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THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF LEBANON'S ARMENIAN CHRISTIANS
Tayyar.org
Sept 18 2009
Lebanon
Lebanon's parliamentary elections demonstrated the growing political
significance of the country's seventh largest ethno-sectarian
community. Due to a number of political and historical factors,
Armenian Christians lined up predominantly on the side of the
opposition and helped propel it to victory in Lebanon's largest
Christian district. The balance of power in the next election cycle
may well hinge on whether they stay this course.
Background
Although small numbers of Armenians have lived in Lebanon for hundreds
of years, most Lebanese Armenians are the descendents of refugees who
fled Turkish persecution during World War I. A second wave of Armenian
refugees came in 1939, after France ceded the Syrian territory of
Alexandretta to Turkey. Lebanese Armenians are concentrated in three
main areas: east Beirut; Bourj Hammoud, a suburb of the capital in
the district of Metn; and the town of Anjar in the Beqaa Valley.
The country's only significant non-Arab minority, the Armenian
Christian community, not only preserved its distinctive ethnic
and cultural identity, religion, and language over the years,
but also functioned as the cultural and spiritual capital of the
broader Armenian Diaspora. There are dozens of Armenian schools
in Lebanon. Haigazian University in Beirut is the only Armenian
institution of higher learning in the Diaspora.
Most Lebanese Armenians feel strong solidarity with the Diaspora, but
this conviction does not conflict significantly with their Lebanese
identity and exerts little direct influence on their domestic
politics today.[1] Armenians are somewhat unique among Lebanese
confessional groups in having no landed notability or traditional
political aristocracy, as destitution and forced migration proved to
be a powerful social equalizer.
The three main Armenian parties in Lebanon - Tashnag (by far
the largest), Ramgavar, and Hunshak - are branches of larger
Armenian Diaspora parties that pre-date Lebanon's independence
and their ideological differences relate mainly to pan-Armenian
issues. Tashnag's power derives in part from its organic relationship
with the powerful Holy See of Cilicia, one of two Catholicosates that
represent Armenian Orthodox around the globe. The Catholicosate left
its original headquarters in Echmiadzin, Armenia in 1058 and settled
in Cilicia. Although a new Catholicos was elected in Echmiadzin in
1441, the Catholicosate of Cilicia kept operating from Turkey until
it was forced out in 1915 and settled in a suburb of Beirut. Armenian
Catholicoi are usually elected by a mechanism that involves delegates
representing the population, so Tashnag's influence throughout the
Diaspora has filtered up into the ranks of the clergy, who in turn
grant the party further legitimacy among the relatively conservative
Armenian community.
When the Soviet Union, with the endorsement of Hunshak and Ramgavar,
gained effective control over the Echmiadzin Catholicosate and threw
Tashnag officials out of Armenia, tensions among the rival parties
led to violent altercations and even assassinations in Lebanon
(and elsewhere in the Diaspora). Following the deaths of roughly a
hundred Armenians in Lebanon's brief 1958 civil war, however, they
began to exhibit more communal solidarity and intra-Armenian violence
has since been relatively rare.
Under Lebanon's communitarian democratic system, ethnic Armenians
receive a fixed number of parliamentary seats, presently six out of
128. There is a widespread consensus that Armenians should vote as
a bloc, and more often than not the three main political parties
have agreed upon a common slate of candidates. They have tended
to give electoral support to governing elites, particularly the
president, in exchange for policies that advance Armenian communal
interests. Prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the Tashnag-led
Armenian bloc aligned with Pierre Gemayel's predominantly Maronite
Christian Phalange party.
Armenian groups did not play an active role in the 1975-1990 Lebanon
war, despite efforts by the Phalangists and later the predominantly
Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia to pressure them into taking
sides. Unfortunately, this lack of protection contributed to a flood
of Armenian emigration that continued after the Syrians completed
their occupation of Lebanon in 1990. By some estimates, more than
half of the 250,000-strong Armenian community left and never returned.
During the 1990s, the three Armenian parties adopted much the same
political strategy as they did before the war. In the 1992 and 1996
elections, they reached agreement on a politically mixed, though
Tashnag-dominated, slate of candidates and forged coalitions with the
most powerful political barons in their respective districts. In Metn,
they joined forces with Greek Orthodox Christian leader Michel Murr,
an alliance that dates back half a century. They sided with late Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri in his electoral stronghold of Beirut. These
alliances caused resentment among Christian opposition candidates
who ran against the electoral coalitions of Hariri and Murr.
Hariri had a falling out with Tashnag in 1998, when pro-Tashnag members
of parliament gave their vote of confidence to a new prime minister
favored by Hariri's archrival, newly elected President Emile Lahoud.[2]
Consequently, prior to the 2000 elections Hariri demanded that Tashnag
commit its candidates to vote in line with his parliamentary bloc
(not the standard practice in Lebanon, where electoral coalitions are
usually fleeting). When Tashnag rejected these terms, Hariri picked
lesser-known Armenian candidates affiliated with Ramgavar and Hunshak,
who pledged and subsequently practiced unswerving loyalty.
In an effort to woo Armenian voters away from Tashnag, Hariri showered
charitable contributions on the Armenian community, while his Future
TV station began broadcasting a 15-minute Armenian language nightly
newscast. Because Armenian neighborhoods in Beirut were split into
different districts under the 2000 electoral law, Hariri was able
to ensure the election of four Armenian members of parliament who
the large majority of Armenians had voted against. Tashnag, which
forged ineffective alliances with Hariri's enemies, captured only
the Armenian seats in Metn and Zahleh.
After the Syrian Withdrawal
Tashnag faced a difficult situation after the withdrawal of Syrian
forces from Lebanon in the spring of 2005, weeks ahead of parliamentary
elections. Once again, the late Hariri's Future Movement swept the
elections in Beirut, though Tashnag retained control of Armenian seats
in Metn and Zahleh, held by Hagop Pakradounian and George Kasarji,
by aligning with Murr and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).
In August 2007, Tashnag again sided with Aoun and Murr in a
parliamentary by-election in Metn, which pitted former President
Amine Gemayel against Camille Khoury, a virtually unknown member of
the FPM. Although the Ramgavar and Hunshak parties supported Gemayel,
the roughly 10,000 Armenian voters in the district cast their ballots
for Khoury by a margin of more than five to one, enabling the FPM to
narrowly win the majority Maronite district by 418 votes.[3]
The FPM victory led to an eruption of anti-Armenian sentiment among
March 14 politicians and press outlets. Minutes after the results were
released, Gemayel declared that he, not Khoury, was "the true Christian
representative," implying that Armenians were not true Christians.[4]
"Armenians are outside the Lebanese will" and "are here to create
a civil war," said Gabriel Murr on a popular Lebanese talk show
program.[5] The pro-March 14 daily L'Orient Le Jour proclaimed the
election result "a fake victory" in its headline the following day,[6]
while Hariri's Al-Mustaqbal newspaper ran the headline "Two-thirds of
Maronites vote for Gemayel, their seat goes to Aoun by 418 votes."[7]
The Armenian community was deeply shaken by these slurs, which brought
back memories of Phalangist intimidation during the civil war. "No one
should allow himself to attack the honor of the Armenian community,"
said Bishop Aram I Keshishian, head of the Cilicia Catholicosate. "We
understand that some tense and sometimes harmful statements are
delivered during and after electoral battles, [but] we do not accept
unfounded accusations and offensive comments."[8] Tashnag leaders
were less understanding, accusing Gemayel of bigotry and racism.[9]
Although Gemayel was quick to proclaim his affection and respect for
the Armenian community, his refusal to apologize for his election
night rhetoric continues to irk many Armenians.
The 2009 Elections
In the aftermath of the Metn by-election, March 14 leaders made
concerted attempts to woo the Armenian community away from Aoun, an
effort that would have been futile had it not been for the defection of
Michel Murr from the opposition in 2008. Last February, Murr formally
announced that he and Gemayel were forming a joint ticket in Metn
and hinted that he could persuade Tashnag to switch sides as well.
Over the next two months, Tashnag conducted negotiations with both
March 14 and the opposition. While there were rumors of disagreement
between Tashnag Secretary-General Hovig Mekhitarian and Pakradounian
over which side to choose, it appears unlikely that a full-fledged
defection by Tashnag was ever in the offing. Tashnag's goal is to build
a unified Armenian parliamentary bloc on par with what existed before
2000. Keen on preserving his ties with Hunshak and Ramgavar, Saad
Hariri insisted on being able to name most of the Armenian candidates
in Beirut.[10] Aoun, on the other hand, was willing to give Tashnag
the final say over the selection of Armenian candidates. In fact,
during the March 14-opposition talks that led to the May 2008 Doha
Accord, he won enormous acclaim from Tashnag by pressing for the
establishment of an all-Armenian electoral district in Beirut.[11]
Tashnag urged Hunshak and Ramgavar to join it in a united Armenian
front, but its rivals were squarely in the Hariri camp.[12] MP
Serge Torsarkissian of the Ramgavar party warned that an Armenian
parliamentary bloc dominated by Tashnag "would pose a danger to
Lebanon."[13] In addition to patronizing Ramgavar and Hunshak,
Hariri is widely believed to have financed the establishment of the
Free Lebanese Armenian Movement (FLAM), led by Nareg Aprahamian,
a retired army general.
In late March, Tashnag officially announced that it would remain
with the opposition, albeit with two minor caveats. In the 8-seat
Metn district, Tashnag instructed its constituents to vote for Murr
alone, but not for the other candidates on his list. In exchange,
March 14 did not field a candidate for the district's Armenian seat,
allowing an uncontested victory for Pakradounian. In addition, by
prior arrangement, pro-Tashnag candidate Arthur Nazarian and Hunshak
candidate Sebouh Kalbakian were elected uncontested in Beirut's second
district, in conformity with the Doha Accord.
It is not entirely clear what reasoning lay behind Tashnag's
choice. It is difficult to justify the decision purely in terms of
narrow electoral self-interest. Although two of its candidates won
uncontested victories, the other three - Freij Saboungian and Krikor
Calouste in Beirut's first district, and Kasarji in Zahleh - faced
difficult electoral battles (and ultimately lost).[14] Had Tashnag
aligned with March 14, it would have had a strong chance of winning
four seats.
Pakradounian called the decision to stick with Aoun "a response to the
[March 14] policy of marginalizing Armenians,"[15] and it is probably
true that Armenian resentment tipped the scales. Gemayel did not help
matters by publicly warning the party that he would run a "closed list"
in Metn (i.e. including an Armenian candidate) if an agreement could
not be reached with Tashnag. Aoun smartly avoided so much as a hint
of intimidation, and it paid off.
The election was fiercely contested, with both coalitions
spending a considerable amount of money on Armenian language media
advertising. Due to the opposition's unexpected loss in Zahleh
(alongside its expected loss in Beirut I), Tashnag ended up with just
two seats, in Metn and Beirut II. Its support for Aoun was critical
to the opposition's capture of six out of eight seats in Metn (Murr
and Gemayel were the only March 14 candidates elected), though its
formidable confessional mobilization may have backfired in Zahleh
by provoking Sunnis in the district to close ranks, resulting in an
opposition loss there. Nevertheless, as a test of Tashnag's leverage
over the Armenian community and ability to mobilize its supporters
to adhere to delicate alliances, the election can be regarded as a
success for the party.
Not surprisingly, there was much grumbling about Tashnag among March 14
Christian leaders after the vote. Murr lashed out at his former ally,
accusing it of threatening his Armenian "friends" to prevent them from
casting their votes in his favor and suggested that the "massive"
Armenian turnout in Bourj Hammoud was the result of fraud.[16]
Lebanese Forces MP Antoine Zahra denounced Tashnag and accused it
of behaving as a "colony" in Lebanon, lacking "pure origin."[17]
Such comments sparked rebukes within the March 14 coalition from
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora[18] and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.[19]
Although formally part of Aoun's Change and Reform bloc, Tashnag's
pre-election flirtations with Hariri and Gemayel suggest that it will
keep its options open for a possible political repositioning. The
party has always been open to alliances with different Lebanese
parties on the condition that they acknowledge it as the major
political representative of the Armenian community. With the rest of
the Christian community more or less evenly divided, it will continue
to play a critical swing role and competition for its allegiance is
likely to be heated.
Postscript: Every now and then one writes an article only to discover
afterwards that someone else has already done an immeasurably more
thorough analysis. This is one of those times. For further reading,
see Ara Sanjian, Deja Vu: Armenians and the 2009 Parliamentary
Elections in Lebanon, Armenian News Network, 29 June 2009.
Notes
[1] The most notable exception is their nearly universal insistence
that Lebanese government institutions officially condemn as genocide
the Ottoman Empire's mass murder of Armenians nearly a century
ago. For a good overview of Armenian politics in Lebanon, see Ara
Sanjian, Armenians and the 2000 Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon,
Armenian News Network, 2000.
[2] Pro-Hunshak MP Yeghig Jerejian and Ramgavar-backed MP Hagop
Demirjian remained loyal.
[3] Khoury won roughly 8,400 Armenian votes, while Gemayel received
1,600. Al-Nahar (Beirut), 6 August 2007.
[4] "Rival Lebanese leaders claim by-elections as 'victory'," The
Daily Star (Beirut), 7 August 2007.
[5] Quoted in The Metn Fallout, Nowlebanon.com, 14 August 2007.
[6] L'Orient Le Jour (Beirut), 6 August 2007.
[7] Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 6 August 2007. Italics added for emphasis.
[8] National News Agency (Beirut), 6 August 2007. Translation by
BBC Monitoring.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Tashnaq rejects Hariri's proposal, confirms alliance with FPM
and Skaff," Nowlebanon.com, 1 April 2009. In exchange, Hariri was
reportedly willing to let Tashnag choose the Armenian representative(s)
in the cabinet. See "Outcome of Metn polls may hinge on Armenians,"
The Daily Star (Beirut), 7 March 2009.
[11] "Analysts say Tueni will beat Aoun's candidate in Beirut race,"
The Daily Star (Beirut), 19 March 2009. Aoun eventually managed
to press for an all-Christian district in Achrafieh featuring two
Armenian seats and bargain for an uncontested distribution of two
other Armenian seats in another district.
[12] Tashnag called for "the reactivation of the Armenian bloc, which
would include six deputies, one for each party, and the remaining three
will be assigned after consensus." "Tashnaq rejects Hariri's proposal,
confirms alliance with FPM and Skaff," Nowlebanon.com, 1 April 2009.
[13] "Suleiman describes ties with Syria as 'excellent'," The Daily
Star, 30 March 2009.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Lebanese Armenians and the 'Madness' of Political Alignment,
Al-Sharq al-Awsat English, 18 April 2009.
[16] Michel al-Murr, Nowlebanon.com, 17 July 2009.
[17] Zahra: Tashnag Armenian Party Behaves as Colony in Lebanon,
almanar.com.lb, 10 June 2009.
[18] "We are hearing increasingly that so-and-so made it parliament
because of the Sunni vote, or the Shia vote or the Armenian vote. What
is this language we are using? Are the Sunnis, Shia and Armenians not
Lebanese?" said Siniora on June 19. Nicholas Lowry, Armenians after
the vote, Nowlebanon.com, 19 June 2009.
[19] Jumblatt condemned those "who are describing the Armenians and
the Tashnag party as outsiders." Quoted in "Sfeir: Poll result averted
takeover by Iran, Syria," The Daily Star (Beirut), 12 June 2009.
Tayyar.org
Sept 18 2009
Lebanon
Lebanon's parliamentary elections demonstrated the growing political
significance of the country's seventh largest ethno-sectarian
community. Due to a number of political and historical factors,
Armenian Christians lined up predominantly on the side of the
opposition and helped propel it to victory in Lebanon's largest
Christian district. The balance of power in the next election cycle
may well hinge on whether they stay this course.
Background
Although small numbers of Armenians have lived in Lebanon for hundreds
of years, most Lebanese Armenians are the descendents of refugees who
fled Turkish persecution during World War I. A second wave of Armenian
refugees came in 1939, after France ceded the Syrian territory of
Alexandretta to Turkey. Lebanese Armenians are concentrated in three
main areas: east Beirut; Bourj Hammoud, a suburb of the capital in
the district of Metn; and the town of Anjar in the Beqaa Valley.
The country's only significant non-Arab minority, the Armenian
Christian community, not only preserved its distinctive ethnic
and cultural identity, religion, and language over the years,
but also functioned as the cultural and spiritual capital of the
broader Armenian Diaspora. There are dozens of Armenian schools
in Lebanon. Haigazian University in Beirut is the only Armenian
institution of higher learning in the Diaspora.
Most Lebanese Armenians feel strong solidarity with the Diaspora, but
this conviction does not conflict significantly with their Lebanese
identity and exerts little direct influence on their domestic
politics today.[1] Armenians are somewhat unique among Lebanese
confessional groups in having no landed notability or traditional
political aristocracy, as destitution and forced migration proved to
be a powerful social equalizer.
The three main Armenian parties in Lebanon - Tashnag (by far
the largest), Ramgavar, and Hunshak - are branches of larger
Armenian Diaspora parties that pre-date Lebanon's independence
and their ideological differences relate mainly to pan-Armenian
issues. Tashnag's power derives in part from its organic relationship
with the powerful Holy See of Cilicia, one of two Catholicosates that
represent Armenian Orthodox around the globe. The Catholicosate left
its original headquarters in Echmiadzin, Armenia in 1058 and settled
in Cilicia. Although a new Catholicos was elected in Echmiadzin in
1441, the Catholicosate of Cilicia kept operating from Turkey until
it was forced out in 1915 and settled in a suburb of Beirut. Armenian
Catholicoi are usually elected by a mechanism that involves delegates
representing the population, so Tashnag's influence throughout the
Diaspora has filtered up into the ranks of the clergy, who in turn
grant the party further legitimacy among the relatively conservative
Armenian community.
When the Soviet Union, with the endorsement of Hunshak and Ramgavar,
gained effective control over the Echmiadzin Catholicosate and threw
Tashnag officials out of Armenia, tensions among the rival parties
led to violent altercations and even assassinations in Lebanon
(and elsewhere in the Diaspora). Following the deaths of roughly a
hundred Armenians in Lebanon's brief 1958 civil war, however, they
began to exhibit more communal solidarity and intra-Armenian violence
has since been relatively rare.
Under Lebanon's communitarian democratic system, ethnic Armenians
receive a fixed number of parliamentary seats, presently six out of
128. There is a widespread consensus that Armenians should vote as
a bloc, and more often than not the three main political parties
have agreed upon a common slate of candidates. They have tended
to give electoral support to governing elites, particularly the
president, in exchange for policies that advance Armenian communal
interests. Prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the Tashnag-led
Armenian bloc aligned with Pierre Gemayel's predominantly Maronite
Christian Phalange party.
Armenian groups did not play an active role in the 1975-1990 Lebanon
war, despite efforts by the Phalangists and later the predominantly
Christian Lebanese Forces (LF) militia to pressure them into taking
sides. Unfortunately, this lack of protection contributed to a flood
of Armenian emigration that continued after the Syrians completed
their occupation of Lebanon in 1990. By some estimates, more than
half of the 250,000-strong Armenian community left and never returned.
During the 1990s, the three Armenian parties adopted much the same
political strategy as they did before the war. In the 1992 and 1996
elections, they reached agreement on a politically mixed, though
Tashnag-dominated, slate of candidates and forged coalitions with the
most powerful political barons in their respective districts. In Metn,
they joined forces with Greek Orthodox Christian leader Michel Murr,
an alliance that dates back half a century. They sided with late Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri in his electoral stronghold of Beirut. These
alliances caused resentment among Christian opposition candidates
who ran against the electoral coalitions of Hariri and Murr.
Hariri had a falling out with Tashnag in 1998, when pro-Tashnag members
of parliament gave their vote of confidence to a new prime minister
favored by Hariri's archrival, newly elected President Emile Lahoud.[2]
Consequently, prior to the 2000 elections Hariri demanded that Tashnag
commit its candidates to vote in line with his parliamentary bloc
(not the standard practice in Lebanon, where electoral coalitions are
usually fleeting). When Tashnag rejected these terms, Hariri picked
lesser-known Armenian candidates affiliated with Ramgavar and Hunshak,
who pledged and subsequently practiced unswerving loyalty.
In an effort to woo Armenian voters away from Tashnag, Hariri showered
charitable contributions on the Armenian community, while his Future
TV station began broadcasting a 15-minute Armenian language nightly
newscast. Because Armenian neighborhoods in Beirut were split into
different districts under the 2000 electoral law, Hariri was able
to ensure the election of four Armenian members of parliament who
the large majority of Armenians had voted against. Tashnag, which
forged ineffective alliances with Hariri's enemies, captured only
the Armenian seats in Metn and Zahleh.
After the Syrian Withdrawal
Tashnag faced a difficult situation after the withdrawal of Syrian
forces from Lebanon in the spring of 2005, weeks ahead of parliamentary
elections. Once again, the late Hariri's Future Movement swept the
elections in Beirut, though Tashnag retained control of Armenian seats
in Metn and Zahleh, held by Hagop Pakradounian and George Kasarji,
by aligning with Murr and Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM).
In August 2007, Tashnag again sided with Aoun and Murr in a
parliamentary by-election in Metn, which pitted former President
Amine Gemayel against Camille Khoury, a virtually unknown member of
the FPM. Although the Ramgavar and Hunshak parties supported Gemayel,
the roughly 10,000 Armenian voters in the district cast their ballots
for Khoury by a margin of more than five to one, enabling the FPM to
narrowly win the majority Maronite district by 418 votes.[3]
The FPM victory led to an eruption of anti-Armenian sentiment among
March 14 politicians and press outlets. Minutes after the results were
released, Gemayel declared that he, not Khoury, was "the true Christian
representative," implying that Armenians were not true Christians.[4]
"Armenians are outside the Lebanese will" and "are here to create
a civil war," said Gabriel Murr on a popular Lebanese talk show
program.[5] The pro-March 14 daily L'Orient Le Jour proclaimed the
election result "a fake victory" in its headline the following day,[6]
while Hariri's Al-Mustaqbal newspaper ran the headline "Two-thirds of
Maronites vote for Gemayel, their seat goes to Aoun by 418 votes."[7]
The Armenian community was deeply shaken by these slurs, which brought
back memories of Phalangist intimidation during the civil war. "No one
should allow himself to attack the honor of the Armenian community,"
said Bishop Aram I Keshishian, head of the Cilicia Catholicosate. "We
understand that some tense and sometimes harmful statements are
delivered during and after electoral battles, [but] we do not accept
unfounded accusations and offensive comments."[8] Tashnag leaders
were less understanding, accusing Gemayel of bigotry and racism.[9]
Although Gemayel was quick to proclaim his affection and respect for
the Armenian community, his refusal to apologize for his election
night rhetoric continues to irk many Armenians.
The 2009 Elections
In the aftermath of the Metn by-election, March 14 leaders made
concerted attempts to woo the Armenian community away from Aoun, an
effort that would have been futile had it not been for the defection of
Michel Murr from the opposition in 2008. Last February, Murr formally
announced that he and Gemayel were forming a joint ticket in Metn
and hinted that he could persuade Tashnag to switch sides as well.
Over the next two months, Tashnag conducted negotiations with both
March 14 and the opposition. While there were rumors of disagreement
between Tashnag Secretary-General Hovig Mekhitarian and Pakradounian
over which side to choose, it appears unlikely that a full-fledged
defection by Tashnag was ever in the offing. Tashnag's goal is to build
a unified Armenian parliamentary bloc on par with what existed before
2000. Keen on preserving his ties with Hunshak and Ramgavar, Saad
Hariri insisted on being able to name most of the Armenian candidates
in Beirut.[10] Aoun, on the other hand, was willing to give Tashnag
the final say over the selection of Armenian candidates. In fact,
during the March 14-opposition talks that led to the May 2008 Doha
Accord, he won enormous acclaim from Tashnag by pressing for the
establishment of an all-Armenian electoral district in Beirut.[11]
Tashnag urged Hunshak and Ramgavar to join it in a united Armenian
front, but its rivals were squarely in the Hariri camp.[12] MP
Serge Torsarkissian of the Ramgavar party warned that an Armenian
parliamentary bloc dominated by Tashnag "would pose a danger to
Lebanon."[13] In addition to patronizing Ramgavar and Hunshak,
Hariri is widely believed to have financed the establishment of the
Free Lebanese Armenian Movement (FLAM), led by Nareg Aprahamian,
a retired army general.
In late March, Tashnag officially announced that it would remain
with the opposition, albeit with two minor caveats. In the 8-seat
Metn district, Tashnag instructed its constituents to vote for Murr
alone, but not for the other candidates on his list. In exchange,
March 14 did not field a candidate for the district's Armenian seat,
allowing an uncontested victory for Pakradounian. In addition, by
prior arrangement, pro-Tashnag candidate Arthur Nazarian and Hunshak
candidate Sebouh Kalbakian were elected uncontested in Beirut's second
district, in conformity with the Doha Accord.
It is not entirely clear what reasoning lay behind Tashnag's
choice. It is difficult to justify the decision purely in terms of
narrow electoral self-interest. Although two of its candidates won
uncontested victories, the other three - Freij Saboungian and Krikor
Calouste in Beirut's first district, and Kasarji in Zahleh - faced
difficult electoral battles (and ultimately lost).[14] Had Tashnag
aligned with March 14, it would have had a strong chance of winning
four seats.
Pakradounian called the decision to stick with Aoun "a response to the
[March 14] policy of marginalizing Armenians,"[15] and it is probably
true that Armenian resentment tipped the scales. Gemayel did not help
matters by publicly warning the party that he would run a "closed list"
in Metn (i.e. including an Armenian candidate) if an agreement could
not be reached with Tashnag. Aoun smartly avoided so much as a hint
of intimidation, and it paid off.
The election was fiercely contested, with both coalitions
spending a considerable amount of money on Armenian language media
advertising. Due to the opposition's unexpected loss in Zahleh
(alongside its expected loss in Beirut I), Tashnag ended up with just
two seats, in Metn and Beirut II. Its support for Aoun was critical
to the opposition's capture of six out of eight seats in Metn (Murr
and Gemayel were the only March 14 candidates elected), though its
formidable confessional mobilization may have backfired in Zahleh
by provoking Sunnis in the district to close ranks, resulting in an
opposition loss there. Nevertheless, as a test of Tashnag's leverage
over the Armenian community and ability to mobilize its supporters
to adhere to delicate alliances, the election can be regarded as a
success for the party.
Not surprisingly, there was much grumbling about Tashnag among March 14
Christian leaders after the vote. Murr lashed out at his former ally,
accusing it of threatening his Armenian "friends" to prevent them from
casting their votes in his favor and suggested that the "massive"
Armenian turnout in Bourj Hammoud was the result of fraud.[16]
Lebanese Forces MP Antoine Zahra denounced Tashnag and accused it
of behaving as a "colony" in Lebanon, lacking "pure origin."[17]
Such comments sparked rebukes within the March 14 coalition from
Prime Minister Fouad Siniora[18] and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.[19]
Although formally part of Aoun's Change and Reform bloc, Tashnag's
pre-election flirtations with Hariri and Gemayel suggest that it will
keep its options open for a possible political repositioning. The
party has always been open to alliances with different Lebanese
parties on the condition that they acknowledge it as the major
political representative of the Armenian community. With the rest of
the Christian community more or less evenly divided, it will continue
to play a critical swing role and competition for its allegiance is
likely to be heated.
Postscript: Every now and then one writes an article only to discover
afterwards that someone else has already done an immeasurably more
thorough analysis. This is one of those times. For further reading,
see Ara Sanjian, Deja Vu: Armenians and the 2009 Parliamentary
Elections in Lebanon, Armenian News Network, 29 June 2009.
Notes
[1] The most notable exception is their nearly universal insistence
that Lebanese government institutions officially condemn as genocide
the Ottoman Empire's mass murder of Armenians nearly a century
ago. For a good overview of Armenian politics in Lebanon, see Ara
Sanjian, Armenians and the 2000 Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon,
Armenian News Network, 2000.
[2] Pro-Hunshak MP Yeghig Jerejian and Ramgavar-backed MP Hagop
Demirjian remained loyal.
[3] Khoury won roughly 8,400 Armenian votes, while Gemayel received
1,600. Al-Nahar (Beirut), 6 August 2007.
[4] "Rival Lebanese leaders claim by-elections as 'victory'," The
Daily Star (Beirut), 7 August 2007.
[5] Quoted in The Metn Fallout, Nowlebanon.com, 14 August 2007.
[6] L'Orient Le Jour (Beirut), 6 August 2007.
[7] Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 6 August 2007. Italics added for emphasis.
[8] National News Agency (Beirut), 6 August 2007. Translation by
BBC Monitoring.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Tashnaq rejects Hariri's proposal, confirms alliance with FPM
and Skaff," Nowlebanon.com, 1 April 2009. In exchange, Hariri was
reportedly willing to let Tashnag choose the Armenian representative(s)
in the cabinet. See "Outcome of Metn polls may hinge on Armenians,"
The Daily Star (Beirut), 7 March 2009.
[11] "Analysts say Tueni will beat Aoun's candidate in Beirut race,"
The Daily Star (Beirut), 19 March 2009. Aoun eventually managed
to press for an all-Christian district in Achrafieh featuring two
Armenian seats and bargain for an uncontested distribution of two
other Armenian seats in another district.
[12] Tashnag called for "the reactivation of the Armenian bloc, which
would include six deputies, one for each party, and the remaining three
will be assigned after consensus." "Tashnaq rejects Hariri's proposal,
confirms alliance with FPM and Skaff," Nowlebanon.com, 1 April 2009.
[13] "Suleiman describes ties with Syria as 'excellent'," The Daily
Star, 30 March 2009.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Lebanese Armenians and the 'Madness' of Political Alignment,
Al-Sharq al-Awsat English, 18 April 2009.
[16] Michel al-Murr, Nowlebanon.com, 17 July 2009.
[17] Zahra: Tashnag Armenian Party Behaves as Colony in Lebanon,
almanar.com.lb, 10 June 2009.
[18] "We are hearing increasingly that so-and-so made it parliament
because of the Sunni vote, or the Shia vote or the Armenian vote. What
is this language we are using? Are the Sunnis, Shia and Armenians not
Lebanese?" said Siniora on June 19. Nicholas Lowry, Armenians after
the vote, Nowlebanon.com, 19 June 2009.
[19] Jumblatt condemned those "who are describing the Armenians and
the Tashnag party as outsiders." Quoted in "Sfeir: Poll result averted
takeover by Iran, Syria," The Daily Star (Beirut), 12 June 2009.