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12/01/2009
Krem lin seeks to thwart negotiations?
17:32 / 11/30/2009
By Ivan Gharibyan
The bellicose statements frequently made by high-ranking Azerbaijani
officials at the most crucial stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process suggest that a certain force is inspiring official Baku with
its promises and advice. Considering the subtle geopolitical games in
the South Caucasus, nothing can be stated with certainty, but some
developments in the intensified Russian-Azerbaijani relations suggest
a number of conclusions about joints efforts by Moscow and Baku aimed
at thwarting the negotiations.
Taking a close view of the development of Russian-Azerbaijani contacts
over the last five months (Head of the RF Presidential Administration
Sergey Naryshkin has paid three visits to Baku over the recent months)
one would easily notice that, after President Ilham Aliyev's `courtesy
visit' to Ulyanovsk, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev
resumed talks about war as the only means of resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Immediately afterwards, Azerbaijani
parliamentarians began discussing the possibility of Azerbaijan's
joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The
Parliament members of the ruling party Yeni Azerbaijan (New
Azerbaijan) made plain statements that closer relations with Russia
may ensure a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of
Azerbaijan.
All the steps are, on the one hand, suggestive of the desperate
efforts by the Azerbaijani authorities, which are rushing from one
geopolitical player to another. Considering Russia's long-term
position on the necessity for maintaining the status quo in the
region, which position was recently revised, Russia and the West may
have had serious disagreements over spheres of influence at the last
moment. The matter can also concern the consolidation of the Russian
forces objecting to excessively rapid `restart' of the Russian-U.S.
relations. Or rather, Moscow may have understood too late that its
`fervent' wish to `put a dirty trick' to Ukraine by signing oil and
gas agreements with Turkey may cost her the influence over the South
Caucasus.
As regards Georgia, there is nothing to speak about. Azerbaijan, in
turn, has never been `famous' for its pro-Russian orientation. If
reopened, the Armenian-Turkish border will seriously reduce the
importance of Russian politico-military presence for Armenia. The
Russian authorities may have arrived at a belated conclusion about the
need for interfering in the processes going on in the South Caucasus.
Since immediate interference in the Armenia-Turkey normalization
process with `a minus sign' will thwart the resumption of contacts
with the United States and affect Russia's economic interests,
particularly its trade and economic relations with Turkey, Baku
remains the only means of torpedoing the normalization processes.
The Azerbaijani authorities, which are now facing the prospect of
consenting to a referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh's status under
international pressure, are an `excellent present' for any of the
Great Powers should they have a wish to torpedo the peace process in
the region. In this context the Kremlin may have thought up an idea of
inciting Ilham Aliyev and his team to new bellicose statements despite
the OSCE Minsk Group's appeals. Repeated threats of war may, one fine
day, cause the Armenian authorities and people to change their moods
with all the ensuring consequences...
On the other hand, we should remember RF President Dmitry Medvedev's
plain statement on the full agreement on the ways of settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Russia and the West. In the
immediate future we will see difference between words and deeds.
Ivan Garibyan
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
12/01/2009
Krem lin seeks to thwart negotiations?
17:32 / 11/30/2009
By Ivan Gharibyan
The bellicose statements frequently made by high-ranking Azerbaijani
officials at the most crucial stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process suggest that a certain force is inspiring official Baku with
its promises and advice. Considering the subtle geopolitical games in
the South Caucasus, nothing can be stated with certainty, but some
developments in the intensified Russian-Azerbaijani relations suggest
a number of conclusions about joints efforts by Moscow and Baku aimed
at thwarting the negotiations.
Taking a close view of the development of Russian-Azerbaijani contacts
over the last five months (Head of the RF Presidential Administration
Sergey Naryshkin has paid three visits to Baku over the recent months)
one would easily notice that, after President Ilham Aliyev's `courtesy
visit' to Ulyanovsk, Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev
resumed talks about war as the only means of resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Immediately afterwards, Azerbaijani
parliamentarians began discussing the possibility of Azerbaijan's
joining the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The
Parliament members of the ruling party Yeni Azerbaijan (New
Azerbaijan) made plain statements that closer relations with Russia
may ensure a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of
Azerbaijan.
All the steps are, on the one hand, suggestive of the desperate
efforts by the Azerbaijani authorities, which are rushing from one
geopolitical player to another. Considering Russia's long-term
position on the necessity for maintaining the status quo in the
region, which position was recently revised, Russia and the West may
have had serious disagreements over spheres of influence at the last
moment. The matter can also concern the consolidation of the Russian
forces objecting to excessively rapid `restart' of the Russian-U.S.
relations. Or rather, Moscow may have understood too late that its
`fervent' wish to `put a dirty trick' to Ukraine by signing oil and
gas agreements with Turkey may cost her the influence over the South
Caucasus.
As regards Georgia, there is nothing to speak about. Azerbaijan, in
turn, has never been `famous' for its pro-Russian orientation. If
reopened, the Armenian-Turkish border will seriously reduce the
importance of Russian politico-military presence for Armenia. The
Russian authorities may have arrived at a belated conclusion about the
need for interfering in the processes going on in the South Caucasus.
Since immediate interference in the Armenia-Turkey normalization
process with `a minus sign' will thwart the resumption of contacts
with the United States and affect Russia's economic interests,
particularly its trade and economic relations with Turkey, Baku
remains the only means of torpedoing the normalization processes.
The Azerbaijani authorities, which are now facing the prospect of
consenting to a referendum on Nagorno-Karabakh's status under
international pressure, are an `excellent present' for any of the
Great Powers should they have a wish to torpedo the peace process in
the region. In this context the Kremlin may have thought up an idea of
inciting Ilham Aliyev and his team to new bellicose statements despite
the OSCE Minsk Group's appeals. Repeated threats of war may, one fine
day, cause the Armenian authorities and people to change their moods
with all the ensuring consequences...
On the other hand, we should remember RF President Dmitry Medvedev's
plain statement on the full agreement on the ways of settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Russia and the West. In the
immediate future we will see difference between words and deeds.
Ivan Garibyan
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress