TURKEY LOSING NEUTRALITY IN 'CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS'
Hurriyet Daily News
Nov 12 2009
Turkey
One of the things that the Erdogan government likes to pride itself
on is the role that Turkey is playing in the efforts to overcome the
"clash of civilizations." Turkeys' Islamic nature and yet secular and
democratic system is the key factor that places it in a position to
play this bridging role. Its geographic location, on the other hand,
appears to symbolize this role in concrete terms.
But it is obvious that Turkey can only succeed in this role by
maintaining a degree of neutrality between the two worlds. Increasing
speculation in the West, however - and particularly in the United
States - about whether Turkey is changing direction under its present
"pro-Islamic" government, and moving more towards the Islamic East,
is leading to questions about whether Ankara is still eligible to
play this grandiose role.
The blame for this must rest on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
to a large extent, due to his position on sensitive issues for the
West. His latest visit to Iran, and the strong messages of support
he gave to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad there, is a case in point.
By continuing to maintain - as he did while in Tehran - that "war
crimes suspect" Israel's nuclear arsenal should be concentrated on
by those who say - without proof - that Iran is chasing after such
weapons, he was consciously going against the grain as far as the
West is concerned.
His strong support for "crimes against humanity" suspect Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir last week, on the other hand, is another case
in point. Maintaining, as Erdogan did, that he has been to Darfur and
seen nothing amiss, and suggesting that Bashir could not have committed
the crimes he is accused of, because Muslims do not do such things,
he again stoked arguments concerning Turkey's real identity.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu insists, of course, that Turkish
foreign policy is not changing direction but merely expanding to new
areas. This is basically his "surrounding Turkey with friends and
reaching further a field for new friends" argument.
Erdogan's general approach appears to suggest, however, that while this
may be the case in terms of Ankara's new foreign policy orientation,
at least as far as he is concerned he likes some "friends" more than
others. The fact that "Erdogan's friends" are fundamentalist Muslims
and ruthless Islamic dictators, on the other hand, merely bolsters
the perception that his heart really lies in the Islamic world.
Neither does he appear too concerned with the contradictory situations
that he lands himself in when maintaining this line. For example,
he has declared strong support for the "Goldstone Report," which says
that Israel committed war crimes in Gaza.
Erdogan also continues to harp on about these accusations against
Israel. But when it comes to Darfur, he is comfortable in suggesting
in so many words that international reports on this topic do not
reflect the truth, and contain fabrications.
When it comes to Iran's nuclear pretensions, instead of emphasizing
that Turkey would not like anyone in the region to have such weapons -
as President Gul and Foreign Minister Davutoglu are saying - Erdogan
prefers the one-sided "what about Israel's weapons?" argument, thus
appearing to legitimize any nuclear weapons program by Tehran.
When forced to, he of course admits that he wants the whole region
emptied of weapons of mass destruction. But this is usually said with
no emphasis added, and almost as an after-thought, as if said out of
necessity, and not for any other reason.
Put briefly, Erdogan's unqualified support for the likes of
Ahmadinejad and Bashir does not present the picture of impartiality
that is required if Turkey is to play the role of a mediator between
civilizations. Neither do his remarks on such topics on Iran's
nuclear program contribute much to efforts to convince Turkey's
Western partners that Ankara is not moving away from them.
The damage Erdogan is doing to Turkey's image in the West is, however,
beginning to show. Take for example the commentary by David Schenker
in the Wall Street Journal last week (Nov. 5).
Arguing that "Ankara is moving closer to the mullocracy in Tehran, even
though the Islamic Republic is undermining stability in Afghanistan
and Iraq," Schenker declares that such behavior is also in violation
of Turkey's NATO commitments.
Schenker, who heads the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, goes on to declare that 2014 could
turn out to be the year of decision for the alliance on Turkey.
"It's time that NATO start thinking about a worst case scenario in
Turkey. For even if the increasingly Islamist state remains a NATO
partner, at best, it seems Turkey will be an unreliable partner,"
he says.
Schenker's exaggerated remarks are not interesting for what they say.
They are interesting because they reflect the kind of perception that
is beginning to spread in the West concerning Turkey. They are also
interesting because they reflect the kinds of questions that Erdogan
will be faced with in Washington, which he will be visiting in a few
weeks time.
The U.S. administration continues to give Erdogan the benefit of the
doubt because of such things as the Kurdish and Armenian openings.
Both of these are crucial to Washington's interests in the Caucusus and
Iraq. But if Erdogan can't deliver on these issues, and yet continue
as he is with his overtly pro-Islamic sympathies in foreign policy
when it comes to sensitive issues for the West such as Israel, Iran
and Sudan, then the tide in Washington could turn.
The messages Erdogan will give in Washington - where he will also
meet President Obama - will therefore be very important given the
doubts that are arising in the West over Turkey's orientation. These
messages will either help dissipate these doubts or fuel them further.
Given his responses to questions relating to Israel, Iran and Sudan
of late, it looks more likely that he will fuel these doubts further,
unless he does an about-turn and changes tack seriously on these
topics. But how he can do so, given his recent remarks, and still
hope to be credible, is an open question.
Hurriyet Daily News
Nov 12 2009
Turkey
One of the things that the Erdogan government likes to pride itself
on is the role that Turkey is playing in the efforts to overcome the
"clash of civilizations." Turkeys' Islamic nature and yet secular and
democratic system is the key factor that places it in a position to
play this bridging role. Its geographic location, on the other hand,
appears to symbolize this role in concrete terms.
But it is obvious that Turkey can only succeed in this role by
maintaining a degree of neutrality between the two worlds. Increasing
speculation in the West, however - and particularly in the United
States - about whether Turkey is changing direction under its present
"pro-Islamic" government, and moving more towards the Islamic East,
is leading to questions about whether Ankara is still eligible to
play this grandiose role.
The blame for this must rest on Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
to a large extent, due to his position on sensitive issues for the
West. His latest visit to Iran, and the strong messages of support
he gave to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad there, is a case in point.
By continuing to maintain - as he did while in Tehran - that "war
crimes suspect" Israel's nuclear arsenal should be concentrated on
by those who say - without proof - that Iran is chasing after such
weapons, he was consciously going against the grain as far as the
West is concerned.
His strong support for "crimes against humanity" suspect Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir last week, on the other hand, is another case
in point. Maintaining, as Erdogan did, that he has been to Darfur and
seen nothing amiss, and suggesting that Bashir could not have committed
the crimes he is accused of, because Muslims do not do such things,
he again stoked arguments concerning Turkey's real identity.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu insists, of course, that Turkish
foreign policy is not changing direction but merely expanding to new
areas. This is basically his "surrounding Turkey with friends and
reaching further a field for new friends" argument.
Erdogan's general approach appears to suggest, however, that while this
may be the case in terms of Ankara's new foreign policy orientation,
at least as far as he is concerned he likes some "friends" more than
others. The fact that "Erdogan's friends" are fundamentalist Muslims
and ruthless Islamic dictators, on the other hand, merely bolsters
the perception that his heart really lies in the Islamic world.
Neither does he appear too concerned with the contradictory situations
that he lands himself in when maintaining this line. For example,
he has declared strong support for the "Goldstone Report," which says
that Israel committed war crimes in Gaza.
Erdogan also continues to harp on about these accusations against
Israel. But when it comes to Darfur, he is comfortable in suggesting
in so many words that international reports on this topic do not
reflect the truth, and contain fabrications.
When it comes to Iran's nuclear pretensions, instead of emphasizing
that Turkey would not like anyone in the region to have such weapons -
as President Gul and Foreign Minister Davutoglu are saying - Erdogan
prefers the one-sided "what about Israel's weapons?" argument, thus
appearing to legitimize any nuclear weapons program by Tehran.
When forced to, he of course admits that he wants the whole region
emptied of weapons of mass destruction. But this is usually said with
no emphasis added, and almost as an after-thought, as if said out of
necessity, and not for any other reason.
Put briefly, Erdogan's unqualified support for the likes of
Ahmadinejad and Bashir does not present the picture of impartiality
that is required if Turkey is to play the role of a mediator between
civilizations. Neither do his remarks on such topics on Iran's
nuclear program contribute much to efforts to convince Turkey's
Western partners that Ankara is not moving away from them.
The damage Erdogan is doing to Turkey's image in the West is, however,
beginning to show. Take for example the commentary by David Schenker
in the Wall Street Journal last week (Nov. 5).
Arguing that "Ankara is moving closer to the mullocracy in Tehran, even
though the Islamic Republic is undermining stability in Afghanistan
and Iraq," Schenker declares that such behavior is also in violation
of Turkey's NATO commitments.
Schenker, who heads the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, goes on to declare that 2014 could
turn out to be the year of decision for the alliance on Turkey.
"It's time that NATO start thinking about a worst case scenario in
Turkey. For even if the increasingly Islamist state remains a NATO
partner, at best, it seems Turkey will be an unreliable partner,"
he says.
Schenker's exaggerated remarks are not interesting for what they say.
They are interesting because they reflect the kind of perception that
is beginning to spread in the West concerning Turkey. They are also
interesting because they reflect the kinds of questions that Erdogan
will be faced with in Washington, which he will be visiting in a few
weeks time.
The U.S. administration continues to give Erdogan the benefit of the
doubt because of such things as the Kurdish and Armenian openings.
Both of these are crucial to Washington's interests in the Caucusus and
Iraq. But if Erdogan can't deliver on these issues, and yet continue
as he is with his overtly pro-Islamic sympathies in foreign policy
when it comes to sensitive issues for the West such as Israel, Iran
and Sudan, then the tide in Washington could turn.
The messages Erdogan will give in Washington - where he will also
meet President Obama - will therefore be very important given the
doubts that are arising in the West over Turkey's orientation. These
messages will either help dissipate these doubts or fuel them further.
Given his responses to questions relating to Israel, Iran and Sudan
of late, it looks more likely that he will fuel these doubts further,
unless he does an about-turn and changes tack seriously on these
topics. But how he can do so, given his recent remarks, and still
hope to be credible, is an open question.