Tweet
"IDEAL SCHEME" TO OPEN BORDERS: IS ANKARA PREPARED FOR ARMENIAN OPTION?
By Ali Mammadov
Today
http://www.today.az/news/politics/ 57028.html
Oct 29 2009
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan and Turkey, the two fraternal nations, have succeeded to
overcome the recent hardships in relations with the smallest losses.
The two countries reiterated their loyalty to fraternal relations. The
incident with flags has been suppressed successfully.
Admittedly, the Azerbaijani and Turkish societies saw incomprehension
following the signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
normalization of relations.
Nevertheless, our Turkish brothers still assure us of inviolability of
eternal friendship and that the two processes - the Ankara-Yerevan
dialogue and settlement of the Karabakh conflict are moving in
parallel.
Azerbaijan voices anxiety for opening of the Armenian-Turkish
border just given the thoughts that despite significant progress
in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and liberation of its
Armenian-occupied territories, it might worsen the situation even.
At first look, any concerns in this respect might seem groundless.
Firstly, promises were given in the top level.
Secondly, both Turkish and western partners of Azerbaijan
state constantly that breakthrough in peace talks to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will happen soon, as if hinting at existence
of some secret gentlemen's agreement with Armenia. Simply, Armenia
is not interested in the existence of a formal "link" between the
process of normalization of relations with Turkey and settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Thirdly, they almost state that normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations in a long-term perspective in parallel with resolution of
the Karabakh conflict meets interests of not only Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Turkey, but also the entire South Caucasus. Quite clear: nothing
causes question in this part.
Initiators of this process believe should all conflicts are solved
at once Armenia will pursue more independent foreign policy, get
involved in regional integration and consequently, cease to play a
destabilizing role in the South Caucasus. U.S. Vice President Joe
Biden is right in this claims that "the main point is not a love and
affection, but opportunities and necessity."
However, any long-term scheme violates the "ideality" because it
ignores threats in a particular historical period that may hinder its
implementation. Better to say, possibilities do not always coincide
with a desire. In this case, the main point is Armenia, more precisely,
this country's President Serzh Sargsyan.
Despite heavy historical responsibility, it is much easier for
Sargsyan to agree to normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations
rather to resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In fact, most
of the Diaspora is opposed to the protocols. But one needs to take
into account the following factor:
Firstly, the Diaspora has no real levers of influence on internal
political situation in Armenia. Dashnaks, who represent the Diaspora's
interests, are not trendsetters in the domestic arena. They
have never gained more than 15 percent of the vote in national
elections. Indeed, this is not a small number, but not enough to
destabilize the political situation. A striking force of the opposition
- the Armenian National Congress led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, despite
criticism of the protocols, in fact, "played into Sargsyan's hands"
refusing to participate in mass rallies organized by the Dashnaks.
Secondly, Sargsyan understood that Armenia will lose nothing in terms
of financial aid from abroad after normalization of relations with
Turkey. The point is that a smaller part of the Diaspora, namely,
money giants who are alien to all sorts of historical sentiments, are
really interested in normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They have just got tired
of providing charity. They need real investments that would yield a
profit. And this is possible only if Armenia resolves conflicts with
its neighbors and becomes involved in regional integration processes.
Furthermore, the Western countries who are interested in normalization
of Armenian-Turkish relations, are likely to increase financial
assistance to Armenia.
Thirdly, absence of serious foreign forces able to oppose the
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations at this historical period
was also taken into account. Many analysts viewed Iran and Russia as a
force capable of influencing Armenia's decisions. However, both Russia
and Iran now are interested in developing normal relations with Turkey.
Meantime, the situation with settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is much more complicated. In this case, Sargsyan has no
serious allies, especially within the country.
Firstly, greater part of the Armenian elite used to earn from the
conflicts both in a literal and figurative sense of the word. Making
profits in peace is much more difficult, because rivals grow in
number. So, definite part of the elite will oppose any peace agreement
with Azerbaijan because of their selfish interests.
Secondly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is not a history, but
present day of Armenia. Many Armenian leaders have made political
capital out of this conflict. Considerable part of them are now
strongly opposed to Sargsyan, including leader of the Armenian National
Congress. They are unlikely to miss an opportunity "to get even with"
Sargsyan.
As a matter of fact, Sargsyan's predecessor, Armenia's ex-president
Robert Kocharyan, is also opposed to him. He has fallen into oblivion
for a while, whilst his counterpart, former Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian, speaks for him sharply criticizing Serzh Sargsyan's policy.
Thirdly, the state of the Armenian armed forces is much more
complicated. Suffice it to recall the post-election events in Armenia.
Sargsyan had to bid farewell to one of the vice ministers of defense
due to his support to the opposition.
Presently, the situation is much more difficult for Serzh Sargsyan and
easier for his potential opponents from the military opposition. After
all, main point is not the power, but Karabakh. It is much easier for
them to provoke unauthorized large-scale hostilities on the Karabakh
front thus leaving no choice to Sargsyan.
Similar events have previously happened in Armenian history. The
conflicting sides signed a ceasefire agreement under Iran's mediation
in Tehran in May 1992. However, Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
began an offensive against the Azerbaijani town of Shusha on that
day in an effort to leave no choice to the then leadership of Armenia
headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a fact that Robert Kocharyan admitted
recently.
Fourth, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in parallel theoretically enhances
opportunities to diversify energy supply routes from the Caspian Sea
to European markets. This is fundamentally contrary to interests
of specific external forces, who have real levers of influence on
political situation in Armenia. These forces are able to torpedo any
peace agreement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through
Armenians' hands. This has happened on numerous occasions. Levon
Ter-Petrosyan's attempts to facilitate a breakthrough in resolving
the conflict in 1998 cost him his power.
A year later, namely in 1999, Robert Kocharyan faced a threat of
overthrow following the shooting in the Armenian parliament. Those
in Armenia have long accustomed to use an opportunity to resolve the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to overthrow the government.
Thus, the problem is that to what extent Turkey and the authors of
this "ideal" scheme are prepared to the afore-said threats of the
peaceable process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict solution. What will
Turkey do if Sargsyan turns out in no condition to fulfill an alleged
gentleman's agreement on settlement of the Karabakh conflict?! After
all, there is a certain time frame for ratification of the protocols.
Deadline is April 24, 2010 at most. After a choice should be made
anyway...
By Ali Mammadov
Today
http://www.today.az/news/politics/ 57028.html
Oct 29 2009
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan and Turkey, the two fraternal nations, have succeeded to
overcome the recent hardships in relations with the smallest losses.
The two countries reiterated their loyalty to fraternal relations. The
incident with flags has been suppressed successfully.
Admittedly, the Azerbaijani and Turkish societies saw incomprehension
following the signing of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on
normalization of relations.
Nevertheless, our Turkish brothers still assure us of inviolability of
eternal friendship and that the two processes - the Ankara-Yerevan
dialogue and settlement of the Karabakh conflict are moving in
parallel.
Azerbaijan voices anxiety for opening of the Armenian-Turkish
border just given the thoughts that despite significant progress
in the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and liberation of its
Armenian-occupied territories, it might worsen the situation even.
At first look, any concerns in this respect might seem groundless.
Firstly, promises were given in the top level.
Secondly, both Turkish and western partners of Azerbaijan
state constantly that breakthrough in peace talks to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will happen soon, as if hinting at existence
of some secret gentlemen's agreement with Armenia. Simply, Armenia
is not interested in the existence of a formal "link" between the
process of normalization of relations with Turkey and settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Thirdly, they almost state that normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations in a long-term perspective in parallel with resolution of
the Karabakh conflict meets interests of not only Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Turkey, but also the entire South Caucasus. Quite clear: nothing
causes question in this part.
Initiators of this process believe should all conflicts are solved
at once Armenia will pursue more independent foreign policy, get
involved in regional integration and consequently, cease to play a
destabilizing role in the South Caucasus. U.S. Vice President Joe
Biden is right in this claims that "the main point is not a love and
affection, but opportunities and necessity."
However, any long-term scheme violates the "ideality" because it
ignores threats in a particular historical period that may hinder its
implementation. Better to say, possibilities do not always coincide
with a desire. In this case, the main point is Armenia, more precisely,
this country's President Serzh Sargsyan.
Despite heavy historical responsibility, it is much easier for
Sargsyan to agree to normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations
rather to resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In fact, most
of the Diaspora is opposed to the protocols. But one needs to take
into account the following factor:
Firstly, the Diaspora has no real levers of influence on internal
political situation in Armenia. Dashnaks, who represent the Diaspora's
interests, are not trendsetters in the domestic arena. They
have never gained more than 15 percent of the vote in national
elections. Indeed, this is not a small number, but not enough to
destabilize the political situation. A striking force of the opposition
- the Armenian National Congress led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, despite
criticism of the protocols, in fact, "played into Sargsyan's hands"
refusing to participate in mass rallies organized by the Dashnaks.
Secondly, Sargsyan understood that Armenia will lose nothing in terms
of financial aid from abroad after normalization of relations with
Turkey. The point is that a smaller part of the Diaspora, namely,
money giants who are alien to all sorts of historical sentiments, are
really interested in normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They have just got tired
of providing charity. They need real investments that would yield a
profit. And this is possible only if Armenia resolves conflicts with
its neighbors and becomes involved in regional integration processes.
Furthermore, the Western countries who are interested in normalization
of Armenian-Turkish relations, are likely to increase financial
assistance to Armenia.
Thirdly, absence of serious foreign forces able to oppose the
normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations at this historical period
was also taken into account. Many analysts viewed Iran and Russia as a
force capable of influencing Armenia's decisions. However, both Russia
and Iran now are interested in developing normal relations with Turkey.
Meantime, the situation with settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict is much more complicated. In this case, Sargsyan has no
serious allies, especially within the country.
Firstly, greater part of the Armenian elite used to earn from the
conflicts both in a literal and figurative sense of the word. Making
profits in peace is much more difficult, because rivals grow in
number. So, definite part of the elite will oppose any peace agreement
with Azerbaijan because of their selfish interests.
Secondly, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is not a history, but
present day of Armenia. Many Armenian leaders have made political
capital out of this conflict. Considerable part of them are now
strongly opposed to Sargsyan, including leader of the Armenian National
Congress. They are unlikely to miss an opportunity "to get even with"
Sargsyan.
As a matter of fact, Sargsyan's predecessor, Armenia's ex-president
Robert Kocharyan, is also opposed to him. He has fallen into oblivion
for a while, whilst his counterpart, former Foreign Minister Vartan
Oskanian, speaks for him sharply criticizing Serzh Sargsyan's policy.
Thirdly, the state of the Armenian armed forces is much more
complicated. Suffice it to recall the post-election events in Armenia.
Sargsyan had to bid farewell to one of the vice ministers of defense
due to his support to the opposition.
Presently, the situation is much more difficult for Serzh Sargsyan and
easier for his potential opponents from the military opposition. After
all, main point is not the power, but Karabakh. It is much easier for
them to provoke unauthorized large-scale hostilities on the Karabakh
front thus leaving no choice to Sargsyan.
Similar events have previously happened in Armenian history. The
conflicting sides signed a ceasefire agreement under Iran's mediation
in Tehran in May 1992. However, Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
began an offensive against the Azerbaijani town of Shusha on that
day in an effort to leave no choice to the then leadership of Armenia
headed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, a fact that Robert Kocharyan admitted
recently.
Fourth, normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in parallel theoretically enhances
opportunities to diversify energy supply routes from the Caspian Sea
to European markets. This is fundamentally contrary to interests
of specific external forces, who have real levers of influence on
political situation in Armenia. These forces are able to torpedo any
peace agreement to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through
Armenians' hands. This has happened on numerous occasions. Levon
Ter-Petrosyan's attempts to facilitate a breakthrough in resolving
the conflict in 1998 cost him his power.
A year later, namely in 1999, Robert Kocharyan faced a threat of
overthrow following the shooting in the Armenian parliament. Those
in Armenia have long accustomed to use an opportunity to resolve the
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh to overthrow the government.
Thus, the problem is that to what extent Turkey and the authors of
this "ideal" scheme are prepared to the afore-said threats of the
peaceable process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict solution. What will
Turkey do if Sargsyan turns out in no condition to fulfill an alleged
gentleman's agreement on settlement of the Karabakh conflict?! After
all, there is a certain time frame for ratification of the protocols.
Deadline is April 24, 2010 at most. After a choice should be made
anyway...