Tweet
TURKISH-ARMENIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MAY BE AROUND THE CORNER
Examiner.com
Sept 4 2009
It is no surprise that Turkey and Armenia do not have diplomatic
relations. During World War I, in the death throes of the Ottoman
Empire, the Turks killed an estimated 1.5 million Armenians. The
Armenians and most of the world call this the "Armenian Genocide." The
Turks furiously deny that it was a genocide and have refused to
consider reparations or even an apology. (See "Turkey needs to accept
responsibility for the Armenian Genocide.")
More recently, in the early 1990s conflict erupted between Armenians
and Azeris, who are ethnically related to the Turks. They fought
over Nagorno-Karabakh, also called "Artsakh" in Armenian. The
Armenians regard Karabakh as a historical part of their homeland,
but the Bolsheviks had assigned it to Azerbaijan in 1923, although
Armenians were its majority population. Years of fighting resulted in
the Armenians winning control over Karabakh with a Russian-mediated
ceasefire of 1994. The Azeri population fled Karabakh. Karabakh now
has nominal independence, recognized only by Armenia. Azerbaijan wants
it back; Armenians are content with the status quo. Turkey sided with
Azerbaijan, and closed its border with Armenia.
Thus, as noted by analyst Joe Ribakoff, while Turkey swiftly recognized
Armenian independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
that's where the train stopped. The two countries did not go on to
establish diplomatic relations. That's no surprise. The surprise is
that this may soon change.
On August 31 the two countries simultaneously announced that they
have "agreed to start their internal political consultations on
the two protocols - the 'Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic
relations' and the 'Protocol on the development of bilateral relations'
- which have been initialed in the course of their efforts under
Swiss mediation." The exchange of ambassadors may be in the offing.
The two nations have apparently decided that their differences,
however serious, should not prevent them from moving towards normal
relations. Armenia, a small, landlocked country, would benefit
economically from the opening of its long, westward-facing Turkish
frontier. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has an announced
policy of "zero problems with neighbors," but more pertinent is gas
pipeline politics. Turkey is positioning itself to be the main route
of Azerbaijan's rich gas resources to Europe. Andrea Bonzanni of the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva
explains in World Politics Review:
The AKP [Turkey's ruling party] leadership has in fact demonstrated
a long-term vision for the country's future and, given the prolonged
political instability in Georgia, it simply does not want to rule out
a precious potential alternative route for Caspian hydrocarbons on
purely ideological grounds. This also explains Turkey's desire for a
full resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
resource-rich Azerbaijan, which would finally bring regional stability.
In addition, good relations with Armenia are instrumental to the
full success of Turkey's plans, not least because of the improvement
in Turkey's reputation that will result. Indeed, trust-building is a
necessary condition, as European governments have to be fully convinced
that Turkey is a reliable partner that can guarantee the security of
gas supplies. With Turkey's accession to the EU currently a remote
possibility, it seems unlikely the Europe would grant Ankara such
a crucial role in the diversification of its gas supplies unless
it is certain that Turkey will prove to be different from Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus.
As in most diplomatic dances, Turkey has to try to please several
partners at once. Consequently, while it courts Armenia, it smiles
winsomely at Azerbaijan, which is afraid of being hypovehiculated
on the Karabakh issue. "To be able to turn this normalization into
permanent peace, we are expecting a forthwith settlement on the
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the contributions of the
international community," said the Turkish foreign minister. Good luck
with that. Karabakh has never been high on the diplomatic agenda. And
Armenian President Serge Sarkisian reiterated on September 2 Armenia's
view that the fate of Karabakh will be decided in accordance with
the wishes of its citizens (now almost entirely Armenian).
Moreover, under the heading of "no good deed goes unpunished," there is
opposition in each country to these efforts to improve relations. The
Armenian opposition party ARF Dashnaktsutyun objected on the ground
that reconciliation would be possible only after Turkish recognition
of the Armenian Genocide. On the other side, the vice president of the
Turkish opposition party the Republican People's Party, Onur Oymen,
complained that "Armenia has promised nothing in response to this
protocol and so what Turkey does will be a one-sided concession."
In short, there are many potential stumbling blocks between here and
Armenian-Turkish normalization.
Examiner.com
Sept 4 2009
It is no surprise that Turkey and Armenia do not have diplomatic
relations. During World War I, in the death throes of the Ottoman
Empire, the Turks killed an estimated 1.5 million Armenians. The
Armenians and most of the world call this the "Armenian Genocide." The
Turks furiously deny that it was a genocide and have refused to
consider reparations or even an apology. (See "Turkey needs to accept
responsibility for the Armenian Genocide.")
More recently, in the early 1990s conflict erupted between Armenians
and Azeris, who are ethnically related to the Turks. They fought
over Nagorno-Karabakh, also called "Artsakh" in Armenian. The
Armenians regard Karabakh as a historical part of their homeland,
but the Bolsheviks had assigned it to Azerbaijan in 1923, although
Armenians were its majority population. Years of fighting resulted in
the Armenians winning control over Karabakh with a Russian-mediated
ceasefire of 1994. The Azeri population fled Karabakh. Karabakh now
has nominal independence, recognized only by Armenia. Azerbaijan wants
it back; Armenians are content with the status quo. Turkey sided with
Azerbaijan, and closed its border with Armenia.
Thus, as noted by analyst Joe Ribakoff, while Turkey swiftly recognized
Armenian independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
that's where the train stopped. The two countries did not go on to
establish diplomatic relations. That's no surprise. The surprise is
that this may soon change.
On August 31 the two countries simultaneously announced that they
have "agreed to start their internal political consultations on
the two protocols - the 'Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic
relations' and the 'Protocol on the development of bilateral relations'
- which have been initialed in the course of their efforts under
Swiss mediation." The exchange of ambassadors may be in the offing.
The two nations have apparently decided that their differences,
however serious, should not prevent them from moving towards normal
relations. Armenia, a small, landlocked country, would benefit
economically from the opening of its long, westward-facing Turkish
frontier. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has an announced
policy of "zero problems with neighbors," but more pertinent is gas
pipeline politics. Turkey is positioning itself to be the main route
of Azerbaijan's rich gas resources to Europe. Andrea Bonzanni of the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva
explains in World Politics Review:
The AKP [Turkey's ruling party] leadership has in fact demonstrated
a long-term vision for the country's future and, given the prolonged
political instability in Georgia, it simply does not want to rule out
a precious potential alternative route for Caspian hydrocarbons on
purely ideological grounds. This also explains Turkey's desire for a
full resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
resource-rich Azerbaijan, which would finally bring regional stability.
In addition, good relations with Armenia are instrumental to the
full success of Turkey's plans, not least because of the improvement
in Turkey's reputation that will result. Indeed, trust-building is a
necessary condition, as European governments have to be fully convinced
that Turkey is a reliable partner that can guarantee the security of
gas supplies. With Turkey's accession to the EU currently a remote
possibility, it seems unlikely the Europe would grant Ankara such
a crucial role in the diversification of its gas supplies unless
it is certain that Turkey will prove to be different from Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus.
As in most diplomatic dances, Turkey has to try to please several
partners at once. Consequently, while it courts Armenia, it smiles
winsomely at Azerbaijan, which is afraid of being hypovehiculated
on the Karabakh issue. "To be able to turn this normalization into
permanent peace, we are expecting a forthwith settlement on the
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan with the contributions of the
international community," said the Turkish foreign minister. Good luck
with that. Karabakh has never been high on the diplomatic agenda. And
Armenian President Serge Sarkisian reiterated on September 2 Armenia's
view that the fate of Karabakh will be decided in accordance with
the wishes of its citizens (now almost entirely Armenian).
Moreover, under the heading of "no good deed goes unpunished," there is
opposition in each country to these efforts to improve relations. The
Armenian opposition party ARF Dashnaktsutyun objected on the ground
that reconciliation would be possible only after Turkish recognition
of the Armenian Genocide. On the other side, the vice president of the
Turkish opposition party the Republican People's Party, Onur Oymen,
complained that "Armenia has promised nothing in response to this
protocol and so what Turkey does will be a one-sided concession."
In short, there are many potential stumbling blocks between here and
Armenian-Turkish normalization.