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THE ARMENIAN OPENING
Hurriyet Daily News
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the- armenian-opening-2009-09-15
Sept 15 2009
Turkey
Obviously, there are objectionable and perhaps deplorable elements
in the Turkish-Armenian protocols but a careful reconsideration
might vividly demonstrate that they are products of a successful
and diligent diplomacy that caters to most of Turkey's outstanding
interests. Most important of all, though tacit, with these protocols
Armenia has delivered Ankara two crucial concessions.
What are they?
First of all Armenia has accepted for the first time ever the
creation of a history commission that might feature historians from
interested third parties in examining the genocide claims. That is,
without saying so the Serge Sarkisian administration of Armenian has
conceded from the "Genocide is a fact, there is no need to verify it
through scientific research or to discuss it" position. Secondly,
for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed
to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars
treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars
treaty. Such recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has
no territorial claims from Turkey or it has turned a cold shoulder
to diaspora's land claims from Turkey.
Because of those concessions Sarkisian is now having a tough ride with
the Armenian opposition, while many Turkish diplomats who devoted a
life to battle Armenian claims against Turkey are expressing with
satisfaction appreciation for the Turkish "diplomatic victory" in
Armenia relations.
Yet, the opposition parties are fuming over the protocols and
delivering tough statements as if the ruling Justice and Development
Party, or AKP, government has betrayed Turkey's national interests.
All the issues on the table in Turkish-Armenian negotiations,
excluding one, are problems between the two countries. Recognition of
the Kars treaty or the joint border defined by that treaty and Armenia
declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey, resolution of the
genocide claims through studies of a joint historical commission,
normalization of relations including establishment of diplomatic
relations and opening of the border gates are the most prominent
issues the Swiss-mediated silent diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia
has been aiming to achieve. Of these topics, only normalization of
relations and opening of the border gates heading was not a purely
bilateral subject as suspension of the plans to open a Turkish embassy
in Yerevan and closure of the border were decided by Ankara as a
reaction to the invasion and subsequent occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh,
a predominantly Armenian dominated enclave in Azerbaijan, and several
Azerbaijani-population regions around the mountainous enclave.
Indeed, without abandoning Azerbaijan and landing Turkish-Azerbaijani
relations in an unprecedented crisis and risking his own political
future very seriously no Turkish leader can open the border without a
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation or at least declaration
of a withdrawal timetable by Armenia. Can Armenia undertake such a
move now? What if, as was suggested earlier, Armenia withdraws from
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri regions around and Russian peacekeepers
are deployed in the mountainous region? Even if with Azerbaijani
demands Turkish troops join Russians as peacekeepers in the disputed
territory, such a development might still be acceptable for Yerevan
as an "interim formula." After all, were not Russian military elements
together with Armenian troops in the occupation of the region?
Such a development may as well help Erdogan escape "treason"
accusation in the 2010 or 2011 early polls while convert him into a
"national hero" in Azerbaijan as he would have secured "liberation"
of occupied Azerbaijani land.
The outcome would serve to Turkish-Russian relations, as well as
the U.S. interests in this geography. Furthermore, such a resolution
would be a great contribution to Western energy security, and thus
would be applauded by the EU, too.
Can Armenia declare a withdrawal timetable? That might make Erdogan a
hero, otherwise, he will find himself in some very serious reputation
problems in domestic politics. Would he care? So far he proved that
he has no such worries.
Hurriyet Daily News
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the- armenian-opening-2009-09-15
Sept 15 2009
Turkey
Obviously, there are objectionable and perhaps deplorable elements
in the Turkish-Armenian protocols but a careful reconsideration
might vividly demonstrate that they are products of a successful
and diligent diplomacy that caters to most of Turkey's outstanding
interests. Most important of all, though tacit, with these protocols
Armenia has delivered Ankara two crucial concessions.
What are they?
First of all Armenia has accepted for the first time ever the
creation of a history commission that might feature historians from
interested third parties in examining the genocide claims. That is,
without saying so the Serge Sarkisian administration of Armenian has
conceded from the "Genocide is a fact, there is no need to verify it
through scientific research or to discuss it" position. Secondly,
for the first time ever in the post-Soviet era, Armenia has agreed
to recognize the joint border with Turkey as was defined in the Kars
treaty, though there is no reference in the protocols to the Kars
treaty. Such recognition by Armenia is no less than declaring it has
no territorial claims from Turkey or it has turned a cold shoulder
to diaspora's land claims from Turkey.
Because of those concessions Sarkisian is now having a tough ride with
the Armenian opposition, while many Turkish diplomats who devoted a
life to battle Armenian claims against Turkey are expressing with
satisfaction appreciation for the Turkish "diplomatic victory" in
Armenia relations.
Yet, the opposition parties are fuming over the protocols and
delivering tough statements as if the ruling Justice and Development
Party, or AKP, government has betrayed Turkey's national interests.
All the issues on the table in Turkish-Armenian negotiations,
excluding one, are problems between the two countries. Recognition of
the Kars treaty or the joint border defined by that treaty and Armenia
declaring it has no territorial claims from Turkey, resolution of the
genocide claims through studies of a joint historical commission,
normalization of relations including establishment of diplomatic
relations and opening of the border gates are the most prominent
issues the Swiss-mediated silent diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia
has been aiming to achieve. Of these topics, only normalization of
relations and opening of the border gates heading was not a purely
bilateral subject as suspension of the plans to open a Turkish embassy
in Yerevan and closure of the border were decided by Ankara as a
reaction to the invasion and subsequent occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh,
a predominantly Armenian dominated enclave in Azerbaijan, and several
Azerbaijani-population regions around the mountainous enclave.
Indeed, without abandoning Azerbaijan and landing Turkish-Azerbaijani
relations in an unprecedented crisis and risking his own political
future very seriously no Turkish leader can open the border without a
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh occupation or at least declaration
of a withdrawal timetable by Armenia. Can Armenia undertake such a
move now? What if, as was suggested earlier, Armenia withdraws from
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri regions around and Russian peacekeepers
are deployed in the mountainous region? Even if with Azerbaijani
demands Turkish troops join Russians as peacekeepers in the disputed
territory, such a development might still be acceptable for Yerevan
as an "interim formula." After all, were not Russian military elements
together with Armenian troops in the occupation of the region?
Such a development may as well help Erdogan escape "treason"
accusation in the 2010 or 2011 early polls while convert him into a
"national hero" in Azerbaijan as he would have secured "liberation"
of occupied Azerbaijani land.
The outcome would serve to Turkish-Russian relations, as well as
the U.S. interests in this geography. Furthermore, such a resolution
would be a great contribution to Western energy security, and thus
would be applauded by the EU, too.
Can Armenia declare a withdrawal timetable? That might make Erdogan a
hero, otherwise, he will find himself in some very serious reputation
problems in domestic politics. Would he care? So far he proved that
he has no such worries.