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PROTOCOLS MAY BECOME JUST ANOTHER NON-BINDING DOCUMENT
Karine Ter-Sahakyan
PanARMENIAN.Net
13.10.2009 GMT+04:00
If the Turkish General Staff sets a priority for Turkey, it is definite
to be accepted by the government; in this country the army still has
the last word.
Signed in Zurich with greatest difficulty and in absolute silence,
the Protocols of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations not
only opened a new page in relations of the two countries, but also
changed the attitude of Turkey towards Azerbaijan and Georgia, and
that of Armenia towards Georgia. Moreover, they changed the stereotype
of the average behavior of an Armenian and a Turk, who now, before
talking about possible warming or cooling of relations between the
two countries, think why we actually signed these Protocols which
may become just another non-binding document.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ It is still difficult to say what Armenia gained as
a result of signing. But now the most interesting question is what
gained Turkey and the mediator countries. It is unlikely that after
signing of documents the process of Turkey's integration into the EU
should pick up speed. The same is true about the settlement of Karabakh
conflict, the main obstacle to implementation of the Protocols. Even if
the parliaments of the two countries ratify the Protocols, this process
may take 2-3 months, and there is no guarantee that the normalization
of relations will proceed along the already fixed path. The "road map"
that has been spoken about since April of the current year, is not
ready yet and will not be ready until Ankara manages to include in it
the preconditions she was not able to include in the Protocols. And
if the Armenian Genocide is a minor issue to the Turkish side and
can be "successfully" dragged out with the commission of historians,
which will not be formed due to rejection from the Armenian side,
the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be the sticking
point for the Turkish opposition, and, under its pressure, for the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this issue being the main
obstacle to establishing diplomatic relations. By the way, that's
exactly what no one speaks about; everyone is talking only about the
opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, which, by the way, has never
functioned fully. The story began back in Soviet times, when Turkey,
then a NATO member, posed a real threat to the southern borders of
the Soviet Union. In 1980, before the Moscow Olympics they began to
raise a customs office at the border, but it remained unfinished. A
checkpoint at the bridge over the Araks River opened only twice: in
1988 during the Spitak earthquake, when via Turkey Armenia received
humanitarian assistance and in 1990, when the UN mission visited
Armenia. Since then, the border has been closed.
The land border between the USSR and Turkey was 618 kilometers, and its
Armenian section of 330 kilometers was not of a great importance. Much
more attention of Moscow drew the maritime boundary in Batumi,
through which people tried to escape from the USSR. Moreover, in
1931 Turkey conceived then rather weak Iran to accept some parts
of the Turkish-Iranian border in exchange for the 11-mile corridor
that allowed Turkey to gain direct access to Nakhichevan, i.e. to
Azerbaijan. It was then that foundation was laid for the expansion
of Turkey into Azerbaijan, which decades later developed into Heydar
Aliyev's slogan ":One nation, two states", allowing it to intervene
into the Karabakh conflict. In principle, the position of Ankara in
this issue is obviously destined to failure, no matter how hard the
U.S. and Europe try to convince Turkey of the contrary. For some
reason immediately after signing of the Protocols Russia came to
believe that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations should
proceed simultaneously with the Karabakh conflict settlement, but
hardly can this be considered the official view of Moscow. Russia's
policy in the Caucasus is still vague and it leads to nothing but
confusion. It can be said that the statement of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the impossibility of opening the border
without regulation of the Karabakh problem, put off the process of
normalization of relations for an indefinite time. Such statements,
made to please Baku and, why not, under her pressure, could lead to a
stalemate in the region. It is difficult to convince Karabakh-focused
Baku that the Armenian issue is not most important for Ankara. Now
on the agenda are the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem. And only
then, time permitting, Ankara will settle relations with Armenia,
renouncing its ties with Azerbaijan. Otherwise, nothing will happen. It
is unlikely that Turkish politicians, including Deniz Baykal and other
opposition figures, should not realize the point. There is a third,
the most effective and decisive force - the Turkish General Staff. If
it sets a priority for Turkey, it is definite to be accepted by the
government. In this country the army still has the last word.
Karine Ter-Sahakyan
PanARMENIAN.Net
13.10.2009 GMT+04:00
If the Turkish General Staff sets a priority for Turkey, it is definite
to be accepted by the government; in this country the army still has
the last word.
Signed in Zurich with greatest difficulty and in absolute silence,
the Protocols of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations not
only opened a new page in relations of the two countries, but also
changed the attitude of Turkey towards Azerbaijan and Georgia, and
that of Armenia towards Georgia. Moreover, they changed the stereotype
of the average behavior of an Armenian and a Turk, who now, before
talking about possible warming or cooling of relations between the
two countries, think why we actually signed these Protocols which
may become just another non-binding document.
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ It is still difficult to say what Armenia gained as
a result of signing. But now the most interesting question is what
gained Turkey and the mediator countries. It is unlikely that after
signing of documents the process of Turkey's integration into the EU
should pick up speed. The same is true about the settlement of Karabakh
conflict, the main obstacle to implementation of the Protocols. Even if
the parliaments of the two countries ratify the Protocols, this process
may take 2-3 months, and there is no guarantee that the normalization
of relations will proceed along the already fixed path. The "road map"
that has been spoken about since April of the current year, is not
ready yet and will not be ready until Ankara manages to include in it
the preconditions she was not able to include in the Protocols. And
if the Armenian Genocide is a minor issue to the Turkish side and
can be "successfully" dragged out with the commission of historians,
which will not be formed due to rejection from the Armenian side,
the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be the sticking
point for the Turkish opposition, and, under its pressure, for the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this issue being the main
obstacle to establishing diplomatic relations. By the way, that's
exactly what no one speaks about; everyone is talking only about the
opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, which, by the way, has never
functioned fully. The story began back in Soviet times, when Turkey,
then a NATO member, posed a real threat to the southern borders of
the Soviet Union. In 1980, before the Moscow Olympics they began to
raise a customs office at the border, but it remained unfinished. A
checkpoint at the bridge over the Araks River opened only twice: in
1988 during the Spitak earthquake, when via Turkey Armenia received
humanitarian assistance and in 1990, when the UN mission visited
Armenia. Since then, the border has been closed.
The land border between the USSR and Turkey was 618 kilometers, and its
Armenian section of 330 kilometers was not of a great importance. Much
more attention of Moscow drew the maritime boundary in Batumi,
through which people tried to escape from the USSR. Moreover, in
1931 Turkey conceived then rather weak Iran to accept some parts
of the Turkish-Iranian border in exchange for the 11-mile corridor
that allowed Turkey to gain direct access to Nakhichevan, i.e. to
Azerbaijan. It was then that foundation was laid for the expansion
of Turkey into Azerbaijan, which decades later developed into Heydar
Aliyev's slogan ":One nation, two states", allowing it to intervene
into the Karabakh conflict. In principle, the position of Ankara in
this issue is obviously destined to failure, no matter how hard the
U.S. and Europe try to convince Turkey of the contrary. For some
reason immediately after signing of the Protocols Russia came to
believe that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations should
proceed simultaneously with the Karabakh conflict settlement, but
hardly can this be considered the official view of Moscow. Russia's
policy in the Caucasus is still vague and it leads to nothing but
confusion. It can be said that the statement of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the impossibility of opening the border
without regulation of the Karabakh problem, put off the process of
normalization of relations for an indefinite time. Such statements,
made to please Baku and, why not, under her pressure, could lead to a
stalemate in the region. It is difficult to convince Karabakh-focused
Baku that the Armenian issue is not most important for Ankara. Now
on the agenda are the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem. And only
then, time permitting, Ankara will settle relations with Armenia,
renouncing its ties with Azerbaijan. Otherwise, nothing will happen. It
is unlikely that Turkish politicians, including Deniz Baykal and other
opposition figures, should not realize the point. There is a third,
the most effective and decisive force - the Turkish General Staff. If
it sets a priority for Turkey, it is definite to be accepted by the
government. In this country the army still has the last word.