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TURKEY RUNS HOT AND COLD
By Andrew Novo
Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KK1 0Ak01.html
Nov 9 2009
Autumn has proved a busy season for Turkey as the nation of more than
76 million continues to establish itself as a regional hegemon while
pursuing a policy of "no problems with neighbors". While the process
of reconciling with neighbors - a tenuous agreement with Armenia,
de-mining the border with Syria, a new energy deal with Russia and open
amity with Iran - is yielding results, "no problems with neighbors"
may mean new problems with old friends.
Turkish foreign affairs have made recent headlines: on October 10,
Turkey signed an agreement normalizing relations with Armenia. The
border between the two countries, closed since 1993, was opened. Two
days later, Turkey canceled a joint air force exercise with Israel. A
few days after that, the European Union released its
annual report on the progress made by countries aspiring to EU
membership.
Naturally, Turkey figured prominently in the report, which many
commentators saw as a balancing act, pitting Turkey's progress -
improvements in relations with Armenia and Syria abroad, and more
rights for Kurds and improved civil-military relations at home -
against its shortcomings: a lack of progress on the Cyprus issue and
the recent ruling and fine against the Dogan Media Group.
The dichotomy inherent in the EU report mirrors larger questions not
only about Turkish politics and society but also about the country's
diplomatic posture. Turkey is familiar with occupying a unique position
in world affairs. As recently as the early 20th century, it was a
polyglot Muslim empire with deep roots in Europe. In the time-worn
but geographically accurate phrase, it is the bridge between Europe
and Asia.
Since 1952, it has been the easternmost member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). It is also the only Muslim state that is
part of the alliance. Turkey contributed to winning the Cold War but
has been lukewarm about the fight against fundamentalist Islam and
opposed the 2003 war in Iraq. In fact, the Turkish government famously
refused a request from the American government to use eastern Turkish
provinces as a launching pad to create a second front in northern
Iraq. Turkey came under fire from high-ranking American policymakers
who blamed this for the strength of the Ba'athist insurgency as late
as 2005. More recently, Turkey has not been shy about sending air
units and even ground troops to combat what it describes as Kurdish
terrorists in northern Iraq.
Turkey's uncompromising attitude toward the "terrorism" of the Kurdish
Workers' Party (PKK) should, in theory, generate support for similar
Israeli policies and actions against groups in Gaza and Lebanon. This
is no longer the case. In January this year, at Davos in Switzerland,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made headlines when he directed
a high-tempered attack on Israeli policy in Gaza toward President
Shimon Peres. Since then, Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered
more substantive setbacks. The above-mentioned cancellation of joint
air exercises being only one example. Turkey continues to improve its
relations with Syria and, most significantly, is now courting favor
with Iran. This new relationship is of genuine concern.
In an interview with British newspaper The Guardian published on
October 26, the prime minister made several controversial statements.
He called Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad a "friend". He claimed
that Turkey had no problems with Iran and its peaceful nuclear
ambitions, and that Western nations were being unfair in calling for
restrictions and transparency that would prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons. Erdogan went so far as to say that even if Iran
wanted a nuclear deterrent, countries like the United States, Britain
or France, as nuclear powers themselves, had no right to protest.
Erdogan followed his Guardian interview with a visit to Iran and
seems intent on strengthening relations between the two countries
even further.
The current administration in Turkey markets itself as a bridging
force. It claims that it will serve as the EU's bridge to its Muslim
neighbors and Muslims already within the EU. In 2008-09, it served as
mediator for backchannel negotiations between Syria and Israel. Turkey
has claimed to use its unique position to bridge the divide between
NATO and Iran. Sadly, both for these challenges and for Turkey's image,
these bridges have not yet proved passable.
The motives behind such acts are not entirely clear. The current
Turkish administration is somewhat promiscuous in its international
affairs. On the one hand it professes love for the European Union,
seeks EU membership and is "Westernizing" in line with the EU's
blueprint. On the other hand, Turkey continues its war against the PKK,
is pursuing its own energy policy in relation to Russia and is flirting
with Iran. The government in Ankara still refused to recognize the
government of the Republic of Cyprus, even though Cyprus is a full
EU member.
The case of Cyprus should not be forgotten because it holds
an important history lesson. In 1974, Turkey, in spite of its
membership in NATO and the Cold War, invaded the island to prevent
its unification with Greece. Greece was a NATO ally, governed at the
time by an anti-communist military junta. Nevertheless, Turkey was
willing to invade and risk splitting NATO. War with Greece was even a
possibility. As recently as 1996, Greece and Turkey have come close to
war stemming from disputes over territory in the Aegean. Such examples
are important. They demonstrate that in matters of national security,
Turkey will not defer to traditional alliances; it will choose the
path along which it feels most secure.
Unfortunately for the West, this path seems to be taking Turkey away
from the United States, the European Union and the NATO alliance. The
current Turkish administration is making decisions that may determine
Turkey's alliances for years to come. If the present course is not
reversed, the effect may be to burn the very bridges that, for years,
Turkey sought to build.
Andrew Novo, DPhil Candidate St Antony's College Oxford, UK.
By Andrew Novo
Asia Times
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KK1 0Ak01.html
Nov 9 2009
Autumn has proved a busy season for Turkey as the nation of more than
76 million continues to establish itself as a regional hegemon while
pursuing a policy of "no problems with neighbors". While the process
of reconciling with neighbors - a tenuous agreement with Armenia,
de-mining the border with Syria, a new energy deal with Russia and open
amity with Iran - is yielding results, "no problems with neighbors"
may mean new problems with old friends.
Turkish foreign affairs have made recent headlines: on October 10,
Turkey signed an agreement normalizing relations with Armenia. The
border between the two countries, closed since 1993, was opened. Two
days later, Turkey canceled a joint air force exercise with Israel. A
few days after that, the European Union released its
annual report on the progress made by countries aspiring to EU
membership.
Naturally, Turkey figured prominently in the report, which many
commentators saw as a balancing act, pitting Turkey's progress -
improvements in relations with Armenia and Syria abroad, and more
rights for Kurds and improved civil-military relations at home -
against its shortcomings: a lack of progress on the Cyprus issue and
the recent ruling and fine against the Dogan Media Group.
The dichotomy inherent in the EU report mirrors larger questions not
only about Turkish politics and society but also about the country's
diplomatic posture. Turkey is familiar with occupying a unique position
in world affairs. As recently as the early 20th century, it was a
polyglot Muslim empire with deep roots in Europe. In the time-worn
but geographically accurate phrase, it is the bridge between Europe
and Asia.
Since 1952, it has been the easternmost member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). It is also the only Muslim state that is
part of the alliance. Turkey contributed to winning the Cold War but
has been lukewarm about the fight against fundamentalist Islam and
opposed the 2003 war in Iraq. In fact, the Turkish government famously
refused a request from the American government to use eastern Turkish
provinces as a launching pad to create a second front in northern
Iraq. Turkey came under fire from high-ranking American policymakers
who blamed this for the strength of the Ba'athist insurgency as late
as 2005. More recently, Turkey has not been shy about sending air
units and even ground troops to combat what it describes as Kurdish
terrorists in northern Iraq.
Turkey's uncompromising attitude toward the "terrorism" of the Kurdish
Workers' Party (PKK) should, in theory, generate support for similar
Israeli policies and actions against groups in Gaza and Lebanon. This
is no longer the case. In January this year, at Davos in Switzerland,
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made headlines when he directed
a high-tempered attack on Israeli policy in Gaza toward President
Shimon Peres. Since then, Israeli-Turkish relations have suffered
more substantive setbacks. The above-mentioned cancellation of joint
air exercises being only one example. Turkey continues to improve its
relations with Syria and, most significantly, is now courting favor
with Iran. This new relationship is of genuine concern.
In an interview with British newspaper The Guardian published on
October 26, the prime minister made several controversial statements.
He called Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad a "friend". He claimed
that Turkey had no problems with Iran and its peaceful nuclear
ambitions, and that Western nations were being unfair in calling for
restrictions and transparency that would prevent Iran from developing
nuclear weapons. Erdogan went so far as to say that even if Iran
wanted a nuclear deterrent, countries like the United States, Britain
or France, as nuclear powers themselves, had no right to protest.
Erdogan followed his Guardian interview with a visit to Iran and
seems intent on strengthening relations between the two countries
even further.
The current administration in Turkey markets itself as a bridging
force. It claims that it will serve as the EU's bridge to its Muslim
neighbors and Muslims already within the EU. In 2008-09, it served as
mediator for backchannel negotiations between Syria and Israel. Turkey
has claimed to use its unique position to bridge the divide between
NATO and Iran. Sadly, both for these challenges and for Turkey's image,
these bridges have not yet proved passable.
The motives behind such acts are not entirely clear. The current
Turkish administration is somewhat promiscuous in its international
affairs. On the one hand it professes love for the European Union,
seeks EU membership and is "Westernizing" in line with the EU's
blueprint. On the other hand, Turkey continues its war against the PKK,
is pursuing its own energy policy in relation to Russia and is flirting
with Iran. The government in Ankara still refused to recognize the
government of the Republic of Cyprus, even though Cyprus is a full
EU member.
The case of Cyprus should not be forgotten because it holds
an important history lesson. In 1974, Turkey, in spite of its
membership in NATO and the Cold War, invaded the island to prevent
its unification with Greece. Greece was a NATO ally, governed at the
time by an anti-communist military junta. Nevertheless, Turkey was
willing to invade and risk splitting NATO. War with Greece was even a
possibility. As recently as 1996, Greece and Turkey have come close to
war stemming from disputes over territory in the Aegean. Such examples
are important. They demonstrate that in matters of national security,
Turkey will not defer to traditional alliances; it will choose the
path along which it feels most secure.
Unfortunately for the West, this path seems to be taking Turkey away
from the United States, the European Union and the NATO alliance. The
current Turkish administration is making decisions that may determine
Turkey's alliances for years to come. If the present course is not
reversed, the effect may be to burn the very bridges that, for years,
Turkey sought to build.
Andrew Novo, DPhil Candidate St Antony's College Oxford, UK.