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GETTING THIS WRONG WILL BE UNFORGIVABLE
Vartan Oskanian
Analysis
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 08 September 2009 14:55
Turkey
We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first
bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia
intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. This is an unprecedented
process that is far-reaching and irreversible.
Yet, the debate on the issue is going in the wrong direction. It is
hugely insulting that high-level government officials can be this
dismissive and trivializing on a matter that is so critical for
our people.
There is no sense whatsoever in telling us that what we see is not
what we get. It is not reasonable to spell out a set of specifics
and then defend an incongruous but desirable interpretation. That
is not how political documents work. It is indeed possible to write
flexibly and loosely in order to allow both sides to interpret things
differently. But this is not that document. This document, perhaps
good intentioned, is formulated badly.
When the Armenian side says that although the protocol specifies
recognition of today's borders, that does not mean that we are
renouncing past borders, that is absurd. That would be commensurate
to the Turks saying, for example, that although there is reference to
the border opening, that does not mean that Armenians will necessarily
receive visas.
Or wh en the Armenian side says that the formulation about a
sub-commission's "examination of historical records and archives" does
not mean they will study the genocide, this is like the Turkish side
saying they will open the border, but not at Margara, but some 10-meter
space somewhere near the 40th latitude and 45th longitude. Again,
this is absurd.
The reality is that a good idea, a needed policy, a necessary
move toward rapprochement has been negotiated poorly and framed
dangerously. It is irresponsible of our government to force our people
to make such choices about our present and our future.
The history of our relations (and non-relations) with Turkey has a
pre-history and begins before Turkey's closing of the Turkey-Armenia
border in 1993.
After Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent republic in
1991, it laid down two clear conditions that had to be met by
Armenia before it would establish diplomatic relations: Armenia was
expected to renounce territorial claims on Turkey, and Armenia was
to set aside or dismiss the genocide recognition process. (Turkey's
later proposal of a historic commission was the modification of
this last condition.) In 1993, with the border closure in support
of its brethren in Azerbaijan, Turkey added a new condition to the
other two already existing, that Armenia renounce Nagorno Karabakh's
struggle for security and self-determination by conceding to=2 0an
Azerbaijani-favorable solution.
To forget this pre-history, or to expect us to forget, or - worse -
to pretend that Turkey has forgotten, is not serious. In the context
of Turkey's consistent policies about territorial issues, genocide
recognition and Karabakh concessions, our public debate must revolve
on the substance of what this protocol gives Armenians and what it
takes away.
Even when signed, these protocols merely tell us Turkey's willingness
to enter into diplomatic relations and to open the border. The open
border will become reality only after eventual parliament ratification.
But whether ratified or not, Turkey will still have received what
it wanted.
When signed, this protocol gives Turkey the opportunity to tell the
world that Armenians have in fact conceptually relinquished territorial
claims and are also ready to offer the genocide for bilateral study,
therefore no third-party involvement, recognition or condemnation is
in order.
As someone who has worked for such normalization both with Turkey
and Azerbaijan, I would want nothing more than to see agreements,
knowing full well they must come with difficult concessions. The
negotiations about these concessions however should not endanger our
future security nor violate our integrity and values.
We can and should, as the protocol says, 'implement a dialogue on the
historical dimension' with 'the aim=2 0of restoring mutual confidence'
but the way to do that is not by mandating an 'impartial scientific
examination of historical records' as if all other examinations
thus far have been neither impartial nor scientific. In earlier
negotiations, we focused on creating an intergovernmental commission
with the aim of overcoming the consequences of our tragic past.
Alternate, more dignified, wording is also possible on the border
issue. We can and should, as the protocol says, 'respect and ensure
respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention
in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and
inviolability of frontiers.' The focus on territorial integrity is
the international formulation that protects concerns about frontiers,
while not diminishing the right to pursue historical injustices. The
current formulation about 'the mutual recognition of the existing
border' should have been avoided.
However, an equal risk in this document is the unwritten one. The link
to Nagorno Karabakh. Unwritten perhaps, but clearly spoken at every
turn are the repeated, continuing, unabated, undiminished affirmations
of the highest Turkish and Azerbaijani officials who insist that Turkey
will continue to defend the interests of Azerbaijan and nothing will
be done, no border will open, until the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process begins to move in a direction that suits Azerbaijan.
=0 D In fact, expecting Turkey to move without considering Azerbaijan's
interests would be similar to expecting Armenia to move without
considering Karabakh's interests. This is not and was not a reasonable
expectation.
In which case, if ratification is to take place, and if it's to take
place before the next Obama-April 24 deadline facing Turkey, then we
can expect that Azerbaijan has received sufficient guarantees on the
return of territories and on the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
These are the worrisome elements - both in the content of these
documents, and in the hasty process that accompanies it - that cast
doubt on the intent of the document. It also makes clear the readiness
to lower the bar to reach an agreement, at questionable cost.
If this implies distrust on our part, that should be eminently
understandable. On the Armenian side, those who crafted this document
are insisting that it really means something other than what it
says. On the other side, Turkey is to 'refrain from pursuing any
policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations,'
yet it continues to side with one neighbor Azerbaijan, against their
other neighbor Armenia.
In other words, on the ground, nothing seems to have changed. Yet,
the Armenian bar has clearly moved lower in the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations, and therefore it is natural to assume that the same thing
may be happening in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.
This is the situation today, as we are presented documents not for
and by third parties, as with the countless historical documents
of the past where Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the
first time in history, a document in which Armenia is signing on to
its own perceived place in history.
This document with such formulations should not be signed. Indeed,
no one is authorized to sign this document with such formulations.
Content-Type: MESSAGE/RFC822; CHARSET=US-ASCII
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From: [email protected]
Subject: Getting This Wrong Will Be Unforgivable
Getting This Wrong Will Be Unforgivable
Analysis / Turkey
Vartan Oskanian
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 08 September 2009 14:55
We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first
bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia
intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. This is an unprecedented
process that is far-reaching and irreversible.
Yet, the debate on the issue is going in the wrong direction. It is
hugely insulting that high-level government officials can be this
dismissive and trivializing on a matter that is so critical for our
people.
There is no sense whatsoever in telling us that what we see is not what
we get. It is not reasonable to spell out a set of specifics and then
defend an incongruous but desirable interpretation. That is not how
political documents work. It is indeed possible to write flexibly and
loosely in order to allow both sides to interpret things differently.
But this is not that document. This document, perhaps good intentioned,
is formulated badly.
When the Armenian side says that although the protocol specifies
recognition of todayâ??s borders, that does not mean that we are
renouncing past borders, that is absurd. That would be commensurate to
the Turks saying, for example, that although there is reference to the
border opening, that does not mean that Armenians will necessarily
receive visas.
Or wh
en the Armenian side says that the formulation about a
sub-commissionâ??s â??examination of historical records and archivesâ?? does
not mean they will study the genocide, this is like the Turkish side
saying they will open the border, but not at Margara, but some 10-meter
space somewhere near the 40th latitude and 45th longitude. Again, this
is absurd.
The reality is that a good idea, a needed policy, a necessary move
toward rapprochement has been negotiated poorly and framed dangerously.
It is irresponsible of our government to force our people to make such
choices about our present and our future.
The history of our relations (and non-relations) with Turkey has a
pre-history and begins before Turkeyâ??s closing of the Turkey-Armenia
border in 1993.
After Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent republic in 1991, it
laid down two clear conditions that had to be met by Armenia before it
would establish diplomatic relations: Armenia was expected to renounce
territorial claims on Turkey, and Armenia was to set aside or dismiss
the genocide recognition process. (Turkeyâ??s later proposal of a
historic commission was the modification of this last condition.) In
1993, with the border closure in support of its brethren in Azerbaijan,
Turkey added a new condition to the other two already existing, that
Armenia renounce Nagorno Karabakhâ??s struggle for security and
self-determination by conceding to=2
0an Azerbaijani-favorable solution.
To forget this pre-history, or to expect us to forget, or â?? worse â?? to
pretend that Turkey has forgotten, is not serious. In the context of
Turkeyâ??s consistent policies about territorial issues, genocide
recognition and Karabakh concessions, our public debate must revolve on
the substance of what this protocol gives Armenians and what it takes
away.
Even when signed, these protocols merely tell us Turkeyâ??s willingness
to enter into diplomatic relations and to open the border. The open
border will become reality only after eventual parliament ratification.
But whether ratified or not, Turkey will still have received what it
wanted. When signed, this protocol gives Turkey the opportunity to tell
the world that Armenians have in fact conceptually relinquished
territorial claims and are also ready to offer the genocide for
bilateral study, therefore no third-party involvement, recognition or
condemnation is in order.
As someone who has worked for such normalization both with Turkey and
Azerbaijan, I would want nothing more than to see agreements, knowing
full well they must come with difficult concessions. The negotiations
about these concessions however should not endanger our future security
nor violate our integrity and values.
We can and should, as the protocol says, â??implement a dialogue on the
historical dimensionâ?? with â??the aim=2
0of restoring mutual confidenceâ?? but
the way to do that is not by mandating an â??impartial scientific
examination of historical recordsâ?? as if all other examinations thus
far have been neither impartial nor scientific. In earlier
negotiations, we focused on creating an intergovernmental commission
with the aim of overcoming the consequences of our tragic past.
Alternate, more dignified, wording is also possible on the border
issue. We can and should, as the protocol says, â??respect and ensure
respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention
in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and
inviolability of frontiers.â?? The focus on territorial integrity is the
international formulation that protects concerns about frontiers, while
not diminishing the right to pursue historical injustices. The current
formulation about â??the mutual recognition of the existing borderâ??
should have been avoided.
However, an equal risk in this document is the unwritten one. The link
to Nagorno Karabakh. Unwritten perhaps, but clearly spoken at every
turn are the repeated, continuing, unabated, undiminished affirmations
of the highest Turkish and Azerbaijani officials who insist that Turkey
will continue to defend the interests of Azerbaijan and nothing will be
done, no border will open, until the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process begins to move in a direction that suits Azerbaijan.
=0
D
In fact, expecting Turkey to move without considering Azerbaijanâ??s
interests would be similar to expecting Armenia to move without
considering Karabakhâ??s interests. This is not and was not a reasonable
expectation.
In which case, if ratification is to take place, and if itâ??s to take
place before the next Obama-April 24 deadline facing Turkey, then we
can expect that Azerbaijan has received sufficient guarantees on the
return of territories and on the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
These are the worrisome elements â?? both in the content of these
documents, and in the hasty process that accompanies it â?? that cast
doubt on the intent of the document. It also makes clear the readiness
to lower the bar to reach an agreement, at questionable cost.
If this implies distrust on our part, that should be eminently
understandable. On the Armenian side, those who crafted this document
are insisting that it really means something other than what it says.
On the other side, Turkey is to â??refrain from pursuing any policy
incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations,â?? yet it
continues to side with one neighbor Azerbaijan, against their other
neighbor Armenia.
In other words, on the ground, nothing seems to have changed. Yet, the
Armenian bar has clearly moved lower in the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations, and therefore it is natural to assume that the same thing
may be happening in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.
This is the situation today, as we are presented documents not for and
by third parties, as with the countless historical documents of the
past where Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the first time
in history, a document in which Armenia is signing on to its own
perceived place in history.
This document with such formulations should not be signed. Indeed, no
one is authorized to sign this document with such formulations.
Vartan Oskanian
Analysis
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 08 September 2009 14:55
Turkey
We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first
bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia
intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. This is an unprecedented
process that is far-reaching and irreversible.
Yet, the debate on the issue is going in the wrong direction. It is
hugely insulting that high-level government officials can be this
dismissive and trivializing on a matter that is so critical for
our people.
There is no sense whatsoever in telling us that what we see is not
what we get. It is not reasonable to spell out a set of specifics
and then defend an incongruous but desirable interpretation. That
is not how political documents work. It is indeed possible to write
flexibly and loosely in order to allow both sides to interpret things
differently. But this is not that document. This document, perhaps
good intentioned, is formulated badly.
When the Armenian side says that although the protocol specifies
recognition of today's borders, that does not mean that we are
renouncing past borders, that is absurd. That would be commensurate
to the Turks saying, for example, that although there is reference to
the border opening, that does not mean that Armenians will necessarily
receive visas.
Or wh en the Armenian side says that the formulation about a
sub-commission's "examination of historical records and archives" does
not mean they will study the genocide, this is like the Turkish side
saying they will open the border, but not at Margara, but some 10-meter
space somewhere near the 40th latitude and 45th longitude. Again,
this is absurd.
The reality is that a good idea, a needed policy, a necessary
move toward rapprochement has been negotiated poorly and framed
dangerously. It is irresponsible of our government to force our people
to make such choices about our present and our future.
The history of our relations (and non-relations) with Turkey has a
pre-history and begins before Turkey's closing of the Turkey-Armenia
border in 1993.
After Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent republic in
1991, it laid down two clear conditions that had to be met by
Armenia before it would establish diplomatic relations: Armenia was
expected to renounce territorial claims on Turkey, and Armenia was
to set aside or dismiss the genocide recognition process. (Turkey's
later proposal of a historic commission was the modification of
this last condition.) In 1993, with the border closure in support
of its brethren in Azerbaijan, Turkey added a new condition to the
other two already existing, that Armenia renounce Nagorno Karabakh's
struggle for security and self-determination by conceding to=2 0an
Azerbaijani-favorable solution.
To forget this pre-history, or to expect us to forget, or - worse -
to pretend that Turkey has forgotten, is not serious. In the context
of Turkey's consistent policies about territorial issues, genocide
recognition and Karabakh concessions, our public debate must revolve
on the substance of what this protocol gives Armenians and what it
takes away.
Even when signed, these protocols merely tell us Turkey's willingness
to enter into diplomatic relations and to open the border. The open
border will become reality only after eventual parliament ratification.
But whether ratified or not, Turkey will still have received what
it wanted.
When signed, this protocol gives Turkey the opportunity to tell the
world that Armenians have in fact conceptually relinquished territorial
claims and are also ready to offer the genocide for bilateral study,
therefore no third-party involvement, recognition or condemnation is
in order.
As someone who has worked for such normalization both with Turkey
and Azerbaijan, I would want nothing more than to see agreements,
knowing full well they must come with difficult concessions. The
negotiations about these concessions however should not endanger our
future security nor violate our integrity and values.
We can and should, as the protocol says, 'implement a dialogue on the
historical dimension' with 'the aim=2 0of restoring mutual confidence'
but the way to do that is not by mandating an 'impartial scientific
examination of historical records' as if all other examinations
thus far have been neither impartial nor scientific. In earlier
negotiations, we focused on creating an intergovernmental commission
with the aim of overcoming the consequences of our tragic past.
Alternate, more dignified, wording is also possible on the border
issue. We can and should, as the protocol says, 'respect and ensure
respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention
in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and
inviolability of frontiers.' The focus on territorial integrity is
the international formulation that protects concerns about frontiers,
while not diminishing the right to pursue historical injustices. The
current formulation about 'the mutual recognition of the existing
border' should have been avoided.
However, an equal risk in this document is the unwritten one. The link
to Nagorno Karabakh. Unwritten perhaps, but clearly spoken at every
turn are the repeated, continuing, unabated, undiminished affirmations
of the highest Turkish and Azerbaijani officials who insist that Turkey
will continue to defend the interests of Azerbaijan and nothing will
be done, no border will open, until the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process begins to move in a direction that suits Azerbaijan.
=0 D In fact, expecting Turkey to move without considering Azerbaijan's
interests would be similar to expecting Armenia to move without
considering Karabakh's interests. This is not and was not a reasonable
expectation.
In which case, if ratification is to take place, and if it's to take
place before the next Obama-April 24 deadline facing Turkey, then we
can expect that Azerbaijan has received sufficient guarantees on the
return of territories and on the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
These are the worrisome elements - both in the content of these
documents, and in the hasty process that accompanies it - that cast
doubt on the intent of the document. It also makes clear the readiness
to lower the bar to reach an agreement, at questionable cost.
If this implies distrust on our part, that should be eminently
understandable. On the Armenian side, those who crafted this document
are insisting that it really means something other than what it
says. On the other side, Turkey is to 'refrain from pursuing any
policy incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations,'
yet it continues to side with one neighbor Azerbaijan, against their
other neighbor Armenia.
In other words, on the ground, nothing seems to have changed. Yet,
the Armenian bar has clearly moved lower in the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations, and therefore it is natural to assume that the same thing
may be happening in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.
This is the situation today, as we are presented documents not for
and by third parties, as with the countless historical documents
of the past where Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the
first time in history, a document in which Armenia is signing on to
its own perceived place in history.
This document with such formulations should not be signed. Indeed,
no one is authorized to sign this document with such formulations.
Content-Type: MESSAGE/RFC822; CHARSET=US-ASCII
Content-Description:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: [email protected]
Subject: Getting This Wrong Will Be Unforgivable
Getting This Wrong Will Be Unforgivable
Analysis / Turkey
Vartan Oskanian
The Civilitas Foundation
Tuesday, 08 September 2009 14:55
We are at a crossroads in our history. We have on the table the first
bilateral document that the independent sovereign Republic of Armenia
intends to sign with the Republic of Turkey. This is an unprecedented
process that is far-reaching and irreversible.
Yet, the debate on the issue is going in the wrong direction. It is
hugely insulting that high-level government officials can be this
dismissive and trivializing on a matter that is so critical for our
people.
There is no sense whatsoever in telling us that what we see is not what
we get. It is not reasonable to spell out a set of specifics and then
defend an incongruous but desirable interpretation. That is not how
political documents work. It is indeed possible to write flexibly and
loosely in order to allow both sides to interpret things differently.
But this is not that document. This document, perhaps good intentioned,
is formulated badly.
When the Armenian side says that although the protocol specifies
recognition of todayâ??s borders, that does not mean that we are
renouncing past borders, that is absurd. That would be commensurate to
the Turks saying, for example, that although there is reference to the
border opening, that does not mean that Armenians will necessarily
receive visas.
Or wh
en the Armenian side says that the formulation about a
sub-commissionâ??s â??examination of historical records and archivesâ?? does
not mean they will study the genocide, this is like the Turkish side
saying they will open the border, but not at Margara, but some 10-meter
space somewhere near the 40th latitude and 45th longitude. Again, this
is absurd.
The reality is that a good idea, a needed policy, a necessary move
toward rapprochement has been negotiated poorly and framed dangerously.
It is irresponsible of our government to force our people to make such
choices about our present and our future.
The history of our relations (and non-relations) with Turkey has a
pre-history and begins before Turkeyâ??s closing of the Turkey-Armenia
border in 1993.
After Turkey recognized Armenia as an independent republic in 1991, it
laid down two clear conditions that had to be met by Armenia before it
would establish diplomatic relations: Armenia was expected to renounce
territorial claims on Turkey, and Armenia was to set aside or dismiss
the genocide recognition process. (Turkeyâ??s later proposal of a
historic commission was the modification of this last condition.) In
1993, with the border closure in support of its brethren in Azerbaijan,
Turkey added a new condition to the other two already existing, that
Armenia renounce Nagorno Karabakhâ??s struggle for security and
self-determination by conceding to=2
0an Azerbaijani-favorable solution.
To forget this pre-history, or to expect us to forget, or â?? worse â?? to
pretend that Turkey has forgotten, is not serious. In the context of
Turkeyâ??s consistent policies about territorial issues, genocide
recognition and Karabakh concessions, our public debate must revolve on
the substance of what this protocol gives Armenians and what it takes
away.
Even when signed, these protocols merely tell us Turkeyâ??s willingness
to enter into diplomatic relations and to open the border. The open
border will become reality only after eventual parliament ratification.
But whether ratified or not, Turkey will still have received what it
wanted. When signed, this protocol gives Turkey the opportunity to tell
the world that Armenians have in fact conceptually relinquished
territorial claims and are also ready to offer the genocide for
bilateral study, therefore no third-party involvement, recognition or
condemnation is in order.
As someone who has worked for such normalization both with Turkey and
Azerbaijan, I would want nothing more than to see agreements, knowing
full well they must come with difficult concessions. The negotiations
about these concessions however should not endanger our future security
nor violate our integrity and values.
We can and should, as the protocol says, â??implement a dialogue on the
historical dimensionâ?? with â??the aim=2
0of restoring mutual confidenceâ?? but
the way to do that is not by mandating an â??impartial scientific
examination of historical recordsâ?? as if all other examinations thus
far have been neither impartial nor scientific. In earlier
negotiations, we focused on creating an intergovernmental commission
with the aim of overcoming the consequences of our tragic past.
Alternate, more dignified, wording is also possible on the border
issue. We can and should, as the protocol says, â??respect and ensure
respect for the principles of equality, sovereignty, non-intervention
in internal affairs of other states, territorial integrity and
inviolability of frontiers.â?? The focus on territorial integrity is the
international formulation that protects concerns about frontiers, while
not diminishing the right to pursue historical injustices. The current
formulation about â??the mutual recognition of the existing borderâ??
should have been avoided.
However, an equal risk in this document is the unwritten one. The link
to Nagorno Karabakh. Unwritten perhaps, but clearly spoken at every
turn are the repeated, continuing, unabated, undiminished affirmations
of the highest Turkish and Azerbaijani officials who insist that Turkey
will continue to defend the interests of Azerbaijan and nothing will be
done, no border will open, until the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process begins to move in a direction that suits Azerbaijan.
=0
D
In fact, expecting Turkey to move without considering Azerbaijanâ??s
interests would be similar to expecting Armenia to move without
considering Karabakhâ??s interests. This is not and was not a reasonable
expectation.
In which case, if ratification is to take place, and if itâ??s to take
place before the next Obama-April 24 deadline facing Turkey, then we
can expect that Azerbaijan has received sufficient guarantees on the
return of territories and on the status of Nagorno Karabakh.
These are the worrisome elements â?? both in the content of these
documents, and in the hasty process that accompanies it â?? that cast
doubt on the intent of the document. It also makes clear the readiness
to lower the bar to reach an agreement, at questionable cost.
If this implies distrust on our part, that should be eminently
understandable. On the Armenian side, those who crafted this document
are insisting that it really means something other than what it says.
On the other side, Turkey is to â??refrain from pursuing any policy
incompatible with the spirit of good neighborly relations,â?? yet it
continues to side with one neighbor Azerbaijan, against their other
neighbor Armenia.
In other words, on the ground, nothing seems to have changed. Yet, the
Armenian bar has clearly moved lower in the Armenia-Turkey
negotiations, and therefore it is natural to assume that the same thing
may be happening in the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations.
This is the situation today, as we are presented documents not for and
by third parties, as with the countless historical documents of the
past where Armenia is a subject and not a party, but for the first time
in history, a document in which Armenia is signing on to its own
perceived place in history.
This document with such formulations should not be signed. Indeed, no
one is authorized to sign this document with such formulations.