Tweet
Bloomberg
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Accord Won't Be Ratified by Dec. 5 Deadline
By Janine Zacharia
Oct. 10 (Bloomberg) -- The renewal of a treaty governing U.S. and
Russian nuclear stockpiles likely won't be ratified by the U.S. Senate
by the time the old one expires Dec. 5, creating a vacuum of at least
several months.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will arrive in Moscow on Oct. 12 to
try to wrap up a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,
under which the U.S., Russia and other former Soviet republics have
destroyed hundreds of bombers and ballistic missiles and removed
thousands of nuclear warheads from their operational forces.
Clinton left last night for Zurich where she is scheduled to witness
Turkey and Armenia today sign protocols toward establishing diplomatic
ties. She will also travel to London, Dublin, Belfast and Kazan,
Russia, in addition to Moscow.
While U.S. officials said they are still aiming to deliver an arms
reduction agreement to President Barack Obama to sign by the Dec. 5
deadline, the Senate likely won't be able to take it up until at least
early next year.
`Even if the administration were that adept, the Senate is not,' said
John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation in Washington. `There's going to be a gap between
the old START agreement and the new one.'
Senator Robert Corker, a Tennessee Republican who met with
U.S. negotiators Oct. 8, said in an interview that they expect a
possible Senate ratification vote in April or May.
Along with START, Clinton will use her trip to Moscow to address
international issues such as Iran's nuclear program and the war in
Afghanistan. She will meet with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov.
`Review Progress'
`They'll review progress and provide further guidance to our
negotiators on a successor agreement to START, they'll discuss
bilateral and regional issues such as cooperation in Afghanistan,
Iran, the Middle East and North Korea,' A
.
Iranian negotiators are scheduled to meet with officials from the
U.S., Russia and France in Vienna on Oct. 19 to discuss a project to
enrich nuclear fuel for a research reactor in Iran.
That meeting is aimed at exploring a method for transferring 1,200
kilos of low-enriched uranium to Russia. Iran agreed earlier this
month to consider sending most of its stock of enriched uranium to
Russia and France to be converted into fuel for an Iranian research
reactor for medical purposes.
Gap Period
During the gap until a new START nuclear treaty takes effect, there
likely will be some sort of `informal agreement to live up to' until
ratification takes place, Isaacs said.
There is little indication the Senate will oppose a new START treaty,
unlike the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that President Bill
Clinton signed and the Senate rejected, Isaacs said.
`Deadlines are important, but even more important will be a final
treaty that provides real benefits to our nation's security,'
Frederick Jones, a spokesman for John Kerry, the Massachusetts
Democrat who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said. `Senator Kerry is confident that our negotiators are doing all
that they can to achieve that goal.'
Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the top Republican on the committee,
said in June that `the foundation of the United States-Russian
strategic relationship is at risk of collapsing before the end of the
year.'
Corker, who also serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said Russia likely will benefit more than the U.S. from the new
treaty.
`Our warheads are very aged,' Corker said. `I don't see how any of us
could support ratifying a START treaty unless the administration makes
an absolute commitment to modernizing our arsenal.'
Enhancing Security
A State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said
a new START treaty would enhance U.S. national security. The treaty is
meant to preserve a stable international strategic environment as well
as verification r nuclear force, the official said.
Getting a new treaty in place swiftly is vital, says Daryl Kimball,
executive director of the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based
policy group.
Without the verification and monitoring provided by the treaty, `the
U.S. intelligence community will be hard-pressed to provide a reliable
assessment of what the Russians are doing over the long haul,' Kimball
said.
`How do you ensure you don't lose the legally binding verification and
transparency arrangements the U.S. regards as important,' said William
Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in
California. `There may be some discussion at the secretary of state
level about what are the most practical options.'
Counting Warheads
Among the sticking points Clinton are the number of delivery vehicles
and warheads that each side will be limited to having and details on
verification mechanisms.
Obama and Medvedev agreed earlier this year to reduce U.S. and Russian
strategic warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675 and limit delivery
vehicles to 500 to 1,100 each.
Under the expiring START and Moscow Treaty signed by President George
W. Bush in 2002, the maximum allowable level of warheads is 2,200 and
the maximum allowable level of launch vehicles is 1,600.
The issue of how to count warheads is one of the main divisive issues,
observers said, specifically whether to count the devices deployed on
missiles or those kept in storage.
`A key component of this new agreement is what are we counting as a
strategic nuclear system, as a strategic warhead? When is something
deployed?' Kimball said. `Do we count ballistic missiles that the
U.S. doesn't have in a submarine but are onshore?'
Another negotiating point is whether the treaty would limit the number
of warheads that can be carried on each missile. There could also be a
discussion during Clinton's visit about missile defense and whether
the U.S. and Russia can collaborate a radar system.
To contact the reporter on this story: Janine Zacharia in Washington
at [email protected].
Last Updated: October 10, 2009 00:01 EDT
U.S.-Russia Nuclear Accord Won't Be Ratified by Dec. 5 Deadline
By Janine Zacharia
Oct. 10 (Bloomberg) -- The renewal of a treaty governing U.S. and
Russian nuclear stockpiles likely won't be ratified by the U.S. Senate
by the time the old one expires Dec. 5, creating a vacuum of at least
several months.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will arrive in Moscow on Oct. 12 to
try to wrap up a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,
under which the U.S., Russia and other former Soviet republics have
destroyed hundreds of bombers and ballistic missiles and removed
thousands of nuclear warheads from their operational forces.
Clinton left last night for Zurich where she is scheduled to witness
Turkey and Armenia today sign protocols toward establishing diplomatic
ties. She will also travel to London, Dublin, Belfast and Kazan,
Russia, in addition to Moscow.
While U.S. officials said they are still aiming to deliver an arms
reduction agreement to President Barack Obama to sign by the Dec. 5
deadline, the Senate likely won't be able to take it up until at least
early next year.
`Even if the administration were that adept, the Senate is not,' said
John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation in Washington. `There's going to be a gap between
the old START agreement and the new one.'
Senator Robert Corker, a Tennessee Republican who met with
U.S. negotiators Oct. 8, said in an interview that they expect a
possible Senate ratification vote in April or May.
Along with START, Clinton will use her trip to Moscow to address
international issues such as Iran's nuclear program and the war in
Afghanistan. She will meet with President Dmitry Medvedev and Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov.
`Review Progress'
`They'll review progress and provide further guidance to our
negotiators on a successor agreement to START, they'll discuss
bilateral and regional issues such as cooperation in Afghanistan,
Iran, the Middle East and North Korea,' A
.
Iranian negotiators are scheduled to meet with officials from the
U.S., Russia and France in Vienna on Oct. 19 to discuss a project to
enrich nuclear fuel for a research reactor in Iran.
That meeting is aimed at exploring a method for transferring 1,200
kilos of low-enriched uranium to Russia. Iran agreed earlier this
month to consider sending most of its stock of enriched uranium to
Russia and France to be converted into fuel for an Iranian research
reactor for medical purposes.
Gap Period
During the gap until a new START nuclear treaty takes effect, there
likely will be some sort of `informal agreement to live up to' until
ratification takes place, Isaacs said.
There is little indication the Senate will oppose a new START treaty,
unlike the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that President Bill
Clinton signed and the Senate rejected, Isaacs said.
`Deadlines are important, but even more important will be a final
treaty that provides real benefits to our nation's security,'
Frederick Jones, a spokesman for John Kerry, the Massachusetts
Democrat who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said. `Senator Kerry is confident that our negotiators are doing all
that they can to achieve that goal.'
Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, the top Republican on the committee,
said in June that `the foundation of the United States-Russian
strategic relationship is at risk of collapsing before the end of the
year.'
Corker, who also serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said Russia likely will benefit more than the U.S. from the new
treaty.
`Our warheads are very aged,' Corker said. `I don't see how any of us
could support ratifying a START treaty unless the administration makes
an absolute commitment to modernizing our arsenal.'
Enhancing Security
A State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said
a new START treaty would enhance U.S. national security. The treaty is
meant to preserve a stable international strategic environment as well
as verification r nuclear force, the official said.
Getting a new treaty in place swiftly is vital, says Daryl Kimball,
executive director of the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based
policy group.
Without the verification and monitoring provided by the treaty, `the
U.S. intelligence community will be hard-pressed to provide a reliable
assessment of what the Russians are doing over the long haul,' Kimball
said.
`How do you ensure you don't lose the legally binding verification and
transparency arrangements the U.S. regards as important,' said William
Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in
California. `There may be some discussion at the secretary of state
level about what are the most practical options.'
Counting Warheads
Among the sticking points Clinton are the number of delivery vehicles
and warheads that each side will be limited to having and details on
verification mechanisms.
Obama and Medvedev agreed earlier this year to reduce U.S. and Russian
strategic warheads to between 1,500 and 1,675 and limit delivery
vehicles to 500 to 1,100 each.
Under the expiring START and Moscow Treaty signed by President George
W. Bush in 2002, the maximum allowable level of warheads is 2,200 and
the maximum allowable level of launch vehicles is 1,600.
The issue of how to count warheads is one of the main divisive issues,
observers said, specifically whether to count the devices deployed on
missiles or those kept in storage.
`A key component of this new agreement is what are we counting as a
strategic nuclear system, as a strategic warhead? When is something
deployed?' Kimball said. `Do we count ballistic missiles that the
U.S. doesn't have in a submarine but are onshore?'
Another negotiating point is whether the treaty would limit the number
of warheads that can be carried on each missile. There could also be a
discussion during Clinton's visit about missile defense and whether
the U.S. and Russia can collaborate a radar system.
To contact the reporter on this story: Janine Zacharia in Washington
at [email protected].
Last Updated: October 10, 2009 00:01 EDT