Tweet
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis
October 14, 2009 Wednesday
Background: The Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement
Analysis. By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS.
In early September 2009, Washington and Tehran found themselves
cooperating in pressuring Ankara and Yerevan to expedite the opening
of their border at the expense of Azerbaijan.
Iranian senior officials were in Yerevan in order to pressure Yerevan
to agree to open the border. "The regional countries have a lot to
benefit too from a peaceful neighborhood," noted the Iranian senior
diplomats involved. The Iranians brought with them an economic
incentive program aimed to help Armenia's economy. An open border, the
Iranian said, would give Armenia access to some 70-million Turkish
consumers and, via Turkey, to the rest of Europe. Iran would like to
use Armenia as "a transit country" in a "greatly expanded" manner,
namely, to repackage Iran-made goods as "Made in Armenia" and export
them to Turkey and Europe.
Meanwhile, a high-level US delegation arrived in Ankara.
The delegation was headed by Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs William Burns and Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina S. Kaidanow.
They were joined by US Ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovitch. The
official agenda of the delegation was to discuss with their Turkish
counterparts the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Washington promised Ankara that it
would pressure Yerevan to accept an agreement which would meet the US
interests and priorities. And the US Barack Obama Administration is
interested in a narrow bilateral agreement between Turkey and Armenia
which did not include "third party interests".
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, both Burns and Kaidanow were instructed to
assure their Turkish counterparts that the Minsk Process (the
Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe process run by the
US, France, and Russia, specifically to address the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute) was progressing well, and that an agreement would be reached
before the end of 2009. Hence, the US position went, there would be no
point holding up the historic rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia
over an essentially resolved issue.
Regarding Iran, the US senior diplomats encouraged Turkey to study the
early integration of gas from and via Iran into the Nabucco pipeline.
* * *
The Minsk Process played a role alongside the October 8-9, 2009,
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Chisinau Summit, in Moldova,
at which -- as a side event -- Azerbaijan Pres. Ilham Aliyev met with
Armenian Pres. Serzh Sarkisian. However, the Chisinau event was seen a
setback for Azerbaijan despite what senior US State Department
officials call "steadfast", "skilled", and "determined" performance by
Azerbaijan Pres. Ilham Aliyev. Privately, the US senior officials
concurred with Aliyev's observations that the Chisinau Summit between
Aliyev and Sarkisian had "failed".
The State Department's analysis of the outcome of the Chisinau Summit
points out to a potential for progress through a profound change in
Minsk Process. US envoy Robert Bradtke reported that the two
presidents came out of their meeting convinced that the Minsk Process
was deadlocked. The two presidents, Bradtke reported, had read through
the main principles for a resolution "line by line" and agreed on them
in principle. They reiterated their agreement that a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict should be based on, in the words of Bradtke,
"non-use of force, right to self-determination and territorial
integrity". However, Bradtke conceded, it was virtually impossible to
reconcile the Armenian interpretation of "right to self-determination"
with Azerbaijan's right to "territorial integrity", and this remains
an insurmountable obstacle in the quest for a negotiated settlement.
The State Department's position in the aftermath of Bradtke's report
is that the lingering deadlock opens the door to convincing and/or
pressuring both countries into accepting US "proposals" for possible
"solutions". Bradtke noted that after their summit meeting, the
presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia asked the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairs to "include recommendations in the Madrid document". The
State Department interprets this request as a license to introduce US
proposals for conflict resolution and pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan
into accepting these solutions. The senior State Department officials
stressed that the formulation of such proposals would be based on the
"principles of policy" instructions of US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton that wherever self-determination and territorial integrity
contradict each other, the quest for self-determination by a minority
or discernable group would take precedence.
In practical terms, the US approach to the Minsk Group is based on the
precedent set during the UN-led mediation in Kosovo. There, the
official UN mandate was to facilitate direct negotiations between the
Serbian Government and the Kosovo-Albanian leadership. However, when
the UN and the US (which was the driving force behind the scenes)
realized that the positions of the Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians were too
far apart and essentially irreconcilable, the US pushed the UN into
first proposing ideas and compromises to both sides based on
independence for Kosovo. Significantly, the main obstacle in the
Kosovo talks was specifically over the issue of Serbia's territorial
integrity (which, unlike the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, is explicitly
guaranteed by the UNSC resolutions that ended the war in 1999).
Nevertheless, the US position was that the quest for
self-determination through independence of the Kosovo-Albanians
superseded even explicit international agreements to the contrary. The
US then tried to coerce the Serbs into accepting these ideas. When the
Serbs refused, the US facilitated the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo.
Significantly, the key US officials who made Kosovo happen are now
involved in Southern Caucasus. These Balkans old-hands were
transferred to dealing with the South Caucasus specifically in order
to use their Kosovo experience in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict.
The US position is also clear from the discussions Secretary Clinton
had with Ankara regarding the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement .
Secretary Clinton repeated the US positions in Zurich. Washington's
proposal is essentially a tacit deal whereupon Yerevan would ignore
the "genocide" issue if Ankara ignored "Nagorno-Karabakh". The
Turkish-Armenian protocol agrees that the "historical dimension" will
be studied by a bilateral commission. Yerevan agreed to effective
foot-dragging. Moreover, the moment the mutual border was recognized,
then the key issue -- Armenian property lost in 1915 and its possible
restitution -- is no longer viable in any case. Similarly, although
Ankara promised Baku that the Turkish-Armenian border would not be
reopened until the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was resolved, and
Armenian forces withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territory,
Washington came up with a solution which permitted Ankara to disregard
its promises. Indeed, although Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan stated that Turkey "will never take any step or decision which
can upset Azerbaijan in the existing problem between Azerbaijan and
Armenia", Turkey was, nonetheless, to sign the agreement with Armenia.
The US solution/compromise is based on arguing that adhering to the
Turkish promises is tantamount to improperly influencing and going
around the existing Minsk Group process to which both Azerbaijan and
Armenia were formally committed. Hence, the US justification is, the
key issue facing Ankara is not interfering with the OSCE's mediation
rather than abiding by promises to Baku. On October 9, 2009,Erdogan
specifically mentioned the connection between the Minsk Process and
the Turkish-Armenian agreement. "Turkey and Armenia will sign
protocols on October 10. OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair countries mediating
in the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict will also attend and
witness the signing ceremony." Thus, according to Erdogan, by
endorsing the Minsk Process Turkey is not reneging on its promises to
Azerbaijan. Despite Erdogan's statement, the senior State Department
officials stressed that indeed the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was not
mentioned as a condition for signing the protocol formally
establishing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Privately, senior State Department officials acknowledged that
Washington was apprehensive that Moscow's position would prevail,
though. Given the growing cooperation between Paris and Moscow in the
context of the Minsk Group, and the overall EU-RF "Eurasian House"
strategic cooperation, Paris and Moscow might create a coalition which
could neutralize Washington's efforts to impose a solution. The
position of Russia has always been to give preference to the
territorial integrity of states over minority rights, the US officials
noted.
The senior State Department officials noted that Baku was clearly
cognizant of this. They pointed to observations by Novruz Mamedov on
the eve of the Chisinau Summit that "official Moscow's position might
give impetus to the negotiations". The State Department believes that
the Kremlin's policy is now based on "the inevitability of the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict exclusively within
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity". Little wonder that the US was
most apprehensive about the October 9, 2009, summit of the presidents
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia concerning a peaceful settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. The US is cognizant that back in
November 2008, Russian Pres. Dmitry Medvedev got presidents Aliyev and
Sarkisian to sign the only document about conflict resolution. Russian
officials acknowledged that they "do not expect any breakthrough from
this meeting". They considered that tripartite summit to be a
"continuation of the relevant dialogue and next move in conflict
settlement". However, the senior State Department officials were
afraid that not only would Pres. Medvedev make more progress than in
the Minsk Group summit, but the Russian position would strengthen
Aliyev's resolve to resist the forthcoming US pressure to essentially
compromise on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As well, the
senior State Department officials were afraid that Sarkisian's
forthcoming working visit to Russia would further reduce the extent of
US influence over Armenia.
* * *
The October 10, 2009, signing of the Turkish-Armenian Protocol
collapsed a mere quarter of an hour before the ceremony had to begin.
With all the dignitaries already gathered, the Turkish and Armenian
delegations could not agree on the text of the statements to be made
after the signing. Sec. Clinton abruptly returned to her hotel but
personally took over mediating the dispute. "We're helping facilitate
the two sides come to agreement on statements that are going to come
out," State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said. "There's not a
breakdown."
According to senior State Department officials, the Armenians broke
the signing ceremony because of two issues. The first was Yerevan's
demand for harsher language concerning the 1915 "genocide". The second
issue was Yerevan's criticism of Erdogan's statement that Turkey would
not hurt the interests of Azerbaijan. Yerevan interpreted the
statement as Ankara's endorsement of the lack of progress over the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Chisinau Summit. In Zurich, the
Armenian senior officials insisted that Yerevan had been assured by
Washington that there would no connection whatsoever between the
Turkish-Armenian agreement and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and
especially the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. They considered Erdogan's
statement a violation of the US assurances and demanded apology from
the Turkish delegation.
The US is taking a decidedly pro-Armenian stand in resolving the
dispute. Sec. Clinton was secretly meeting with Armenian Foreign
Minister Edward Nalbandian, while only talking by telephone with
Turkish officials. (Clinton's meeting with Nalbandian was officially
denied by State Department.) Officially, senior US officials were
meeting with their Armenian counterparts while only talking by phone
to the Turkish counterparts. Initially, Clinton offered Nalbandian a
deal whereupon in return for the Armenian accepting of a mellowed text
on the "genocide", the US would intensify pressure on Azerbaijan to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict via the Minsk Group Process and
under favorable terms for the Armenians. At the end, Clinton struck a
deal whereupon Armenia and Turkey would refrain from making any
statement after the signing in return for the promised US pressure on
Azerbaijan.
* * *
After delays and intense negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed the
two protocols which would open the border and facilitate the
establishment of diplomatic relations. The Foreign Ministers of Turkey
and Armenia signed the documents and exchanged firm handshakes.
The signing was made possible by a US mediated deal. Hillary promised
Nalbandian that the US would make sure that Turkey will not be able to
exert any influence on the negotiations on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. She specifically stated that the US would
ensure the pre-eminence of the "proposals" for possible "solutions" as
articulated by Robert Bradtke in Chisinau. This means that the US
would insist on giving legal preference to self-determination over
territorial integrity.
The US assurances to Armenia were reiterated by the EU in the
statement issued by EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, immediately after the signing ceremony. "This
Armenia-Turkey agreement will benefit all countries in the South
Caucasus region," the statement said. Ferrero-Waldner further alluded
to the US promise that Turkey would no longer be able to affect the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by reiterating that the ratification and
implementation of the protocols should now proceed "according to the
agreed timetable and without any additional pre-conditions".
October 14, 2009 Wednesday
Background: The Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement
Analysis. By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS.
In early September 2009, Washington and Tehran found themselves
cooperating in pressuring Ankara and Yerevan to expedite the opening
of their border at the expense of Azerbaijan.
Iranian senior officials were in Yerevan in order to pressure Yerevan
to agree to open the border. "The regional countries have a lot to
benefit too from a peaceful neighborhood," noted the Iranian senior
diplomats involved. The Iranians brought with them an economic
incentive program aimed to help Armenia's economy. An open border, the
Iranian said, would give Armenia access to some 70-million Turkish
consumers and, via Turkey, to the rest of Europe. Iran would like to
use Armenia as "a transit country" in a "greatly expanded" manner,
namely, to repackage Iran-made goods as "Made in Armenia" and export
them to Turkey and Europe.
Meanwhile, a high-level US delegation arrived in Ankara.
The delegation was headed by Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs William Burns and Deputy Assistant Secretary Tina S. Kaidanow.
They were joined by US Ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovitch. The
official agenda of the delegation was to discuss with their Turkish
counterparts the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation and the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Washington promised Ankara that it
would pressure Yerevan to accept an agreement which would meet the US
interests and priorities. And the US Barack Obama Administration is
interested in a narrow bilateral agreement between Turkey and Armenia
which did not include "third party interests".
Regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, both Burns and Kaidanow were instructed to
assure their Turkish counterparts that the Minsk Process (the
Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe process run by the
US, France, and Russia, specifically to address the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute) was progressing well, and that an agreement would be reached
before the end of 2009. Hence, the US position went, there would be no
point holding up the historic rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia
over an essentially resolved issue.
Regarding Iran, the US senior diplomats encouraged Turkey to study the
early integration of gas from and via Iran into the Nabucco pipeline.
* * *
The Minsk Process played a role alongside the October 8-9, 2009,
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Chisinau Summit, in Moldova,
at which -- as a side event -- Azerbaijan Pres. Ilham Aliyev met with
Armenian Pres. Serzh Sarkisian. However, the Chisinau event was seen a
setback for Azerbaijan despite what senior US State Department
officials call "steadfast", "skilled", and "determined" performance by
Azerbaijan Pres. Ilham Aliyev. Privately, the US senior officials
concurred with Aliyev's observations that the Chisinau Summit between
Aliyev and Sarkisian had "failed".
The State Department's analysis of the outcome of the Chisinau Summit
points out to a potential for progress through a profound change in
Minsk Process. US envoy Robert Bradtke reported that the two
presidents came out of their meeting convinced that the Minsk Process
was deadlocked. The two presidents, Bradtke reported, had read through
the main principles for a resolution "line by line" and agreed on them
in principle. They reiterated their agreement that a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict should be based on, in the words of Bradtke,
"non-use of force, right to self-determination and territorial
integrity". However, Bradtke conceded, it was virtually impossible to
reconcile the Armenian interpretation of "right to self-determination"
with Azerbaijan's right to "territorial integrity", and this remains
an insurmountable obstacle in the quest for a negotiated settlement.
The State Department's position in the aftermath of Bradtke's report
is that the lingering deadlock opens the door to convincing and/or
pressuring both countries into accepting US "proposals" for possible
"solutions". Bradtke noted that after their summit meeting, the
presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia asked the OSCE Minsk Group
co-chairs to "include recommendations in the Madrid document". The
State Department interprets this request as a license to introduce US
proposals for conflict resolution and pressure Armenia and Azerbaijan
into accepting these solutions. The senior State Department officials
stressed that the formulation of such proposals would be based on the
"principles of policy" instructions of US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton that wherever self-determination and territorial integrity
contradict each other, the quest for self-determination by a minority
or discernable group would take precedence.
In practical terms, the US approach to the Minsk Group is based on the
precedent set during the UN-led mediation in Kosovo. There, the
official UN mandate was to facilitate direct negotiations between the
Serbian Government and the Kosovo-Albanian leadership. However, when
the UN and the US (which was the driving force behind the scenes)
realized that the positions of the Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians were too
far apart and essentially irreconcilable, the US pushed the UN into
first proposing ideas and compromises to both sides based on
independence for Kosovo. Significantly, the main obstacle in the
Kosovo talks was specifically over the issue of Serbia's territorial
integrity (which, unlike the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, is explicitly
guaranteed by the UNSC resolutions that ended the war in 1999).
Nevertheless, the US position was that the quest for
self-determination through independence of the Kosovo-Albanians
superseded even explicit international agreements to the contrary. The
US then tried to coerce the Serbs into accepting these ideas. When the
Serbs refused, the US facilitated the unilateral declaration of
independence of Kosovo.
Significantly, the key US officials who made Kosovo happen are now
involved in Southern Caucasus. These Balkans old-hands were
transferred to dealing with the South Caucasus specifically in order
to use their Kosovo experience in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict.
The US position is also clear from the discussions Secretary Clinton
had with Ankara regarding the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement .
Secretary Clinton repeated the US positions in Zurich. Washington's
proposal is essentially a tacit deal whereupon Yerevan would ignore
the "genocide" issue if Ankara ignored "Nagorno-Karabakh". The
Turkish-Armenian protocol agrees that the "historical dimension" will
be studied by a bilateral commission. Yerevan agreed to effective
foot-dragging. Moreover, the moment the mutual border was recognized,
then the key issue -- Armenian property lost in 1915 and its possible
restitution -- is no longer viable in any case. Similarly, although
Ankara promised Baku that the Turkish-Armenian border would not be
reopened until the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was resolved, and
Armenian forces withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territory,
Washington came up with a solution which permitted Ankara to disregard
its promises. Indeed, although Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan stated that Turkey "will never take any step or decision which
can upset Azerbaijan in the existing problem between Azerbaijan and
Armenia", Turkey was, nonetheless, to sign the agreement with Armenia.
The US solution/compromise is based on arguing that adhering to the
Turkish promises is tantamount to improperly influencing and going
around the existing Minsk Group process to which both Azerbaijan and
Armenia were formally committed. Hence, the US justification is, the
key issue facing Ankara is not interfering with the OSCE's mediation
rather than abiding by promises to Baku. On October 9, 2009,Erdogan
specifically mentioned the connection between the Minsk Process and
the Turkish-Armenian agreement. "Turkey and Armenia will sign
protocols on October 10. OSCE Minsk Group Co-chair countries mediating
in the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict will also attend and
witness the signing ceremony." Thus, according to Erdogan, by
endorsing the Minsk Process Turkey is not reneging on its promises to
Azerbaijan. Despite Erdogan's statement, the senior State Department
officials stressed that indeed the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict was not
mentioned as a condition for signing the protocol formally
establishing diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia.
Privately, senior State Department officials acknowledged that
Washington was apprehensive that Moscow's position would prevail,
though. Given the growing cooperation between Paris and Moscow in the
context of the Minsk Group, and the overall EU-RF "Eurasian House"
strategic cooperation, Paris and Moscow might create a coalition which
could neutralize Washington's efforts to impose a solution. The
position of Russia has always been to give preference to the
territorial integrity of states over minority rights, the US officials
noted.
The senior State Department officials noted that Baku was clearly
cognizant of this. They pointed to observations by Novruz Mamedov on
the eve of the Chisinau Summit that "official Moscow's position might
give impetus to the negotiations". The State Department believes that
the Kremlin's policy is now based on "the inevitability of the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict exclusively within
Azerbaijan's territorial integrity". Little wonder that the US was
most apprehensive about the October 9, 2009, summit of the presidents
of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia concerning a peaceful settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. The US is cognizant that back in
November 2008, Russian Pres. Dmitry Medvedev got presidents Aliyev and
Sarkisian to sign the only document about conflict resolution. Russian
officials acknowledged that they "do not expect any breakthrough from
this meeting". They considered that tripartite summit to be a
"continuation of the relevant dialogue and next move in conflict
settlement". However, the senior State Department officials were
afraid that not only would Pres. Medvedev make more progress than in
the Minsk Group summit, but the Russian position would strengthen
Aliyev's resolve to resist the forthcoming US pressure to essentially
compromise on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As well, the
senior State Department officials were afraid that Sarkisian's
forthcoming working visit to Russia would further reduce the extent of
US influence over Armenia.
* * *
The October 10, 2009, signing of the Turkish-Armenian Protocol
collapsed a mere quarter of an hour before the ceremony had to begin.
With all the dignitaries already gathered, the Turkish and Armenian
delegations could not agree on the text of the statements to be made
after the signing. Sec. Clinton abruptly returned to her hotel but
personally took over mediating the dispute. "We're helping facilitate
the two sides come to agreement on statements that are going to come
out," State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said. "There's not a
breakdown."
According to senior State Department officials, the Armenians broke
the signing ceremony because of two issues. The first was Yerevan's
demand for harsher language concerning the 1915 "genocide". The second
issue was Yerevan's criticism of Erdogan's statement that Turkey would
not hurt the interests of Azerbaijan. Yerevan interpreted the
statement as Ankara's endorsement of the lack of progress over the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Chisinau Summit. In Zurich, the
Armenian senior officials insisted that Yerevan had been assured by
Washington that there would no connection whatsoever between the
Turkish-Armenian agreement and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and
especially the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. They considered Erdogan's
statement a violation of the US assurances and demanded apology from
the Turkish delegation.
The US is taking a decidedly pro-Armenian stand in resolving the
dispute. Sec. Clinton was secretly meeting with Armenian Foreign
Minister Edward Nalbandian, while only talking by telephone with
Turkish officials. (Clinton's meeting with Nalbandian was officially
denied by State Department.) Officially, senior US officials were
meeting with their Armenian counterparts while only talking by phone
to the Turkish counterparts. Initially, Clinton offered Nalbandian a
deal whereupon in return for the Armenian accepting of a mellowed text
on the "genocide", the US would intensify pressure on Azerbaijan to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict via the Minsk Group Process and
under favorable terms for the Armenians. At the end, Clinton struck a
deal whereupon Armenia and Turkey would refrain from making any
statement after the signing in return for the promised US pressure on
Azerbaijan.
* * *
After delays and intense negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed the
two protocols which would open the border and facilitate the
establishment of diplomatic relations. The Foreign Ministers of Turkey
and Armenia signed the documents and exchanged firm handshakes.
The signing was made possible by a US mediated deal. Hillary promised
Nalbandian that the US would make sure that Turkey will not be able to
exert any influence on the negotiations on resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. She specifically stated that the US would
ensure the pre-eminence of the "proposals" for possible "solutions" as
articulated by Robert Bradtke in Chisinau. This means that the US
would insist on giving legal preference to self-determination over
territorial integrity.
The US assurances to Armenia were reiterated by the EU in the
statement issued by EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita
Ferrero-Waldner, immediately after the signing ceremony. "This
Armenia-Turkey agreement will benefit all countries in the South
Caucasus region," the statement said. Ferrero-Waldner further alluded
to the US promise that Turkey would no longer be able to affect the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict by reiterating that the ratification and
implementation of the protocols should now proceed "according to the
agreed timetable and without any additional pre-conditions".