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On The Military Doctrine Of Azerbaijan

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  • On The Military Doctrine Of Azerbaijan

    ON THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF AZERBAIJAN

    WPS Agency
    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    September 7, 2009 Monday
    Russia

    Azerbaijan at last wishes to establish its military-political
    priorities. It is supposed to be discussed and adopted by the
    military doctrine of Azerbaijan at the autumn session by the
    country's parliament (it will begin work on October, 1st, 2009). The
    document is adopted for the first time. Paramount attention is paid
    in Azerbaijan to the plans dealing with maintenance of military
    security, though. After all there are problems with Karabakh - the
    territories which belonged to Azerbaijan before the disintegration
    of the USSR. The problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is being
    solved by Baku peacefully. However, it is not excluded that it may
    use force. About two billion dollars will be allocated for the needs
    of defense this year in the country's budget. This is serious money,
    and it is already clear that Azerbaijan will be ready for military
    action in the near future despite these peaceful actions. It already
    holds large-scale military exercises and buys modern military materiel
    and arms.

    Many political scientists in the country see Armenia, the ally of
    Russia in the CSTO as an enemy of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan members of
    parliament, probably, will be ready to enter Armenia in the list
    of countries potentially threatening its security in the military
    doctrine. It is not excluded, that Turkmenistan which is now ready
    today to protect their oil fields and gas deposits on the Caspian Sea
    (the Omar, Osmanli Turk and Serdar) may also be included.

    That was recently revealed when the president of Turkmenistan
    announced plans to set up a navy base on the Caspian Sea to protect
    the sea borders of the republic. Ashkhabad does not conceal the fact
    that such actions are caused by their concern with the problems of
    hydrocarbon deposit ownership. "On my instructions special work to
    reinforce our sea borders and protect the Caspian sea coast is now
    carried out in order to secure it from encroachment", explained
    Gurbanbuly Berdymukhamedov, at a session of the State Council on
    security. He said an effective system of radar and optical control
    would be installed. Besides, as the Turkmen leader noted, the border
    service of the republic is already purchasing modern high-speed patrol
    boats, as well as two modern missile boats, for the country's Navy.

    Speaking about Baku's intentions to develop disputed hydrocarbon
    deposits, the Turkmen president said that "such practice of
    unilateral actions on the Caspian sea, such as working on the
    sites where there are no arrangements by the interested states" was
    unacceptable for Turkmenia. Berdymukhamedov issued orders to inform
    international companies doing work at disputable sites, that in case
    the International arbitration sides with Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan will
    demand indemnification. Ashkhabad may proceed to use military force
    to protect the oil and gas deposits it considers its own. That will
    make it necessary for Baku to write this scenario into their defense
    doctrine. For now official Baku supports demilitarization of the sea
    and removal of military infrastructure from its coast and islands.

    In these conditions Russia gets geopolitical advantages. What are they?

    First, the Nabucco plan to create alternative routes of hydrocarbon
    transportation is doomed in the situation of an apparent military
    conflict on the Caspian sea.

    Second, the RF receives additional levers of pressure upon Ashkhabad
    which wishes to diversify hydrocarbon streams going from the country.

    Thirdly, instability on the Caspian sea freezes the launch of
    operations at disputable deposits which under certain conditions are
    included in the orbit of the RF economic interests.

    Fourthly, Baku concentrating on military problems on the Caspian
    sea will delay the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict
    concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. After all it is obvious that oil and gas
    exploration and development is more important for Baku than the costly
    campaign to regain control of Karabakh. In these conditions the status
    of the unrecognized Armenian autonomy may remain unchanged for a long
    time. It may be for the benefit of Armenia and, probably, Russia.

    But there are also negative aspects.

    1. A full-scale conflict between Baku and Ashkhabad provides a
    hypothetical possibility of the third countries getting involved in
    the conflict. First of all, the NATO.

    2. Naval operations on the Caspian sea, of course, increase the
    probability of the conflict's expansion and export of instability
    to the Caspian countries, including Russia, especially its Southern
    Federal district.

    In these conditions Russia's priority is to end the fighting. Both
    Armenia and Azerbaijan are important to Moscow for both its
    military-political interests in the Southern Caucasus, and the
    preservation of stability in the country, as very large Armenian and
    Azerbaijani diasporas (not less than 2 million persons) have been
    spawned in Russia since disintegration of the USSR and, of course,
    they influence both its foreign and internal policy.
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