ARMENIA WILL BE READY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH PROBLEM: UKRAINIAN ANALYST
Today
Nov 20 2009
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with senior consultant at Ukraine-based National
Institute of International Affairs Elena Kotelyanets.
Day.Az: What can you say about possible ratification of the protocols
in the Turkish and Armenia parliaments? Is opening of borders between
the countries is possible in near future?
Elena Kotelyanets: Signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
normalization of bilateral relations can rightly be called a historic
decision. Turkey realized one of its most important foreign policy
initiatives and secured a diplomatic victory. By signing the protocols
Armenia seems to make a principal concessions primarily with regard
to the "Armenian genocide" processes of recognition of which can be
considered "frozen".
If such a question is set aside, Armenia will likely be ready to make
further concessions (concerning resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict) in exchange for economic and political dividends. We believe
the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as well as proactive steps to
establish full diplomatic relations between the countries will be
brought to logical conclusion, despite the mixed reaction of the
Armenian and Turkish public on this process.
Of course, one should not expect that normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations to be simple and quick. However, one can assume that the
leadership of both countries will make every effort to ratify the
protocols in the parliaments as huge work has been done in this regard
and realization of national interests of both countries is involved.
Q: What is Ukraine's stance on settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict?
A: Ukraine's official position implies recognition of Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity and diplomatic support for this position. The
Ukrainian side believes that the OSCE Minsk Group has the main
role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A Ukrainian
representative is also involved with the Minsk Group. Ukraine supports
resolution of any conflict exclusively through peaceful means in
accordance with international law.
We believe it is high time for Ukraine to intensify foreign policy
activities in the South Caucasus subregion and form a basic document
on foreign policy strategy in the South Caucasus. This document
is projected to contain Ukraine's proposals to develop new forms of
cooperation with regional countries in politics, economy, security and
options to involve Ukraine with important economic and energy projects
in the subregion, as well as settlement of ethno-political conflicts.
Q: Do you think Armenian diaspora's negative attitude to possible
ratification of the protocols can be viewed as a lack of interest in
further development of Armenia?
A: The process of discussion of the Armenian-Turkish protocols in
Armenia is not limited by national borders of this republic. Opinion
of a large Armenian diaspora, though it does not decide Armenia's
domestic and foreign policies, is an important factor that no leader
of the country can ignore. The Armenian community both within and
outside Armenia perceives normalization of relations with Turkey
ambiguously. The Diaspora (not only Armenian) are often more radical
towards complex national issues than their compatriots in the
"historic homeland."
Such a position is attributed lack of knowledge about realities back
in homeland, current interests and a need to emphasize ethnicity,
historical past and traditions in a multi-ethnic environment in every
possible way. This radicalism can also be attributed to life conditions
in another country, where stereotypes of the past, fears and phobias,
historical experience are stronger than in historical homeland.
Thus, Armenian diaspora's negative attitude to Armenia-Turkey
reconciliation can be regarded not as its disinterest in development
of historical homeland, but in absence of a sense of current needs
of Armenia.
Q: The South Caucasus region is currently unstable for many reasons.
Under what circumstances full cooperation between all countries in
the region is possible?
A: Full cooperation among the South Caucasus countries in near future
is unlikely, even fantastic. The current situation in the Caucasus is
due to several trends. To overcome these trends and create conditions
for effective cooperation among the countries is a very complex task.
The point is that the South Caucasus still remains the epicenter
where interests of leading countries (such as the U.S. and EU) and the
Black Sea-Caspian region, in particular (Russia, Turkey, Iran) clash.
Thus, political influence can clearly be seen on the South Caucasian
countries. Secondly, there is rivalry in the Caucasus between the
two security systems: NATO (which seeks to integrate Georgia and
Azerbaijan) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (which
includes Armenia). In addition, there are a number of outstanding
historical, ethnic, religious, territorial issues, which pose
difficulties for relations among countries of the region. Full
cooperation of the South Caucasus countries is impossible until a
wide range of complex problems are resolved.
Q: Media recently reported that Washington plans to appoint U.S. State
Department diplomat Matthew Bryza a new ambassador to Azerbaijan. What
effect can it have on relations between Azerbaijan and the United
States?
A: As far as I know, the procedure of approval of Matthew Bryza as
U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was suspended. However, his appointment
to this position would be justified step. Bryza has served as co-chair
of OSCE Minsk Group from the United States for quite a long time. He
is well aware of the problems in the Caucasus and all "pitfalls"
for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is quite
difficult to foresee new trends in the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations
with appointment of a new U.S. ambassador.
The point is that the U.S. president and his new administration have
pushed the issue of the Caucasus aside due to the global economic
crisis focusing on domestic economic issues and foreign policy
objectives such as to restart relations with Russia. The Barack Obama
administration has not yet formed the concept of U.S. foreign policy
in the Caucasus. It is difficult to predict impact of a U.S.
ambassador to relations with Azerbaijan or any other South Caucasian
country till he/she is appointed.
Q: Do you believe Turkey can become a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk? If
so, how this may impact the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
A: Despite the fact that the international community links settlement
of the Karabakh conflict exclusively with efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group, conflict resolution mechanism and MG participants have been
changed in past years. Russia and Turkey, leading regional players,
have intensified efforts. Turkey has even made an initiative
to establish stability in the South Caucasus region and solve the
regional conflicts, which comprises basis of "Platform of Stability
and Security in the Caucasus."
According to this document, Turkey today pursues a policy of
rapprochement with Armenia initiating negotiations on Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, Turkey, having no relation
to the OSCE Minsk Group, today plays a role of chief mediator in
the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I believe Turkish
diplomacy does not aim at accession to the Minsk Group since it can
realize its foreign policy plans in the Caucasus beyond the OSCE.
Moreover, Turkey will not be able to obtain membership in the Minsk
Group at least because of two reasons: Armenia considers Turkey a
party that supports Azerbaijan's position in the settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia will not back Turkey's accession
to the OSCE MG.
Today
Nov 20 2009
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with senior consultant at Ukraine-based National
Institute of International Affairs Elena Kotelyanets.
Day.Az: What can you say about possible ratification of the protocols
in the Turkish and Armenia parliaments? Is opening of borders between
the countries is possible in near future?
Elena Kotelyanets: Signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
normalization of bilateral relations can rightly be called a historic
decision. Turkey realized one of its most important foreign policy
initiatives and secured a diplomatic victory. By signing the protocols
Armenia seems to make a principal concessions primarily with regard
to the "Armenian genocide" processes of recognition of which can be
considered "frozen".
If such a question is set aside, Armenia will likely be ready to make
further concessions (concerning resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict) in exchange for economic and political dividends. We believe
the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as well as proactive steps to
establish full diplomatic relations between the countries will be
brought to logical conclusion, despite the mixed reaction of the
Armenian and Turkish public on this process.
Of course, one should not expect that normalization of Armenian-Turkish
relations to be simple and quick. However, one can assume that the
leadership of both countries will make every effort to ratify the
protocols in the parliaments as huge work has been done in this regard
and realization of national interests of both countries is involved.
Q: What is Ukraine's stance on settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict?
A: Ukraine's official position implies recognition of Azerbaijan's
territorial integrity and diplomatic support for this position. The
Ukrainian side believes that the OSCE Minsk Group has the main
role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A Ukrainian
representative is also involved with the Minsk Group. Ukraine supports
resolution of any conflict exclusively through peaceful means in
accordance with international law.
We believe it is high time for Ukraine to intensify foreign policy
activities in the South Caucasus subregion and form a basic document
on foreign policy strategy in the South Caucasus. This document
is projected to contain Ukraine's proposals to develop new forms of
cooperation with regional countries in politics, economy, security and
options to involve Ukraine with important economic and energy projects
in the subregion, as well as settlement of ethno-political conflicts.
Q: Do you think Armenian diaspora's negative attitude to possible
ratification of the protocols can be viewed as a lack of interest in
further development of Armenia?
A: The process of discussion of the Armenian-Turkish protocols in
Armenia is not limited by national borders of this republic. Opinion
of a large Armenian diaspora, though it does not decide Armenia's
domestic and foreign policies, is an important factor that no leader
of the country can ignore. The Armenian community both within and
outside Armenia perceives normalization of relations with Turkey
ambiguously. The Diaspora (not only Armenian) are often more radical
towards complex national issues than their compatriots in the
"historic homeland."
Such a position is attributed lack of knowledge about realities back
in homeland, current interests and a need to emphasize ethnicity,
historical past and traditions in a multi-ethnic environment in every
possible way. This radicalism can also be attributed to life conditions
in another country, where stereotypes of the past, fears and phobias,
historical experience are stronger than in historical homeland.
Thus, Armenian diaspora's negative attitude to Armenia-Turkey
reconciliation can be regarded not as its disinterest in development
of historical homeland, but in absence of a sense of current needs
of Armenia.
Q: The South Caucasus region is currently unstable for many reasons.
Under what circumstances full cooperation between all countries in
the region is possible?
A: Full cooperation among the South Caucasus countries in near future
is unlikely, even fantastic. The current situation in the Caucasus is
due to several trends. To overcome these trends and create conditions
for effective cooperation among the countries is a very complex task.
The point is that the South Caucasus still remains the epicenter
where interests of leading countries (such as the U.S. and EU) and the
Black Sea-Caspian region, in particular (Russia, Turkey, Iran) clash.
Thus, political influence can clearly be seen on the South Caucasian
countries. Secondly, there is rivalry in the Caucasus between the
two security systems: NATO (which seeks to integrate Georgia and
Azerbaijan) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (which
includes Armenia). In addition, there are a number of outstanding
historical, ethnic, religious, territorial issues, which pose
difficulties for relations among countries of the region. Full
cooperation of the South Caucasus countries is impossible until a
wide range of complex problems are resolved.
Q: Media recently reported that Washington plans to appoint U.S. State
Department diplomat Matthew Bryza a new ambassador to Azerbaijan. What
effect can it have on relations between Azerbaijan and the United
States?
A: As far as I know, the procedure of approval of Matthew Bryza as
U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan was suspended. However, his appointment
to this position would be justified step. Bryza has served as co-chair
of OSCE Minsk Group from the United States for quite a long time. He
is well aware of the problems in the Caucasus and all "pitfalls"
for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is quite
difficult to foresee new trends in the U.S.-Azerbaijani relations
with appointment of a new U.S. ambassador.
The point is that the U.S. president and his new administration have
pushed the issue of the Caucasus aside due to the global economic
crisis focusing on domestic economic issues and foreign policy
objectives such as to restart relations with Russia. The Barack Obama
administration has not yet formed the concept of U.S. foreign policy
in the Caucasus. It is difficult to predict impact of a U.S.
ambassador to relations with Azerbaijan or any other South Caucasian
country till he/she is appointed.
Q: Do you believe Turkey can become a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk? If
so, how this may impact the settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
A: Despite the fact that the international community links settlement
of the Karabakh conflict exclusively with efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group, conflict resolution mechanism and MG participants have been
changed in past years. Russia and Turkey, leading regional players,
have intensified efforts. Turkey has even made an initiative
to establish stability in the South Caucasus region and solve the
regional conflicts, which comprises basis of "Platform of Stability
and Security in the Caucasus."
According to this document, Turkey today pursues a policy of
rapprochement with Armenia initiating negotiations on Karabakh conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, Turkey, having no relation
to the OSCE Minsk Group, today plays a role of chief mediator in
the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I believe Turkish
diplomacy does not aim at accession to the Minsk Group since it can
realize its foreign policy plans in the Caucasus beyond the OSCE.
Moreover, Turkey will not be able to obtain membership in the Minsk
Group at least because of two reasons: Armenia considers Turkey a
party that supports Azerbaijan's position in the settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Russia will not back Turkey's accession
to the OSCE MG.