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THE EU-TURKEY-CYPRUS TRIANGLE: "TURKEY AND ARMENIA VOW TO HEAL PAST WOUNDS", HUGH POPE
http://www.noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&am p;nid=2009
11 September 2009
It's been a long time coming, but Turkey and Armenia's vow on 31 August
to establish diplomatic relations, open their long-closed border and
begin to talk seriously about the past is excellent news. As laid out
in our 14 April report Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening
Borders, normalisation between Turkey and Armenia will benefit not
just the bilateral relationship. If successful, it could win back for
Turkey and its AKP government much of their recently faded prestige
as domestic reformers, as regional peace-makers and as a country
seriously intending to push forward with its accession process to
the European Union.
The brief joint announcement from Ankara, Yerevan and the Swiss
mediators in Bern said that two protocols had been initialled on
the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of
bilateral relations. The two sides committed to seeing the protocols
through to parliamentary ratifications within six weeks -- that is,
two days before a 14 October World Cup qualifier match between Armenia
and Turkey due to be played in the western Turkish provincial city
of Bursa. Turkey hopes that Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian will
accept its invitation to attend, just as Turkish President Abdullah
Gul initiated the current process by attending the first round match
in Yerevan in September 2008.
Texts of the two protocols circulating in Turkey and Armenia set
out a fully rounded and reasonable plan. In a "Protocol on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" the two sides promised to
establish diplomatic relations on the first day of the first month
after ratification; to exchange diplomatic missions; to reopen the
border within two months of ratification; and to mutually recognize
the existing border. In a "Protocol on Development of Relations" --
to go into effect simultaneously with the diplomatic opening -- the
two sides promised to promote cooperation in all areas from energy
infrastructure to tourism; to set up a mechanism of regular foreign
ministry consultations, including a main intergovernmental commission
and seven sub-commissions; to act jointly to preserve the cultural
heritage of both sides; and to establish consular cooperation. The
protocols are accompanied by a detailed timetable, in which all
steps and commissions would be fully implemented and in motion within
four months.
On the vexed question of how to describe the Ottoman-era massacres
of Armenians in the First World War - widely known as the Armenian
genocide, a label rejected by Turkey - the "Protocol on Development
of Relations" agreed to "implement a dialogue on the historical
dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the
two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the
historical records and archives to define existing problems and
formulate recommendations." The timetable adds that this dialogue
will be conducted under the aegis of the main intergovernmental
commission in a "sub-commission on the historical dimension ... in
which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international
experts shall take part." In short, Turkey and Armenia have taken a
brave and statesmanlike step. Both will win if it succeeds. Armenia
will overcome the sense that it is surrounded and under siege, will
open a new commercial and psychological gateway westward to Europe,
will be able to look better after the interests of the many tens
of thousands of Armenians working in Turkey, will be able to market
its electricity surplus and have easier access to the many Armenian
cultural and religious sites in eastern Turkey. For Turkey, the gains
are just as significant: the ability to show European and Western
partners that it is working toward closure with Armenians on the
contested matter of the First World War massacres; to add a new plank
in its efforts to bring stability, prosperity and cooperation through
relations with all three of its Caucasus neighbours; and, finally,
to achieve the satisfaction of full and public Armenian recognition of
its borders. The 31 August step towards normalisation was originally
expected in April, but Turkey backed away from the deal. All that could
be announced on 22 April 2009 was a vague road map. This hesitation
was apparently due to pressure from Azerbaijan -- a major supplier
of cheap gas to Turkey, and with which Turkey shares close linguistic
ties -- and continued nationalist opposition to compromise with Armenia
inside the Turkish political system. This coincided with a period in
Turkey in which reforms towards EU accession had virtually halted;
in which Prime Minister Erdohan appeared disengaged with EU ambitions
and to be pursuing alternatives in Russia and the Middle East; and
in which Turkey appeared to be taking sides in Middle Eastern issues,
with notably harsh criticism of Israel. Turkey also appeared to side
fully with Azerbaijan against Armenia, and it remains unclear what will
happen to Erdohan's 14 May promise to the Azerbaijani National Assembly
that there would be no opening of the Armenia-Turkey border until
there is an Armenian withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory.
The news that normalisation with Armenia is back on track, therefore,
is a signal that Turkey may be changing direction again. In the past
few months, Turkey and the AKP leadership have also begun to push
hard for progress on two other difficult dossiers, coming to terms
with t he Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and firmly setting
out a framework of reconciliation with its own substantial Kurdish
community. Progress towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation has also
been helped by the unusual way that the US and Russia appear to
have been working separately toward a similar compromise outcome,
and pushing more actively for progress toward a settlement of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh.
The fact that Turkey is now leaning back towards a reconciliation
with Armenia will do much to clear doubts about the country's
posture and the priorities of Prime Minister Erdohan. It will also
do proper credit to the polls that showed 70 per cent of the Turkish
population supported President Gul's gesture of visiting Armenia for
last September's first round football match, and the great strides
Turkey's intellectual and political elites have taken in the past
decade to dismiss the old-fashioned narrative of nationalist denial
towards the catastrophic Armenian massacres of 1915. Normalisation
with Armenia will also give real substance to new Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu's stated goals of "zero problems" and "peace in
the neighbourhood". However, while reconciliation with Armenia will
rightly attract great positive attention in Europe, the next test
will not be long in coming. Turkey has to find a way to expedite
a solution to the long-running Cyprus solution in the next several
months, or see its EU accession process effectively grind to a halt.
http://www.noravank.am/en/?page=analitics&am p;nid=2009
11 September 2009
It's been a long time coming, but Turkey and Armenia's vow on 31 August
to establish diplomatic relations, open their long-closed border and
begin to talk seriously about the past is excellent news. As laid out
in our 14 April report Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening
Borders, normalisation between Turkey and Armenia will benefit not
just the bilateral relationship. If successful, it could win back for
Turkey and its AKP government much of their recently faded prestige
as domestic reformers, as regional peace-makers and as a country
seriously intending to push forward with its accession process to
the European Union.
The brief joint announcement from Ankara, Yerevan and the Swiss
mediators in Bern said that two protocols had been initialled on
the establishment of diplomatic relations and the development of
bilateral relations. The two sides committed to seeing the protocols
through to parliamentary ratifications within six weeks -- that is,
two days before a 14 October World Cup qualifier match between Armenia
and Turkey due to be played in the western Turkish provincial city
of Bursa. Turkey hopes that Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian will
accept its invitation to attend, just as Turkish President Abdullah
Gul initiated the current process by attending the first round match
in Yerevan in September 2008.
Texts of the two protocols circulating in Turkey and Armenia set
out a fully rounded and reasonable plan. In a "Protocol on the
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" the two sides promised to
establish diplomatic relations on the first day of the first month
after ratification; to exchange diplomatic missions; to reopen the
border within two months of ratification; and to mutually recognize
the existing border. In a "Protocol on Development of Relations" --
to go into effect simultaneously with the diplomatic opening -- the
two sides promised to promote cooperation in all areas from energy
infrastructure to tourism; to set up a mechanism of regular foreign
ministry consultations, including a main intergovernmental commission
and seven sub-commissions; to act jointly to preserve the cultural
heritage of both sides; and to establish consular cooperation. The
protocols are accompanied by a detailed timetable, in which all
steps and commissions would be fully implemented and in motion within
four months.
On the vexed question of how to describe the Ottoman-era massacres
of Armenians in the First World War - widely known as the Armenian
genocide, a label rejected by Turkey - the "Protocol on Development
of Relations" agreed to "implement a dialogue on the historical
dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the
two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the
historical records and archives to define existing problems and
formulate recommendations." The timetable adds that this dialogue
will be conducted under the aegis of the main intergovernmental
commission in a "sub-commission on the historical dimension ... in
which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international
experts shall take part." In short, Turkey and Armenia have taken a
brave and statesmanlike step. Both will win if it succeeds. Armenia
will overcome the sense that it is surrounded and under siege, will
open a new commercial and psychological gateway westward to Europe,
will be able to look better after the interests of the many tens
of thousands of Armenians working in Turkey, will be able to market
its electricity surplus and have easier access to the many Armenian
cultural and religious sites in eastern Turkey. For Turkey, the gains
are just as significant: the ability to show European and Western
partners that it is working toward closure with Armenians on the
contested matter of the First World War massacres; to add a new plank
in its efforts to bring stability, prosperity and cooperation through
relations with all three of its Caucasus neighbours; and, finally,
to achieve the satisfaction of full and public Armenian recognition of
its borders. The 31 August step towards normalisation was originally
expected in April, but Turkey backed away from the deal. All that could
be announced on 22 April 2009 was a vague road map. This hesitation
was apparently due to pressure from Azerbaijan -- a major supplier
of cheap gas to Turkey, and with which Turkey shares close linguistic
ties -- and continued nationalist opposition to compromise with Armenia
inside the Turkish political system. This coincided with a period in
Turkey in which reforms towards EU accession had virtually halted;
in which Prime Minister Erdohan appeared disengaged with EU ambitions
and to be pursuing alternatives in Russia and the Middle East; and
in which Turkey appeared to be taking sides in Middle Eastern issues,
with notably harsh criticism of Israel. Turkey also appeared to side
fully with Azerbaijan against Armenia, and it remains unclear what will
happen to Erdohan's 14 May promise to the Azerbaijani National Assembly
that there would be no opening of the Armenia-Turkey border until
there is an Armenian withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory.
The news that normalisation with Armenia is back on track, therefore,
is a signal that Turkey may be changing direction again. In the past
few months, Turkey and the AKP leadership have also begun to push
hard for progress on two other difficult dossiers, coming to terms
with t he Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and firmly setting
out a framework of reconciliation with its own substantial Kurdish
community. Progress towards Turkey-Armenia normalisation has also
been helped by the unusual way that the US and Russia appear to
have been working separately toward a similar compromise outcome,
and pushing more actively for progress toward a settlement of the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh.
The fact that Turkey is now leaning back towards a reconciliation
with Armenia will do much to clear doubts about the country's
posture and the priorities of Prime Minister Erdohan. It will also
do proper credit to the polls that showed 70 per cent of the Turkish
population supported President Gul's gesture of visiting Armenia for
last September's first round football match, and the great strides
Turkey's intellectual and political elites have taken in the past
decade to dismiss the old-fashioned narrative of nationalist denial
towards the catastrophic Armenian massacres of 1915. Normalisation
with Armenia will also give real substance to new Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu's stated goals of "zero problems" and "peace in
the neighbourhood". However, while reconciliation with Armenia will
rightly attract great positive attention in Europe, the next test
will not be long in coming. Turkey has to find a way to expedite
a solution to the long-running Cyprus solution in the next several
months, or see its EU accession process effectively grind to a halt.