the fact that progress of the relations
with Turkey is connected with the Karabakh conflict. It is obvious
that Armenia will not pay such a price for its relations with Turkey,
but the latter demands just this price. For this reason, we have got
a situation when the process is more important than its results, and
what the parties say turns to be more important than their specific
arrangements.
The situation with Turkey is more or less clear. What does this
declarative process make important to Armenia?
The most important to Armenia is to separate the Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation from Nagorny Karabakh problem. Armenia must show that
its problems with Azerbaijan have nothing in common with Turkey.
The latest statement by Erdogan in Baku was different...
Yes, but, actually, you forget about another aspect of this
problem. Unfortunately, the greatest part of politicians and experts
are focusing on geopolitical combinations, and the interests of
the United States and Russia in the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. At
the same time there is a domestic political aspect both in Armenia
and Turkey since both states have good experience in terrorist
activity. In addition, I'd like to mention the situation in the Middle
East. Yitskhak Rabin was killed by Israeli and not Arab terrorists
and the major enemy of Mahmoud Abbas is Hamas i.e. own Palestinean
Movement and not Israel. Speaking of reconciliation of the two states
now, one should not forget about that. In this context, I can bring
also certain moments from the history of Armenia and Turkey, but I
will not do it for political reasons. At the same time the public in
the two states is not ready for reconciliation yet. Speaking of human
rights, progress etc., the USA and Europe can pat the shoulders of
Abdullah Gul and Serzh Sargsyan as long as they want. All this is
fine, but the public in Armenia and Turkey is not ready to do the
same in case of reconciliation of these two states.
Is the road-map a declarative document as well?
First of all, I have not seen the text of the road-map. Like many
others, I am informed only of interpretations. Nevertheless, it is
not for the first time that a roadmap is used. It was used in Middle
East, Dniester regi on, Cyprus and we see that it changed not so
much things. The word combination itself does not guarantee so much
that it will lead to the right road. The document just says that the
situation must be changed, but how to change it if there are people
from both sides interested in instrumentalization of the conflicts,
that built their political career and business on such basis.
What is the role of Turkey's aspiration for the EU in the
Armenian-Turkish relations?
The role is undoubtedly big. With Erdogan's coming to power, the
European vector became essential in the foreign policy of Turkey,
and the relations with the Americans worsened a little because
of Iraq. At the same time I doubt about the European prospects
of Turkey as European Union has already extended much, and it is
even too difficult for the structure to bear Romania and Bulgaria,
despite the progress presented to us. The European Union as well
as NATO have found themselves in a very hard situation after
such extensions. Transformation of the structure supposes not only
quantitative but also qualitative changes. Stemming from this I think
Turkey has few chances to join EU. By the way, this atmosphere of
overestimated expectations has rather an important negative role in
this process. Today the EU simply is not ready to receive any CIS
country, but at the same time it flirts with them and is forming
an atmosphere of high expectations that it is possible to resolve
problems by-passing Russia. This is wrong as it is impossible to
resolve anything by-passing Russia
What about the Eastern Partnership Project? Does it meet this logic?
The Eastern Partnership is already criticized for not involving Turkey
which is also among the partners striving for Europe. There is certain
ideology in it since it is a Polish-Swedish project. It is an attempt
to build a new infrastructure parallel to the Russian one.
EU's preferences to 6 CIS member-states are clear. What can Armenia
offer Europe besides immature democracy?
Europe can hardly offer something real. Actually, studying the
Eastern Partnership Project, we will see that it differs from
other similar projects very little. There is nothing fundamentally
new in it. There are no points facilitating the visa regime or
recognizing certificates. So, it is also a certain declaration of
intentions. Nevertheless, I admit that Europe is most of all concerned
about stability in all this. If there is no stability Europe will
get more and more new citizens, despite being overcrowded.
What do you think of competition between the USA and Russia in the
South Caucasus for the last years?
Both Russia and the USA have actually made many omissions. Russia
has an outdated imagination of the CIS. It thinks that the CIS will
be its geopolitical property forever. There can be no property in
geopolitics. It is necessary to fight for it and prove one's own
rights every day. As for the USA, it believes it is possible to push
something through the Caucasus by-passing Russia. This is not possible
either since Russia has its own interests especially when it is also
a Caucasian state. Nevertheless, I think that Moscow and Washington
find understanding and go on compromises in some issues related to the
Caucasus, for instance, the problems regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan,
the Karabakh conflict.
In the meanwhile, Georgia separates these states to the opposite parts
of the barricades. The point is how much the new Administration of the
US President will correct the approaches of the previous one. Obama
Administration has not said its last word yet, so it is senseless
making any forecasts so far. At the same time I do not think that
Georgia or Azerbaijan may join NATO in the short-term outlook since
even Macedonia that is involved in NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP)
has not received any invitation yet. Georgia and Azerbaijan is nothing
but a new headache for NATO.
Thank you