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Radikal, Turkey
Sept 2 2009
Background of Protocol Signed With Armenia
by Murat Yetkin
When Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu came out of his meeting with
Bashar al-Asad at the Presidential Palace in Damascus it was past the
evening meal that breaks the Ramadan fast. The entire Turkish
delegation went to the Noble Palace Restaurant, which is one of the
best restaurants in Damascus. After breaking his fast, Davutoglu
teasingly asked: "Have you been able to transmit your reports?" Erdal
Safak had reportedly experienced a technical problem and he had not
been able to transmit his article to Sabah. Davutoglu continued to
teasingly say: "Never mind, there will be another report shortly and
you will write about it."
The telephone of Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu, new under secretary
of the Foreign Ministry, rang several minutes before eight o'clock. He
was sitting at the right side of the minister. After speaking on the
phone, Sinirlioglu whispered something in Davutoglu's ear. Davutoglu
said something like: "No way! They should do it the way we agreed."
Sinirlioglu got up from the table, moved away, and spoke on the
phone. Then he returned to the table. At around a quarter or twenty
past eight Sinirlioglu's telephone rang again. The under secretary
listened, he said "all right," later he whispered something in
Davutoglu's ear again. Davutoglu and Sinirlioglu got up from the table
in spite of the fact that they had not finished eating. Davutoglu
said: "We have to go to the embassy. We will issue a statement on
board the plane.'
As the journalists drove towards the airport, Foreign Minister
Spokesman Burak Ozugergin issued the statement: Turkey and Armenia,
with the assistance of Switzerland, have initialed a protocol with the
aim of establishing diplomatic ties and forming commissions for the
normalization of the ties. At the end of six weeks, the protocol will
be submitted to the approval of the parliaments of the two countries.
Apparently the foreign minister had gone to the Turkish Embassy in
Damascus with the aim of calling and briefing Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan. It was understood on board the plane that the statement
should have been issued at 1700. Foreign Minister Davutoglu had held
countless phone conversations with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline
Calmy Rey - phone conversations that had been cut off every time
Davutoglu had passed through the labyrinths with the cement walls for
going to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Armenia had asked for changing
one word in the protocol at the last minute. Turkey in turn had
insisted via Switzerland on remaining loyal to the text of the
agreement and therefore there had been a delay.
Nonetheless this was not the only delay. The developments that had
occurred behind the scenes in association with the announcement of the
protocol showed this.
For example the protocol whose details were announced yesterday was
not actually initialed on 31 August when the statement was
issued. Even on 22 April, when it was announced that Turkey and
Armenia, with the assistance of Switzerland, had begun to work on
protocols for the normalization of the relations, the work had not
been completed. Swiss Secretary of State Michael Ambihl had conducted
shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Yerevan on 1-3 April (in other
words prior to the visit that US President Barack Obama had conducted
to Turkey on 4-6 April) and he had enabled the initialization of the
protocol about which you will read on our newspaper today. CHP's
[Republican People's Party's] Yilmaz announced this date as 2 April on
Kanal-D yesterday evening. Despite Armenia's strong opposition Turkey
had insisted on announcing that the talks had begun (the announcement
had not said the talks had not been finalized) on 22 April (in other
words on the eve of 24
April which is of critical importance in terms of the US
Congress). Given that the protocol had been ready for five months,
what were the items that had been negotiated for the past five months?
The information that we received from the behind the scenes shows that
Turkish and Armenian diplomats have been holding talks on how to write
the text of the announcement of the protocol, which Davutoglu approved
during the fast-breaking dinner in Damascus.
It is understood that the talks were very tough. It is also understood
that the strong reaction that the 22 April announcement had causes not
only in Turkey and Armenia, but also in Azerbaijan had brought these
long-lasting talks on the text of the press statement to the point of
breaking many times.
It is also seen that due to the effect of the debates that had been
held at that time, Ankara did not neglect to brief Baku on each and
every step that it took with Yerevan. The fact that Prime Minister
Erdogan called and briefed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on 28
August, when the text of the announcement had begun to shape and the
fact that on the following day he sent Under Secretary Sinirlioglu as
well as Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Unal Cevikoz to Baku in order
to give Aliyev detailed information are the signs of this.
Therefore the initial statements issued by Baku said: "We are not
uncomfortable with these developments and this is their internal
affair." Neither Aliyev's statement to the effect that "the opening of
the border without the solution of the Karabakh issue runs against our
national interests," nor Davutoglu's statement that "Turkey will not
take any steps that will harm Azerbaijan" contradicted the picture
that had emerged. This is because despite Armenia's insistence (on
ensuring that the protocol would keep the door ajar for keeping
Nagorno-Karabakh outside the process), the protocol does not include
the word "without any preliminary conditions." In other words, the
Karabakh dispute is part of this process. Prime Minister Erdogan's
statement to the effect that "the protocol will not come into effect
without the approval of the National Assembly" also points to the
Karabakh issue.
It is understood that the government will not submit the protocol to
the approval of the National Assembly if no progress is made in the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue (in fact, its approval will be impossible under
those circumstances). Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are aware of this.
Speaking to Clinton the day before yesterday and to Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner,
members of the Minsk Group for Karabakh, yesterday Davutoglu said: "A
step has been taken but if the solution of the Karabakh issue is not
stepped up, this step may not be completed and therefore you should
convince Armenia for a solution." These words prove this framework.
In fact there are no additional items that should be negotiated
between Turkey and Armenia during the next six weeks. Davutoglu said:
"With the announcement the briefing process has also begun. During
this process we will begin to brief the public at home and abroad and
to hold consultations." The same thing is relevant for Armenia and
Azerbaijan. There is a period between the interesting points of this
process [sentence as published]. Even if it is not announced publicly,
the six week period ends on the eve of the soccer game between the
Turkish and Armenian national teams on 14 October. This has brought a
psychological threshold to the protocol. It appears that whether or
not Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan will come to Turkey in return to
the visit that President Abdullah Gul had conducted to Armenia on 6
September will no longer have an impact on the process. Nonetheless
there is yet another surprise at the end of the six-week period. A
simple look
at the calendar shows that the six-week period ends on 13
October. This date has been set as a result of serious bargains. The
Armenians reportedly called for ending the process on 5
October. Ankara reportedly understood that Armenia wants to impose
pressure on Azerbaijan during the Aliyev-Sargsyan meeting that will be
held during the Independent States Summit that will be held in
Kishinev, Moldova on 7-9 October. In order to prevent this, Ankara
reportedly requested the process to end after the summit in
question. As a result it was decided that the process will end
somewhere between 10 to 14 October. As for 13 October, this is the
psychological reason behind the Turkish Foreign Ministry's insistence
on issuing the announcement on 31 August.
13 October is the anniversary of the signing of the 1921 Treaty of
Kars that had been signed by the TBMM [Turkish Grand National
Assembly]. The treaty had closed the TBMM armies' eastern front and
had determined the border between the Soviet Union and Armenia. Given
that with the protocol process Yerevan will indirectly recognize
Turkey's borders, it may issue the announcement one or two days
earlier in order to avoid ending the protocol process on a day that is
very meaningful in terms of Turkey's establishment.
[translated from Turkish]
Sept 2 2009
Background of Protocol Signed With Armenia
by Murat Yetkin
When Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu came out of his meeting with
Bashar al-Asad at the Presidential Palace in Damascus it was past the
evening meal that breaks the Ramadan fast. The entire Turkish
delegation went to the Noble Palace Restaurant, which is one of the
best restaurants in Damascus. After breaking his fast, Davutoglu
teasingly asked: "Have you been able to transmit your reports?" Erdal
Safak had reportedly experienced a technical problem and he had not
been able to transmit his article to Sabah. Davutoglu continued to
teasingly say: "Never mind, there will be another report shortly and
you will write about it."
The telephone of Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu, new under secretary
of the Foreign Ministry, rang several minutes before eight o'clock. He
was sitting at the right side of the minister. After speaking on the
phone, Sinirlioglu whispered something in Davutoglu's ear. Davutoglu
said something like: "No way! They should do it the way we agreed."
Sinirlioglu got up from the table, moved away, and spoke on the
phone. Then he returned to the table. At around a quarter or twenty
past eight Sinirlioglu's telephone rang again. The under secretary
listened, he said "all right," later he whispered something in
Davutoglu's ear again. Davutoglu and Sinirlioglu got up from the table
in spite of the fact that they had not finished eating. Davutoglu
said: "We have to go to the embassy. We will issue a statement on
board the plane.'
As the journalists drove towards the airport, Foreign Minister
Spokesman Burak Ozugergin issued the statement: Turkey and Armenia,
with the assistance of Switzerland, have initialed a protocol with the
aim of establishing diplomatic ties and forming commissions for the
normalization of the ties. At the end of six weeks, the protocol will
be submitted to the approval of the parliaments of the two countries.
Apparently the foreign minister had gone to the Turkish Embassy in
Damascus with the aim of calling and briefing Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan. It was understood on board the plane that the statement
should have been issued at 1700. Foreign Minister Davutoglu had held
countless phone conversations with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline
Calmy Rey - phone conversations that had been cut off every time
Davutoglu had passed through the labyrinths with the cement walls for
going to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry. Armenia had asked for changing
one word in the protocol at the last minute. Turkey in turn had
insisted via Switzerland on remaining loyal to the text of the
agreement and therefore there had been a delay.
Nonetheless this was not the only delay. The developments that had
occurred behind the scenes in association with the announcement of the
protocol showed this.
For example the protocol whose details were announced yesterday was
not actually initialed on 31 August when the statement was
issued. Even on 22 April, when it was announced that Turkey and
Armenia, with the assistance of Switzerland, had begun to work on
protocols for the normalization of the relations, the work had not
been completed. Swiss Secretary of State Michael Ambihl had conducted
shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Yerevan on 1-3 April (in other
words prior to the visit that US President Barack Obama had conducted
to Turkey on 4-6 April) and he had enabled the initialization of the
protocol about which you will read on our newspaper today. CHP's
[Republican People's Party's] Yilmaz announced this date as 2 April on
Kanal-D yesterday evening. Despite Armenia's strong opposition Turkey
had insisted on announcing that the talks had begun (the announcement
had not said the talks had not been finalized) on 22 April (in other
words on the eve of 24
April which is of critical importance in terms of the US
Congress). Given that the protocol had been ready for five months,
what were the items that had been negotiated for the past five months?
The information that we received from the behind the scenes shows that
Turkish and Armenian diplomats have been holding talks on how to write
the text of the announcement of the protocol, which Davutoglu approved
during the fast-breaking dinner in Damascus.
It is understood that the talks were very tough. It is also understood
that the strong reaction that the 22 April announcement had causes not
only in Turkey and Armenia, but also in Azerbaijan had brought these
long-lasting talks on the text of the press statement to the point of
breaking many times.
It is also seen that due to the effect of the debates that had been
held at that time, Ankara did not neglect to brief Baku on each and
every step that it took with Yerevan. The fact that Prime Minister
Erdogan called and briefed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on 28
August, when the text of the announcement had begun to shape and the
fact that on the following day he sent Under Secretary Sinirlioglu as
well as Deputy Undersecretary Ambassador Unal Cevikoz to Baku in order
to give Aliyev detailed information are the signs of this.
Therefore the initial statements issued by Baku said: "We are not
uncomfortable with these developments and this is their internal
affair." Neither Aliyev's statement to the effect that "the opening of
the border without the solution of the Karabakh issue runs against our
national interests," nor Davutoglu's statement that "Turkey will not
take any steps that will harm Azerbaijan" contradicted the picture
that had emerged. This is because despite Armenia's insistence (on
ensuring that the protocol would keep the door ajar for keeping
Nagorno-Karabakh outside the process), the protocol does not include
the word "without any preliminary conditions." In other words, the
Karabakh dispute is part of this process. Prime Minister Erdogan's
statement to the effect that "the protocol will not come into effect
without the approval of the National Assembly" also points to the
Karabakh issue.
It is understood that the government will not submit the protocol to
the approval of the National Assembly if no progress is made in the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue (in fact, its approval will be impossible under
those circumstances). Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are aware of this.
Speaking to Clinton the day before yesterday and to Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov and French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner,
members of the Minsk Group for Karabakh, yesterday Davutoglu said: "A
step has been taken but if the solution of the Karabakh issue is not
stepped up, this step may not be completed and therefore you should
convince Armenia for a solution." These words prove this framework.
In fact there are no additional items that should be negotiated
between Turkey and Armenia during the next six weeks. Davutoglu said:
"With the announcement the briefing process has also begun. During
this process we will begin to brief the public at home and abroad and
to hold consultations." The same thing is relevant for Armenia and
Azerbaijan. There is a period between the interesting points of this
process [sentence as published]. Even if it is not announced publicly,
the six week period ends on the eve of the soccer game between the
Turkish and Armenian national teams on 14 October. This has brought a
psychological threshold to the protocol. It appears that whether or
not Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan will come to Turkey in return to
the visit that President Abdullah Gul had conducted to Armenia on 6
September will no longer have an impact on the process. Nonetheless
there is yet another surprise at the end of the six-week period. A
simple look
at the calendar shows that the six-week period ends on 13
October. This date has been set as a result of serious bargains. The
Armenians reportedly called for ending the process on 5
October. Ankara reportedly understood that Armenia wants to impose
pressure on Azerbaijan during the Aliyev-Sargsyan meeting that will be
held during the Independent States Summit that will be held in
Kishinev, Moldova on 7-9 October. In order to prevent this, Ankara
reportedly requested the process to end after the summit in
question. As a result it was decided that the process will end
somewhere between 10 to 14 October. As for 13 October, this is the
psychological reason behind the Turkish Foreign Ministry's insistence
on issuing the announcement on 31 August.
13 October is the anniversary of the signing of the 1921 Treaty of
Kars that had been signed by the TBMM [Turkish Grand National
Assembly]. The treaty had closed the TBMM armies' eastern front and
had determined the border between the Soviet Union and Armenia. Given
that with the protocol process Yerevan will indirectly recognize
Turkey's borders, it may issue the announcement one or two days
earlier in order to avoid ending the protocol process on a day that is
very meaningful in terms of Turkey's establishment.
[translated from Turkish]