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Greek American News Agency
Nov 1 2009
Turkey: An Ally No More
Î`Ï?άÏ?ε ι ο/η Greek American News Agency
01.11.09
by Daniel Pipes, Front Page Magazine
"There is no doubt he is our friend," Turkey's prime minister, Recep
Tayyip ErdoÄ?an, says of Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even as
he accuses Israel's foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of threatening
to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. These outrageous assertions point
to the profound change of orientation by Turkey's government, for six
decades the West's closest Muslim ally, since ErdoÄ?an's AK party came
to power in 2002.
Three events this past month reveal the extent of that change. The
first came on October 11 with the news that the Turkish military - a
long-time bastion of secularism and advocate of cooperation with
Israel - abruptly asked Israeli forces not to participate in the
annual "Anatolian Eagle" air force exercise.
ErdoÄ?an cited "diplomatic sensitivities" for the cancelation and
Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu spoke of "sensitivity on Gaza, East
Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque." The Turks specifically rejected Israeli
planes that may have attacked Hamas (an Islamist terrorist
organization) during last winter's Gaza Strip operation. While
Damascus applauded the disinvitation, it prompted the U.S. and Italian
governments to withdraw their forces from Anatolian Eagle, which in
turn meant canceling the international exercise.
As for the Israelis, this "sudden and unexpected" shift shook to the
core their military alignment with Turkey, in place since 1996. Former
air force chief Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, for example, called the cancelation
"a seriously worrying development." Jerusalem immediately responded by
reviewing Israel's practice of supplying Turkey with advanced weapons,
such as the recent $140 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of
targeting pods. The idea also arose to stop helping the Turks defeat
the Armenian genocide resolutions that regularly appear before the
U.S. Congress.
Barry Rubin of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya not only
argues that "The Israel-Turkey alliance is over" but concludes that
Turkey's armed forces no longer guard the secular republic and can no
longer intervene when the government becomes too Islamist.
The second event took place two days later, on October 13, when
Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem announced that Turkish and
Syrian forces had just "carried out maneuvers near Ankara." Moallem
rightly called this an important development "because it refutes
reports of poor relations between the military and political
institutions in Turkey over strategic relations with Syria."
Translation: Turkey's armed forces lost out to its politicians.
Thirdly, ten Turkish ministers, led by DavutoÄ?lu, joined their Syrian
counterparts on October 13 for talks under the auspices of the
just-established "Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council." The ministers announced having signed almost 40 agreements
to be implemented within 10 days; that "a more comprehensive, a
bigger" joint land military exercise would be held than the first one
in April; and that the two countries' leaders would sign a strategic
agreement in November.
The council's concluding joint statement announced the formation of "a
long-term strategic partnership" between the two sides "to bolster and
expand their cooperation in a wide spectrum of issues of mutual
benefit and interest and strengthen the cultural bonds and solidarity
among their peoples." The council's spirit, DavutoÄ?lu explained, "is
common destiny, history and future; we will build the future
together," while Moallem called the get-together a "festival to
celebrate" the two peoples.
Bilateral relations have indeed been dramatically reversed from a
decade earlier, when Ankara came perilously close to war with Syria.
But improved ties with Damascus are only one part of a much larger
effort by Ankara to enhance relations with regional and Muslim states,
a strategy enunciated by DavutoÄ?lu in his influential 2000 book,
Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu ("Strategic Depth:
Turkey's International Position").
In brief, DavutoÄ?lu envisions reduced conflict with neighbors and
Turkey emerging as a regional power, a sort-of modernized Ottoman
Empire. Implicit in this strategy is a distancing of Turkey from the
West in general and Israel in particular. Although not presented in
Islamist terms, "strategic depth" closely fits the AK party's Islamist
world view.
As Barry Rubin notes, "the Turkish government is closer politically to
Iran and Syria than to the United States and Israel." Caroline Glick,
a Jerusalem Post columnist, goes further: Ankara already "left the
Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis." But
official circles in the West seem nearly oblivious to this momentous
change in Turkey's allegiance or its implications. The cost of their
error will soon become evident.
http://www.greekamericannewsagency.com/g ana/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& ;id=6296&Itemid=83
Nov 1 2009
Turkey: An Ally No More
Î`Ï?άÏ?ε ι ο/η Greek American News Agency
01.11.09
by Daniel Pipes, Front Page Magazine
"There is no doubt he is our friend," Turkey's prime minister, Recep
Tayyip ErdoÄ?an, says of Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even as
he accuses Israel's foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of threatening
to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. These outrageous assertions point
to the profound change of orientation by Turkey's government, for six
decades the West's closest Muslim ally, since ErdoÄ?an's AK party came
to power in 2002.
Three events this past month reveal the extent of that change. The
first came on October 11 with the news that the Turkish military - a
long-time bastion of secularism and advocate of cooperation with
Israel - abruptly asked Israeli forces not to participate in the
annual "Anatolian Eagle" air force exercise.
ErdoÄ?an cited "diplomatic sensitivities" for the cancelation and
Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu spoke of "sensitivity on Gaza, East
Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque." The Turks specifically rejected Israeli
planes that may have attacked Hamas (an Islamist terrorist
organization) during last winter's Gaza Strip operation. While
Damascus applauded the disinvitation, it prompted the U.S. and Italian
governments to withdraw their forces from Anatolian Eagle, which in
turn meant canceling the international exercise.
As for the Israelis, this "sudden and unexpected" shift shook to the
core their military alignment with Turkey, in place since 1996. Former
air force chief Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, for example, called the cancelation
"a seriously worrying development." Jerusalem immediately responded by
reviewing Israel's practice of supplying Turkey with advanced weapons,
such as the recent $140 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of
targeting pods. The idea also arose to stop helping the Turks defeat
the Armenian genocide resolutions that regularly appear before the
U.S. Congress.
Barry Rubin of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya not only
argues that "The Israel-Turkey alliance is over" but concludes that
Turkey's armed forces no longer guard the secular republic and can no
longer intervene when the government becomes too Islamist.
The second event took place two days later, on October 13, when
Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem announced that Turkish and
Syrian forces had just "carried out maneuvers near Ankara." Moallem
rightly called this an important development "because it refutes
reports of poor relations between the military and political
institutions in Turkey over strategic relations with Syria."
Translation: Turkey's armed forces lost out to its politicians.
Thirdly, ten Turkish ministers, led by DavutoÄ?lu, joined their Syrian
counterparts on October 13 for talks under the auspices of the
just-established "Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation
Council." The ministers announced having signed almost 40 agreements
to be implemented within 10 days; that "a more comprehensive, a
bigger" joint land military exercise would be held than the first one
in April; and that the two countries' leaders would sign a strategic
agreement in November.
The council's concluding joint statement announced the formation of "a
long-term strategic partnership" between the two sides "to bolster and
expand their cooperation in a wide spectrum of issues of mutual
benefit and interest and strengthen the cultural bonds and solidarity
among their peoples." The council's spirit, DavutoÄ?lu explained, "is
common destiny, history and future; we will build the future
together," while Moallem called the get-together a "festival to
celebrate" the two peoples.
Bilateral relations have indeed been dramatically reversed from a
decade earlier, when Ankara came perilously close to war with Syria.
But improved ties with Damascus are only one part of a much larger
effort by Ankara to enhance relations with regional and Muslim states,
a strategy enunciated by DavutoÄ?lu in his influential 2000 book,
Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası konumu ("Strategic Depth:
Turkey's International Position").
In brief, DavutoÄ?lu envisions reduced conflict with neighbors and
Turkey emerging as a regional power, a sort-of modernized Ottoman
Empire. Implicit in this strategy is a distancing of Turkey from the
West in general and Israel in particular. Although not presented in
Islamist terms, "strategic depth" closely fits the AK party's Islamist
world view.
As Barry Rubin notes, "the Turkish government is closer politically to
Iran and Syria than to the United States and Israel." Caroline Glick,
a Jerusalem Post columnist, goes further: Ankara already "left the
Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis." But
official circles in the West seem nearly oblivious to this momentous
change in Turkey's allegiance or its implications. The cost of their
error will soon become evident.
http://www.greekamericannewsagency.com/g ana/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& ;id=6296&Itemid=83