Tweet
GlobalPost
September 5, 2009 Saturday 9:07 AM EST
Opinion: The Turkey-Armenia detente
by Ian O. Lesser
Sep. 5, 2009
WASHINGTON - This week, Turkey and Armenia announced their intention
to establish diplomatic relations, open the closed border between the
two countries and launch a series of talks and confidence-building
measures aimed at resolving long-standing disputes and fostering
closer cooperation.
To be sure, these protocols will need to be ratified in Ankara and
Yerevan, and some important political hurdles remain. But these new
accords, reached with the help of Swiss mediation, could prove
transformational for regional stability in the Black Sea region. They
are also very good news for American and European interests.
These positive developments are a direct result of the opening
established last September when Turkeys president, Abdullah Gul, took
up an invitation from the Armenian president, Serzh Sargysan, to
attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match in Yerevan. The visit was
unprecedented and groundbreaking.
In a more fundamental sense, this weeks announcement flows from years
of quiet, unofficial dialogue among senior intellectuals and opinion
shapers on both sides. The changed atmosphere also shows the influence
of business leaders keen to capture the benefits of bilateral trade,
and enlightened policy figures anxious to take a long-standing problem
off the table.
The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will produce clear
benefits for the region and transatlantic security interests. First,
an open border will contribute to the economic development of Armenia
and rebalance the countrys position between East and West. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict pitting
Russian-backed Armenia against Turkish-backed Azerbaijan, and the
closure of Turkeys border with Armenia in 1993, Yerevans ties to the
West have remained underdeveloped. Open links to Turkey will give
Armenia new options on the international scene and contribute to the
economic development and stability of the country. (Substantial
numbers of Armenians already work and trade in Turkey on an
undocumented basis.)
Second, improved relations between Armenia and Turkey can have an
important demonstration effect. Multiple flashpoints and Å`frozen
conflicts around the Black Sea underscore the dangers of resurgent
nationalism against a backdrop of economic strain. The conflict
between Russia and Georgia, and looming tensions between Russia and
Ukraine, highlight the risk. Open borders and confidence-building
measures can encourage the emergence of a more integrated Black Sea
region, rather than a retreat to inward-looking, nationalistic
postures. If Ankara and Yerevan can change course and resolve disputes
long seen as intractable, this can set a positive precedent for crisis
management and conflict resolution from the Balkans to the Caspian,
and beyond. Could the Å`intractable Cyprus dispute be next?
Third, for Turkey, a genuine opening to Armenia will reinforce the
countrys new approach to foreign policy. In recent years, Turkish
leaders have pursued a Å`zero problems approach to relations in the
Balkans, the Aegean, the Black Sea and the Middle East. By and large,
Ankara has succeeded in transforming its often troubled relations with
neighbors as diverse as Greece, Bulgaria and Syria. Western observers
may be ambivalent about some aspects of this Turkish strategy, not
least Ankaras improved ties to Iran and Russia. But Turkish-Armenian
detente is another matter. Like the rise of Turkish-Greek detente over
the last decade, normalized relations with Yerevan should be an
undiluted benefit for Turkeys transatlantic partners. At a time when
Turkeys European Union candidacy faces serious challenges, the opening
to Armenia can also remind Europeans that Turkey is a producer rather
than a consumer of security in Europes neighborhood.
Finally, the roadmap set out by the parties envisions the
establishment of an international commission to review the contentious
history of 1915 and its aftermath that has bedeviled Armenian-Turkish
relations for nearly 100 years. It would be surprising if this group
manages to reconcile strongly held and competing historical
narratives. It would be even more surprising if detente between Ankara
and Yerevan ends the perennial debate in the U.S. Congress on an
Armenian genocide resolution - feelings run too high on this matter,
especially among the Armenian diaspora.
Yet a formal dialogue about the tragic events of 1915 will extend the
trend of recent years, in which both societies have become more
comfortable with frank discussion about Armenian-Turkish relations,
past and present. From the perspective of American regional interests,
there is much to be gained from a climate in which pressing bilateral
issues, including Iran, Russia and energy security, can take center
stage in relations with Ankara - and Yerevan.
The prospect of genuine Armenian-Turkish detente can help make this a
reality. The process deserves continued and unreserved support from
Washington.
Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall
Fund of the United States in Washington.
September 5, 2009 Saturday 9:07 AM EST
Opinion: The Turkey-Armenia detente
by Ian O. Lesser
Sep. 5, 2009
WASHINGTON - This week, Turkey and Armenia announced their intention
to establish diplomatic relations, open the closed border between the
two countries and launch a series of talks and confidence-building
measures aimed at resolving long-standing disputes and fostering
closer cooperation.
To be sure, these protocols will need to be ratified in Ankara and
Yerevan, and some important political hurdles remain. But these new
accords, reached with the help of Swiss mediation, could prove
transformational for regional stability in the Black Sea region. They
are also very good news for American and European interests.
These positive developments are a direct result of the opening
established last September when Turkeys president, Abdullah Gul, took
up an invitation from the Armenian president, Serzh Sargysan, to
attend a Turkish-Armenian soccer match in Yerevan. The visit was
unprecedented and groundbreaking.
In a more fundamental sense, this weeks announcement flows from years
of quiet, unofficial dialogue among senior intellectuals and opinion
shapers on both sides. The changed atmosphere also shows the influence
of business leaders keen to capture the benefits of bilateral trade,
and enlightened policy figures anxious to take a long-standing problem
off the table.
The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will produce clear
benefits for the region and transatlantic security interests. First,
an open border will contribute to the economic development of Armenia
and rebalance the countrys position between East and West. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict pitting
Russian-backed Armenia against Turkish-backed Azerbaijan, and the
closure of Turkeys border with Armenia in 1993, Yerevans ties to the
West have remained underdeveloped. Open links to Turkey will give
Armenia new options on the international scene and contribute to the
economic development and stability of the country. (Substantial
numbers of Armenians already work and trade in Turkey on an
undocumented basis.)
Second, improved relations between Armenia and Turkey can have an
important demonstration effect. Multiple flashpoints and Å`frozen
conflicts around the Black Sea underscore the dangers of resurgent
nationalism against a backdrop of economic strain. The conflict
between Russia and Georgia, and looming tensions between Russia and
Ukraine, highlight the risk. Open borders and confidence-building
measures can encourage the emergence of a more integrated Black Sea
region, rather than a retreat to inward-looking, nationalistic
postures. If Ankara and Yerevan can change course and resolve disputes
long seen as intractable, this can set a positive precedent for crisis
management and conflict resolution from the Balkans to the Caspian,
and beyond. Could the Å`intractable Cyprus dispute be next?
Third, for Turkey, a genuine opening to Armenia will reinforce the
countrys new approach to foreign policy. In recent years, Turkish
leaders have pursued a Å`zero problems approach to relations in the
Balkans, the Aegean, the Black Sea and the Middle East. By and large,
Ankara has succeeded in transforming its often troubled relations with
neighbors as diverse as Greece, Bulgaria and Syria. Western observers
may be ambivalent about some aspects of this Turkish strategy, not
least Ankaras improved ties to Iran and Russia. But Turkish-Armenian
detente is another matter. Like the rise of Turkish-Greek detente over
the last decade, normalized relations with Yerevan should be an
undiluted benefit for Turkeys transatlantic partners. At a time when
Turkeys European Union candidacy faces serious challenges, the opening
to Armenia can also remind Europeans that Turkey is a producer rather
than a consumer of security in Europes neighborhood.
Finally, the roadmap set out by the parties envisions the
establishment of an international commission to review the contentious
history of 1915 and its aftermath that has bedeviled Armenian-Turkish
relations for nearly 100 years. It would be surprising if this group
manages to reconcile strongly held and competing historical
narratives. It would be even more surprising if detente between Ankara
and Yerevan ends the perennial debate in the U.S. Congress on an
Armenian genocide resolution - feelings run too high on this matter,
especially among the Armenian diaspora.
Yet a formal dialogue about the tragic events of 1915 will extend the
trend of recent years, in which both societies have become more
comfortable with frank discussion about Armenian-Turkish relations,
past and present. From the perspective of American regional interests,
there is much to be gained from a climate in which pressing bilateral
issues, including Iran, Russia and energy security, can take center
stage in relations with Ankara - and Yerevan.
The prospect of genuine Armenian-Turkish detente can help make this a
reality. The process deserves continued and unreserved support from
Washington.
Ian O. Lesser is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall
Fund of the United States in Washington.