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TURKEY-ARMENIA: TOO STEEP FOR "ZERO-PROBLEMS WITH NEIGHBORS" THEORY
Adil Baguirov
Hurriyet Daily News
Oct 26 2009
Turkey
As a rule, the art of successful politics and diplomacy, whose
fundamental objective is to resolve problems, always aims to improve
the ranking and position of a nation-state when there is a seeming
balance, to preserve the status quo if someone is trying to change
that balance or to do damage-control and stall the decline brought
by forces outside its control for as long as possible. However, the
aim is never to worsen the country's short-, medium- and long-term
posture, goals and objectives - what is sometimes referred to as the
national interest of the state. Regrettably at the moment, it seems
to be the case that Turkey's policy of "zero-problems with neighbors,"
has resulted in the worsening of its geostrategic stance in the south
Caucasus and Caspian regions.
Conceptually, the notion of "zero-problems with neighbors" is a
highly appealing and welcoming academic theory. The reality, sadly,
differs, as there is no real precedent in the history of international
relations for any one country to rapidly improve relations and resolve
several sizeable problems in a short, compressed time-frame. While it
is true that the world, especially the Greater Middle East, has had
centuries to work out its still unresolved problems, that necessitates
fresh theoretical approaches. Moreover, these new methods should
not undermine, fracture or spoil something that works and has been
cherished and built for previous generations. As a famous Russian
proverb says, it is better to have a smaller bird in hand, than a
bigger bird in the sky. Primum non nocere - do no harm.
While everyone in the Turkish government understands the supreme
importance of a special and strategic relationship with the biggest
and most important country in the south Caucasus region, fraternal
Azerbaijan - including the architect of the "zero-problems" theory,
cabinet minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who cites this Turkic country
repeatedly in his book - it seems that the latest series of setbacks
are the result of unclear communication, insufficient consultations,
outright insensitivities and poor calculations. It did not have to be
so - after all, the ambitious undertaking by the Turkish government
could have been clearer and far more successful. After all, the end
goals of the two states, are one and the same - peace, prosperity
and development.
The "zero-problems" policy's scorecard remains a mixed bag of advances
and frustrating setbacks. Guided by the new policy, Turkey has achieved
some great successes, such as the resolution of the PKK terrorism,
improving relations with the Arab world and historic nemesis Iran,
repairing relations with the U.S., as well as a new, unprecedented
strategic relationship with Russia that has brought a flood of
important energy megaprojects. Turkey has also legitimized itself
as a permanent actor and acceptable broker in the affairs of the
south Caucasus. However, the list of setbacks and potential failures
are no less thought-provoking: One can point to the Cyprus issue,
EU accession being as far away as ever, worsening relations with
Georgia, problems with Israel and the Jewish lobby, the recruitment
of an increasing number of co-sponsors in an anti-Turkish resolution
from the U.S. Congress by the Armenian lobby (i.e., "business as
usual"). In addition to these, it is necessary to mention the rift
with Azerbaijan over the worsened prospects of an Armenian military
withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions due to
the Armenian calculation that it can now prolong occupation and get
a better deal once the land border with Turkey is open. That is the
crux of Azerbaijan's frustration with the symbolism of the opening
of the border before Armenia commits to a withdrawal from Karabakh.
The Armenian government and the diaspora view it in zero-sum terms,
while Turkey quixotically attempts to achieve a positive-sum result.
If Turkey's gambit will result in long-term cooling of relations with
not just Azerbaijan, but the Azerbaijani people, and by association,
with the rest of the Turkic world in Central Asia - who are watching
how all this plays out and will make their determination - it
would be the equivalent of the Justice and Development Party, or
AKP, government shooting itself in the foot. It does not make much
economic or geographical sense to essentially trade the interests
of a fraternal nation that fought alongside the Turkish people -
even in Gallipoli in 1915 - and with whom Turkey enjoys almost $3
billion in growing trade turnover and a geopolitical renaissance
due to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum pipelines for
a much smaller and inherently hostile nation with only about $200
million in trade turnover with bleak prospects.
Even though this is not the aim of Turkish calculations, it is how
it appears to many, especially after such examples of insensitivity
like the allowance of the flag of separatist Karabakh during the
football match in Yerevan, but the public interdiction, and subsequent
disrespect, of the Azerbaijani flag during the match in Bursa (it
should be noted that several oversized Turkish flags were present
at the Azerbaijan-Russia game that same day in Baku). One should not
forget either the unprecedented special cooking by the First Lady of
Turkey for the Armenian President, who admitted culpability for the
single biggest tragedy in Karabakh, the Khojaly Massacre of 1992,
when hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians were violently killed overnight.
The reality of a multi-polar world is that Turkey's goodwill and
attempt to help resolve regional problems could result in potentially
embarrassing failures, like it did on the Cyprus issue. Neither U.S.
President Barack Obama and his government nor President Sarkisian
in Armenia can prevent or completely stop the Armenian lobby's
determination to push forward their very raison d'être. Likewise, EU
bureaucrats will be unable to convince all member nations that Turkey
deserves to become a full fledged member of that union. Armenia,
meanwhile, will be unable to generate even 10% of trade benefits
with Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan, and, importantly, its people,
can turn back, and with them close the Turkish bridge to the other
Turkic nations of Central Asia. At the moment, it seems that Turkish
government is still confident it can pull this gambit off, and could
be guided by the famous words of the grand strategist Metternich:
"Diplomacy is the art of avoiding the appearance of victory."
* Ms. Adil Baguirov is the founding member of the Azerbaijan Turkey
Historical Research Foundation (ATAF), co-founder of the U.S. Turkic
Network (USTN) and is a post-doctoral fellow at the Moscow State
Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)
Adil Baguirov
Hurriyet Daily News
Oct 26 2009
Turkey
As a rule, the art of successful politics and diplomacy, whose
fundamental objective is to resolve problems, always aims to improve
the ranking and position of a nation-state when there is a seeming
balance, to preserve the status quo if someone is trying to change
that balance or to do damage-control and stall the decline brought
by forces outside its control for as long as possible. However, the
aim is never to worsen the country's short-, medium- and long-term
posture, goals and objectives - what is sometimes referred to as the
national interest of the state. Regrettably at the moment, it seems
to be the case that Turkey's policy of "zero-problems with neighbors,"
has resulted in the worsening of its geostrategic stance in the south
Caucasus and Caspian regions.
Conceptually, the notion of "zero-problems with neighbors" is a
highly appealing and welcoming academic theory. The reality, sadly,
differs, as there is no real precedent in the history of international
relations for any one country to rapidly improve relations and resolve
several sizeable problems in a short, compressed time-frame. While it
is true that the world, especially the Greater Middle East, has had
centuries to work out its still unresolved problems, that necessitates
fresh theoretical approaches. Moreover, these new methods should
not undermine, fracture or spoil something that works and has been
cherished and built for previous generations. As a famous Russian
proverb says, it is better to have a smaller bird in hand, than a
bigger bird in the sky. Primum non nocere - do no harm.
While everyone in the Turkish government understands the supreme
importance of a special and strategic relationship with the biggest
and most important country in the south Caucasus region, fraternal
Azerbaijan - including the architect of the "zero-problems" theory,
cabinet minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who cites this Turkic country
repeatedly in his book - it seems that the latest series of setbacks
are the result of unclear communication, insufficient consultations,
outright insensitivities and poor calculations. It did not have to be
so - after all, the ambitious undertaking by the Turkish government
could have been clearer and far more successful. After all, the end
goals of the two states, are one and the same - peace, prosperity
and development.
The "zero-problems" policy's scorecard remains a mixed bag of advances
and frustrating setbacks. Guided by the new policy, Turkey has achieved
some great successes, such as the resolution of the PKK terrorism,
improving relations with the Arab world and historic nemesis Iran,
repairing relations with the U.S., as well as a new, unprecedented
strategic relationship with Russia that has brought a flood of
important energy megaprojects. Turkey has also legitimized itself
as a permanent actor and acceptable broker in the affairs of the
south Caucasus. However, the list of setbacks and potential failures
are no less thought-provoking: One can point to the Cyprus issue,
EU accession being as far away as ever, worsening relations with
Georgia, problems with Israel and the Jewish lobby, the recruitment
of an increasing number of co-sponsors in an anti-Turkish resolution
from the U.S. Congress by the Armenian lobby (i.e., "business as
usual"). In addition to these, it is necessary to mention the rift
with Azerbaijan over the worsened prospects of an Armenian military
withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions due to
the Armenian calculation that it can now prolong occupation and get
a better deal once the land border with Turkey is open. That is the
crux of Azerbaijan's frustration with the symbolism of the opening
of the border before Armenia commits to a withdrawal from Karabakh.
The Armenian government and the diaspora view it in zero-sum terms,
while Turkey quixotically attempts to achieve a positive-sum result.
If Turkey's gambit will result in long-term cooling of relations with
not just Azerbaijan, but the Azerbaijani people, and by association,
with the rest of the Turkic world in Central Asia - who are watching
how all this plays out and will make their determination - it
would be the equivalent of the Justice and Development Party, or
AKP, government shooting itself in the foot. It does not make much
economic or geographical sense to essentially trade the interests
of a fraternal nation that fought alongside the Turkish people -
even in Gallipoli in 1915 - and with whom Turkey enjoys almost $3
billion in growing trade turnover and a geopolitical renaissance
due to the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum pipelines for
a much smaller and inherently hostile nation with only about $200
million in trade turnover with bleak prospects.
Even though this is not the aim of Turkish calculations, it is how
it appears to many, especially after such examples of insensitivity
like the allowance of the flag of separatist Karabakh during the
football match in Yerevan, but the public interdiction, and subsequent
disrespect, of the Azerbaijani flag during the match in Bursa (it
should be noted that several oversized Turkish flags were present
at the Azerbaijan-Russia game that same day in Baku). One should not
forget either the unprecedented special cooking by the First Lady of
Turkey for the Armenian President, who admitted culpability for the
single biggest tragedy in Karabakh, the Khojaly Massacre of 1992,
when hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians were violently killed overnight.
The reality of a multi-polar world is that Turkey's goodwill and
attempt to help resolve regional problems could result in potentially
embarrassing failures, like it did on the Cyprus issue. Neither U.S.
President Barack Obama and his government nor President Sarkisian
in Armenia can prevent or completely stop the Armenian lobby's
determination to push forward their very raison d'être. Likewise, EU
bureaucrats will be unable to convince all member nations that Turkey
deserves to become a full fledged member of that union. Armenia,
meanwhile, will be unable to generate even 10% of trade benefits
with Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan, and, importantly, its people,
can turn back, and with them close the Turkish bridge to the other
Turkic nations of Central Asia. At the moment, it seems that Turkish
government is still confident it can pull this gambit off, and could
be guided by the famous words of the grand strategist Metternich:
"Diplomacy is the art of avoiding the appearance of victory."
* Ms. Adil Baguirov is the founding member of the Azerbaijan Turkey
Historical Research Foundation (ATAF), co-founder of the U.S. Turkic
Network (USTN) and is a post-doctoral fellow at the Moscow State
Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)