Tweet
TRANSLATING THE ARF ROADMAP TO REGIME CHANGE INTO ACTION (PART I)
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
Nov 16th, 2009
The adage is that "actions speak louder than words." The principles
and concepts guiding the Armenian Revolutionary Federation's (ARF)
recently announced roadmap to regime change in Armenia are consistent
with the historic mission of the ARF.
Unfortunately, however, it took the protocols-an 11th hour development
in the process of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey-for
the ARF to respond not only to these documents, but to conditions that
have been festering for close to 20 years in the homeland (Armenia,
Artsakh (Karabagh), and Javakhk):
First, the abysmal socio-economic conditions in Armenia that have
plagued its workers and their families. Second, the conditions
afflicting the Javakheti Armenians, which have steadily deteriorated
during this time frame. Only recently the Javakheti Armenian activist
Vahagn Chakhalyan was the victim of flagrant police and judicial
misconduct for having spoken out against the restrictive policies of
the government. He was convicted of acquiring and possessing weapons,
"hooliganism," and violating public order (an event that occurred two
years prior to the instant charge). He is presently serving a 10-year
term in a prison where the most hardened criminals in the Georgian
penal system are sent (see "Javakhk Activist Vahagn Chakhalyan:
Justice Denied by Georgia," the Armenian Weekly, Sept. 18, 2009).
And finally, the failure of Armenia to have the Nagorno Karabagh
Republic become a party to the negotiations that will determine its
future. This has been Karabagh's goal since 1994, when a ceasefire
ended hostilities and the republic gained de facto independence.
After that somewhat critical assessment, let it be understood that the
ARF is the one entity that has the experience and the determination to
guide Armenia out of the quagmire into which the Sarkisian government
has led the country. For 120 years, the Dashnaktsutiun has been the
principal Armenian adversary of the Ottoman Turkish government and
all subsequent Turkish governments in representing the injustices
perpetrated against the Armenian nation. Its founding in Tiflis
(Tbilisi) in 1892 was to advance social democratic principles
by whatever means necessary to improve the political and economic
wellbeing of the Armenians in the Anatolian provinces of Ottoman Turkey
(the historic western provinces of Armenia). In terms of its mission,
history, organization, and public support, the ARF is prepared to
undertake this vital effort at regime change in Armenia.
However, the means for affecting this change represents a difficult
challenge. The present situation demands that the ARF interpret
its roadmap to regime change as being not only multi-faceted in
its mission, but multi-operational in its implementation. Effective
regime change requires (1) preventing parliamentary ratification of
the protocols or significant modification of the negotiation results;
(2) strengthening Stepanakert's claim to Karabagh and the liberated
territories, and forcefully aiding in its determination to secure
de jure independence; (3) aiding the Javakheti Armenians to secure
improved economic and political conditions, and the right to their
language and cultural institutions; (4) implementing socio-economic
initiatives to improve the quality of life for workers and their
families in Armenia; and (5) preparing for the forthcoming presidential
and parliamentary elections.
Given the evolving nature of this crisis, the Dashnaktsutiun does
not have the luxury of time to respond in a step-by-step progression
to achieve these objectives. They must be prepared to launch an
offensive that has multiple objectives requiring simultaneous (and
possibly divergent) courses of action. This is a gargantuan task that
requires the harnessing of human resources and the raising of funds
far beyond anything the ARF has previously attempted.
The beginning salvos have already been fired. The demonstrations
in Armenia must increase in size and frequency if they are to have
any effect influencing the Sarkisian government as well as sending
a message to Ankara.
Demonstrations throughout the Armenian Diaspora should complement these
efforts as a means to provide moral support for their compatriots in
the homeland and to send a message of disapproval to the Minsk Group
countries. Maintaining this level of participation requires that the
ARF articulate reasons why this ongoing process of normalization is a
threat to the political viability of Armenia as well as to the future
wellbeing of the Armenian citizen.
The ARF must organize conferences where articulate speakers will
present the Dashnaktsutiun's position with respect to its roadmap
objectives to sympathetic journalists, legislators, leaders of advocacy
groups, and influential business executives.
The tri-chairs of the Minsk Group-Russia, France, and the United
States-know full well the price they are requiring Armenia to pay.
However, this should not dissuade the ARF from openly questioning
why Armenia's national interests should be sacrificed for Turkey's
benefit. Once the Minsk Group has forced Armenia to accede to Turkey's
interests, it will turn its attention-as it has already begun to do-to
resolving the Karabagh issue with no consideration of the price the
Karabaghtsis will be required to pay.
To assist the ARF in providing position papers to support the
objectives of regime change envisioned in the roadmap, "think tanks"
must be organized and staffed by competent professionals. There is
no shortage of Armenian men and women with expertise in any field
that the ARF may require as it formulates and implements this
comprehensive program for regime change. Position papers must be
distributed to media outlets, sympathetic foreign governments and
legislators, and especially to members of the U.S. Congressional
Armenian Caucus. These "papers" must explain the adverse impact this
pressured rapprochement will have on the political vitality of Armenia
and on the legitimate issues that successive Turkish governments have
refused to acknowledge. Garnering effective support for its roadmap
to regime change is predicated upon showing the legitimacy of the
Armenian Cause (Hai Tahd); the degraded position of the Armenian
worker and his family; and an understanding of the background with
respect to the Karabaghtsis' determination to be independent and the
legal and human rights principles that support their actions. The
position papers must explain how and why the Javakheti Armenians are
continually being denied their basic economic and political rights as
citizens of Georgia, and of the government's attempts to deny them
their use of the Armenian language and cultural institutions. The
adverse environment created by the Georgian government is aimed at
acculturating the Armenian minority or, failing that, encouraging
them to leave their historic lands.
It cannot be assumed that those who may be in a position to aid the
ARF-journalists, political leaders, major donors, and the rank and
file Armenian public-understand the history of events and the rationale
that motivates the Dashnaktsutiun in its determination to effect regime
change. In support of this objective, a steady stream of journalists,
foreign legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen must be
invited to Karabagh to hear and see for themselves the story of the
Karabaghtsis. The resettlement program to increase the population of
Artsakh by some 100,000 people (about 30-35,000 families) has lagged,
and the population of Artsakh has not increased appreciably since
1994. This was a major initiative of the Stepanakert government that
would have served to strengthen its hold on the liberated territories
(see "The Political-Strategic Resettlement of Karabakh's Security
Zone," the Armenian Weekly, June 30-July 7, 2007).
Javakhk presents a different set of problems. Who but a handful of
Armenians know precisely what our brothers and sisters in this historic
Armenian region within Georgia are forced to endure? As with Artsakh,
a steady stream of official visitors should be invited to see the
conditions for themselves and to hear the concerns of the people.
Should the Georgian government refuse entry to these foreign
journalists and legislators, all the better to show the attitude of a
government that contravenes the positive changes in its treatment of
minorities-which it has agreed to introduce as a member of the European
Union's "European Neighborhood Policy." Whether these visitors are
allowed entry or are refused, Tbilisi cannot escape the onus for the
adverse condition of the Javakheti Armenians.
Implementing the roadmap to regime change demands a highly coordinated
offensive that cannot be accomplished without massive support within
and beyond Armenia. It requires a well conceived and executed
information generating and distributing system that effectively
supports the roadmap's objectives. There are formidable obstacles that
the ARF must overcome in carrying out its proposed changes. The party
not only faces an entrenched power structure and a political philosophy
that makes legitimate opposition difficult, but it must contend with
the Minsk Group chaired by France, Russia, and the United States,
which has been responsible for pressuring Armenia to capitulate to
Turkish interests in order to facilitate their respective national
interests. Not to be underestimated are the visceral attacks that
may be made by pro-Sarkisian and anti-Dashnaktsutiun elements that
seek to join the ARF to many of the problems they now claim they are
prepared to solve.
Armenia is not without some leverage in responding to these pressures.
Iran has much to lose if this rapprochement as presently formatted
is carried to its expected conclusion. Iran has a sizeable Turkic
population adjacent to Azerbaijan whose allegiance to Teheran has
always been problematic. A Turkish victory could have a significant
impact on the internal political stability and spatial integrity of
Iran, where slightly less than 50 percent of the population are ethnic
Persians. Russia's role in the present situation is perplexing. It is
reminiscent of the Bolshevik's inability to accurately gauge Ataturk's
philosophical predilections when it gave Armenia's historic lands
to Turkey (Treaty of Kars) in 1921 as part of its failed attempt
to encourage their Turkic neighbor (Azerbaijan as well) to become
ideological soul mates. Moscow misread the situation then and it
appears that it may be misreading the situation now. What Russia
expects to gain by betraying Armenia, its only reliable ally in the
south Caucasus, is difficult to fathom. There is room in the south
Caucasus for only one major power: Turkey (a United States surrogate
at least for the time being) or Russia. The unlikely key that may
determine what will happen with respect to the ongoing process
of rapprochement may very well depend on Artsakh's response. The
determination of its people to defend their independence is the one
element that has not been fully taken into consideration simply because
it is believed that the republic will not or could not respond to an
Azeri attack. Only time will tell.
By Michael Mensoian
Asbarez
Nov 16th, 2009
The adage is that "actions speak louder than words." The principles
and concepts guiding the Armenian Revolutionary Federation's (ARF)
recently announced roadmap to regime change in Armenia are consistent
with the historic mission of the ARF.
Unfortunately, however, it took the protocols-an 11th hour development
in the process of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey-for
the ARF to respond not only to these documents, but to conditions that
have been festering for close to 20 years in the homeland (Armenia,
Artsakh (Karabagh), and Javakhk):
First, the abysmal socio-economic conditions in Armenia that have
plagued its workers and their families. Second, the conditions
afflicting the Javakheti Armenians, which have steadily deteriorated
during this time frame. Only recently the Javakheti Armenian activist
Vahagn Chakhalyan was the victim of flagrant police and judicial
misconduct for having spoken out against the restrictive policies of
the government. He was convicted of acquiring and possessing weapons,
"hooliganism," and violating public order (an event that occurred two
years prior to the instant charge). He is presently serving a 10-year
term in a prison where the most hardened criminals in the Georgian
penal system are sent (see "Javakhk Activist Vahagn Chakhalyan:
Justice Denied by Georgia," the Armenian Weekly, Sept. 18, 2009).
And finally, the failure of Armenia to have the Nagorno Karabagh
Republic become a party to the negotiations that will determine its
future. This has been Karabagh's goal since 1994, when a ceasefire
ended hostilities and the republic gained de facto independence.
After that somewhat critical assessment, let it be understood that the
ARF is the one entity that has the experience and the determination to
guide Armenia out of the quagmire into which the Sarkisian government
has led the country. For 120 years, the Dashnaktsutiun has been the
principal Armenian adversary of the Ottoman Turkish government and
all subsequent Turkish governments in representing the injustices
perpetrated against the Armenian nation. Its founding in Tiflis
(Tbilisi) in 1892 was to advance social democratic principles
by whatever means necessary to improve the political and economic
wellbeing of the Armenians in the Anatolian provinces of Ottoman Turkey
(the historic western provinces of Armenia). In terms of its mission,
history, organization, and public support, the ARF is prepared to
undertake this vital effort at regime change in Armenia.
However, the means for affecting this change represents a difficult
challenge. The present situation demands that the ARF interpret
its roadmap to regime change as being not only multi-faceted in
its mission, but multi-operational in its implementation. Effective
regime change requires (1) preventing parliamentary ratification of
the protocols or significant modification of the negotiation results;
(2) strengthening Stepanakert's claim to Karabagh and the liberated
territories, and forcefully aiding in its determination to secure
de jure independence; (3) aiding the Javakheti Armenians to secure
improved economic and political conditions, and the right to their
language and cultural institutions; (4) implementing socio-economic
initiatives to improve the quality of life for workers and their
families in Armenia; and (5) preparing for the forthcoming presidential
and parliamentary elections.
Given the evolving nature of this crisis, the Dashnaktsutiun does
not have the luxury of time to respond in a step-by-step progression
to achieve these objectives. They must be prepared to launch an
offensive that has multiple objectives requiring simultaneous (and
possibly divergent) courses of action. This is a gargantuan task that
requires the harnessing of human resources and the raising of funds
far beyond anything the ARF has previously attempted.
The beginning salvos have already been fired. The demonstrations
in Armenia must increase in size and frequency if they are to have
any effect influencing the Sarkisian government as well as sending
a message to Ankara.
Demonstrations throughout the Armenian Diaspora should complement these
efforts as a means to provide moral support for their compatriots in
the homeland and to send a message of disapproval to the Minsk Group
countries. Maintaining this level of participation requires that the
ARF articulate reasons why this ongoing process of normalization is a
threat to the political viability of Armenia as well as to the future
wellbeing of the Armenian citizen.
The ARF must organize conferences where articulate speakers will
present the Dashnaktsutiun's position with respect to its roadmap
objectives to sympathetic journalists, legislators, leaders of advocacy
groups, and influential business executives.
The tri-chairs of the Minsk Group-Russia, France, and the United
States-know full well the price they are requiring Armenia to pay.
However, this should not dissuade the ARF from openly questioning
why Armenia's national interests should be sacrificed for Turkey's
benefit. Once the Minsk Group has forced Armenia to accede to Turkey's
interests, it will turn its attention-as it has already begun to do-to
resolving the Karabagh issue with no consideration of the price the
Karabaghtsis will be required to pay.
To assist the ARF in providing position papers to support the
objectives of regime change envisioned in the roadmap, "think tanks"
must be organized and staffed by competent professionals. There is
no shortage of Armenian men and women with expertise in any field
that the ARF may require as it formulates and implements this
comprehensive program for regime change. Position papers must be
distributed to media outlets, sympathetic foreign governments and
legislators, and especially to members of the U.S. Congressional
Armenian Caucus. These "papers" must explain the adverse impact this
pressured rapprochement will have on the political vitality of Armenia
and on the legitimate issues that successive Turkish governments have
refused to acknowledge. Garnering effective support for its roadmap
to regime change is predicated upon showing the legitimacy of the
Armenian Cause (Hai Tahd); the degraded position of the Armenian
worker and his family; and an understanding of the background with
respect to the Karabaghtsis' determination to be independent and the
legal and human rights principles that support their actions. The
position papers must explain how and why the Javakheti Armenians are
continually being denied their basic economic and political rights as
citizens of Georgia, and of the government's attempts to deny them
their use of the Armenian language and cultural institutions. The
adverse environment created by the Georgian government is aimed at
acculturating the Armenian minority or, failing that, encouraging
them to leave their historic lands.
It cannot be assumed that those who may be in a position to aid the
ARF-journalists, political leaders, major donors, and the rank and
file Armenian public-understand the history of events and the rationale
that motivates the Dashnaktsutiun in its determination to effect regime
change. In support of this objective, a steady stream of journalists,
foreign legislators, advocacy leaders, and businessmen must be
invited to Karabagh to hear and see for themselves the story of the
Karabaghtsis. The resettlement program to increase the population of
Artsakh by some 100,000 people (about 30-35,000 families) has lagged,
and the population of Artsakh has not increased appreciably since
1994. This was a major initiative of the Stepanakert government that
would have served to strengthen its hold on the liberated territories
(see "The Political-Strategic Resettlement of Karabakh's Security
Zone," the Armenian Weekly, June 30-July 7, 2007).
Javakhk presents a different set of problems. Who but a handful of
Armenians know precisely what our brothers and sisters in this historic
Armenian region within Georgia are forced to endure? As with Artsakh,
a steady stream of official visitors should be invited to see the
conditions for themselves and to hear the concerns of the people.
Should the Georgian government refuse entry to these foreign
journalists and legislators, all the better to show the attitude of a
government that contravenes the positive changes in its treatment of
minorities-which it has agreed to introduce as a member of the European
Union's "European Neighborhood Policy." Whether these visitors are
allowed entry or are refused, Tbilisi cannot escape the onus for the
adverse condition of the Javakheti Armenians.
Implementing the roadmap to regime change demands a highly coordinated
offensive that cannot be accomplished without massive support within
and beyond Armenia. It requires a well conceived and executed
information generating and distributing system that effectively
supports the roadmap's objectives. There are formidable obstacles that
the ARF must overcome in carrying out its proposed changes. The party
not only faces an entrenched power structure and a political philosophy
that makes legitimate opposition difficult, but it must contend with
the Minsk Group chaired by France, Russia, and the United States,
which has been responsible for pressuring Armenia to capitulate to
Turkish interests in order to facilitate their respective national
interests. Not to be underestimated are the visceral attacks that
may be made by pro-Sarkisian and anti-Dashnaktsutiun elements that
seek to join the ARF to many of the problems they now claim they are
prepared to solve.
Armenia is not without some leverage in responding to these pressures.
Iran has much to lose if this rapprochement as presently formatted
is carried to its expected conclusion. Iran has a sizeable Turkic
population adjacent to Azerbaijan whose allegiance to Teheran has
always been problematic. A Turkish victory could have a significant
impact on the internal political stability and spatial integrity of
Iran, where slightly less than 50 percent of the population are ethnic
Persians. Russia's role in the present situation is perplexing. It is
reminiscent of the Bolshevik's inability to accurately gauge Ataturk's
philosophical predilections when it gave Armenia's historic lands
to Turkey (Treaty of Kars) in 1921 as part of its failed attempt
to encourage their Turkic neighbor (Azerbaijan as well) to become
ideological soul mates. Moscow misread the situation then and it
appears that it may be misreading the situation now. What Russia
expects to gain by betraying Armenia, its only reliable ally in the
south Caucasus, is difficult to fathom. There is room in the south
Caucasus for only one major power: Turkey (a United States surrogate
at least for the time being) or Russia. The unlikely key that may
determine what will happen with respect to the ongoing process
of rapprochement may very well depend on Artsakh's response. The
determination of its people to defend their independence is the one
element that has not been fully taken into consideration simply because
it is believed that the republic will not or could not respond to an
Azeri attack. Only time will tell.