Tweet
Kurdish Globe
Saturday, 03 October 2009, 02:07 EDT
Kurdish Question, Turkey and the European Union -- PART II
Mustafa Kemal Atat?Ã?¼rk, ?Ä?°smet ?Ä?°n?Ã?¶n?Ã?¼ and Fevzi ?Ã?akmak on the
7th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.
Photograph with historic significance scanned from a clipping from the
newspaper Cumhuriyet
By Salah Bayaziddi
The Kurdish Globe
Hopes of independent Kurdistan following the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire
The end of World War One and the armistice of 1918 left Turkey in a
disastrous situation. The emerging Turkish republic was to be
partitioned into spheres of Allied influence and Armenian, Kurdish and
Greek states. Arnold Toynbee described the situation as follows:
"Turkey's Provinces were gone; her allies were crushed; and except for
her champions among the Indian Muslims, she was friendless even in
camp of Islam. Constantinople was held by the victors, Turkey was
encircled by enemies. Like wolves around the camp fire the Powers at
the threshold with hungry eyes, for Turkey by nature is rich, and
imperialism is greedy" (quoted in Ahmad, 1993:46-7). The elites that
had under girded the Ottoman political system were severely divided
between the Sultan's Ottoman camp in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal
Pasha's (Ataturk) nationalists in central Anatolia. The Sultan's camp
reluctantly accepted all Allied dictates, culminating in the signing
of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. For the Kurds, the most important
element in the Treaty of Sevres was article 64: "If within one year
the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within
the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the
Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a
majority of the population of these areas desire independence from
Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people are
capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted
to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to
renounce all rights and title over these areas?.If and when such
renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principle
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish
State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has been
hitherto included in the Mosul Vilayet (McDowall, 1996: 459-60). If
there ever existed an auspicious political opportunity for Kurdish
nationalists, it was embodied on the Treaty of Sevres, accepted by the
Sultan and his coterie of government elites and endorsed by the Allied
powers. Ataturk's nationalist coalition, which rejected the Treaty,
had its hands full in 1920 fighting Greek, Armenian, French and
pro-Sultan forces on all fronts (Ahmad, 1993:50). Hence there existed
little capacity to repress Kurdish nationalists, should they have
chosen this window of opportunity to make the Treaty Sevres'
provisions for a Kurdish state a reality.
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) which had been imposed on the defeated
Ottoman Empire was never notified. Indeed, two new developments
towards the end of 1920, destroyed Kurdish hopes of achieving
independence in Ottoman Kurdistan. The rise of Mustafa Kemal, the
leader of so called the Young Turks on Anatolia, and factional
division among the Kurds themselves shattered the independence of
Kurdistan. At the beginning, Mustafa Kemal was careful not to mention
the Turkish state. Instead, he stressed either the fraternity between
Kurds and Turks, or the Ottoman nation in conflict with foreign
occupation force. In line with this argument, Gunter has pointed out,
"when Mustafa Kemal first began to form the Turkish-nation state, it
was not clear what constituted a Turk. Indeed, in appealing for
Islamic unity against the Christian invaders, Ismet (Inonu)-Ataturk's
famous lieutenant and eventual successor-initially spoke of the new
state as being a "homeland for Kurds and Turks" (Gunter, 1997:5). The
Turkish nationalists established a national assembly at Ankara, which,
shortly before the Sevres Treaty was signed announced that it would
not recognize any agreement signed by the Ottoman government in
occupied Constantinople (Bulloch, 1992:91). While many Kurdish
nationalists sought of the Allies for the Kurdish national aims, a
considerable number also supported the Turkish Sultan in the name of
loyalty to the head of Islam. In fact, Mustafa Kemal became able to
form a Turkish nation-state when the Kurds turned in favour of his
Pan-Islamic propaganda and stood against their national interests. As
David McDowall writes: "at any rate they (Anglo-French planners in the
Middle East) seem to have had little difficulty in mobilizing Kurds
still loyal to the Ottoman state to move against such groups. The
Turks made a great effort to win the confidence of the Kurds during
this period. By the end of the year at least 70 Kurdish tribes, apart
from a number of influential urban notables, had declared their
support for Kemal" (McDowall, 1996:130). Ever since, Turkish
government in Kurdistan has collaborated with the most reactionary and
corrupt sections of society like tribal leaders and religious sheikhs,
in order to suppress the Kurdish national movement. These locally
powerful economic, religious and political elites find it to their
advantage to cooperate with the Turkish government. As B.C. Smith, has
pointed out, "in the Kurdish region of Turkey, for example, the
Kurdish landlords and wealthy merchants have been integrated into
Turkish economy through trade and investment in urban property and
small-scale industry in the major urban centers" (Smith, 1992:291).
These Kurdish ruling class are also who opposed the Kurdish national
movement.
In fact, some Kurdish groups did try to take advantage of this
historical opportunity (the Treaty of Sevres). Only three months after
the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the Istanbul-based Society for
the Rise of Kurdistan and leaders of the Kuchgiri Kurdish tribe broke
into revolt in Dersim (Tunceli) region of eastern Turkey (Olson,
1989:28). The rebels were no doubt attempting to take advantage of a
clear opportunity: "In September of 1920 the position of the Kemalists
had begun to take more fragile as the Armenians lunched a major
offensive in the east. A month later the Greeks mounted their
offensive in the west. On 20 October the Kurds seized a large shipment
of arms and, rather than returning it to the Kemalists, Alishan Beg
(aKuchgiri chief and a leader of the revolt) used this windfall to
rally the Dersim tribes in rebellion (McDowall, 1996:185). Robert
Olson, the main English-language authority on the revolt, cites the
following precipitating causes: "The main reason for the rebellion
seems to have been that the Kurds wanted to use the stipulations of
article 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres to increase their autonomy
within Anatolia. They wished to take advantage of the fledgling
Kemalist government, which had only declared its national pact
(Misak-I Milli) one year before the rebellion. In spring 1921, the
Kemalists were locked un battle with Greeks; as mentioned above, the
Kurds wanted to take advantage of the situation. The Kurds were also
in a good position to receive international support for their
activities and even aid from the French, British, or Greeks
(1989:33). The Kurdish nationalists sent the following demands to
Atatuk's government in Ankara: 1) Acceptance by Ankara of Kurdish
autonomy as already agreed by Istanbul; 2) The release of all Kurdish
prisoners in Elaziz, Malatya, Sivas and Erzinjan jails; 3) The
withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Kuchgiri region (McDowall, 1996,
185). Significantly, the demands were all Kurdish nationalist in
nature, rather than religious, class or otherwise based. The
government in Ankara refrained from refusing the demands, since it was
already fighting other forces on too many fronts. Instead, Ataturk
played for time, sending representatives to negotiate with the Kurdish
nationalists and even offering their leader Alishan Beg candidacy to
the Ankara Assembly (McDowall, 1996, 186).
The Kemalists and the illusion of a state based on Turkish - Kurdish
brotherhood
The Kemalists were also able to prevent the rebellion from spreading
to other Kurdish regions. The Kuchgiri Kurds were Alevi (a
denomination of Islam that was often the target of persecution by
larger and mainstream Sunni groups) and for the most part had not
participated in the massacres and dispassion of the Armenians. Many
Sunni Kurds, on the other hands, not only had a history of "bad blood"
with Alevi Kurds, but also feared the possible establishment of an
Armenian state (especially on land claimed by Kurds) and the resulting
likelihood of Armenian retribution towards Kurds implicated in the
events of 1915 and before. Ataturk was thus able to paint the ongoing
struggle as a contest between the infidel Western powers who supported
Christian Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds
fighting to save Sultan, Caliph and Homeland (Olson, 1989:44-45). By
framing the issue in this manner, the Kuchgiri rebels could be accused
of treason to the Muslim homeland, seeing as they timed their revolt
to coincide with the struggle against invading Armenian and Greek
armies. Those who wished to prevent the establishment of an Armenian
state and subjugation of Muslim lands would support the Kemalists
(Olson, 1989:37).
Crucially, Ataturk at the time did not revel what kind of state the
Kemalists wished to establish (assuming he even knew himself before
1923). Instead, he allowed the Kurds to believe that joining the
Kemalists meant to save the Ottoman legacy (under which Kurds and
Turks were equal as Muslims) and establishing a state based on
Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. In his own words: "As long as there are
fine people with honour and respect, Turks and Kurds will continue to
live together as brothers around the institution of the khilafa
(Caliphate), and an unshakeable iron tower will be raised against
internal and external enemies" (McDowall, 1996:187). Pronouncements
such as these, together with offering land and high government posts
to the Kurdish elites, made the institutionalized political system
appear open to Kurds and Kurdish interests. Many cautious and
reasonable Kurdish elites, unaware of Turkish secular ethnic
nationalist sentiments brewing in Ankara, therefore found it only
logical at the time to support the Kemalists and pursue their
interests from within emerging system. Most Kurds ended up joining and
making a vital contribution to the Kemalist War of Independence
against the Greeks, Armenians and Allied powers. Although some Kurdish
nationalist organizations insisted on putting the struggle for a
Kurdish state ahead of protecting Muslim lands against the Allied,
Armenian and Greek threat, they were hamstrung by the more influential
Kurdish chieftains, who had been won over to the Kemalist camp (Van
Bruinesson, 1992:279).
Essentially, the illusion of an open institutionalized political
system (promised by the Kemalists) combined with patronage from Ankara
and tribal and religious divisions amongst the Kurds themselves,
denied the Kurdish nationalists leaders of the Kuchgiri revolt the
number of elite allies (along with their tribal or religious
followers) necessary to succeed. By the spring 1921, the Kemalists
were able to divert enough troops from the other war fronts to crush
the Kuchgiri, seeing as the revolt was still limited to the Dersim
region. Although the Kuchgiri Kurds and several Kurdish political
organizations of the time had tried to frame their movement in broad,
Kurdish nationalist terms, support from a broad section of Kurdistan
never materialized. However, despite its failure, the Kuchgiri
rebellion also demonstrated the changing nature of the 'Kurdish
national movement'. (This term is used herein to include all forces in
Anatolia campaigning under the banner of Kurdish nationalism, even if
they were not necessarily ethnically Kurdish.) The Tribal sheikhs had
clearly played the principal leadership role in the rebellion. Yet, a
great deal of its leadership - or, at least, its instigation - came
from a city, Istanbul (Olson, 1989: 34-35). Even though the defeat
meant that leadership of later rebellion moved to the provinces, this
showed that the cities too were beginning to play an active role in
the movement.
The modern Turkish republic formed when the Treaty of Sevres was
replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. With the entry into force
of this treaty on August 6, 1924, the international consideration of
the Kurdish question, growing out of the First World War, was
terminated. Already, it was painfully obvious not only that the
nationalists themselves were not accepted in international
circles. There was no Kurdish representative at the Lausanne
Conference and the Kurds played no role in the presence of non-Muslim
minorities-Armenians, Greeks and Jews-within Turkey. Mustafa Kemal who
by this time had established the Turkish nation-state, immediately
broke his promises of the Kurdish autonomy and dissolved the Kurdish
National Assembly. He abolished Kurdish schools, use of Kurdish
language was outlawed, and Kurds officially were labelled "Mountain
Turks" and their land called "Eastern Anatolia". Mustafa Kemal's
regime also forced the abolition of the Muslim caliphate through a
protesting assembly (March, 3, 1924). The symbolism was apt: the
four-month old Turkish Republic's first major act was an attempt to
crush the two forces with which it would be battle (Kurdish
nationalism and Islamic element), increasingly defensive throughout
the next eight decades (Nicole and Huge Pope, 1997:248-249). It should
be noted, however, that both Islamists and Kemalists have adapted
almost similar policies towards the Kurdish question in Turkey: no
political and cultural rights for the Kurds. To the Islamists (such as
the Welfare Party) ethnic divisions are artificial; they naturally
contend that if Islam had formed the foundation of the state, the
Kurds would not have felt excluded (Barkey and Fuller,
1998:101). Therefore, both the Islamic element and Turkish nationalism
have no desire to find a peaceful and democratic solution for the
Kurdish question in Turkey.
It is also crucial to mention here that in the aftermath of the
Kochgiri rebellion, there was talk in the new Turkish Republic's Grand
National Assembly of some limited forms of 'Autonomous Administration'
by the Kurds in a Kurdish region centred on Kurdistan. However, all
this disappeared in the Treaty of Lausanne. Bitterly disappointed, the
Kurds turned again to armed struggle in 1925, this time led by Sheikh
Said, but organized by Azadi (a new type of Kurdish organization was
formed in 1923) (Olson, 1989: 39-41). It was Sheikh Said, reportedly,
who convinced Hamidiye commanders to fight for Kurdish independence.
According to Robert Olson, the Kurdish officers expressed their
objectives in November 1924 as being 'to deliver the Kurds from
Turkish oppression; to give Kurds freedom and opportunity to develop
their country; and to obtain British assistance, realizing that
Kurdistan could not stand alone' (Olson, 1989: 43). Once again, the
same factors of tribalism, religious sectarianism and ethnic
differences helped to limit the extent and success of a Kurdish
rebellion - although some were simply obeying 'their chiefs, sheikhs
or landlords when ordered to do so', while some chiefs merely 'wanted
to use the opportunity to settle old scores against other tribes and
against government representatives' (Olson, 1989: p. 97).
The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurdish uprisings
The main part of the uprising was over by the end of March, as the
Turkish authorities crushed the rebellion with continual aerial
bombardments and a massive concentration of forces (Van Bruinessen,
1978: 378-391). Sheikh Said was captured in mid-April 1925 and hanged
together with most of other rebel leaders on 29 June. The rebellion
was already virtually defeated when was captured. The advancing Turks
reportedly bombed Kurdish positions and began daily execution of
suspected collaborators (Olson, 1989: 116-25). An extensive
pacification programme in Turkish Kurdistan was waged by the
Kemalists, which 'continued unabated throughout 1926 and 1927. Martial
law was declared on 25 February 1925 throughout Turkish Kurdistan, and
Ankara declared that it was treason to support the rebellion (Olson,
1989: 123-4). It should be noted, however, that Sheikh said had led
the largest armed and most sustained Kurdish nationalist rebellion of
the twentieth century.
There is no doubt that as a result of the division of Kurdistan by the
end of the First World War, and the subjugation of the Kurdish people
by the powerful militarist regime of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, the
Kurds faced the choice of assimilation or being eliminated. The
Kurdish response was a series of uprisings throughout the 1920s and
1930s led by a combination of nationalists and feudal leaders, some of
whom had religious backgrounds, and urban intellectuals. Moreover,
during this period hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deported to
western Turkey. Thus, the ruthless policy of deportation of Kurdish
dissidents and the failure of Dersim revolt st movement in Turkey.
Describing what had occurred, Kurdish author, N. Kendal wrote that
"during this thirteen years of repression, struggle, revolts, and
deportation?more than half million Kurds were deported and
massacred. The entire area beyond the Euphrates?was declared out of
hands for foreigners until 1965 and was kept under a permanent state
of siege till 1965" (Gunter, 1990:12-13). After 1923, the Turkish
state is declared to consist of a single ethnic group-this despite the
fact that a very large part of the Kurdish people (more than fifty
percent) had been left within the borders of the Republic of Turkey.
According to Kemalist ideology it is obligatory to be Turkish. Thus,
attempts to prove that the Kurds are Turks were intensified and become
systematic policy in Mustafa Kemal era. For instance, "in December
1936 the Governor of Tunceli (Dersim), Army General Abdullah Alpdgan,
argued that Kurds were in essence 'mountain Turks'. He criticized the
practice of 'calling them Kurds" (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997:103).
Turkish universities and other institutes also spent massive resources
to "prove" that Kurdish was a dialect of Turkish. The Turkish state
also uses all means at its disposal to make the assimilation policy
succeed. Both ideological and repressive apparatus are used. The state
its instruments of ideological apparatus, schools, mass media etc. to
persuade the Kurds are Turkish. If in spite of all these efforts there
are still some who remain un- persuaded, who still assert their
Kurdish origin, if there are people raising Kurdish national and
democratic demands, it is then the oppressive tools of the state
intervene (Besikci, 1991: 33). The role of the Turkish press is worth
mentioning in this paper. On the question of Kurdistan, the Turkish
press works like a branch of the Turkish intelligence organization.
For example, the Turkish media lunched a campaign to "prove" that the
tradition Kurdish colours (red, yellow and green) were actually those
of certain crack Ottoman regiments. As a result, one can suggest that
a strict concept of a nation-state in combination with extreme
nationalism sentiment, are essential characteristics of Turkish state
ideology.
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displ ayArticle.jsp?id=03C77B45AFAA13E537C1D4393A4AD211
Saturday, 03 October 2009, 02:07 EDT
Kurdish Question, Turkey and the European Union -- PART II
Mustafa Kemal Atat?Ã?¼rk, ?Ä?°smet ?Ä?°n?Ã?¶n?Ã?¼ and Fevzi ?Ã?akmak on the
7th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.
Photograph with historic significance scanned from a clipping from the
newspaper Cumhuriyet
By Salah Bayaziddi
The Kurdish Globe
Hopes of independent Kurdistan following the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire
The end of World War One and the armistice of 1918 left Turkey in a
disastrous situation. The emerging Turkish republic was to be
partitioned into spheres of Allied influence and Armenian, Kurdish and
Greek states. Arnold Toynbee described the situation as follows:
"Turkey's Provinces were gone; her allies were crushed; and except for
her champions among the Indian Muslims, she was friendless even in
camp of Islam. Constantinople was held by the victors, Turkey was
encircled by enemies. Like wolves around the camp fire the Powers at
the threshold with hungry eyes, for Turkey by nature is rich, and
imperialism is greedy" (quoted in Ahmad, 1993:46-7). The elites that
had under girded the Ottoman political system were severely divided
between the Sultan's Ottoman camp in Istanbul and Mustafa Kemal
Pasha's (Ataturk) nationalists in central Anatolia. The Sultan's camp
reluctantly accepted all Allied dictates, culminating in the signing
of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. For the Kurds, the most important
element in the Treaty of Sevres was article 64: "If within one year
the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within
the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the
Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a
majority of the population of these areas desire independence from
Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people are
capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted
to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to
renounce all rights and title over these areas?.If and when such
renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principle
Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish
State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has been
hitherto included in the Mosul Vilayet (McDowall, 1996: 459-60). If
there ever existed an auspicious political opportunity for Kurdish
nationalists, it was embodied on the Treaty of Sevres, accepted by the
Sultan and his coterie of government elites and endorsed by the Allied
powers. Ataturk's nationalist coalition, which rejected the Treaty,
had its hands full in 1920 fighting Greek, Armenian, French and
pro-Sultan forces on all fronts (Ahmad, 1993:50). Hence there existed
little capacity to repress Kurdish nationalists, should they have
chosen this window of opportunity to make the Treaty Sevres'
provisions for a Kurdish state a reality.
The Treaty of Sevres (1920) which had been imposed on the defeated
Ottoman Empire was never notified. Indeed, two new developments
towards the end of 1920, destroyed Kurdish hopes of achieving
independence in Ottoman Kurdistan. The rise of Mustafa Kemal, the
leader of so called the Young Turks on Anatolia, and factional
division among the Kurds themselves shattered the independence of
Kurdistan. At the beginning, Mustafa Kemal was careful not to mention
the Turkish state. Instead, he stressed either the fraternity between
Kurds and Turks, or the Ottoman nation in conflict with foreign
occupation force. In line with this argument, Gunter has pointed out,
"when Mustafa Kemal first began to form the Turkish-nation state, it
was not clear what constituted a Turk. Indeed, in appealing for
Islamic unity against the Christian invaders, Ismet (Inonu)-Ataturk's
famous lieutenant and eventual successor-initially spoke of the new
state as being a "homeland for Kurds and Turks" (Gunter, 1997:5). The
Turkish nationalists established a national assembly at Ankara, which,
shortly before the Sevres Treaty was signed announced that it would
not recognize any agreement signed by the Ottoman government in
occupied Constantinople (Bulloch, 1992:91). While many Kurdish
nationalists sought of the Allies for the Kurdish national aims, a
considerable number also supported the Turkish Sultan in the name of
loyalty to the head of Islam. In fact, Mustafa Kemal became able to
form a Turkish nation-state when the Kurds turned in favour of his
Pan-Islamic propaganda and stood against their national interests. As
David McDowall writes: "at any rate they (Anglo-French planners in the
Middle East) seem to have had little difficulty in mobilizing Kurds
still loyal to the Ottoman state to move against such groups. The
Turks made a great effort to win the confidence of the Kurds during
this period. By the end of the year at least 70 Kurdish tribes, apart
from a number of influential urban notables, had declared their
support for Kemal" (McDowall, 1996:130). Ever since, Turkish
government in Kurdistan has collaborated with the most reactionary and
corrupt sections of society like tribal leaders and religious sheikhs,
in order to suppress the Kurdish national movement. These locally
powerful economic, religious and political elites find it to their
advantage to cooperate with the Turkish government. As B.C. Smith, has
pointed out, "in the Kurdish region of Turkey, for example, the
Kurdish landlords and wealthy merchants have been integrated into
Turkish economy through trade and investment in urban property and
small-scale industry in the major urban centers" (Smith, 1992:291).
These Kurdish ruling class are also who opposed the Kurdish national
movement.
In fact, some Kurdish groups did try to take advantage of this
historical opportunity (the Treaty of Sevres). Only three months after
the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, the Istanbul-based Society for
the Rise of Kurdistan and leaders of the Kuchgiri Kurdish tribe broke
into revolt in Dersim (Tunceli) region of eastern Turkey (Olson,
1989:28). The rebels were no doubt attempting to take advantage of a
clear opportunity: "In September of 1920 the position of the Kemalists
had begun to take more fragile as the Armenians lunched a major
offensive in the east. A month later the Greeks mounted their
offensive in the west. On 20 October the Kurds seized a large shipment
of arms and, rather than returning it to the Kemalists, Alishan Beg
(aKuchgiri chief and a leader of the revolt) used this windfall to
rally the Dersim tribes in rebellion (McDowall, 1996:185). Robert
Olson, the main English-language authority on the revolt, cites the
following precipitating causes: "The main reason for the rebellion
seems to have been that the Kurds wanted to use the stipulations of
article 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres to increase their autonomy
within Anatolia. They wished to take advantage of the fledgling
Kemalist government, which had only declared its national pact
(Misak-I Milli) one year before the rebellion. In spring 1921, the
Kemalists were locked un battle with Greeks; as mentioned above, the
Kurds wanted to take advantage of the situation. The Kurds were also
in a good position to receive international support for their
activities and even aid from the French, British, or Greeks
(1989:33). The Kurdish nationalists sent the following demands to
Atatuk's government in Ankara: 1) Acceptance by Ankara of Kurdish
autonomy as already agreed by Istanbul; 2) The release of all Kurdish
prisoners in Elaziz, Malatya, Sivas and Erzinjan jails; 3) The
withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Kuchgiri region (McDowall, 1996,
185). Significantly, the demands were all Kurdish nationalist in
nature, rather than religious, class or otherwise based. The
government in Ankara refrained from refusing the demands, since it was
already fighting other forces on too many fronts. Instead, Ataturk
played for time, sending representatives to negotiate with the Kurdish
nationalists and even offering their leader Alishan Beg candidacy to
the Ankara Assembly (McDowall, 1996, 186).
The Kemalists and the illusion of a state based on Turkish - Kurdish
brotherhood
The Kemalists were also able to prevent the rebellion from spreading
to other Kurdish regions. The Kuchgiri Kurds were Alevi (a
denomination of Islam that was often the target of persecution by
larger and mainstream Sunni groups) and for the most part had not
participated in the massacres and dispassion of the Armenians. Many
Sunni Kurds, on the other hands, not only had a history of "bad blood"
with Alevi Kurds, but also feared the possible establishment of an
Armenian state (especially on land claimed by Kurds) and the resulting
likelihood of Armenian retribution towards Kurds implicated in the
events of 1915 and before. Ataturk was thus able to paint the ongoing
struggle as a contest between the infidel Western powers who supported
Christian Armenians and Greeks, and Muslim-Ottoman Turks and Kurds
fighting to save Sultan, Caliph and Homeland (Olson, 1989:44-45). By
framing the issue in this manner, the Kuchgiri rebels could be accused
of treason to the Muslim homeland, seeing as they timed their revolt
to coincide with the struggle against invading Armenian and Greek
armies. Those who wished to prevent the establishment of an Armenian
state and subjugation of Muslim lands would support the Kemalists
(Olson, 1989:37).
Crucially, Ataturk at the time did not revel what kind of state the
Kemalists wished to establish (assuming he even knew himself before
1923). Instead, he allowed the Kurds to believe that joining the
Kemalists meant to save the Ottoman legacy (under which Kurds and
Turks were equal as Muslims) and establishing a state based on
Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. In his own words: "As long as there are
fine people with honour and respect, Turks and Kurds will continue to
live together as brothers around the institution of the khilafa
(Caliphate), and an unshakeable iron tower will be raised against
internal and external enemies" (McDowall, 1996:187). Pronouncements
such as these, together with offering land and high government posts
to the Kurdish elites, made the institutionalized political system
appear open to Kurds and Kurdish interests. Many cautious and
reasonable Kurdish elites, unaware of Turkish secular ethnic
nationalist sentiments brewing in Ankara, therefore found it only
logical at the time to support the Kemalists and pursue their
interests from within emerging system. Most Kurds ended up joining and
making a vital contribution to the Kemalist War of Independence
against the Greeks, Armenians and Allied powers. Although some Kurdish
nationalist organizations insisted on putting the struggle for a
Kurdish state ahead of protecting Muslim lands against the Allied,
Armenian and Greek threat, they were hamstrung by the more influential
Kurdish chieftains, who had been won over to the Kemalist camp (Van
Bruinesson, 1992:279).
Essentially, the illusion of an open institutionalized political
system (promised by the Kemalists) combined with patronage from Ankara
and tribal and religious divisions amongst the Kurds themselves,
denied the Kurdish nationalists leaders of the Kuchgiri revolt the
number of elite allies (along with their tribal or religious
followers) necessary to succeed. By the spring 1921, the Kemalists
were able to divert enough troops from the other war fronts to crush
the Kuchgiri, seeing as the revolt was still limited to the Dersim
region. Although the Kuchgiri Kurds and several Kurdish political
organizations of the time had tried to frame their movement in broad,
Kurdish nationalist terms, support from a broad section of Kurdistan
never materialized. However, despite its failure, the Kuchgiri
rebellion also demonstrated the changing nature of the 'Kurdish
national movement'. (This term is used herein to include all forces in
Anatolia campaigning under the banner of Kurdish nationalism, even if
they were not necessarily ethnically Kurdish.) The Tribal sheikhs had
clearly played the principal leadership role in the rebellion. Yet, a
great deal of its leadership - or, at least, its instigation - came
from a city, Istanbul (Olson, 1989: 34-35). Even though the defeat
meant that leadership of later rebellion moved to the provinces, this
showed that the cities too were beginning to play an active role in
the movement.
The modern Turkish republic formed when the Treaty of Sevres was
replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. With the entry into force
of this treaty on August 6, 1924, the international consideration of
the Kurdish question, growing out of the First World War, was
terminated. Already, it was painfully obvious not only that the
nationalists themselves were not accepted in international
circles. There was no Kurdish representative at the Lausanne
Conference and the Kurds played no role in the presence of non-Muslim
minorities-Armenians, Greeks and Jews-within Turkey. Mustafa Kemal who
by this time had established the Turkish nation-state, immediately
broke his promises of the Kurdish autonomy and dissolved the Kurdish
National Assembly. He abolished Kurdish schools, use of Kurdish
language was outlawed, and Kurds officially were labelled "Mountain
Turks" and their land called "Eastern Anatolia". Mustafa Kemal's
regime also forced the abolition of the Muslim caliphate through a
protesting assembly (March, 3, 1924). The symbolism was apt: the
four-month old Turkish Republic's first major act was an attempt to
crush the two forces with which it would be battle (Kurdish
nationalism and Islamic element), increasingly defensive throughout
the next eight decades (Nicole and Huge Pope, 1997:248-249). It should
be noted, however, that both Islamists and Kemalists have adapted
almost similar policies towards the Kurdish question in Turkey: no
political and cultural rights for the Kurds. To the Islamists (such as
the Welfare Party) ethnic divisions are artificial; they naturally
contend that if Islam had formed the foundation of the state, the
Kurds would not have felt excluded (Barkey and Fuller,
1998:101). Therefore, both the Islamic element and Turkish nationalism
have no desire to find a peaceful and democratic solution for the
Kurdish question in Turkey.
It is also crucial to mention here that in the aftermath of the
Kochgiri rebellion, there was talk in the new Turkish Republic's Grand
National Assembly of some limited forms of 'Autonomous Administration'
by the Kurds in a Kurdish region centred on Kurdistan. However, all
this disappeared in the Treaty of Lausanne. Bitterly disappointed, the
Kurds turned again to armed struggle in 1925, this time led by Sheikh
Said, but organized by Azadi (a new type of Kurdish organization was
formed in 1923) (Olson, 1989: 39-41). It was Sheikh Said, reportedly,
who convinced Hamidiye commanders to fight for Kurdish independence.
According to Robert Olson, the Kurdish officers expressed their
objectives in November 1924 as being 'to deliver the Kurds from
Turkish oppression; to give Kurds freedom and opportunity to develop
their country; and to obtain British assistance, realizing that
Kurdistan could not stand alone' (Olson, 1989: 43). Once again, the
same factors of tribalism, religious sectarianism and ethnic
differences helped to limit the extent and success of a Kurdish
rebellion - although some were simply obeying 'their chiefs, sheikhs
or landlords when ordered to do so', while some chiefs merely 'wanted
to use the opportunity to settle old scores against other tribes and
against government representatives' (Olson, 1989: p. 97).
The Treaty of Lausanne and the Kurdish uprisings
The main part of the uprising was over by the end of March, as the
Turkish authorities crushed the rebellion with continual aerial
bombardments and a massive concentration of forces (Van Bruinessen,
1978: 378-391). Sheikh Said was captured in mid-April 1925 and hanged
together with most of other rebel leaders on 29 June. The rebellion
was already virtually defeated when was captured. The advancing Turks
reportedly bombed Kurdish positions and began daily execution of
suspected collaborators (Olson, 1989: 116-25). An extensive
pacification programme in Turkish Kurdistan was waged by the
Kemalists, which 'continued unabated throughout 1926 and 1927. Martial
law was declared on 25 February 1925 throughout Turkish Kurdistan, and
Ankara declared that it was treason to support the rebellion (Olson,
1989: 123-4). It should be noted, however, that Sheikh said had led
the largest armed and most sustained Kurdish nationalist rebellion of
the twentieth century.
There is no doubt that as a result of the division of Kurdistan by the
end of the First World War, and the subjugation of the Kurdish people
by the powerful militarist regime of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, the
Kurds faced the choice of assimilation or being eliminated. The
Kurdish response was a series of uprisings throughout the 1920s and
1930s led by a combination of nationalists and feudal leaders, some of
whom had religious backgrounds, and urban intellectuals. Moreover,
during this period hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deported to
western Turkey. Thus, the ruthless policy of deportation of Kurdish
dissidents and the failure of Dersim revolt st movement in Turkey.
Describing what had occurred, Kurdish author, N. Kendal wrote that
"during this thirteen years of repression, struggle, revolts, and
deportation?more than half million Kurds were deported and
massacred. The entire area beyond the Euphrates?was declared out of
hands for foreigners until 1965 and was kept under a permanent state
of siege till 1965" (Gunter, 1990:12-13). After 1923, the Turkish
state is declared to consist of a single ethnic group-this despite the
fact that a very large part of the Kurdish people (more than fifty
percent) had been left within the borders of the Republic of Turkey.
According to Kemalist ideology it is obligatory to be Turkish. Thus,
attempts to prove that the Kurds are Turks were intensified and become
systematic policy in Mustafa Kemal era. For instance, "in December
1936 the Governor of Tunceli (Dersim), Army General Abdullah Alpdgan,
argued that Kurds were in essence 'mountain Turks'. He criticized the
practice of 'calling them Kurds" (Kirisci and Winrow, 1997:103).
Turkish universities and other institutes also spent massive resources
to "prove" that Kurdish was a dialect of Turkish. The Turkish state
also uses all means at its disposal to make the assimilation policy
succeed. Both ideological and repressive apparatus are used. The state
its instruments of ideological apparatus, schools, mass media etc. to
persuade the Kurds are Turkish. If in spite of all these efforts there
are still some who remain un- persuaded, who still assert their
Kurdish origin, if there are people raising Kurdish national and
democratic demands, it is then the oppressive tools of the state
intervene (Besikci, 1991: 33). The role of the Turkish press is worth
mentioning in this paper. On the question of Kurdistan, the Turkish
press works like a branch of the Turkish intelligence organization.
For example, the Turkish media lunched a campaign to "prove" that the
tradition Kurdish colours (red, yellow and green) were actually those
of certain crack Ottoman regiments. As a result, one can suggest that
a strict concept of a nation-state in combination with extreme
nationalism sentiment, are essential characteristics of Turkish state
ideology.
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displ ayArticle.jsp?id=03C77B45AFAA13E537C1D4393A4AD211