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news.az, Azerbaijan
Nov 7 2009
Russian economist expects Nabucco gas pipeline project to fail
Sat 07 November 2009 | 06:35 GMT Text size:
Mikhail Khazin News.Az interviews Mikhail Khazin, Russian economist
and president of the Neocon consulting company.
How will the Armenian economy benefit from the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish borders? What separate dividends will Armenia and
Turkey gain? Is the normalization of relations between these two
countries based on political or economic motives?
On the whole, the normalization of these relations is a principal
issue of today's geopolitics. It sounds like this: if the Caucasus has
a strong player, he is interested in peace, interaction and the
absence of external actors. Several big "external" superpowers,
primarily England and the United States, are traditional actors in the
Caucasus.
They backed the wars in the 1990s (and even the conflicts of the
"late" USSR) and they are mongering wars today, while there are only
two and a half `internal' players in the region. These are Russia,
Turkey and Iran (as a half). They are really interested in creating
the predicted system of internal security in the Caucasus and the
maximum agreement of all participants in the political process.
As for Azerbaijan, for it the export of energy sources via Russia is
no worse than in any other directions and it does not pose any threat
to Europe (but it is threatening to the US with the consolidation of
the `Eastern' direction of European policy)
Mikhail Khazin
Other participants (primarily, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, though
the latter is ruled not by the national elite but by a pro-American
group used to raise tensions in the region) are interested in it.
Armenia and Turkey have always maintained economic relations and here
the normalization of political relations would also be positive.
The head of Armenia's financial-budget commission, Gagik Minasyan,
said Armenia is at a critical point of economic recession and `there
can be nothing worse than this'. At the peak of the economic crisis
Moscow provided colossal financial assistance to Yerevan. Is it
profitable for Moscow to draw its economically weak partner out of the
crisis in which Armenia has been for several years already? Why does
Moscow take such seemingly inexpedient steps?
I can say about the phrase `there can be nothing worse than this' that
this is either a policy or misunderstanding. As for Moscow, being the
second important player in the Caucasus, it is also interested in
stability and is doing much for all the countries of the region. I
would like to recall the money transfers home by members of the
Azerbaijani diaspora living in Russia. Everything was relatively good
with Georgia until Saakashvili came to power.
But it has been established historically that Armenia and Russia have
closer relations, including in connection with Azerbaijan's more
multi-vectoral foreign policy. I think this will have a major
influence on developments. All the countries of the region have the
same basic interest ` normalization of the political situation and
economic development.
How do you assess Azerbaijan's economic state? Has Azerbaijan's
economy proved strong amid the financial crisis?
Azerbaijan should diversify its economy as prices for oil and demand
will decline in the medium term. But now that the the price for oil is
declining more slowly than for most other resources, the situation in
the country will be more or less stable. Anyway, it is important for
Azerbaijan, as for any small state, to look to the future as
reasonably as possible and not to yield to provocations.
What economic goals is Russia pursuing in the normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations? What are Armenia's losses resulting from
its isolation by Turkey and Azerbaijan?
It is difficult to speak of the economy now, as it is hard to separate
political losses (isolation) from economic (crisis). As I have already
said, political stability in the region and driving out external
powers that threaten political stability is a key element for Russia
today.
Why is Europe accelerating the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations, forgetting that winter is coming and it should not worsen
ties with Azerbaijan which can now sell its energy sources via Russia?
Europe is again making itself dependent on Russia, though they have
lately attempted to get rid of this dependence.
Europe has its own problems. It has its "principles" (mostly imposed
within the framework of the Atlantic unity with the United States and
the Eastern European countries after they joined the EU) and includes
the interests of specific countries (for example, France and Germany).
Today, their debates have become common (for example, on construction
of gas pipelines "bypassing" [Russia], though it is unclear how
Nabucco differs economically from North Stream, the difference is only
in geopolitics), which means that the EU is starting to undertake
debatable issues.
England and the United States, are traditional actors in the Caucasus.
They backed the wars in the 1990s
Mikhail Khazin
As for Azerbaijan, for it the export of energy sources via Russia is
no worse than in any other direction and does not pose any threat to
Europe, but it is threatening to the US with the consolidation of the
`Eastern' direction in European policy. I implied these things, when I
wrote in my previous responses that political provocations should be
ignored.
Some analysts say that the signing of the protocols has significantly
cooled the strategic and partnership relations between Turkey and
Azerbaijan. And the first result was that Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev said Baku had failed to agree on Azerbaijani gas transit with
Ankara. And now Azerbaijan views Russia as one of the alternative
routes for Azerbaijani gas transit. Thus, the Nabucco pipeline is
losing its importance, giving way to South Stream initiated by Moscow.
Don't you think that the Kremlin is interested in cooling relations
between Turkey and Azerbaijan to bury Nabucco and push Europe into
implementing the South Stream project?
Certainly, Russia does not need Nabucco. Perhaps, it is economically
profitable for Turkey but it is politically a headache as it concerns
Turkish policy towards America's line in Europe, while the United
States has failed to execute their main duty ` to persuade the EU to
admit Turkey.
Considering the developing crisis that will most likely destroy the
system of "Atlantic unity" (though not at once), Turkey needs to
change its policy, and it is gradually doing this, and to strengthen
the northern (Russia), eastern (Iran) and southern (Islam) components.
And I do not rule out that agreements with Russia may compensate
purely financially for the absence of Nabucco, while agreements on
Karabakh, which will probably be implemented after the main
geopolitical schemes in the region are established, will become
serious compensation for Azerbaijan.
But the most important thing here is the construction of the Caucasus
market, as external markets will be restricted for all countries,
especially energy exporters, because of the global economic crisis.
B.A.
News.Az
Nov 7 2009
Russian economist expects Nabucco gas pipeline project to fail
Sat 07 November 2009 | 06:35 GMT Text size:
Mikhail Khazin News.Az interviews Mikhail Khazin, Russian economist
and president of the Neocon consulting company.
How will the Armenian economy benefit from the opening of the
Armenian-Turkish borders? What separate dividends will Armenia and
Turkey gain? Is the normalization of relations between these two
countries based on political or economic motives?
On the whole, the normalization of these relations is a principal
issue of today's geopolitics. It sounds like this: if the Caucasus has
a strong player, he is interested in peace, interaction and the
absence of external actors. Several big "external" superpowers,
primarily England and the United States, are traditional actors in the
Caucasus.
They backed the wars in the 1990s (and even the conflicts of the
"late" USSR) and they are mongering wars today, while there are only
two and a half `internal' players in the region. These are Russia,
Turkey and Iran (as a half). They are really interested in creating
the predicted system of internal security in the Caucasus and the
maximum agreement of all participants in the political process.
As for Azerbaijan, for it the export of energy sources via Russia is
no worse than in any other directions and it does not pose any threat
to Europe (but it is threatening to the US with the consolidation of
the `Eastern' direction of European policy)
Mikhail Khazin
Other participants (primarily, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, though
the latter is ruled not by the national elite but by a pro-American
group used to raise tensions in the region) are interested in it.
Armenia and Turkey have always maintained economic relations and here
the normalization of political relations would also be positive.
The head of Armenia's financial-budget commission, Gagik Minasyan,
said Armenia is at a critical point of economic recession and `there
can be nothing worse than this'. At the peak of the economic crisis
Moscow provided colossal financial assistance to Yerevan. Is it
profitable for Moscow to draw its economically weak partner out of the
crisis in which Armenia has been for several years already? Why does
Moscow take such seemingly inexpedient steps?
I can say about the phrase `there can be nothing worse than this' that
this is either a policy or misunderstanding. As for Moscow, being the
second important player in the Caucasus, it is also interested in
stability and is doing much for all the countries of the region. I
would like to recall the money transfers home by members of the
Azerbaijani diaspora living in Russia. Everything was relatively good
with Georgia until Saakashvili came to power.
But it has been established historically that Armenia and Russia have
closer relations, including in connection with Azerbaijan's more
multi-vectoral foreign policy. I think this will have a major
influence on developments. All the countries of the region have the
same basic interest ` normalization of the political situation and
economic development.
How do you assess Azerbaijan's economic state? Has Azerbaijan's
economy proved strong amid the financial crisis?
Azerbaijan should diversify its economy as prices for oil and demand
will decline in the medium term. But now that the the price for oil is
declining more slowly than for most other resources, the situation in
the country will be more or less stable. Anyway, it is important for
Azerbaijan, as for any small state, to look to the future as
reasonably as possible and not to yield to provocations.
What economic goals is Russia pursuing in the normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations? What are Armenia's losses resulting from
its isolation by Turkey and Azerbaijan?
It is difficult to speak of the economy now, as it is hard to separate
political losses (isolation) from economic (crisis). As I have already
said, political stability in the region and driving out external
powers that threaten political stability is a key element for Russia
today.
Why is Europe accelerating the normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations, forgetting that winter is coming and it should not worsen
ties with Azerbaijan which can now sell its energy sources via Russia?
Europe is again making itself dependent on Russia, though they have
lately attempted to get rid of this dependence.
Europe has its own problems. It has its "principles" (mostly imposed
within the framework of the Atlantic unity with the United States and
the Eastern European countries after they joined the EU) and includes
the interests of specific countries (for example, France and Germany).
Today, their debates have become common (for example, on construction
of gas pipelines "bypassing" [Russia], though it is unclear how
Nabucco differs economically from North Stream, the difference is only
in geopolitics), which means that the EU is starting to undertake
debatable issues.
England and the United States, are traditional actors in the Caucasus.
They backed the wars in the 1990s
Mikhail Khazin
As for Azerbaijan, for it the export of energy sources via Russia is
no worse than in any other direction and does not pose any threat to
Europe, but it is threatening to the US with the consolidation of the
`Eastern' direction in European policy. I implied these things, when I
wrote in my previous responses that political provocations should be
ignored.
Some analysts say that the signing of the protocols has significantly
cooled the strategic and partnership relations between Turkey and
Azerbaijan. And the first result was that Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev said Baku had failed to agree on Azerbaijani gas transit with
Ankara. And now Azerbaijan views Russia as one of the alternative
routes for Azerbaijani gas transit. Thus, the Nabucco pipeline is
losing its importance, giving way to South Stream initiated by Moscow.
Don't you think that the Kremlin is interested in cooling relations
between Turkey and Azerbaijan to bury Nabucco and push Europe into
implementing the South Stream project?
Certainly, Russia does not need Nabucco. Perhaps, it is economically
profitable for Turkey but it is politically a headache as it concerns
Turkish policy towards America's line in Europe, while the United
States has failed to execute their main duty ` to persuade the EU to
admit Turkey.
Considering the developing crisis that will most likely destroy the
system of "Atlantic unity" (though not at once), Turkey needs to
change its policy, and it is gradually doing this, and to strengthen
the northern (Russia), eastern (Iran) and southern (Islam) components.
And I do not rule out that agreements with Russia may compensate
purely financially for the absence of Nabucco, while agreements on
Karabakh, which will probably be implemented after the main
geopolitical schemes in the region are established, will become
serious compensation for Azerbaijan.
But the most important thing here is the construction of the Caucasus
market, as external markets will be restricted for all countries,
especially energy exporters, because of the global economic crisis.
B.A.
News.Az