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MENSOIAN: SARKISIAN'S FAUSTIAN BARGAIN
By Michael Mensoian
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/10/1 7/mensoian-sarkisians-faustian-bargain/
October 17, 2009
It would be fair to say that the protocols Nalbandian recently signed
in Zurich contains absolutely nothing that benefits Armenia's economic
and political interests or its longterm security needs. The protocols
are Turkish documents, under the guise of having been mediated by
Switzerland. They are documents that strengthen Turkey's position
within the region and essentially reduce Armenia to a vassal state,
whose president is no better than a satrap.
No one will argue that Yerevan is on par with Ankara in terms of raw
power and influence. However, President Sarkisian had taken a sacred
oath to protect the interests of Armenia (and the Armenian nation).
Signing the protocols as a basis for continued negotiations not only
represents a complete denial of that solemn oath, but a repudiation
of everything that Hai Tahd represents.
Paradoxically, it may be the Turkish Parliament that may save Armenia
from the protocols. Ankara will not abandon Azeri President Ilhem
Aliyev and he, in turn, will not voluntarily relinquish Azerbaijan's
claim to Karabagh (Artsakh). Azerbaijan is Turkey's link to Central
Asia and its vast energy resources. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is
a major supplier of oil to the West. That pipeline, supplemented
by the projected Nabucco gas pipeline from Baku through Turkey
to its terminus in Baumgarten, Austria, will rival Gazprom in its
capacity to deliver energy resources to Europe. With that in mind,
it's questionable if the protocols will be ratified by the Turkish
Parliament without the Karabagh issue being part of the negotiations
leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations and the opening
of the border. This is possibly more wishful thinking than a rational
assessment as to what the Turkish Parliament will do. As it is, the
protocols essentially prevent Armenia from supporting any defensive
effort by the Karabaghtsis against future Azeri aggression. Any hope
of de jure independence that our brothers and sisters in Artsakh had,
has been effectively eliminated.
Any benefits that Armenia believes it will receive with opening the
border are illusory at best. Obviously marginal gains will be made.
That fact is not being ignored. However, any palpable gains associated
with an open border will come at an exorbitant price for Armenia. It
is incredulous that the government has not commissioned a study whose
findings would support its determination to have an open border with
Turkey. Could it be because none exist?
First and foremost, normalization based on the protocols will yield
Turkish gains that will far exceed anything that Armenia may hope to
achieve under the most favorable of circumstances. Ankara will become
the dominant power in the south Caucasus, able to challenge Russia
and Iran in a region both these countries consider important to their
national interests. In addition, normalization will revitalize the
dormant Pan-Turanian movement that would expand Turkish influence
through Azerbaijan into Central Asia and possibly further east to
include the Chinese province of Xinjiang (Sinkiang), home of the
Muslim Uighurs. (Only recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
chastised Chinese officials for engaging in genocide in putting
down nationalist demonstrations by the Uighurs.) And finally, it
will burnish Turkey's image as a conciliator as its candidacy for
ascension to the European Union is considered.
If these are not sufficient benefits for Armenia to bestow upon
Turkey, consider that Turkey will not have to acknowledge the murder
of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide, nor will any attempt be made
by Yerevan to lay claim to the Turkish-occupied western provinces of
Armenia (eastern provinces of Turkey) promised in the Treaty of Sevres
(Wilsonian Armenia). In return for all this, Turkey will allow its
border with Armenia to be reopened (and subject to closure on the
slightest pretext based on Ankara's interpretation of the protocols).
What political message does this send to the Kurdish nationalists who
continue to confront Turkey for their independence? What confidence
does this inspire on the part of Armenians, especially those in the
diaspora, in Yerevan's continued leadership?
Since there is no definitive study available, let's consider what
might logically be expected with the opening of the border. It will
not be a panacea for what ails the Armenian economy, as its proponents
claim. On one side of the open border is Armenia, with a population
less than five percent of Turkey's population (75 million). In terms
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there can be no comparability between
Armenia and Turkey in the value of their respective GDPs, range of
goods produced, or per unit costs of specific products. The volume
of cross-border trade that will take place will obviously favor Turkey.
The Armenian market would soon be saturated with goods marked "Made
in Turkey" that will compete with domestically produced goods to
the detriment of their local producers. A possible benefit to the
Armenian consumer might be a greater quantity and variety of goods
at possibly lower prices. Before long, however, the Armenian consumer
would become more dependent on Turkish imports than locally produced
goods, and prices may not remain as low as initially experienced. In
return, what is it that Armenia can export in sufficient quantities to
pay for this invasion of Turkish products? Given this very plausible
scenario, how does one envision that the Armenian economy can benefit
from an open border? On what premise would it be based?
In a relatively short span of time, Turkish entrepreneurs guided by
Turkish government regulations would become the significant players,
as compared to their Armenian counterparts, in determining the rate
and direction of Armenia's economic development. Given the anticipated
imbalance in the value of trade between the two countries, Armenia
would eventually become a debtor nation to Turkey. This situation could
lead to greater financial control by Turkish interests of Armenian
industry and whatever improved or newly developed infrastructure that
may result. Profits generated by Turkish-controlled interests might
be used for further economic expansion in Armenia or just as easily
flow to Turkey. This transference of funds would further exacerbate
Armenia's balance of payment situation. Not a very encouraging
situation to contemplate.
With high rates of unemployment in both countries, does it seem
reasonable that Turkish entrepreneurs, guided by their government's
regulations, will invest heavily in Armenia to create a robust economy
generating a higher level of employment? Both nations are presently
exporting labor in response to high levels of unemployment. If
investments are made, some industries that immediately come to mind
are the manufacturing of cement, copper mining, and the lumber industry
(it doesn't matter that Armenia is not heavily forested).
These are mentioned because they tend to despoil the environment
without effective mitigating controls in place. Who will rise in
protest if people are employed? What a sad trade-off to envision
for Armenia.
Whatever other economic activities are generated will be based on
harnessing the low end of worker skills and wages, although it must
be conceded that the Armenian labor force may, overall, experience a
slight increase in its take-home pay. The better educated members of
the workforce-engineers, research scientists, technicians, etc.-would
be siphoned off to accept positions in Turkey rather than use their
productive and creative capabilities within Armenia. This "brain drain"
would benefit Turkey and weaken Armenia in the long term. This could
lead to a demographic shift of the better educated families to Turkey.
The tourist trade, which is a principal growth industry in Armenia,
could well be taken over by Turkish interests. Armenia has great
potential as a destination for tourists especially from Europe and
the diaspora (assuming there is a continuing desire to connect with
Armenia). The return on investment in the tourist industry is high.
The expansion of this industry has a high multiplier effect in terms
of job creation. However, most tend to be at the lower end of the
wage scale. The Turkish tourist industry has attracted international
investment and is at a more sophisticated level of operation compared
to Armenia's. It would seem logical for the Turkish tourist industry
to expand its operations to include Armenia.
It would not be surprising that within three to five years, Armenians
would prefer the Turkish lira to the Armenian dram as the currency of
choice. In time, it can be expected that the Armenian economy would
become an integral part of the Turkish economic system with the lira
as the only currency.
The oft-repeated benefit that Armenia would have another outlet to
the world has no basis in fact. There are no Turkish Black Sea ports
comparable to Batumi or Poti in Georgia, and those that do exist
(from Trabzon eastward) are neither easily nor economically accessible.
Armenia would still be dependent on Georgia as its principal
transportation route. Given Armenia's weakened political position, why
would the Tbilisi government view her neighbor's transit requirements
in a more favorable light? Also, how would this "capitulation" affect
the future of the Javakhk Armenians? As it is, they are under constant
and pernicious pressure by the Georgian government to acculturate.
Another thought concerning the protocols is why the Ministry of
Diaspora, created by the Sarkisian government as a liaison between
Armenia and the diaspora, was never given a meaningful role as a
sounding board with the diasporan communities and the leadership of
the political and humanitarian relief organizations for their input.
Here was an opportunity to utilize the diaspora beyond its value
simply as a source of humanitarian and economic aid.
However, many in the diaspora have taken a "Let's wait to see what
happens" attitude. Unfortunately, this attitude can be interpreted as
tacit approval of the dangerous path of conciliation that Sarkisian
is traveling. These chezoks (neutrals), by failing to take a definite
position, are welcomed by the proponents of the protocols because
they provide no opposition to what is taking place. In essence,
they are supporting Yerevan's capitulation to Turkey.
There are no economic concessions that Turkey can offer
Armenia-including the unlikely routing of a spur line connecting
Armenia to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or having the projected Nabucco
gas pipeline transit Armenia-that can justify Sarkisian's signing of
the protocols. He has not only failed in his sacred duty to protect
Armenia from its enemies, but has committed mer Hairenik to a Faustian
Bargain that must be annulled at all costs. These Turkish documents
are contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty and undermine its future
as a viable political entity.
By Michael Mensoian
http://www.hairenik.com/weekly/2009/10/1 7/mensoian-sarkisians-faustian-bargain/
October 17, 2009
It would be fair to say that the protocols Nalbandian recently signed
in Zurich contains absolutely nothing that benefits Armenia's economic
and political interests or its longterm security needs. The protocols
are Turkish documents, under the guise of having been mediated by
Switzerland. They are documents that strengthen Turkey's position
within the region and essentially reduce Armenia to a vassal state,
whose president is no better than a satrap.
No one will argue that Yerevan is on par with Ankara in terms of raw
power and influence. However, President Sarkisian had taken a sacred
oath to protect the interests of Armenia (and the Armenian nation).
Signing the protocols as a basis for continued negotiations not only
represents a complete denial of that solemn oath, but a repudiation
of everything that Hai Tahd represents.
Paradoxically, it may be the Turkish Parliament that may save Armenia
from the protocols. Ankara will not abandon Azeri President Ilhem
Aliyev and he, in turn, will not voluntarily relinquish Azerbaijan's
claim to Karabagh (Artsakh). Azerbaijan is Turkey's link to Central
Asia and its vast energy resources. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is
a major supplier of oil to the West. That pipeline, supplemented
by the projected Nabucco gas pipeline from Baku through Turkey
to its terminus in Baumgarten, Austria, will rival Gazprom in its
capacity to deliver energy resources to Europe. With that in mind,
it's questionable if the protocols will be ratified by the Turkish
Parliament without the Karabagh issue being part of the negotiations
leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations and the opening
of the border. This is possibly more wishful thinking than a rational
assessment as to what the Turkish Parliament will do. As it is, the
protocols essentially prevent Armenia from supporting any defensive
effort by the Karabaghtsis against future Azeri aggression. Any hope
of de jure independence that our brothers and sisters in Artsakh had,
has been effectively eliminated.
Any benefits that Armenia believes it will receive with opening the
border are illusory at best. Obviously marginal gains will be made.
That fact is not being ignored. However, any palpable gains associated
with an open border will come at an exorbitant price for Armenia. It
is incredulous that the government has not commissioned a study whose
findings would support its determination to have an open border with
Turkey. Could it be because none exist?
First and foremost, normalization based on the protocols will yield
Turkish gains that will far exceed anything that Armenia may hope to
achieve under the most favorable of circumstances. Ankara will become
the dominant power in the south Caucasus, able to challenge Russia
and Iran in a region both these countries consider important to their
national interests. In addition, normalization will revitalize the
dormant Pan-Turanian movement that would expand Turkish influence
through Azerbaijan into Central Asia and possibly further east to
include the Chinese province of Xinjiang (Sinkiang), home of the
Muslim Uighurs. (Only recently, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
chastised Chinese officials for engaging in genocide in putting
down nationalist demonstrations by the Uighurs.) And finally, it
will burnish Turkey's image as a conciliator as its candidacy for
ascension to the European Union is considered.
If these are not sufficient benefits for Armenia to bestow upon
Turkey, consider that Turkey will not have to acknowledge the murder
of 1.5 million Armenians as genocide, nor will any attempt be made
by Yerevan to lay claim to the Turkish-occupied western provinces of
Armenia (eastern provinces of Turkey) promised in the Treaty of Sevres
(Wilsonian Armenia). In return for all this, Turkey will allow its
border with Armenia to be reopened (and subject to closure on the
slightest pretext based on Ankara's interpretation of the protocols).
What political message does this send to the Kurdish nationalists who
continue to confront Turkey for their independence? What confidence
does this inspire on the part of Armenians, especially those in the
diaspora, in Yerevan's continued leadership?
Since there is no definitive study available, let's consider what
might logically be expected with the opening of the border. It will
not be a panacea for what ails the Armenian economy, as its proponents
claim. On one side of the open border is Armenia, with a population
less than five percent of Turkey's population (75 million). In terms
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), there can be no comparability between
Armenia and Turkey in the value of their respective GDPs, range of
goods produced, or per unit costs of specific products. The volume
of cross-border trade that will take place will obviously favor Turkey.
The Armenian market would soon be saturated with goods marked "Made
in Turkey" that will compete with domestically produced goods to
the detriment of their local producers. A possible benefit to the
Armenian consumer might be a greater quantity and variety of goods
at possibly lower prices. Before long, however, the Armenian consumer
would become more dependent on Turkish imports than locally produced
goods, and prices may not remain as low as initially experienced. In
return, what is it that Armenia can export in sufficient quantities to
pay for this invasion of Turkish products? Given this very plausible
scenario, how does one envision that the Armenian economy can benefit
from an open border? On what premise would it be based?
In a relatively short span of time, Turkish entrepreneurs guided by
Turkish government regulations would become the significant players,
as compared to their Armenian counterparts, in determining the rate
and direction of Armenia's economic development. Given the anticipated
imbalance in the value of trade between the two countries, Armenia
would eventually become a debtor nation to Turkey. This situation could
lead to greater financial control by Turkish interests of Armenian
industry and whatever improved or newly developed infrastructure that
may result. Profits generated by Turkish-controlled interests might
be used for further economic expansion in Armenia or just as easily
flow to Turkey. This transference of funds would further exacerbate
Armenia's balance of payment situation. Not a very encouraging
situation to contemplate.
With high rates of unemployment in both countries, does it seem
reasonable that Turkish entrepreneurs, guided by their government's
regulations, will invest heavily in Armenia to create a robust economy
generating a higher level of employment? Both nations are presently
exporting labor in response to high levels of unemployment. If
investments are made, some industries that immediately come to mind
are the manufacturing of cement, copper mining, and the lumber industry
(it doesn't matter that Armenia is not heavily forested).
These are mentioned because they tend to despoil the environment
without effective mitigating controls in place. Who will rise in
protest if people are employed? What a sad trade-off to envision
for Armenia.
Whatever other economic activities are generated will be based on
harnessing the low end of worker skills and wages, although it must
be conceded that the Armenian labor force may, overall, experience a
slight increase in its take-home pay. The better educated members of
the workforce-engineers, research scientists, technicians, etc.-would
be siphoned off to accept positions in Turkey rather than use their
productive and creative capabilities within Armenia. This "brain drain"
would benefit Turkey and weaken Armenia in the long term. This could
lead to a demographic shift of the better educated families to Turkey.
The tourist trade, which is a principal growth industry in Armenia,
could well be taken over by Turkish interests. Armenia has great
potential as a destination for tourists especially from Europe and
the diaspora (assuming there is a continuing desire to connect with
Armenia). The return on investment in the tourist industry is high.
The expansion of this industry has a high multiplier effect in terms
of job creation. However, most tend to be at the lower end of the
wage scale. The Turkish tourist industry has attracted international
investment and is at a more sophisticated level of operation compared
to Armenia's. It would seem logical for the Turkish tourist industry
to expand its operations to include Armenia.
It would not be surprising that within three to five years, Armenians
would prefer the Turkish lira to the Armenian dram as the currency of
choice. In time, it can be expected that the Armenian economy would
become an integral part of the Turkish economic system with the lira
as the only currency.
The oft-repeated benefit that Armenia would have another outlet to
the world has no basis in fact. There are no Turkish Black Sea ports
comparable to Batumi or Poti in Georgia, and those that do exist
(from Trabzon eastward) are neither easily nor economically accessible.
Armenia would still be dependent on Georgia as its principal
transportation route. Given Armenia's weakened political position, why
would the Tbilisi government view her neighbor's transit requirements
in a more favorable light? Also, how would this "capitulation" affect
the future of the Javakhk Armenians? As it is, they are under constant
and pernicious pressure by the Georgian government to acculturate.
Another thought concerning the protocols is why the Ministry of
Diaspora, created by the Sarkisian government as a liaison between
Armenia and the diaspora, was never given a meaningful role as a
sounding board with the diasporan communities and the leadership of
the political and humanitarian relief organizations for their input.
Here was an opportunity to utilize the diaspora beyond its value
simply as a source of humanitarian and economic aid.
However, many in the diaspora have taken a "Let's wait to see what
happens" attitude. Unfortunately, this attitude can be interpreted as
tacit approval of the dangerous path of conciliation that Sarkisian
is traveling. These chezoks (neutrals), by failing to take a definite
position, are welcomed by the proponents of the protocols because
they provide no opposition to what is taking place. In essence,
they are supporting Yerevan's capitulation to Turkey.
There are no economic concessions that Turkey can offer
Armenia-including the unlikely routing of a spur line connecting
Armenia to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or having the projected Nabucco
gas pipeline transit Armenia-that can justify Sarkisian's signing of
the protocols. He has not only failed in his sacred duty to protect
Armenia from its enemies, but has committed mer Hairenik to a Faustian
Bargain that must be annulled at all costs. These Turkish documents
are contemptuous of Armenia's sovereignty and undermine its future
as a viable political entity.