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DAVUTOGLU'S VISIT TO IRAN HIGHLIGHTS ANKARA'S REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
Saban Kardas
Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac he=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35490&tx_ttnew s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=be70dc982c
Sept 14 2009
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu paid an official visit
to Iran on September 12-13. He met the Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Parliamentary Speaker
Ali Larijani and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security
Council and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Following
his meeting with Mottaki, Davutoglu and his counterpart stressed the
importance they attach to bilateral relations, as well as regional
cooperation. Davutoglu noted that the two countries shared deep-rooted
historical ties and their neighborly relations are based on the
principle of refraining from interfering in each other's affairs. He
outlined many areas where they explored boosting bilateral relations,
ranging from economic cooperation to security. Referring to this
multi-dimensional partnership, Mottaki described Turkish-Iranian
relations as "strategic" (Cihan Haber Ajansi, Anadolu Ajansi,
September 12).
The foreign ministers emphasized that given the centrality of the
threat of terrorism facing both countries, they will continue their
collaboration in combating this phenomenon, referring to their joint
efforts against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Party
of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). Davutoglu also highlighted the
flourishing economic activity between the two countries, noting that
the bilateral trade volume has reached $11 billion annually, despite
the global economic crisis. In addition to discussing cooperation
in various areas, the two main items on Davutoglu's agenda were
the nuclear issue and energy cooperation. Davutoglu's meeting came
in the wake of the announcement by Washington that it will consider
holding talks with Tehran, despite the latter's reluctance to discuss
its nuclear program. Iran forwarded a proposal to the major powers
expressing its readiness to discuss global nuclear disarmament, as
well as other international issues. Although the White House did not
find Iran's proposals as responsive to its concerns about its nuclear
program, it nonetheless showed interest in holding direct talks with
Iran (Today's Zaman, September 14).
Davutoglu reiterated Turkey's position that the resolution of the
nuclear problem should be based on mutual respect. He also conveyed
to Jalili Turkey's readiness to host negotiations between Iran and
Western countries (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). However, this is
not the first time that Turkey has proposed to mediate between Iran
and the West, and its previous offers failed to produce any practical
results. Reportedly, both Washington and Tehran were reluctant to see
Ankara play such a role (EDM, March 10). Following the press briefing
with Davutoglu, Mottaki thanked his Turkish counterpart for Turkey's
support for Iran's right to obtain nuclear energy (Anadolu Ajansi,
September 12). Although Ankara remains eager to act as a mediator,
what leverage it may hold to convince Tehran to compromise on the
Western demands remains to be seen.
Energy was the other key issue on the agenda. Turkey has a major
incentive to help solve the diplomatic problems bedeviling Iran's
relations with the West and bring Iran into the orbit of the European
energy security discussions, a policy which is also supported by many
European countries.
Turkey seeks to deepen its energy partnership with Iran, especially
considering its efforts to become a major energy hub. Indeed, one
of the biggest obstacles before the Nabucco project, which Turkey
considers as a strategic priority, is finding suppliers, Iran is the
most likely alternative, since it possesses the second largest gas
reserves in the world. Turkey indeed has been eager to act as a bridge
connecting Iranian gas to the European grid through Nabucco. Although
Ankara signed a major energy cooperation deal with Iran in 2007, it
had to suspend those plans due to American objections. U.S. sanctions
toward Iran prevent the development of the Iranian gas sector and
the export of its gas to Western markets. Since its fields are
underdeveloped and it needs immense transportation infrastructure,
Iran has not emerged as a major player in gas markets, and even has
been forced to import gas from Turkmenistan to meet its domestic
demand. Prior to the signing of the Nabucco inter-governmental
agreement in Ankara, Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan emphasized their willingness to tap into Iranian gas,
but U.S. officials reiterated their objection to the Iranian option
(EDM, July 14). However, Davutoglu said that Turkey would work to
help Iran export its gas to European markets.
Turkey's Iran policy resonates well with the recent course of its
regional diplomacy. Ankara has fostered closer regional dialogue with
Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries in order to create a peaceful
neighborhood and develop closer economic partnerships, including
energy projects (EDM, August 12). Bringing Iran into the same circle
is definitely a prime motive driving Ankara's policies toward Tehran.
Davutoglu, as the architect of this policy, appreciates the central
role that Iran plays in the region and expresses his aversion to any
instability that might be caused by the ongoing diplomatic problems,
as well as the developments in Iranian domestic politics. This concern,
however, results in a status quo policy of supporting the Iranian
government. As reflected in Ankara's acquiescent attitude during
the Iranian regime's harsh crackdown on the protestors following the
disputed presidential elections, Turkey was criticized for not being
sensitive to domestic developments in Iranian politics (EDM, June 18).
Another underlying problem in Turkey's Iran policy concerns
the differing interpretations both parties attach to "regional
cooperation." Iran views regional cooperation as a way to limit the
involvement of the West and the United States in regional affairs,
as well as to exclude Israel. Turkey, in contrast, values its ties
to the West and defines its regional policies in complementary
terms. Indeed, such differences of opinion were apparent in
Ahmadinejad's statements following his meeting with Davutoglu,
which contained strong anti-Western rhetoric. Ahmadinejad claimed
that the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations is an obligation
"in a process whereby great and oppressor powers are in decline"
(Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).
A major test for Turkey's regional diplomacy might perhaps stem from
its ability to foster closer cooperation among its neighbors, while
also ensuring that it does not present an anti-Western platform.
Saban Kardas
Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cac he=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35490&tx_ttnew s%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=be70dc982c
Sept 14 2009
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu paid an official visit
to Iran on September 12-13. He met the Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Parliamentary Speaker
Ali Larijani and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security
Council and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Following
his meeting with Mottaki, Davutoglu and his counterpart stressed the
importance they attach to bilateral relations, as well as regional
cooperation. Davutoglu noted that the two countries shared deep-rooted
historical ties and their neighborly relations are based on the
principle of refraining from interfering in each other's affairs. He
outlined many areas where they explored boosting bilateral relations,
ranging from economic cooperation to security. Referring to this
multi-dimensional partnership, Mottaki described Turkish-Iranian
relations as "strategic" (Cihan Haber Ajansi, Anadolu Ajansi,
September 12).
The foreign ministers emphasized that given the centrality of the
threat of terrorism facing both countries, they will continue their
collaboration in combating this phenomenon, referring to their joint
efforts against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Party
of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). Davutoglu also highlighted the
flourishing economic activity between the two countries, noting that
the bilateral trade volume has reached $11 billion annually, despite
the global economic crisis. In addition to discussing cooperation
in various areas, the two main items on Davutoglu's agenda were
the nuclear issue and energy cooperation. Davutoglu's meeting came
in the wake of the announcement by Washington that it will consider
holding talks with Tehran, despite the latter's reluctance to discuss
its nuclear program. Iran forwarded a proposal to the major powers
expressing its readiness to discuss global nuclear disarmament, as
well as other international issues. Although the White House did not
find Iran's proposals as responsive to its concerns about its nuclear
program, it nonetheless showed interest in holding direct talks with
Iran (Today's Zaman, September 14).
Davutoglu reiterated Turkey's position that the resolution of the
nuclear problem should be based on mutual respect. He also conveyed
to Jalili Turkey's readiness to host negotiations between Iran and
Western countries (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). However, this is
not the first time that Turkey has proposed to mediate between Iran
and the West, and its previous offers failed to produce any practical
results. Reportedly, both Washington and Tehran were reluctant to see
Ankara play such a role (EDM, March 10). Following the press briefing
with Davutoglu, Mottaki thanked his Turkish counterpart for Turkey's
support for Iran's right to obtain nuclear energy (Anadolu Ajansi,
September 12). Although Ankara remains eager to act as a mediator,
what leverage it may hold to convince Tehran to compromise on the
Western demands remains to be seen.
Energy was the other key issue on the agenda. Turkey has a major
incentive to help solve the diplomatic problems bedeviling Iran's
relations with the West and bring Iran into the orbit of the European
energy security discussions, a policy which is also supported by many
European countries.
Turkey seeks to deepen its energy partnership with Iran, especially
considering its efforts to become a major energy hub. Indeed, one
of the biggest obstacles before the Nabucco project, which Turkey
considers as a strategic priority, is finding suppliers, Iran is the
most likely alternative, since it possesses the second largest gas
reserves in the world. Turkey indeed has been eager to act as a bridge
connecting Iranian gas to the European grid through Nabucco. Although
Ankara signed a major energy cooperation deal with Iran in 2007, it
had to suspend those plans due to American objections. U.S. sanctions
toward Iran prevent the development of the Iranian gas sector and
the export of its gas to Western markets. Since its fields are
underdeveloped and it needs immense transportation infrastructure,
Iran has not emerged as a major player in gas markets, and even has
been forced to import gas from Turkmenistan to meet its domestic
demand. Prior to the signing of the Nabucco inter-governmental
agreement in Ankara, Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan emphasized their willingness to tap into Iranian gas,
but U.S. officials reiterated their objection to the Iranian option
(EDM, July 14). However, Davutoglu said that Turkey would work to
help Iran export its gas to European markets.
Turkey's Iran policy resonates well with the recent course of its
regional diplomacy. Ankara has fostered closer regional dialogue with
Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries in order to create a peaceful
neighborhood and develop closer economic partnerships, including
energy projects (EDM, August 12). Bringing Iran into the same circle
is definitely a prime motive driving Ankara's policies toward Tehran.
Davutoglu, as the architect of this policy, appreciates the central
role that Iran plays in the region and expresses his aversion to any
instability that might be caused by the ongoing diplomatic problems,
as well as the developments in Iranian domestic politics. This concern,
however, results in a status quo policy of supporting the Iranian
government. As reflected in Ankara's acquiescent attitude during
the Iranian regime's harsh crackdown on the protestors following the
disputed presidential elections, Turkey was criticized for not being
sensitive to domestic developments in Iranian politics (EDM, June 18).
Another underlying problem in Turkey's Iran policy concerns
the differing interpretations both parties attach to "regional
cooperation." Iran views regional cooperation as a way to limit the
involvement of the West and the United States in regional affairs,
as well as to exclude Israel. Turkey, in contrast, values its ties
to the West and defines its regional policies in complementary
terms. Indeed, such differences of opinion were apparent in
Ahmadinejad's statements following his meeting with Davutoglu,
which contained strong anti-Western rhetoric. Ahmadinejad claimed
that the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations is an obligation
"in a process whereby great and oppressor powers are in decline"
(Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).
A major test for Turkey's regional diplomacy might perhaps stem from
its ability to foster closer cooperation among its neighbors, while
also ensuring that it does not present an anti-Western platform.