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MATTHEW DER MANUELIAN
http://hetq.am/en/politics/turkish-arme nian-protocols-reality-and-irrationality-%e2%80%93 -a-response/#more-18529
2009/10/06 | 19:00
Politics
David Davidian has offered an analysis on the proposed Turkey- Armenia
Protocols in his piece "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and
Irrationality" that leads him to conclude that in the Protocols "the
only item that changes anything is the physical lifting of the Turkish
border blockade" and that Armenia should ratify them without delay.
Davidian's analysis is severely flawed, however, and certainly the
physical lifting of the Turkish blockade is not the only thing that
the Protocols will change. They will change the whole game on issues
of primary importance to Armenia's long-term security and viability
as a state.
Davidian effectively uses a grid to explain his analysis and so the
grid is helpful here in discussing that analysis and presenting our
own. At the end, we will offer our own grid, which will reflect very
different conclusions from those of Davidian.
Davidian's grid is as follows:
The grid lists five conditions to the lifting of the Turkish blockade
that were, according to Davidian suggested, agreed to or dismissed
throughout discussions, post 2005. In fact, there really have been
three principal Turkish conditions to lifting the Turkish blockade
since the early 1990's. They have been the following:
1.End International Recognition of the Armenian Genocide;
2.Explicitly Recognize the Turkey Armenia Border (and thereby
implicitly renounce any territorial claims against Turkey);
3.Withdraw Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
territories.
One of these preconditions is properly reflected in Davidian's
grid as a condition: "End International Recognition of the
Armenian Genocide." The condition "Armenian Forces Withdraw from
Nagorno-Karabakh" should actually read "Armenian Forces Withdraw
from Nagorno-Karabakh and Surrounding Territories." The "Historical
Commission" is really subsumed in "End International Recognition
of Armenian Genocide." "Explicitly State no Land Claims on Western
Armenia" is misstated: the Turkish diplomatic ask has always been
for Armenia to explicitly recognize the current border (because by
doing so, Armenia would implicitly renounce any future territorial
claims). "Open Border" is the subject of the conditions and not
a condition in and of itself and so doesn't belong in the grid at
all. With the elimination of "Open Border" from the grid, there are no
Armenian preconditions (which is the stated Armenian, U.S. and European
policy) and only Turkish preconditions. The "Suggesting Party" column
is therefore superfluous and the "Condition" column can be re-labeled
"Turkish Preconditions".
We will avoid the semantic gymnastics that President Sarkisian
and Foreign Minister Nalbandian have applied. It is our view that
conditions, preconditions, and to use President Sarkisian's words
"compromises" are the same things for purposes of this discussion.
Davidian's analysis is flawed because it looks only at whether
preconditions are stated explicitly. It does not consider whether
preconditions that are not stated explicitly are in fact reflected
implicitly in, or actually achieved through, the Protocols.
End International Recognition of the Genocide
Davidian's grid correctly reflects that ending genocide recognition
is not expressly in the Protocols.
However, although this precondition does not appear explicitly, it is
reflected implicitly through the establishment of the subcommission on
historical matters. He lists the Historical Commission as a separate
condition, but the establishment of the subcommission is not so much a
condition in itself, but a Turkish strategy for achieving the primary
precondition of ending international recognition of the genocide.
In lobbying for official recognition of the Armenian Genocide,
diasporan Armenians have always faced an insuperable obstacle
when the Armenian Genocide was the topic of bilateral Turkish
and Armenian discussions - this was the case with TARC and again
with the announcement by Turkey and Armenia of the "roadmap"
in April 2009. Davidian recognizes that the establishment of the
subcommission is "at best a method for Turks to delay international
debate on genocide recognition." He argues that the delay tactic
won't work because "Turkish disingenuousness will be clear to the
international community." But the international community finds the
Armenian Genocide recognition campaign an obstacle to maintaining good
relations with an emerging Turkish power and, when under pressure to
recognize the Armenian Genocide from Armenian lobbyist groups, looks
for any convenient cover to avoid taking up the issue. As long as
Turkey can argue there is a process going on (and no matter Armenian
protestations of Turkish disingenuousness), there is no evidence that
the international community will call Turkey on this. Actual recent
experience, in fact, tells us the opposite.
While Davidian recognizes the subcommission will cause delay in
further international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, he does not
analyze how long that delay may be or the effect the delay will have
if extended over a long period. Foreign Minister Nalbandian told the
Armenian Parliament on October 1 that the historical subcommission
has no time limits "because we realize that this process can last
very long - maybe 10 years, maybe 20 years, maybe 50 years, or maybe
longer." If the Armenian government recognizes the long-term nature
of the subcommission and as long as the Turks can maintain that
the Armenian Genocide issue is still on the table or still subject
to debate or that no conclusion has been reached jointly by the two
sides, we are really speaking about a permanent or semi-permanent end
to official Armenian Genocide recognition because no Western government
will recognize the Armenian Genocide under these circumstances.
The Protocols, therefore, will end the international genocide
recognition campaign as we have known it for the last 50 years.
In conclusion, the Turkish precondition of ending international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide is not stated explicitly, but is
reflected implicitly in the Protocols and is, in fact, achieved through
the establishment of the subcommission on historical matters. This
concession by Armenia runs counter to Armenia's overall security
concept which includes international genocide recognition as an
important element.
Explicitly Recognize the Turkey Armenia Border
As stated earlier, the Turkish demand has not been for an explicit
statement that there are no land claims on Western Armenia as
suggested by Davidian's grid. The Turkish condition has consistently
been recognition of the current de facto border because this will
constitute implicit disavowal of all future territorial claims on
Turkey whether based on President Wilson's arbitration award or on a
genocide reparations theory. Even in the absence of any assertion of
territorial claims, by conceding to this Turkish precondition, Armenia
surrenders one of the few cards it holds in future negotiations with
Turkey on a variety of issues. Both former Armenian Foreign Ministers
Oskanian and Hovannisian have effectively argued that Armenia should
not concede this strategic issue.
Once formally in the Protocols and elevated to the level of a treaty
by ratification of the two countries' parliaments, Armenia loses
the ability to argue for territorial adjustments or to negotiate a
genuine substantive quid pro quo for the surrender of territorial
claims (e.g., irrevocable access to the sea with international
guarantees). Certainly, with the Protocols, any argument based on
Wilson's arbitration award is irrevocably lost and any argument based
on genocide reparations is likely irrevocably lost as well or at best
will be a tremendous uphill battle.
Davidian has argued cogently through his web-site
www.regionalkinetics.com that Armenia to be viable needs an outlet to
the sea. The only two legal bases for achieving that goal are through
territorial adjustments based on President Wilson's arbitration award
or on a genocide reparations theory - both would provide a legal
basis to obtaining the proposed minimum border adjustment advocated by
Davidian on his web-site. Both prongs of the legal argument are lost
or, at least, almost irrevocably lost, however, with the concession
in the Protocols with respect to explicit recognition of the borders.
In the Protocols, Armenia satisfies the Turkish precondition on
recognition of borders although territorial adjustments or irrevocable
easements permitting Armenia access to the sea are critical to
Armenia's long-term security and viability under current conditions.
Withdraw Armenian Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and Surrounding
Territories
Davidian's grid correctly points out that there is no condition in
the Protocols that Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding territories. Nor is there any implicit reflection of this.
As commentators have noted, however, the ratification procedure
contained in the Protocols may provide Turkey the ability to push
Armenia to make further concessions in the Karabakh talks since
the Turkish Parliament may not ratify the Protocols without such
concessions. The Turkish Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and
President have repeatedly stated that the border won't be opened
without "progress" on Nagorno-Karabakh. And we cannot rule out that
the U.S. and Europe, despite their assurances that they support
normalization without preconditions (which has not kept them from
pressuring Armenia on the preconditions in the current Protocols),
will not then use the situation with the Turkish Parliament to
push Armenia to make further concessions on Karabakh that result
in a comprehensive simultaneous "settlement" of the Karabakh and
Turkey-Armenia issues detrimental to Armenia's interests.
Armenia's ability and motivation to press forward with the Armenian
position on Nagorno-Karabakh will also be challenged by the opening of
the border. The Armenian political and economic oligarchic structure,
rampant corruption and lack of democratic institutions and independent
media leave Armenia vulnerable to extensive Turkish influence at all
policy levels.
The questions are: Once the border is open, will the current oligarchs
or some subset of them who benefit economically on a large scale
from the open border and who effectively control the authoritarian
regime in Armenia promote Armenia's interests or Turkey's? Will Turkey
supplant Russia as the regional power who determines Armenian policy
at the macro-level? Although these questions require further study and
analysis on a multi-dimensional level, and while there is no explicit
or implicit condition in the Protocols with respect to the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories,
it certainly seems likely that the Protocols and implementation of
the opening of the border will ultimately have the effect of leading
to concessions by Armenia detrimental both to Nagorno-Karabakh and
to Armenia's own long-term security and viability.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we would offer the following grid
instead of Davidian's:
In summary, the Protocols achieve for Turkey two of its primary
preconditions: (1) ending international recognition of the Armenian
Genocide and (2) explicitly recognizing the Turkey Armenia border
(and implicitly renouncing any territorial claims). The Protocols do
not explicitly or implicitly reflect Turkey's third condition with
respect to the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding territories, but it is likely that both during the process
of Turkish ratification and during and after the implementation of
the opening of the border, Armenia will be compelled through direct
and indirect Turkish and Western pressure to make more concessions
on Nagorno-Karabakh. We obviously cannot predict the extent of those
concessions.
Because all three Turkish preconditions touch issues of, and
significantly harm, Armenia's long-term security and viability as a
state and since at least two of the three preconditions are clearly
achieved through the Protocols, Armenia must neither sign nor ratify
the Protocols in their present form.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://hetq.am/en/politics/turkish-arme nian-protocols-reality-and-irrationality-%e2%80%93 -a-response/#more-18529
2009/10/06 | 19:00
Politics
David Davidian has offered an analysis on the proposed Turkey- Armenia
Protocols in his piece "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and
Irrationality" that leads him to conclude that in the Protocols "the
only item that changes anything is the physical lifting of the Turkish
border blockade" and that Armenia should ratify them without delay.
Davidian's analysis is severely flawed, however, and certainly the
physical lifting of the Turkish blockade is not the only thing that
the Protocols will change. They will change the whole game on issues
of primary importance to Armenia's long-term security and viability
as a state.
Davidian effectively uses a grid to explain his analysis and so the
grid is helpful here in discussing that analysis and presenting our
own. At the end, we will offer our own grid, which will reflect very
different conclusions from those of Davidian.
Davidian's grid is as follows:
The grid lists five conditions to the lifting of the Turkish blockade
that were, according to Davidian suggested, agreed to or dismissed
throughout discussions, post 2005. In fact, there really have been
three principal Turkish conditions to lifting the Turkish blockade
since the early 1990's. They have been the following:
1.End International Recognition of the Armenian Genocide;
2.Explicitly Recognize the Turkey Armenia Border (and thereby
implicitly renounce any territorial claims against Turkey);
3.Withdraw Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding
territories.
One of these preconditions is properly reflected in Davidian's
grid as a condition: "End International Recognition of the
Armenian Genocide." The condition "Armenian Forces Withdraw from
Nagorno-Karabakh" should actually read "Armenian Forces Withdraw
from Nagorno-Karabakh and Surrounding Territories." The "Historical
Commission" is really subsumed in "End International Recognition
of Armenian Genocide." "Explicitly State no Land Claims on Western
Armenia" is misstated: the Turkish diplomatic ask has always been
for Armenia to explicitly recognize the current border (because by
doing so, Armenia would implicitly renounce any future territorial
claims). "Open Border" is the subject of the conditions and not
a condition in and of itself and so doesn't belong in the grid at
all. With the elimination of "Open Border" from the grid, there are no
Armenian preconditions (which is the stated Armenian, U.S. and European
policy) and only Turkish preconditions. The "Suggesting Party" column
is therefore superfluous and the "Condition" column can be re-labeled
"Turkish Preconditions".
We will avoid the semantic gymnastics that President Sarkisian
and Foreign Minister Nalbandian have applied. It is our view that
conditions, preconditions, and to use President Sarkisian's words
"compromises" are the same things for purposes of this discussion.
Davidian's analysis is flawed because it looks only at whether
preconditions are stated explicitly. It does not consider whether
preconditions that are not stated explicitly are in fact reflected
implicitly in, or actually achieved through, the Protocols.
End International Recognition of the Genocide
Davidian's grid correctly reflects that ending genocide recognition
is not expressly in the Protocols.
However, although this precondition does not appear explicitly, it is
reflected implicitly through the establishment of the subcommission on
historical matters. He lists the Historical Commission as a separate
condition, but the establishment of the subcommission is not so much a
condition in itself, but a Turkish strategy for achieving the primary
precondition of ending international recognition of the genocide.
In lobbying for official recognition of the Armenian Genocide,
diasporan Armenians have always faced an insuperable obstacle
when the Armenian Genocide was the topic of bilateral Turkish
and Armenian discussions - this was the case with TARC and again
with the announcement by Turkey and Armenia of the "roadmap"
in April 2009. Davidian recognizes that the establishment of the
subcommission is "at best a method for Turks to delay international
debate on genocide recognition." He argues that the delay tactic
won't work because "Turkish disingenuousness will be clear to the
international community." But the international community finds the
Armenian Genocide recognition campaign an obstacle to maintaining good
relations with an emerging Turkish power and, when under pressure to
recognize the Armenian Genocide from Armenian lobbyist groups, looks
for any convenient cover to avoid taking up the issue. As long as
Turkey can argue there is a process going on (and no matter Armenian
protestations of Turkish disingenuousness), there is no evidence that
the international community will call Turkey on this. Actual recent
experience, in fact, tells us the opposite.
While Davidian recognizes the subcommission will cause delay in
further international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, he does not
analyze how long that delay may be or the effect the delay will have
if extended over a long period. Foreign Minister Nalbandian told the
Armenian Parliament on October 1 that the historical subcommission
has no time limits "because we realize that this process can last
very long - maybe 10 years, maybe 20 years, maybe 50 years, or maybe
longer." If the Armenian government recognizes the long-term nature
of the subcommission and as long as the Turks can maintain that
the Armenian Genocide issue is still on the table or still subject
to debate or that no conclusion has been reached jointly by the two
sides, we are really speaking about a permanent or semi-permanent end
to official Armenian Genocide recognition because no Western government
will recognize the Armenian Genocide under these circumstances.
The Protocols, therefore, will end the international genocide
recognition campaign as we have known it for the last 50 years.
In conclusion, the Turkish precondition of ending international
recognition of the Armenian Genocide is not stated explicitly, but is
reflected implicitly in the Protocols and is, in fact, achieved through
the establishment of the subcommission on historical matters. This
concession by Armenia runs counter to Armenia's overall security
concept which includes international genocide recognition as an
important element.
Explicitly Recognize the Turkey Armenia Border
As stated earlier, the Turkish demand has not been for an explicit
statement that there are no land claims on Western Armenia as
suggested by Davidian's grid. The Turkish condition has consistently
been recognition of the current de facto border because this will
constitute implicit disavowal of all future territorial claims on
Turkey whether based on President Wilson's arbitration award or on a
genocide reparations theory. Even in the absence of any assertion of
territorial claims, by conceding to this Turkish precondition, Armenia
surrenders one of the few cards it holds in future negotiations with
Turkey on a variety of issues. Both former Armenian Foreign Ministers
Oskanian and Hovannisian have effectively argued that Armenia should
not concede this strategic issue.
Once formally in the Protocols and elevated to the level of a treaty
by ratification of the two countries' parliaments, Armenia loses
the ability to argue for territorial adjustments or to negotiate a
genuine substantive quid pro quo for the surrender of territorial
claims (e.g., irrevocable access to the sea with international
guarantees). Certainly, with the Protocols, any argument based on
Wilson's arbitration award is irrevocably lost and any argument based
on genocide reparations is likely irrevocably lost as well or at best
will be a tremendous uphill battle.
Davidian has argued cogently through his web-site
www.regionalkinetics.com that Armenia to be viable needs an outlet to
the sea. The only two legal bases for achieving that goal are through
territorial adjustments based on President Wilson's arbitration award
or on a genocide reparations theory - both would provide a legal
basis to obtaining the proposed minimum border adjustment advocated by
Davidian on his web-site. Both prongs of the legal argument are lost
or, at least, almost irrevocably lost, however, with the concession
in the Protocols with respect to explicit recognition of the borders.
In the Protocols, Armenia satisfies the Turkish precondition on
recognition of borders although territorial adjustments or irrevocable
easements permitting Armenia access to the sea are critical to
Armenia's long-term security and viability under current conditions.
Withdraw Armenian Forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and Surrounding
Territories
Davidian's grid correctly points out that there is no condition in
the Protocols that Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding territories. Nor is there any implicit reflection of this.
As commentators have noted, however, the ratification procedure
contained in the Protocols may provide Turkey the ability to push
Armenia to make further concessions in the Karabakh talks since
the Turkish Parliament may not ratify the Protocols without such
concessions. The Turkish Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and
President have repeatedly stated that the border won't be opened
without "progress" on Nagorno-Karabakh. And we cannot rule out that
the U.S. and Europe, despite their assurances that they support
normalization without preconditions (which has not kept them from
pressuring Armenia on the preconditions in the current Protocols),
will not then use the situation with the Turkish Parliament to
push Armenia to make further concessions on Karabakh that result
in a comprehensive simultaneous "settlement" of the Karabakh and
Turkey-Armenia issues detrimental to Armenia's interests.
Armenia's ability and motivation to press forward with the Armenian
position on Nagorno-Karabakh will also be challenged by the opening of
the border. The Armenian political and economic oligarchic structure,
rampant corruption and lack of democratic institutions and independent
media leave Armenia vulnerable to extensive Turkish influence at all
policy levels.
The questions are: Once the border is open, will the current oligarchs
or some subset of them who benefit economically on a large scale
from the open border and who effectively control the authoritarian
regime in Armenia promote Armenia's interests or Turkey's? Will Turkey
supplant Russia as the regional power who determines Armenian policy
at the macro-level? Although these questions require further study and
analysis on a multi-dimensional level, and while there is no explicit
or implicit condition in the Protocols with respect to the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories,
it certainly seems likely that the Protocols and implementation of
the opening of the border will ultimately have the effect of leading
to concessions by Armenia detrimental both to Nagorno-Karabakh and
to Armenia's own long-term security and viability.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we would offer the following grid
instead of Davidian's:
In summary, the Protocols achieve for Turkey two of its primary
preconditions: (1) ending international recognition of the Armenian
Genocide and (2) explicitly recognizing the Turkey Armenia border
(and implicitly renouncing any territorial claims). The Protocols do
not explicitly or implicitly reflect Turkey's third condition with
respect to the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Nagorno-Karabakh and
surrounding territories, but it is likely that both during the process
of Turkish ratification and during and after the implementation of
the opening of the border, Armenia will be compelled through direct
and indirect Turkish and Western pressure to make more concessions
on Nagorno-Karabakh. We obviously cannot predict the extent of those
concessions.
Because all three Turkish preconditions touch issues of, and
significantly harm, Armenia's long-term security and viability as a
state and since at least two of the three preconditions are clearly
achieved through the Protocols, Armenia must neither sign nor ratify
the Protocols in their present form.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress