Tweet
Kotchikian: The Turkish-Armenian Protocols and 'Public' (Dis)Content
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/ 09/30/kotchikian-the-turkish-armenian-protocols-an d-public-discontent/
September 30, 2009
The past three weeks have witnessed increased attention, condemnations,
and justifications to the protocols as announced by the Armenian
and Turkish governments on Aug. 31. Not surprisingly, what received
the most attention was the section of the protocols that called for
the establishment of "a sub-commission on the historical dimension
to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence
between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination
of the historical records and archives to define existing problems
and formulate recommendations..." Yet another clause that received
attention states: "... recognition of the existing border between the
two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international
law." Both of the above points received the most attention and
criticism from those opposing the protocols on the Armenian side-and
for a good reason, as both these points are the ones that carry the
most nationalist sentiments.
The aim of this opinion piece is neither to justify nor to condemn
the protocols. Rather, it is to raise some questions and offer some
alternative reading of the protocols by focusing on such issues as:
Who is opposing the protocols? Is such opposition viable? And is it
possible to link the opposition in the Armenian Diaspora with the
one in Armenia?
Perhaps the first obvious question would be: Are these protocols a
fait accompli and if so, can parties criticizing them introduce any
changes? If history is any indicator, policymaking in Armenia is
far from being a democratic process. It is, and has always been,
a monopoly in the hands of a few in Armenia. During the last 18
years, most if not all of the decisions made by successive Armenian
governments have rarely swayed, no matter how "disastrous" or "naive"
these policies were, and no matter how much opposition came from the
diaspora. The fact that all three previous Armenian administrations
lacked legitimacy because of fraudulent elections had led them to
operate from a position of insecurity and lack of compromise, as they
continued to view any dialogue with the opposition within Armenia as
a manifestation of weakness.
The above observations lead to the next question: Is there any mass
opposition against the protocols in Armenia? Again, a quick glance
over the past decade or so rarely shows the presence and operation of
a viable opposition movement against the dominant system. Political
control in Armenia is based on hegemony, and no matter how much
discontent exits regarding any given policy, the authorities have
rarely reconsidered their policies. In today's political atmosphere in
Armenia, especially after almost a decade of no coherent and distinct
opposition, the task of the government is much easier as there are
no official leverages (parliamentary groups, civil society activists,
etc.) that any group opposing the government can utilize.
Related to the issue of the existence of an opposition, a
relevant question remains over the number of people opposing the
protocols. While it is clear that there are a number of Armenians
opposing this specific issue, it is far from being sizeable. This is
true not only in Armenia but also in the diaspora, where opponents to
the protocols are small in number. This does not mean that the majority
of Armenians support the government or its decisions; rather, it is a
manifestation of widespread political apathy and a disconnect of the
masses from politics and political discourse. At the end of the day,
the playing field in Armenia(n) politics remains polarized between
two relatively smaller groups, the decision makers and their opponents.
Finally, an interesting point recently brought up by a political
analyst is the necessary distinction that should be made between
the normalization of relations and reconciliation. While the former
is a Turkey-Armenia issue, the latter is a Turkish-Armenian one. If
Armenia decides to normalize its relations with Turkey then it is
a simple state-to-state issue, one that the nation does not and
should not have any say in. However, if the issue at hand is about
reconciliation, then it becomes a topic that requires the ownership of
all Armenians. The problem with the interpretation of these protocols
is that it is both about normalization and reconciliation-hence merging
the two sometimes non-overlapping ideas of the nation's interest and
the state's interest.
One thing that strikes an observer of this process is the complete
inability of the Armenain government to articulate its position on
the protocols-a fact that many people would promptly attribute to
the notion that Armenia is under pressure and hence its government
has no option but to sign the protocols.
President Sarkisian's recent announcement that he intends to visit
diasporan communities and centers for consultative purposes is clearly
an attempt to articulate his position regarding the protocols. The
hope is that this time around, he will be better prepared than the
consultative meetings he had in Armenia with the local political
parties.
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/ 09/30/kotchikian-the-turkish-armenian-protocols-an d-public-discontent/
September 30, 2009
The past three weeks have witnessed increased attention, condemnations,
and justifications to the protocols as announced by the Armenian
and Turkish governments on Aug. 31. Not surprisingly, what received
the most attention was the section of the protocols that called for
the establishment of "a sub-commission on the historical dimension
to implement a dialogue with the aim to restore mutual confidence
between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination
of the historical records and archives to define existing problems
and formulate recommendations..." Yet another clause that received
attention states: "... recognition of the existing border between the
two countries as defined by the relevant treaties of international
law." Both of the above points received the most attention and
criticism from those opposing the protocols on the Armenian side-and
for a good reason, as both these points are the ones that carry the
most nationalist sentiments.
The aim of this opinion piece is neither to justify nor to condemn
the protocols. Rather, it is to raise some questions and offer some
alternative reading of the protocols by focusing on such issues as:
Who is opposing the protocols? Is such opposition viable? And is it
possible to link the opposition in the Armenian Diaspora with the
one in Armenia?
Perhaps the first obvious question would be: Are these protocols a
fait accompli and if so, can parties criticizing them introduce any
changes? If history is any indicator, policymaking in Armenia is
far from being a democratic process. It is, and has always been,
a monopoly in the hands of a few in Armenia. During the last 18
years, most if not all of the decisions made by successive Armenian
governments have rarely swayed, no matter how "disastrous" or "naive"
these policies were, and no matter how much opposition came from the
diaspora. The fact that all three previous Armenian administrations
lacked legitimacy because of fraudulent elections had led them to
operate from a position of insecurity and lack of compromise, as they
continued to view any dialogue with the opposition within Armenia as
a manifestation of weakness.
The above observations lead to the next question: Is there any mass
opposition against the protocols in Armenia? Again, a quick glance
over the past decade or so rarely shows the presence and operation of
a viable opposition movement against the dominant system. Political
control in Armenia is based on hegemony, and no matter how much
discontent exits regarding any given policy, the authorities have
rarely reconsidered their policies. In today's political atmosphere in
Armenia, especially after almost a decade of no coherent and distinct
opposition, the task of the government is much easier as there are
no official leverages (parliamentary groups, civil society activists,
etc.) that any group opposing the government can utilize.
Related to the issue of the existence of an opposition, a
relevant question remains over the number of people opposing the
protocols. While it is clear that there are a number of Armenians
opposing this specific issue, it is far from being sizeable. This is
true not only in Armenia but also in the diaspora, where opponents to
the protocols are small in number. This does not mean that the majority
of Armenians support the government or its decisions; rather, it is a
manifestation of widespread political apathy and a disconnect of the
masses from politics and political discourse. At the end of the day,
the playing field in Armenia(n) politics remains polarized between
two relatively smaller groups, the decision makers and their opponents.
Finally, an interesting point recently brought up by a political
analyst is the necessary distinction that should be made between
the normalization of relations and reconciliation. While the former
is a Turkey-Armenia issue, the latter is a Turkish-Armenian one. If
Armenia decides to normalize its relations with Turkey then it is
a simple state-to-state issue, one that the nation does not and
should not have any say in. However, if the issue at hand is about
reconciliation, then it becomes a topic that requires the ownership of
all Armenians. The problem with the interpretation of these protocols
is that it is both about normalization and reconciliation-hence merging
the two sometimes non-overlapping ideas of the nation's interest and
the state's interest.
One thing that strikes an observer of this process is the complete
inability of the Armenain government to articulate its position on
the protocols-a fact that many people would promptly attribute to
the notion that Armenia is under pressure and hence its government
has no option but to sign the protocols.
President Sarkisian's recent announcement that he intends to visit
diasporan communities and centers for consultative purposes is clearly
an attempt to articulate his position regarding the protocols. The
hope is that this time around, he will be better prepared than the
consultative meetings he had in Armenia with the local political
parties.