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TURKEY CONSIDERS THE STATUS OF ABKHAZIA
Emrullah Uslu
Jamestown Foundation
October 5, 2009 04:32 PM
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
In response to a question as to whether Ankara and Moscow have reached
a deal to recognize Abkhazia and the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated: "Russia
will not enter a deal implying the recognition of Northern Cyprus in
exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia" (Zaman, October 4).
The debate was originally triggered by an article written by Paul
Goble in the Moscow Times on September 16. Goble argued that:
"There appears to be a chance that Turkey, despite denials by its
officials, might break the embargo against recognition because of
Ankara's desire to play a greater role in the South Caucasus region,
its own long-standing experience as the only country to recognize the
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, and the influence of its own Abkhaz
and Circassian communities." He based his argument on the intention
of the Turkish Foreign Minister Akhmet Davutoglu to visit Abkhazia in
order to "get acquainted with [that republic] and attempt to regulate
its relations with Georgia," while he continued, "thus potentially
positioning Turkey to play a role paralleling the one it has offered to
play between Azerbaijan and Armenia." Two days later, Unal Cevikoz,
the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Turkish
Foreign Ministry, who is of Circassian descent, visited Sukhumi and
met with the Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba. While Turkish
officials said that Ankara had informed Tbilisi about the visit and
had not changed its policy of supporting the territorial integrity of
Georgia, Cevikoz's visit raised hopes in Sukhumi (The Moscow Times,
September 16).
Regarding Cevikoz's visit to the region, Davutoglu said that the
existence of the Abkhaz community in Turkey compels Ankara to consider
how to resolve this problem. "We know very well that having peace
and stability in the South Caucasus region without achieving this
in Georgia is very difficult. With these thoughts and perspectives,
Turkey will continue making efforts toward the resolution of the
Abkhazian conflict, as it has done in previous years" Davutoglu
explained (Today's Zaman, September 8).
Goble's analysis also triggered a new debate within Turkey. The Turkish
media ran optimistic stories about the possibility of such mutually
beneficial recognition policies (Vatan, September 21). However,
Turkish analysts are skeptical that Turkey would want to recognize
Abkhazia or that Russia would choose to recognize the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (www.turksam.org, September 27).
Recently, Lavrov joined the debate and revealed Moscow's position:
Russia will not enter any deal implying the recognition of Northern
Cyprus in exchange for the Turkish recognition of Abkhazia. "We are
not inclined to enter any deals following 'scratch my back and I'll
scratch yours' logic. These are two absolutely different stories. These
are different situations from the historical, moral and humanitarian
points of view. Any bargaining is out of the question. Each situation
should be considered in its historical context," Lavrov added
(www.russiatoday.ru, October 3).
It seems that Lavrov's emphasis on history may indicate that Ankara
could be interested in establishing some form of relations with
Abkhazia. Historically tens of thousands of Muslim Ab as part of a
larger Muslim migration process from the Caucasus in the nineteenth
century. Approximately 500,000 Abkhazian descendents now live in
Turkey. In addition, other Caucasus communities in Turkey have close
relations with Abkhazians. The only exception is the Georgian descended
Muslim communities in Turkey. Due to their over representation in
critical government institutions, such as the National Intelligence
Organization (MIT), the Turkish armed forces, and their nationalist
outlook, Abkhazians retain significant lobbying power in Ankara.
By emphasizing the historical perspective, Moscow might expect
help from these communities in order to generate pressure on the
Turkish government to establish some form of relationship with
Abkhazia. Cevikoz's visit to Sukhumi may indicate a policy shift in
Ankara. In 2007, when the Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh wanted to visit
Turkey to meet with the Abkhaz diaspora, the Turkish government refused
to issue a visa and President Abdullah Gul at the time stated that
"I can only reiterate in this regard that Turkey supports Georgia's
territorial integrity" (www.civil.ge, November 21, 2007).
The crucial question remains: since 2007, what has changed that
has required Turkish diplomats to visit the region? Hasan Kanpolat,
a Turkish analyst who has close relations with the Turkish foreign
minister, pointed out what had led the government to revise its
outlook toward Abkhazia:
"During a period in which Abkhazia's independence process has
begun to gain momentum, Cevikoz could not have gone to Sukhumi to
engage in efforts to restart a peace process between Abkhazia and
Georgia. Therefore, we can presume that, to prevent Abkhazia from
unifying any further with the Russian Federation, Ankara may have
asked Tbilisi to allow a controlled relationship with Abkhazia. To
be more explicit, the door may be opened to preventing Georgia from
intercepting ships on humanitarian missions or those involved in
trade traveling between Turkey and Abkhazia using the Black Sea"
(T kara sees that a close relationship with Abkhazia would eventually
produce a similar multi-dimensional relationship with Cypriot Turks
in the eastern Mediterranean. Abkhazia in this case would become an
accessible Black Sea coastline for Turkey.
Emrullah Uslu
Jamestown Foundation
October 5, 2009 04:32 PM
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
In response to a question as to whether Ankara and Moscow have reached
a deal to recognize Abkhazia and the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated: "Russia
will not enter a deal implying the recognition of Northern Cyprus in
exchange for Turkish recognition of Abkhazia" (Zaman, October 4).
The debate was originally triggered by an article written by Paul
Goble in the Moscow Times on September 16. Goble argued that:
"There appears to be a chance that Turkey, despite denials by its
officials, might break the embargo against recognition because of
Ankara's desire to play a greater role in the South Caucasus region,
its own long-standing experience as the only country to recognize the
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, and the influence of its own Abkhaz
and Circassian communities." He based his argument on the intention
of the Turkish Foreign Minister Akhmet Davutoglu to visit Abkhazia in
order to "get acquainted with [that republic] and attempt to regulate
its relations with Georgia," while he continued, "thus potentially
positioning Turkey to play a role paralleling the one it has offered to
play between Azerbaijan and Armenia." Two days later, Unal Cevikoz,
the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Turkish
Foreign Ministry, who is of Circassian descent, visited Sukhumi and
met with the Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergey Shamba. While Turkish
officials said that Ankara had informed Tbilisi about the visit and
had not changed its policy of supporting the territorial integrity of
Georgia, Cevikoz's visit raised hopes in Sukhumi (The Moscow Times,
September 16).
Regarding Cevikoz's visit to the region, Davutoglu said that the
existence of the Abkhaz community in Turkey compels Ankara to consider
how to resolve this problem. "We know very well that having peace
and stability in the South Caucasus region without achieving this
in Georgia is very difficult. With these thoughts and perspectives,
Turkey will continue making efforts toward the resolution of the
Abkhazian conflict, as it has done in previous years" Davutoglu
explained (Today's Zaman, September 8).
Goble's analysis also triggered a new debate within Turkey. The Turkish
media ran optimistic stories about the possibility of such mutually
beneficial recognition policies (Vatan, September 21). However,
Turkish analysts are skeptical that Turkey would want to recognize
Abkhazia or that Russia would choose to recognize the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (www.turksam.org, September 27).
Recently, Lavrov joined the debate and revealed Moscow's position:
Russia will not enter any deal implying the recognition of Northern
Cyprus in exchange for the Turkish recognition of Abkhazia. "We are
not inclined to enter any deals following 'scratch my back and I'll
scratch yours' logic. These are two absolutely different stories. These
are different situations from the historical, moral and humanitarian
points of view. Any bargaining is out of the question. Each situation
should be considered in its historical context," Lavrov added
(www.russiatoday.ru, October 3).
It seems that Lavrov's emphasis on history may indicate that Ankara
could be interested in establishing some form of relations with
Abkhazia. Historically tens of thousands of Muslim Ab as part of a
larger Muslim migration process from the Caucasus in the nineteenth
century. Approximately 500,000 Abkhazian descendents now live in
Turkey. In addition, other Caucasus communities in Turkey have close
relations with Abkhazians. The only exception is the Georgian descended
Muslim communities in Turkey. Due to their over representation in
critical government institutions, such as the National Intelligence
Organization (MIT), the Turkish armed forces, and their nationalist
outlook, Abkhazians retain significant lobbying power in Ankara.
By emphasizing the historical perspective, Moscow might expect
help from these communities in order to generate pressure on the
Turkish government to establish some form of relationship with
Abkhazia. Cevikoz's visit to Sukhumi may indicate a policy shift in
Ankara. In 2007, when the Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh wanted to visit
Turkey to meet with the Abkhaz diaspora, the Turkish government refused
to issue a visa and President Abdullah Gul at the time stated that
"I can only reiterate in this regard that Turkey supports Georgia's
territorial integrity" (www.civil.ge, November 21, 2007).
The crucial question remains: since 2007, what has changed that
has required Turkish diplomats to visit the region? Hasan Kanpolat,
a Turkish analyst who has close relations with the Turkish foreign
minister, pointed out what had led the government to revise its
outlook toward Abkhazia:
"During a period in which Abkhazia's independence process has
begun to gain momentum, Cevikoz could not have gone to Sukhumi to
engage in efforts to restart a peace process between Abkhazia and
Georgia. Therefore, we can presume that, to prevent Abkhazia from
unifying any further with the Russian Federation, Ankara may have
asked Tbilisi to allow a controlled relationship with Abkhazia. To
be more explicit, the door may be opened to preventing Georgia from
intercepting ships on humanitarian missions or those involved in
trade traveling between Turkey and Abkhazia using the Black Sea"
(T kara sees that a close relationship with Abkhazia would eventually
produce a similar multi-dimensional relationship with Cypriot Turks
in the eastern Mediterranean. Abkhazia in this case would become an
accessible Black Sea coastline for Turkey.