Tweet
THERIAULT: THE FINAL STAGE OF GENOCIDE: CONSOLIDATION
By Henry Theriault
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/10/ 11/theriault-the-final-stage-of-genocide-consolida tion/
October 11, 2009
This essay is an analysis of the Turkish-Armenian protocol process in
relation to the Armenian Genocide. I say "protocol process" because
mere analysis of the protocols themselves cannot be meaningful. The
protocols exist within a complex historical, cultural, political, and
geopolitical context dominated by genocide and its aftermath. It is
impossible to interpret accurately the meaning of particular elements
of the protocols without reference to that context.
Before I offer my analysis, I must point out that there has emerged
a certain conceptual muddle in recent self-declared "objective" or
"rational" evaluations of the protocols. I am especially concerned
by Asbed Kotchikian's neutralist analysis and David Davidian's
claimed "rational" analysis, both of which dismiss much of the recent
diasporan discourse on the protocols that challenges their value and
legitimacy (Kotchikian, "The Armenian-Turkish Protocols and Public
(Dis)Content," Armenian Weekly On-line, October 4, 2009, and Davidian,
"Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and Irrationality," Armenian
Weekly On-line, October 1, 2009).
The conceptual muddle is this: Neutrality is not inherently
objectivity and dispassion is not inherently rationality. In fact,
neutrality itself is a position that can be biased or irrational,
if the facts and logic call for taking a position one way or
another on an issue. Furthermore, a person who chooses to advocate a
position in strong terms is not by that fact automatically biased or
irrational. Rationality-logic-is a form of thought in which reasons
are given in support of a claim. Far from it being illogical to take a
position on an issue, reasonable people have a moral responsibility to
take positions if the facts and reason warrant doing so. The question
of rationality is simply the question of whether one provides reasoning
(facts and logical connection of the facts to the position advocated)
to support one's position. Unequivocal advocacy of a position, no
matter how "all or nothing" (to quote Davidian), is not inherently
irrational. A viewpoint is non-rational if it is not supported by
logically connected reasons in support of the position or supported by
facts that are not convincingly connected to the position advocated. A
position is irrational if it contradicts or culpably ignores known
evidence and the logical connections of that evidence to the question
at hand. While of course there are irrational and biased individuals
in any large group, overall, the numerous dissenting Armenian voices
rejecting the protocols present rational arguments based on factual
evidence for rejection. While one might challenge the logic and dispute
the claimed facts, the fact that some rational people disagree with
rejection of the protocols does not mean that those who reject them
are irrational.
Perhaps with some dramatic irony, in his own thinking Davidian himself
presents us with a very good example of irrationality. In the opening
sections of his piece, he states that if Armenia chooses to reject
international pressure to "discuss historical issues" (read: discuss
whether a genocide happened) with Turkey, then the situation will be
analogous to Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to stop "ethnic cleansing"
(does Davidian mean in 1995 in Bosnia or in 1999 in Kosovo?) because
he believed (most genocide perpetrators, as contemporaneous genocide
deniers, do) that the Serbs "didn't start it." Davidian points out that
Serbs were bombed and were foolish not to yield to the pressure as
Armenia appears poised to. Thus, Armenians today would be irrational
not to cave to the international pressure being applied to them. But,
an analogy is the presentation of a situation, argument, or event
(1) that is emotionally, politically, culturally, etc., neutral for
the author/speaker and/or his/her audience and (2) that has strong
relevant structural similarities to a situation, argument, or event to
which the author/speaker and/or audience have emotional, political,
cultural, etc., connections to. The goal is to allow dispassionate
analysis of the latter situation, in order to see things that
proximity and emotion obscure. An analogy depends on the structural
similarity between the things analogized. But Davidian is comparing
(1) a post-genocidal victim state and society that have attempted
to engage the international community, including Turkey, on the past
genocide (though of course not in the way the perpetrator, committed to
denial, would like) with (2) a perpetrator state actively engaged in
an act of genocide and organized around pathological rationalization
of that genocide despite legitimate international objection to and
pressure against it. That Davidian finds it logically valid to liken
the situation of the Armenian state and society today to Serbia at
the time it was committing genocide does not call into !
question tocols but to Davidian's own pretentions to logical
analysis. When the issue is negotiation over the truth about a
genocide, by definition the logical positioning of a state that is
heir to a victim society cannot be analogous to the positioning of a
perpetrator state. To suggest that Armenia would face military force
for not signing the protocols in the way that Serbia faced bombing
because it was participating in genocide makes no sense. Indeed, the
real lesson regarding Serbia is that a state can do much more against
international pressure than Armenia is doing-indeed, participate in
a genocide for three years-without being subjected to any meaningful
outside intervention for quite awhile, which is the opposite message
from what Davidian suggests.
Let me qualify this somewhat. A victim state cannot be analogized
to a perpetrator state in so far as the former is a victim state. If
Armenia were to commit a genocide itself, then this would be the basis
of an analogy between it and Serbia. In addition, if a particular
individual or group within Armenia adopted a denialist position and
agenda similar to that in Turkey, there could be some kind of analogy
based on this as well. But this is not what Davidian is claiming.
Now to the analysis. It has become a truism that "denial is the
final stage of genocide." Greg Stanton, the former president of the
International Association of Genocide Scholars, for instance, asserts
this in his stage theory of genocide. But, as with many truisms,
this one is false. That denial is present long after a genocide
does not mean that denial is the final stage of a genocide. Denial
is present at many stages of a genocide. With very few exceptions,
denials are issued by perpetrators while they are committing genocide.
Denials are typically offered immediately after a genocide to prevent
accountability of individual perpetrators as well as the perpetrator
society. One need only look at the court transcripts of trials of
Rwanda or Bosnia Genocide perpetrators to confirm this. And, denials
are offered in the long-term aftermath of a genocide to cover up the
historical facts. The motives for this include such things as the
desperate desire to preserve the legitimacy of an ideology and linked
sense of group identity in the face of exposure of the genocidal nature
of that ideology, the desire to prevent reparations in terms of land
and/or wealth, and a sense of shame among members of the perpetrator
society that is not coupled with a moral commitment to rectify the
impact of the past. Given this, denial is dominant in the long-term
aftermath of genocide, but it is an instrument for deeper goals.
The last stage of genocide is consolidation of the gains of the
genocide. In this stage, the perpetrator group tries to establish the
results of the genocide as the status quo, rather than a persisting
violation requiring rectification. It uses denial as a tool, because
if deniers convince enough people that a genocide did not happen or
is doubtful, then these people will see the existing post-genocidal
state of affairs as legitimate. They will see the small population of
the victims, their political weakness, their cultural tenuousness,
their relative poverty, and so forth as the natural result of an
uneventful history. If a perpetrator society can effectively deny the
past genocide, it will succeed in keeping what the direct perpetrators
gained for it.
To the credit of Stanton and others who view denial as the last stage
of genocide, it is typically the dominant activity of the perpetrators
in the long-term aftermath of genocide. What is more, even when the
possibility of material rectification is lessened, the perpetrators
or their progeny typically aggressive seek to cover up even the
knowledge of the genocide, to achieve full erasure of its victims and
full validation of the perpetrators such that they do not even pay
a moral price for the past. Such figures as Elie Wiesel and Israel
Charny have commented on this attempted final conceptual erasure.
But, sometimes denial fails to change perceptions of history or
at least to produce a stalemate in which the issue is viewed as a
perpetual and irresolvable conflict between two parties over history,
which is a victory for perpetrators in so far as they are allowed to
keep the material, political, ideological, and cultural gains of the
genocide for the foreseeable future. In such a case, denial has become
ineffective, but consolidation is still the goal. The perpetrator
state will seek to consolidate the gains of the genocide in question
by some other means.
This is precisely what we are seeing with the new protocols. Denial
has failed the Turkish state, and until April 2009 the pressure
was mounting to deal with the legacy of the Armenian Genocide
in a meaningful manner. That pressure had intensified especially
over the past two years through the challenges posed by activists,
journalists, and intellectuals inside Turkey after the Hrant Dink
assassination shocked morally-grounded members of Turkish society with
the genocidal anti-Armenianism that had previously been rationalized
by their government or hidden from their view. The stage was set for
the kind of real transformation in Turkey that can be the only path
toward a genuine improvement in Armenian-Turkish relations.
The protocols are the last-ditch response by the Turkish government to
protect and solidify the gains of the genocide. Through them, Turkey
has gone from the brink of required justice to a potential victory
deniers could only dream of three decades ago. What the protocols do
is achieve agreement from the putative representative of the victim
community that the perpetrator's successor state and society will
never have to give up the land gained through the genocide nor make
any material restitution for the horrific suffering imposed on the
victim community, which still reverberates today. What the protocols
ensure is that the weak and poor Armenia produced by the genocide will
become the permanent state of Armenians, while the increased power,
prestige, land, wealth, and ideological security the Turkish state
and society gained through genocide will remain its. In other words,
the protocols finish the Armenian Genocide as successfully as the
pro-genocidal segment of today's Turkey ever could have hoped. The
protocols are the last stage of the Armenian Genocide, the successful
completion of the Armenian Genocide.
It is telling that an important element of the protocols is the
reinsertion of denial of the Armenian Genocide as a credible position
by agreement of the Armenian government itself. This is the meaning of
the provision for a historical commission to study the mutual history
of the two protocol partners. Denial is the official position of
the Turkish government and clearly the starting position for their
participation in such a commission. The fact that the protocols
do not specify that the commission will consider the issue of
"the Armenian Genocide" shows that Turkey wants to maintain this
position. Given that its government and academic leaders know full
well a genocide occurred, there is no reason Turkey would not just
admit the genocide if it were not intent on maintaining denial. As
Roger Smith, the former president of the International Association of
Genocide Scholars and current chair of the Academic Board of Directors
of the Zoryan Institute, states in his Sept. 30 letter to Armenian
President Sarkisian, Turkey would even be bound by its own laws to
reject a finding of genocide by this historical commission. Of course,
it is unlikely that the commission's membership will be constituted
in such a way as to allow that result to emerge-we are sure to see
Turkey insist on deniers as members of the commission. In this way,
the denial campaign that has faltered and been widely discredited
will be relegitimized within the process that has resulted from the
denial's failure in the first place. The irony is thick here.
For Armenians to acquiesce in this is not merely to betray the memories
of those who died and those who survived. It is not merely to accept
one of the great grand larcenies of history and the debilitating
poverty that has resulted. It is to accept the permanence of the
destruction of Armenian political, social, cultural, and economic
life, rather than receive the rehabilitative rectification that world
ethical and legal principles unequivocally recognize as the victims'
desperate need and right.
Davidian and others argue that Armenia and Armenians have no choice
and should try to get what they can in the face of this inevitable
destruction. But, if, as many in Armenia and outside have argued,
Armenia's survival depends on some rectification of the genocide that
continues to impact it materially,
geopolitically, etc., then acquiescing is dangerous self-delusion. It
is yet another instance of Armenians in a desperate situation giving
up and embracing a thoughtless, irrational faith that those who have
done them great harm in the past and present will somehow suddenly
change utterly and things will work out. It is the mentality of
the beaten, the destroyed, the resigned. It is the mentality that
Armenian Genocide survivors rejected despite the horrific suffering
they experienced. Can we do less now?
Davidian claims that the geopolitical realities of Armenia's
existence preclude it "from engaging in zero sum inanity, such as
demanding an all-or-nothing state of affairs." The idea is that
realism should replace ethical principle as the basis of Armenian
decision-making. But, given the history with Turkey, given its clear
intentions and absolute lack of repentance for the Armenian Genocide to
the point where it cannot even recognize the genocide in the interest
of negotiating better relations with Armenia, it would be truly
"inane" to enter into an agreement that depends on Turkey working
with Armenia in good faith. It is not just that it is wrong to trade
recognition of the Armenian Genocide for some short-term economic
benefit (which might prove illusory anyway); the trade cannot work by
its very nature. The fact that the perpetrator successor state remains
committed to denial of the genocide and thus to the acceptability of
genocide as a tool against Armenians makes it impossible for it to
enter a productive relationship with Armenia and Armenians. So long
as the Turkish state and society remain unrepentant for the genocide,
Armenians have no choice but to require an all-or-nothing state of
affairs regarding the Armenian Genocide. It is Turkish denial and
approval of genocide that forces Armenians into this position.
Contrary to Davidian's assertion, such an all-or-nothing ethics-based
approach that rejects coercion by the pressure of "interests"
and power is anything but irrational. We need look no further than
Plato's Republic and Gorgias to see advocacy of ethical principle
over realpolitik by a thinker universally recognized as one of the
most rational in human history. Of course, those who understand how
social movements really work, how they succeed, will recognize this
all-or-nothing strategy as quite practical, and not only because the
squeaky wheel gets the oil or because pressing such demands pushes
the compromise point of the negotiation further toward the goals of
that squeaky wheel. It wasn't those who accepted segregation because
it was backed by tremendous political, cultural, social, and military
power whose view of race relations changed the United States; it was
Malcolm X's and Martin Luther King's all-or-nothing challenges. India
was not freed from the British because Gandhi compromised with the
British, but because he asserted an all-or-nothing requirement for
independence and dignity. What is striking about these examples-and
many others from history-is that these all-or-nothing demands came
from positions of great material, political, and military weakness and
yet still succeeded because of the moral strength of the position of
the "weak" vis-a-vis the "strong." Moral legitimacy is a great force
in geopolitics and is the reliable ally of the weak, oppressed, and
marginalized. It is the force that those committed to power politics,
realpolitik, fear so desperately that they incessantly mock it as
if whistling in the dark, ridiculing those who believe in it in the
hope that they will stop believing and thus be tricked into giving up
the most powerful tool of change. It is Armenia's one advantage today,
and the present leadership, through unhistorical, naive "realpolitical"
calculations of the web of power and interests around them, are about
to squander it.
Henry Theriault is a Professor of Philosophy at Worcester State
College.
By Henry Theriault
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/10/ 11/theriault-the-final-stage-of-genocide-consolida tion/
October 11, 2009
This essay is an analysis of the Turkish-Armenian protocol process in
relation to the Armenian Genocide. I say "protocol process" because
mere analysis of the protocols themselves cannot be meaningful. The
protocols exist within a complex historical, cultural, political, and
geopolitical context dominated by genocide and its aftermath. It is
impossible to interpret accurately the meaning of particular elements
of the protocols without reference to that context.
Before I offer my analysis, I must point out that there has emerged
a certain conceptual muddle in recent self-declared "objective" or
"rational" evaluations of the protocols. I am especially concerned
by Asbed Kotchikian's neutralist analysis and David Davidian's
claimed "rational" analysis, both of which dismiss much of the recent
diasporan discourse on the protocols that challenges their value and
legitimacy (Kotchikian, "The Armenian-Turkish Protocols and Public
(Dis)Content," Armenian Weekly On-line, October 4, 2009, and Davidian,
"Turkish-Armenian Protocols: Reality and Irrationality," Armenian
Weekly On-line, October 1, 2009).
The conceptual muddle is this: Neutrality is not inherently
objectivity and dispassion is not inherently rationality. In fact,
neutrality itself is a position that can be biased or irrational,
if the facts and logic call for taking a position one way or
another on an issue. Furthermore, a person who chooses to advocate a
position in strong terms is not by that fact automatically biased or
irrational. Rationality-logic-is a form of thought in which reasons
are given in support of a claim. Far from it being illogical to take a
position on an issue, reasonable people have a moral responsibility to
take positions if the facts and reason warrant doing so. The question
of rationality is simply the question of whether one provides reasoning
(facts and logical connection of the facts to the position advocated)
to support one's position. Unequivocal advocacy of a position, no
matter how "all or nothing" (to quote Davidian), is not inherently
irrational. A viewpoint is non-rational if it is not supported by
logically connected reasons in support of the position or supported by
facts that are not convincingly connected to the position advocated. A
position is irrational if it contradicts or culpably ignores known
evidence and the logical connections of that evidence to the question
at hand. While of course there are irrational and biased individuals
in any large group, overall, the numerous dissenting Armenian voices
rejecting the protocols present rational arguments based on factual
evidence for rejection. While one might challenge the logic and dispute
the claimed facts, the fact that some rational people disagree with
rejection of the protocols does not mean that those who reject them
are irrational.
Perhaps with some dramatic irony, in his own thinking Davidian himself
presents us with a very good example of irrationality. In the opening
sections of his piece, he states that if Armenia chooses to reject
international pressure to "discuss historical issues" (read: discuss
whether a genocide happened) with Turkey, then the situation will be
analogous to Slobodan Milosevic's refusal to stop "ethnic cleansing"
(does Davidian mean in 1995 in Bosnia or in 1999 in Kosovo?) because
he believed (most genocide perpetrators, as contemporaneous genocide
deniers, do) that the Serbs "didn't start it." Davidian points out that
Serbs were bombed and were foolish not to yield to the pressure as
Armenia appears poised to. Thus, Armenians today would be irrational
not to cave to the international pressure being applied to them. But,
an analogy is the presentation of a situation, argument, or event
(1) that is emotionally, politically, culturally, etc., neutral for
the author/speaker and/or his/her audience and (2) that has strong
relevant structural similarities to a situation, argument, or event to
which the author/speaker and/or audience have emotional, political,
cultural, etc., connections to. The goal is to allow dispassionate
analysis of the latter situation, in order to see things that
proximity and emotion obscure. An analogy depends on the structural
similarity between the things analogized. But Davidian is comparing
(1) a post-genocidal victim state and society that have attempted
to engage the international community, including Turkey, on the past
genocide (though of course not in the way the perpetrator, committed to
denial, would like) with (2) a perpetrator state actively engaged in
an act of genocide and organized around pathological rationalization
of that genocide despite legitimate international objection to and
pressure against it. That Davidian finds it logically valid to liken
the situation of the Armenian state and society today to Serbia at
the time it was committing genocide does not call into !
question tocols but to Davidian's own pretentions to logical
analysis. When the issue is negotiation over the truth about a
genocide, by definition the logical positioning of a state that is
heir to a victim society cannot be analogous to the positioning of a
perpetrator state. To suggest that Armenia would face military force
for not signing the protocols in the way that Serbia faced bombing
because it was participating in genocide makes no sense. Indeed, the
real lesson regarding Serbia is that a state can do much more against
international pressure than Armenia is doing-indeed, participate in
a genocide for three years-without being subjected to any meaningful
outside intervention for quite awhile, which is the opposite message
from what Davidian suggests.
Let me qualify this somewhat. A victim state cannot be analogized
to a perpetrator state in so far as the former is a victim state. If
Armenia were to commit a genocide itself, then this would be the basis
of an analogy between it and Serbia. In addition, if a particular
individual or group within Armenia adopted a denialist position and
agenda similar to that in Turkey, there could be some kind of analogy
based on this as well. But this is not what Davidian is claiming.
Now to the analysis. It has become a truism that "denial is the
final stage of genocide." Greg Stanton, the former president of the
International Association of Genocide Scholars, for instance, asserts
this in his stage theory of genocide. But, as with many truisms,
this one is false. That denial is present long after a genocide
does not mean that denial is the final stage of a genocide. Denial
is present at many stages of a genocide. With very few exceptions,
denials are issued by perpetrators while they are committing genocide.
Denials are typically offered immediately after a genocide to prevent
accountability of individual perpetrators as well as the perpetrator
society. One need only look at the court transcripts of trials of
Rwanda or Bosnia Genocide perpetrators to confirm this. And, denials
are offered in the long-term aftermath of a genocide to cover up the
historical facts. The motives for this include such things as the
desperate desire to preserve the legitimacy of an ideology and linked
sense of group identity in the face of exposure of the genocidal nature
of that ideology, the desire to prevent reparations in terms of land
and/or wealth, and a sense of shame among members of the perpetrator
society that is not coupled with a moral commitment to rectify the
impact of the past. Given this, denial is dominant in the long-term
aftermath of genocide, but it is an instrument for deeper goals.
The last stage of genocide is consolidation of the gains of the
genocide. In this stage, the perpetrator group tries to establish the
results of the genocide as the status quo, rather than a persisting
violation requiring rectification. It uses denial as a tool, because
if deniers convince enough people that a genocide did not happen or
is doubtful, then these people will see the existing post-genocidal
state of affairs as legitimate. They will see the small population of
the victims, their political weakness, their cultural tenuousness,
their relative poverty, and so forth as the natural result of an
uneventful history. If a perpetrator society can effectively deny the
past genocide, it will succeed in keeping what the direct perpetrators
gained for it.
To the credit of Stanton and others who view denial as the last stage
of genocide, it is typically the dominant activity of the perpetrators
in the long-term aftermath of genocide. What is more, even when the
possibility of material rectification is lessened, the perpetrators
or their progeny typically aggressive seek to cover up even the
knowledge of the genocide, to achieve full erasure of its victims and
full validation of the perpetrators such that they do not even pay
a moral price for the past. Such figures as Elie Wiesel and Israel
Charny have commented on this attempted final conceptual erasure.
But, sometimes denial fails to change perceptions of history or
at least to produce a stalemate in which the issue is viewed as a
perpetual and irresolvable conflict between two parties over history,
which is a victory for perpetrators in so far as they are allowed to
keep the material, political, ideological, and cultural gains of the
genocide for the foreseeable future. In such a case, denial has become
ineffective, but consolidation is still the goal. The perpetrator
state will seek to consolidate the gains of the genocide in question
by some other means.
This is precisely what we are seeing with the new protocols. Denial
has failed the Turkish state, and until April 2009 the pressure
was mounting to deal with the legacy of the Armenian Genocide
in a meaningful manner. That pressure had intensified especially
over the past two years through the challenges posed by activists,
journalists, and intellectuals inside Turkey after the Hrant Dink
assassination shocked morally-grounded members of Turkish society with
the genocidal anti-Armenianism that had previously been rationalized
by their government or hidden from their view. The stage was set for
the kind of real transformation in Turkey that can be the only path
toward a genuine improvement in Armenian-Turkish relations.
The protocols are the last-ditch response by the Turkish government to
protect and solidify the gains of the genocide. Through them, Turkey
has gone from the brink of required justice to a potential victory
deniers could only dream of three decades ago. What the protocols do
is achieve agreement from the putative representative of the victim
community that the perpetrator's successor state and society will
never have to give up the land gained through the genocide nor make
any material restitution for the horrific suffering imposed on the
victim community, which still reverberates today. What the protocols
ensure is that the weak and poor Armenia produced by the genocide will
become the permanent state of Armenians, while the increased power,
prestige, land, wealth, and ideological security the Turkish state
and society gained through genocide will remain its. In other words,
the protocols finish the Armenian Genocide as successfully as the
pro-genocidal segment of today's Turkey ever could have hoped. The
protocols are the last stage of the Armenian Genocide, the successful
completion of the Armenian Genocide.
It is telling that an important element of the protocols is the
reinsertion of denial of the Armenian Genocide as a credible position
by agreement of the Armenian government itself. This is the meaning of
the provision for a historical commission to study the mutual history
of the two protocol partners. Denial is the official position of
the Turkish government and clearly the starting position for their
participation in such a commission. The fact that the protocols
do not specify that the commission will consider the issue of
"the Armenian Genocide" shows that Turkey wants to maintain this
position. Given that its government and academic leaders know full
well a genocide occurred, there is no reason Turkey would not just
admit the genocide if it were not intent on maintaining denial. As
Roger Smith, the former president of the International Association of
Genocide Scholars and current chair of the Academic Board of Directors
of the Zoryan Institute, states in his Sept. 30 letter to Armenian
President Sarkisian, Turkey would even be bound by its own laws to
reject a finding of genocide by this historical commission. Of course,
it is unlikely that the commission's membership will be constituted
in such a way as to allow that result to emerge-we are sure to see
Turkey insist on deniers as members of the commission. In this way,
the denial campaign that has faltered and been widely discredited
will be relegitimized within the process that has resulted from the
denial's failure in the first place. The irony is thick here.
For Armenians to acquiesce in this is not merely to betray the memories
of those who died and those who survived. It is not merely to accept
one of the great grand larcenies of history and the debilitating
poverty that has resulted. It is to accept the permanence of the
destruction of Armenian political, social, cultural, and economic
life, rather than receive the rehabilitative rectification that world
ethical and legal principles unequivocally recognize as the victims'
desperate need and right.
Davidian and others argue that Armenia and Armenians have no choice
and should try to get what they can in the face of this inevitable
destruction. But, if, as many in Armenia and outside have argued,
Armenia's survival depends on some rectification of the genocide that
continues to impact it materially,
geopolitically, etc., then acquiescing is dangerous self-delusion. It
is yet another instance of Armenians in a desperate situation giving
up and embracing a thoughtless, irrational faith that those who have
done them great harm in the past and present will somehow suddenly
change utterly and things will work out. It is the mentality of
the beaten, the destroyed, the resigned. It is the mentality that
Armenian Genocide survivors rejected despite the horrific suffering
they experienced. Can we do less now?
Davidian claims that the geopolitical realities of Armenia's
existence preclude it "from engaging in zero sum inanity, such as
demanding an all-or-nothing state of affairs." The idea is that
realism should replace ethical principle as the basis of Armenian
decision-making. But, given the history with Turkey, given its clear
intentions and absolute lack of repentance for the Armenian Genocide to
the point where it cannot even recognize the genocide in the interest
of negotiating better relations with Armenia, it would be truly
"inane" to enter into an agreement that depends on Turkey working
with Armenia in good faith. It is not just that it is wrong to trade
recognition of the Armenian Genocide for some short-term economic
benefit (which might prove illusory anyway); the trade cannot work by
its very nature. The fact that the perpetrator successor state remains
committed to denial of the genocide and thus to the acceptability of
genocide as a tool against Armenians makes it impossible for it to
enter a productive relationship with Armenia and Armenians. So long
as the Turkish state and society remain unrepentant for the genocide,
Armenians have no choice but to require an all-or-nothing state of
affairs regarding the Armenian Genocide. It is Turkish denial and
approval of genocide that forces Armenians into this position.
Contrary to Davidian's assertion, such an all-or-nothing ethics-based
approach that rejects coercion by the pressure of "interests"
and power is anything but irrational. We need look no further than
Plato's Republic and Gorgias to see advocacy of ethical principle
over realpolitik by a thinker universally recognized as one of the
most rational in human history. Of course, those who understand how
social movements really work, how they succeed, will recognize this
all-or-nothing strategy as quite practical, and not only because the
squeaky wheel gets the oil or because pressing such demands pushes
the compromise point of the negotiation further toward the goals of
that squeaky wheel. It wasn't those who accepted segregation because
it was backed by tremendous political, cultural, social, and military
power whose view of race relations changed the United States; it was
Malcolm X's and Martin Luther King's all-or-nothing challenges. India
was not freed from the British because Gandhi compromised with the
British, but because he asserted an all-or-nothing requirement for
independence and dignity. What is striking about these examples-and
many others from history-is that these all-or-nothing demands came
from positions of great material, political, and military weakness and
yet still succeeded because of the moral strength of the position of
the "weak" vis-a-vis the "strong." Moral legitimacy is a great force
in geopolitics and is the reliable ally of the weak, oppressed, and
marginalized. It is the force that those committed to power politics,
realpolitik, fear so desperately that they incessantly mock it as
if whistling in the dark, ridiculing those who believe in it in the
hope that they will stop believing and thus be tricked into giving up
the most powerful tool of change. It is Armenia's one advantage today,
and the present leadership, through unhistorical, naive "realpolitical"
calculations of the web of power and interests around them, are about
to squander it.
Henry Theriault is a Professor of Philosophy at Worcester State
College.