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CALLING A SPADE A SPADE
The Civilitas Foundation
Thursday, 03 September 2009 14:48
Attempts to analyze the present state of Armeno-Turkish relations
are based on one of two hypotheses.
The first is that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia without
a Karabagh settlement or progress toward one. In short, it won't
open the border without Azerbaijan's assent. For the proponents of
this theory, the signing of the August 31 protocols is a nightmarish
development: Those documents have given Turkey, in writing, everything
it had wanted of Armenia since Armenia's independence but had been
unable to gain.
In other words, Armenia has not yet gotten what it expects of Turkey,
the opening of the border--a tangible, physical act--whereas Turkey's
expectations of Armenia are merely statements, which it has already
gotten, and in writing at that.
>From the moment that the protocols were made public, they
allowed Turkey to reap rewards--diplomatic, political, moral, and
other--because the Armenian government had given its assent to those
documents. It's not possible to assert, therefore, that so long as
parliament has not approved the protocols Turkey has not achieved what
it wanted of Armenia regarding the genocide and territorial demands.
As soon as the protocols were made public, many pundits and the
representatives of the administration hailed the absence of an
y mention of Karabagh in those documents as a great diplomatic
achievement.
But if we take into account that Turkey's highest officials have
in the past year-and-a-half taken every opportunity to proclaim
that the Armenia-Turkey border would open only after a settlement
of the Karabagh question, we must reach the opposite conclusion:
Only if the Karabagh question were referenced in the protocols,
with the clear formulation that Karabagh is in no way connected to
the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, could we have talked
of a diplomatic victory.
Because only such a reference would have precluded the Turkish foreign
minister from asserting--as he did just one day after the protocols
were made public--that the settlement of the Karabagh issue is a
precondition for the establishment of Armeno-Turkish relations.
Moreover, a sober assessment inevitably reveals the following dangerous
scenario. The Turkish executive branch, by seeking to improve relations
with Armenia, has displayed its "goodwill" before the entire world;
as "an established democracy," however, it cannot force its will
on parliament.
It's already evident from the reactions of Turkish legislators that
the protocols-related ruckus in parliament will be loud. And so the
Turkish government could easily explain to the international powers
that in order for the protocols to be ratified by its parliament,
the Armenian side should make at least some concessi ons on Karabagh
and evacuate the territories adjacent to Karabagh.
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is prepared to move toward opening
the border even at the cost of temporarily or outwardly alienating
Azerbaijan, and so Armenia must also expend every effort toward that
end. The proponents of this theory can be provisionally divided into
two groups.
The first thinks that the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border takes
precedence over all other concerns, and so the Armenian side can
refrain from asserting historical concerns, because in an environment
of open borders those issues could more easily be resolved between
the two nations.
The adherents of this interpretation of the situation must nevertheless
realize that the Karabagh issue cannot be bypassed. If Turkey agrees
to open the border without first obtaining any progress favorable to
Azerbaijan regarding the Karabagh issue, there can be no doubt that
it will have done so only because it has obtained clear promises from
international powers that all territories abutting Karabagh will
be returned to Azerbaijan without any guarantee of a final status
for Karabagh.
The second group understands the incontrovertible necessity of opening
the border, but it is not prepared to achieve it at all costs. And that
is the very basis on which a healthy debate must unfold. It would be
an irreversible mistake for the Armenian parliament to discount all
th e dangers lurking in the protocols merely for the sake of saving
face for the executive branch. Although it's clear that including
the mechanism of parliamentary ratification was Turkey's idea, we
should nevertheless attempt to take advantage of it by allowing for
the possibility of either inserting modifications into this version
of the document or rejecting it altogether.
And finally, it is important to recognize that independent Armenia,
as a sovereign state, would for the first time be signing a joint
agreement with Turkey having to do with territory, borders, and our
most painful issue, the genocide--and that cannot be done merely as a
matter of political expediency. It's also apparent that the documents,
in their present form, are not in our national interest. Efforts to
present the protocols as a great diplomatic victory cannot be taken
seriously. Armenia's previous administrations, however, over the last
17 years, have refrained from such a step, because they had a sense
of political and historical responsibility.
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From: [email protected]
Subject: Calling a Spade a Spade
Calling a Spade a Spade
Analysis / Turkey
The Civilitas Foundation
Thursday, 03 September 2009 14:48
Attempts to analyze the present state of Armeno-Turkish relations are
based on one of two hypotheses.
The first is that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia without
a Karabagh settlement or progress toward one. In short, it won't open
the border without Azerbaijan's assent. For the proponents of this
theory, the signing of the August 31 protocols is a nightmarish
development: Those documents have given Turkey, in writing, everything
it had wanted of Armenia since Armenia's independence but had been
unable to gain.
In other words, Armenia has not yet gotten what it expects of Turkey,
the opening of the borderâ??a tangible, physical actâ??whereas Turkey's
expectations of Armenia are merely statements, which it has already
gotten, and in writing at that.
From the moment that the protocols were made public, they allowed
Turkey to reap rewardsâ??diplomatic, political, moral, and otherâ??because
the Armenian government had given its assent to those documents. It's
not possible to assert, therefore, that so long as parliament has not
approved the protocols Turkey has not achieved what it wanted of
Armenia regarding the genocide and territorial demands.
As soon as the protocols were made public, many pundits and the
representatives of the administration hailed the absence of an
y mention
of Karabagh in those documents as a great diplomatic achievement. But
if we take into account that Turkey's highest officials have in the
past year-and-a-half taken every opportunity to proclaim that the
Armenia-Turkey border would open only after a settlement of the
Karabagh question, we must reach the opposite conclusion: Only if the
Karabagh question were referenced in the protocols, with the clear
formulation that Karabagh is in no way connected to the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations, could we have talked of a diplomatic
victory.
Because only such a reference would have precluded the Turkish foreign
minister from assertingâ??as he did just one day after the protocols were
made publicâ??that the settlement of the Karabagh issue is a precondition
for the establishment of Armeno-Turkish relations.
Moreover, a sober assessment inevitably reveals the following dangerous
scenario. The Turkish executive branch, by seeking to improve relations
with Armenia, has displayed its "goodwill" before the entire world; as
"an established democracy," however, it cannot force its will on
parliament. It's already evident from the reactions of Turkish
legislators that the protocols-related ruckus in parliament will be
loud. And so the Turkish government could easily explain to the
international powers that in order for the protocols to be ratified by
its parliament, the Armenian side should make at least some concessi
ons
on Karabagh and evacuate the territories adjacent to Karabagh.
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is prepared to move toward opening
the border even at the cost of temporarily or outwardly alienating
Azerbaijan, and so Armenia must also expend every effort toward that
end. The proponents of this theory can be provisionally divided into
two groups.
The first thinks that the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border takes
precedence over all other concerns, and so the Armenian side can
refrain from asserting historical concerns, because in an environment
of open borders those issues could more easily be resolved between the
two nations.
The adherents of this interpretation of the situation must nevertheless
realize that the Karabagh issue cannot be bypassed. If Turkey agrees to
open the border without first obtaining any progress favorable to
Azerbaijan regarding the Karabagh issue, there can be no doubt that it
will have done so only because it has obtained clear promises from
international powers that all territories abutting Karabagh will be
returned to Azerbaijan without any guarantee of a final status for
Karabagh.
The second group understands the incontrovertible necessity of opening
the border, but it is not prepared to achieve it at all costs. And that
is the very basis on which a healthy debate must unfold. It would be an
irreversible mistake for the Armenian parliament to discount all th
e
dangers lurking in the protocols merely for the sake of saving face for
the executive branch. Although it's clear that including the mechanism
of parliamentary ratification was Turkey's idea, we should nevertheless
attempt to take advantage of it by allowing for the possibility of
either inserting modifications into this version of the document or
rejecting it altogether.
And finally, it is important to recognize that independent Armenia, as
a sovereign state, would for the first time be signing a joint
agreement with Turkey having to do with territory, borders, and our
most painful issue, the genocideâ??and that cannot be done merely as a
matter of political expediency. It's also apparent that the documents,
in their present form, are not in our national interest. Efforts to
present the protocols as a great diplomatic victory cannot be taken
seriously. Armenia's previous administrations, however, over the last
17 years, have refrained from such a step, because they had a sense of
political and historical responsibility.
To read the complete protocol click here
The Civilitas Foundation
Thursday, 03 September 2009 14:48
Attempts to analyze the present state of Armeno-Turkish relations
are based on one of two hypotheses.
The first is that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia without
a Karabagh settlement or progress toward one. In short, it won't
open the border without Azerbaijan's assent. For the proponents of
this theory, the signing of the August 31 protocols is a nightmarish
development: Those documents have given Turkey, in writing, everything
it had wanted of Armenia since Armenia's independence but had been
unable to gain.
In other words, Armenia has not yet gotten what it expects of Turkey,
the opening of the border--a tangible, physical act--whereas Turkey's
expectations of Armenia are merely statements, which it has already
gotten, and in writing at that.
>From the moment that the protocols were made public, they
allowed Turkey to reap rewards--diplomatic, political, moral, and
other--because the Armenian government had given its assent to those
documents. It's not possible to assert, therefore, that so long as
parliament has not approved the protocols Turkey has not achieved what
it wanted of Armenia regarding the genocide and territorial demands.
As soon as the protocols were made public, many pundits and the
representatives of the administration hailed the absence of an
y mention of Karabagh in those documents as a great diplomatic
achievement.
But if we take into account that Turkey's highest officials have
in the past year-and-a-half taken every opportunity to proclaim
that the Armenia-Turkey border would open only after a settlement
of the Karabagh question, we must reach the opposite conclusion:
Only if the Karabagh question were referenced in the protocols,
with the clear formulation that Karabagh is in no way connected to
the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, could we have talked
of a diplomatic victory.
Because only such a reference would have precluded the Turkish foreign
minister from asserting--as he did just one day after the protocols
were made public--that the settlement of the Karabagh issue is a
precondition for the establishment of Armeno-Turkish relations.
Moreover, a sober assessment inevitably reveals the following dangerous
scenario. The Turkish executive branch, by seeking to improve relations
with Armenia, has displayed its "goodwill" before the entire world;
as "an established democracy," however, it cannot force its will
on parliament.
It's already evident from the reactions of Turkish legislators that
the protocols-related ruckus in parliament will be loud. And so the
Turkish government could easily explain to the international powers
that in order for the protocols to be ratified by its parliament,
the Armenian side should make at least some concessi ons on Karabagh
and evacuate the territories adjacent to Karabagh.
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is prepared to move toward opening
the border even at the cost of temporarily or outwardly alienating
Azerbaijan, and so Armenia must also expend every effort toward that
end. The proponents of this theory can be provisionally divided into
two groups.
The first thinks that the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border takes
precedence over all other concerns, and so the Armenian side can
refrain from asserting historical concerns, because in an environment
of open borders those issues could more easily be resolved between
the two nations.
The adherents of this interpretation of the situation must nevertheless
realize that the Karabagh issue cannot be bypassed. If Turkey agrees
to open the border without first obtaining any progress favorable to
Azerbaijan regarding the Karabagh issue, there can be no doubt that
it will have done so only because it has obtained clear promises from
international powers that all territories abutting Karabagh will
be returned to Azerbaijan without any guarantee of a final status
for Karabagh.
The second group understands the incontrovertible necessity of opening
the border, but it is not prepared to achieve it at all costs. And that
is the very basis on which a healthy debate must unfold. It would be
an irreversible mistake for the Armenian parliament to discount all
th e dangers lurking in the protocols merely for the sake of saving
face for the executive branch. Although it's clear that including
the mechanism of parliamentary ratification was Turkey's idea, we
should nevertheless attempt to take advantage of it by allowing for
the possibility of either inserting modifications into this version
of the document or rejecting it altogether.
And finally, it is important to recognize that independent Armenia,
as a sovereign state, would for the first time be signing a joint
agreement with Turkey having to do with territory, borders, and our
most painful issue, the genocide--and that cannot be done merely as a
matter of political expediency. It's also apparent that the documents,
in their present form, are not in our national interest. Efforts to
present the protocols as a great diplomatic victory cannot be taken
seriously. Armenia's previous administrations, however, over the last
17 years, have refrained from such a step, because they had a sense
of political and historical responsibility.
Content-Type: MESSAGE/RFC822; CHARSET=US-ASCII
Content-Description:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
From: [email protected]
Subject: Calling a Spade a Spade
Calling a Spade a Spade
Analysis / Turkey
The Civilitas Foundation
Thursday, 03 September 2009 14:48
Attempts to analyze the present state of Armeno-Turkish relations are
based on one of two hypotheses.
The first is that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia without
a Karabagh settlement or progress toward one. In short, it won't open
the border without Azerbaijan's assent. For the proponents of this
theory, the signing of the August 31 protocols is a nightmarish
development: Those documents have given Turkey, in writing, everything
it had wanted of Armenia since Armenia's independence but had been
unable to gain.
In other words, Armenia has not yet gotten what it expects of Turkey,
the opening of the borderâ??a tangible, physical actâ??whereas Turkey's
expectations of Armenia are merely statements, which it has already
gotten, and in writing at that.
From the moment that the protocols were made public, they allowed
Turkey to reap rewardsâ??diplomatic, political, moral, and otherâ??because
the Armenian government had given its assent to those documents. It's
not possible to assert, therefore, that so long as parliament has not
approved the protocols Turkey has not achieved what it wanted of
Armenia regarding the genocide and territorial demands.
As soon as the protocols were made public, many pundits and the
representatives of the administration hailed the absence of an
y mention
of Karabagh in those documents as a great diplomatic achievement. But
if we take into account that Turkey's highest officials have in the
past year-and-a-half taken every opportunity to proclaim that the
Armenia-Turkey border would open only after a settlement of the
Karabagh question, we must reach the opposite conclusion: Only if the
Karabagh question were referenced in the protocols, with the clear
formulation that Karabagh is in no way connected to the normalization
of Turkish-Armenian relations, could we have talked of a diplomatic
victory.
Because only such a reference would have precluded the Turkish foreign
minister from assertingâ??as he did just one day after the protocols were
made publicâ??that the settlement of the Karabagh issue is a precondition
for the establishment of Armeno-Turkish relations.
Moreover, a sober assessment inevitably reveals the following dangerous
scenario. The Turkish executive branch, by seeking to improve relations
with Armenia, has displayed its "goodwill" before the entire world; as
"an established democracy," however, it cannot force its will on
parliament. It's already evident from the reactions of Turkish
legislators that the protocols-related ruckus in parliament will be
loud. And so the Turkish government could easily explain to the
international powers that in order for the protocols to be ratified by
its parliament, the Armenian side should make at least some concessi
ons
on Karabagh and evacuate the territories adjacent to Karabagh.
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is prepared to move toward opening
the border even at the cost of temporarily or outwardly alienating
Azerbaijan, and so Armenia must also expend every effort toward that
end. The proponents of this theory can be provisionally divided into
two groups.
The first thinks that the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border takes
precedence over all other concerns, and so the Armenian side can
refrain from asserting historical concerns, because in an environment
of open borders those issues could more easily be resolved between the
two nations.
The adherents of this interpretation of the situation must nevertheless
realize that the Karabagh issue cannot be bypassed. If Turkey agrees to
open the border without first obtaining any progress favorable to
Azerbaijan regarding the Karabagh issue, there can be no doubt that it
will have done so only because it has obtained clear promises from
international powers that all territories abutting Karabagh will be
returned to Azerbaijan without any guarantee of a final status for
Karabagh.
The second group understands the incontrovertible necessity of opening
the border, but it is not prepared to achieve it at all costs. And that
is the very basis on which a healthy debate must unfold. It would be an
irreversible mistake for the Armenian parliament to discount all th
e
dangers lurking in the protocols merely for the sake of saving face for
the executive branch. Although it's clear that including the mechanism
of parliamentary ratification was Turkey's idea, we should nevertheless
attempt to take advantage of it by allowing for the possibility of
either inserting modifications into this version of the document or
rejecting it altogether.
And finally, it is important to recognize that independent Armenia, as
a sovereign state, would for the first time be signing a joint
agreement with Turkey having to do with territory, borders, and our
most painful issue, the genocideâ??and that cannot be done merely as a
matter of political expediency. It's also apparent that the documents,
in their present form, are not in our national interest. Efforts to
present the protocols as a great diplomatic victory cannot be taken
seriously. Armenia's previous administrations, however, over the last
17 years, have refrained from such a step, because they had a sense of
political and historical responsibility.
To read the complete protocol click here