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ARMENIA AND TURKEY: CREATING THEIR OWN GLOBAL WARMING?
by Sergey Markedonov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
September 21, 2009 Monday
Normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey could be more
important than it seems
Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, without any exaggeration,
may be one of the most important events of the year. For the first
time, during a series of "behind closed doors" negotiations, instead
of being politically correct, courteous, and engaging in "football
diplomacy", Yerevan and Ankara began making concrete commitments in
order to establish diplomatic relations.
If successful, the reconciliation process of the two neighboring
countries could significantly alter the status quo in the Greater
Caucasus, which was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
on a scale comparable to the results of the Five Day War. The opening
of the Armenian-Turkish land border (which has remained closed,
even during the 1993 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) will fundamentally
change Armenia's geopolitical situation. If this decision is adopted,
Yerevan will no longer be as dependent upon the outcome of the two
regional conflicts, as it is today.
First - is the Russo-Georgian conflict (Armenia does not share a
land border with Russia; Russia is a strategic partner of Yerevan;
and Georgia became a strategic adversary of Moscow). Another is the
US-Iranian confrontation. For Armenia, Iran is the second "window"
to the world. The risk of Tehran's entanglement in a serious
confrontation with Washington has also significantly aggravated
the already-difficult situation in Armenia. A new open border will
diversify Armenian policies even more than they are today. With the
appearance of Turkish business (which will inevitably happen with
the opening of the borders), Russia's economic presence (according
to 2008 end-of-year data, Russia is Armenia's largest investor)
will no longer be dominant. Moreover, with such a development, the
advisability of the presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri and
Russian border guards in Armenia will sooner or later be questioned.
In this case, Ankara's appearance in the Caucasus will not simply
be a declaration of intent. Today, Turkey is demonstrating that
it has outgrown the level of an "elder brother" and protector of
Azerbaijan. Ankara is actively cooperating with Georgia and - unlike
all NATO members - conducting its policies in Abkhazia and trying
to play the role of an "honest broker" between the U.S., EU and the
Middle East.
The warming of relations with Turkey will theoretically enable Yerevan
to separate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the general spectrum of
Armenian-Turkish relations. The two recently signed bilateral protocols
do not so much as contain a hint of "parallelism" between the solution
to the Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. In this
case, Azerbaijan's position will be weakened; it will basically be
deprived of even the theoretical prospect of military revenge. However,
some nuances exist here as well. If, today, Ankara is refraining
from discussing the problem, it does not mean that it has been
"buried". During the six-week national consultations, this question
can be raised by parliamentarians as well as community activists.
In considering the prospects for defusing tensions between Yerevan
and Ankara, the emphasis is still being placed on geopolitical
aspects. Will Russia's position in the region be compromised with the
opening of the land border? How distant will Baku and Ankara become as
a result of successful negotiations between Armenia and Turkey? What
are the interests of the US administration? Meanwhile, the progress in
Turkish-Armenian relations does not solely rest upon the leaders of
the two countries and the position of the great powers. An important
element in this progress is the domestic political support of the
normalization process.
Clearly, in Armenia and Turkey, the rational arguments of the
supporters of reconciliation will not be well-received by many,
including politicians, experts and ordinary citizens. In both
societies, the level of mutual enmity has, over the years,
been at a "steadily high level". As a matter of fact, the current
Armenian-Turkish negotiation process is not unique. One should recall
how the Nobel Peace Prize award to the signatories of the Middle East
peace agreement was followed by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin
(not by an Arab, but one of "their own", a Jewish terrorist) and a
surge of Islamist extremism in Palestine.
All of this could deter the necessary, yet complex, rapprochement
between the two countries. Thus, it is too early to celebrate. The
path toward peace is not a set of stairs but a winding road, full of
surprises and bumps, for which people must prepare in advance so as
to avoid high expectations and disappointments.
by Sergey Markedonov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
September 21, 2009 Monday
Normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey could be more
important than it seems
Normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, without any exaggeration,
may be one of the most important events of the year. For the first
time, during a series of "behind closed doors" negotiations, instead
of being politically correct, courteous, and engaging in "football
diplomacy", Yerevan and Ankara began making concrete commitments in
order to establish diplomatic relations.
If successful, the reconciliation process of the two neighboring
countries could significantly alter the status quo in the Greater
Caucasus, which was established after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
on a scale comparable to the results of the Five Day War. The opening
of the Armenian-Turkish land border (which has remained closed,
even during the 1993 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) will fundamentally
change Armenia's geopolitical situation. If this decision is adopted,
Yerevan will no longer be as dependent upon the outcome of the two
regional conflicts, as it is today.
First - is the Russo-Georgian conflict (Armenia does not share a
land border with Russia; Russia is a strategic partner of Yerevan;
and Georgia became a strategic adversary of Moscow). Another is the
US-Iranian confrontation. For Armenia, Iran is the second "window"
to the world. The risk of Tehran's entanglement in a serious
confrontation with Washington has also significantly aggravated
the already-difficult situation in Armenia. A new open border will
diversify Armenian policies even more than they are today. With the
appearance of Turkish business (which will inevitably happen with
the opening of the borders), Russia's economic presence (according
to 2008 end-of-year data, Russia is Armenia's largest investor)
will no longer be dominant. Moreover, with such a development, the
advisability of the presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri and
Russian border guards in Armenia will sooner or later be questioned.
In this case, Ankara's appearance in the Caucasus will not simply
be a declaration of intent. Today, Turkey is demonstrating that
it has outgrown the level of an "elder brother" and protector of
Azerbaijan. Ankara is actively cooperating with Georgia and - unlike
all NATO members - conducting its policies in Abkhazia and trying
to play the role of an "honest broker" between the U.S., EU and the
Middle East.
The warming of relations with Turkey will theoretically enable Yerevan
to separate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the general spectrum of
Armenian-Turkish relations. The two recently signed bilateral protocols
do not so much as contain a hint of "parallelism" between the solution
to the Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. In this
case, Azerbaijan's position will be weakened; it will basically be
deprived of even the theoretical prospect of military revenge. However,
some nuances exist here as well. If, today, Ankara is refraining
from discussing the problem, it does not mean that it has been
"buried". During the six-week national consultations, this question
can be raised by parliamentarians as well as community activists.
In considering the prospects for defusing tensions between Yerevan
and Ankara, the emphasis is still being placed on geopolitical
aspects. Will Russia's position in the region be compromised with the
opening of the land border? How distant will Baku and Ankara become as
a result of successful negotiations between Armenia and Turkey? What
are the interests of the US administration? Meanwhile, the progress in
Turkish-Armenian relations does not solely rest upon the leaders of
the two countries and the position of the great powers. An important
element in this progress is the domestic political support of the
normalization process.
Clearly, in Armenia and Turkey, the rational arguments of the
supporters of reconciliation will not be well-received by many,
including politicians, experts and ordinary citizens. In both
societies, the level of mutual enmity has, over the years,
been at a "steadily high level". As a matter of fact, the current
Armenian-Turkish negotiation process is not unique. One should recall
how the Nobel Peace Prize award to the signatories of the Middle East
peace agreement was followed by the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin
(not by an Arab, but one of "their own", a Jewish terrorist) and a
surge of Islamist extremism in Palestine.
All of this could deter the necessary, yet complex, rapprochement
between the two countries. Thus, it is too early to celebrate. The
path toward peace is not a set of stairs but a winding road, full of
surprises and bumps, for which people must prepare in advance so as
to avoid high expectations and disappointments.