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Does a new treaty on European security have a future?
00:1103/10/2009
MOSCOW. (Vladimir Ryzhkov for RIA Novosti) -At a recent UN General
Assembly in New York, President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated last year's
proposal to draft and sign a comprehensive treaty on European
security.
In the last few years, Russia has been frustrated by the international
organizations in which it holds membership. They have been near idle,
as with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), or have reduced their activities to what Moscow considers
interference in the internal affairs of Russia and other
countries. The Council of Europe and, again, the OSCE have been
monitoring elections, human rights, freedom of speech, etc.
These actions have been accompanied by NATO's eastward expansion,
deployment of new weapons and renunciation of commitments under the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) (for instance, the
recently abandoned U.S. plan to deploy missile defense in Poland and
the Czech Republic). In Moscow's opinion, these are attempts to
guarantee one's own security at the expense of Russia and other
countries.
Russia cannot accept NATO's claims to play the role of all but the
only guarantor of security in Europe, the OSCE's reluctance to do
anything regarding the first and second "baskets", or the unilateral
policy of the United States, which has ignored not only the UN
Security Council, but often even its own allies in Europe in the last
few years.
Medvedev urged all concerned parties to draft and sign a legally
binding treaty based on the principle of indivisibility of security,
which would secure, in part, a commitment "not to guarantee one's own
security at the expense of others." At a forum on international
security in Evian, France, he suggested that the parties of the
proposed treaty should assume the following commitments:
- reaffirm basic principles of security and interstate relations in
the Euro-Atlantic space;
- consider the use of force or its threat in international relations
unacceptab
qual security for all;
- not to allow any state or international organization to have an
exclusive right to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe;
- establish basic parameters for arms control and reasonable
sufficiency in the military strength.
These general principles suggest that Moscow wants the United States
and the West in general to give it legal guarantees on the following:
- cessation of NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders, primarily,
Ukraine and Georgia's non-admission;
- renunciation of the deployment of new military hardware and
facilities in Europe, imposition of ceilings on armaments, which can
be changed only by agreement between the parties;
- legal and practical delimitation of the zones of responsibility (or
spheres of influence) between major security organizations in Greater
Europe - NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
OSCE and probably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO);
- limitation of U.S. unilateral activity in the region, including in
those countries which Moscow considers its "sphere of vital
interests."
Speaking about the format of the new treaty, Medvedev suggested OSCE
modernization, vesting it with new authority. He believes it should
concentrate on the first "basket". In this case, as a pan-European
organization, which includes Russia, OSCE could break NATO's emerging
monopoly, and pursue a uniform security policy in the entire
region. In other words, Medvedev suggested a Helsinki-plus agreement.
However, there are doubts that this most meaningful Russian initiative
in the last few years will find enough supporters and be carried out,
for a variety of reasons.
First, many countries do not share Moscow's opinion on the
inadequacies of the existing security system. To the contrary, it
fully suits the majority (not only the United States, but most of the
European countries). Statements to this effect have already been made
by the U.S., EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy Javier Solana, and by other high-rankin
ctive use of existing mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council,
OSCE, and a permanent dialogue between Russia and the European Union.
Second, it does not seem worthwhile to establish a new organization,
when members of the existing ones violate their commitments
(recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia's failure
to comply with its commitments in the Council of Europe, NATO's
unilateral actions, etc.)
The main problem is not the structure of these organizations but the
lack of trust and mutual understanding between their
participants. This often blocks decision-making in the UN Security
Council, paralyzes the OSCE, and the NATO-Russia Council, and
obstructs dialogue between Russia and the EU and in the Council of
Europe. Any new organization could also be paralyzed in much the same
manner.
Conclusion of a new treaty requires a consensus between all states of
the Euro-Atlantic region. Would it be signed by Serbia, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan without revising the decisions to recognize
Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, or without settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue? Are such a revision and such settlement
possible? Without these countries, and another dozen states with
unsettled grievances, how would a proposed new treaty be
comprehensive?
The new security treaty is unlikely to materialize. At the same time,
the discussion of its proposed provisions may be useful in specifying
the positions of the parties, in their consideration in practical
policy, in enhancing the effectiveness of the existing organizations
and formats of cooperation, and in establishing cooperation between
international organizations that never cooperated before (for example,
NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO). Such debates could facilitate an
elaboration of a much needed spirit of trust and mutual
understanding. Dialogue between Russia and the EU can play a key role
in this process. In 2003, they agreed to build a common security
space. It is essential to seal this agreement in the new Russia-EU
Treaty, which is now being d
yzhkov is a member of the presidium of the Council for Foreign and
Defense Policy, professor of the Higher School of Economics.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
00:1103/10/2009
MOSCOW. (Vladimir Ryzhkov for RIA Novosti) -At a recent UN General
Assembly in New York, President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated last year's
proposal to draft and sign a comprehensive treaty on European
security.
In the last few years, Russia has been frustrated by the international
organizations in which it holds membership. They have been near idle,
as with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), or have reduced their activities to what Moscow considers
interference in the internal affairs of Russia and other
countries. The Council of Europe and, again, the OSCE have been
monitoring elections, human rights, freedom of speech, etc.
These actions have been accompanied by NATO's eastward expansion,
deployment of new weapons and renunciation of commitments under the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) (for instance, the
recently abandoned U.S. plan to deploy missile defense in Poland and
the Czech Republic). In Moscow's opinion, these are attempts to
guarantee one's own security at the expense of Russia and other
countries.
Russia cannot accept NATO's claims to play the role of all but the
only guarantor of security in Europe, the OSCE's reluctance to do
anything regarding the first and second "baskets", or the unilateral
policy of the United States, which has ignored not only the UN
Security Council, but often even its own allies in Europe in the last
few years.
Medvedev urged all concerned parties to draft and sign a legally
binding treaty based on the principle of indivisibility of security,
which would secure, in part, a commitment "not to guarantee one's own
security at the expense of others." At a forum on international
security in Evian, France, he suggested that the parties of the
proposed treaty should assume the following commitments:
- reaffirm basic principles of security and interstate relations in
the Euro-Atlantic space;
- consider the use of force or its threat in international relations
unacceptab
qual security for all;
- not to allow any state or international organization to have an
exclusive right to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe;
- establish basic parameters for arms control and reasonable
sufficiency in the military strength.
These general principles suggest that Moscow wants the United States
and the West in general to give it legal guarantees on the following:
- cessation of NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders, primarily,
Ukraine and Georgia's non-admission;
- renunciation of the deployment of new military hardware and
facilities in Europe, imposition of ceilings on armaments, which can
be changed only by agreement between the parties;
- legal and practical delimitation of the zones of responsibility (or
spheres of influence) between major security organizations in Greater
Europe - NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
OSCE and probably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO);
- limitation of U.S. unilateral activity in the region, including in
those countries which Moscow considers its "sphere of vital
interests."
Speaking about the format of the new treaty, Medvedev suggested OSCE
modernization, vesting it with new authority. He believes it should
concentrate on the first "basket". In this case, as a pan-European
organization, which includes Russia, OSCE could break NATO's emerging
monopoly, and pursue a uniform security policy in the entire
region. In other words, Medvedev suggested a Helsinki-plus agreement.
However, there are doubts that this most meaningful Russian initiative
in the last few years will find enough supporters and be carried out,
for a variety of reasons.
First, many countries do not share Moscow's opinion on the
inadequacies of the existing security system. To the contrary, it
fully suits the majority (not only the United States, but most of the
European countries). Statements to this effect have already been made
by the U.S., EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy Javier Solana, and by other high-rankin
ctive use of existing mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council,
OSCE, and a permanent dialogue between Russia and the European Union.
Second, it does not seem worthwhile to establish a new organization,
when members of the existing ones violate their commitments
(recognition of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia's failure
to comply with its commitments in the Council of Europe, NATO's
unilateral actions, etc.)
The main problem is not the structure of these organizations but the
lack of trust and mutual understanding between their
participants. This often blocks decision-making in the UN Security
Council, paralyzes the OSCE, and the NATO-Russia Council, and
obstructs dialogue between Russia and the EU and in the Council of
Europe. Any new organization could also be paralyzed in much the same
manner.
Conclusion of a new treaty requires a consensus between all states of
the Euro-Atlantic region. Would it be signed by Serbia, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan without revising the decisions to recognize
Kosovo, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, or without settling the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue? Are such a revision and such settlement
possible? Without these countries, and another dozen states with
unsettled grievances, how would a proposed new treaty be
comprehensive?
The new security treaty is unlikely to materialize. At the same time,
the discussion of its proposed provisions may be useful in specifying
the positions of the parties, in their consideration in practical
policy, in enhancing the effectiveness of the existing organizations
and formats of cooperation, and in establishing cooperation between
international organizations that never cooperated before (for example,
NATO, the CSTO, and the SCO). Such debates could facilitate an
elaboration of a much needed spirit of trust and mutual
understanding. Dialogue between Russia and the EU can play a key role
in this process. In 2003, they agreed to build a common security
space. It is essential to seal this agreement in the new Russia-EU
Treaty, which is now being d
yzhkov is a member of the presidium of the Council for Foreign and
Defense Policy, professor of the Higher School of Economics.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.