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[BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE]: TIME TO CHANGE THE COURSE ON CYPRUS
MEHMET KALYONCU
Today's Zaman
Sept 23 2009
Turkey
The second round of negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cyprus,
headed by Dimitris Christofias (R) and Mehmet Ali Talat, began on
Sept. 10 under the shadow of accusatory remarks.
The second-round talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the
unification of the two sides of the island were supposed to start
on Sept. 3. However, what was hoped to be a final step toward the
resolution of one of the most troublesome conflicts of the last
century has stalled yet again.
According to news reports, the Greek Cypriot leadership "postponed" the
second-round negotiations on the pretext that some dozen Greek-Cypriots
were denied entry into the north, and that, according to Greek Cypriot
leader Dimitris Christofias, it apparently demonstrated the Turkish
Cypriot's ill will to block the progress of the negotiations.
On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister DerviÅ~_
Eroglu remarked that the Greek-Cypriots had deliberately set up
the row over the entry by sending individuals without the proper
documentation, so that they could withdraw from, or at least stall, the
negotiations. Similarly, frustrated by his Greek Cypriot counterpart's
last-minute step back, the Turkish Cypriot president, Mehmet Ali Talat,
stated that the negotiations would not last forever and that the
Turkish Cypriots would resort to alternative solutions if the Greek
Cypriots rejected the solution to be proposed in the second-round
negotiations. Talat implied that these alternative solutions might
lead to a permanent partition of the island.
Under the shadow of such tense remarks, the second-round negotiations
began on Sept. 10. Given the historical characteristics of the
relationship between the two communities, and more so the leaderships,
the negotiations are not likely to yield any substantial solutions,
or if any, one that will soon be shattered by yet another row between
the two sides of the island on a trivial issue.
The recent disruption in the negotiations is just more of the same in
the general course of the Turkish-Greek Cypriot relationship. However,
it raises a question critical to the possibility of achieving
a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem: Under the current
circumstance of disparity in political power between the two sides
of the island, is a long-term solution even possible? If not, what
is the step to take to break the vicious cycle of endless negotiations?
Is a long-term solution even possible on the island?
During a seminar on peacemaking and preventive diplomacy in Oslo, I
was asked by a prominent Greek-American expert/professor of diplomatic
negotiations whether a long-term solution in Cyprus is possible now,
given that the political leaderships on both sides of the island and
in the guarantor states (Greece and Turkey) have changed and that they
all seem resolved to move on. My answer was "no, it's not possible"
under the current circumstances, because the partition of the island
itself was illegitimate and unjustified in the first place, the Turkish
Cypriots had had legitimate territorial claims over the south, from
where they had been ethnically cleansed and forcefully evicted to the
north and because neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots seem to
be interested in a conclusive solution to the Cyprus problem.
The professor's explanation of why the Greek Cypriot leadership had
rejected the Annan plan in 2004 has only reinforced that under the
current circumstances of the unjustified partition of the island,
the prospect for a sustainable solution is quite low. She argued that
the Greek Cypriots were economically much better off compared to the
Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot government was internationally
recognized as the sole representative of the whole of Cyprus and the
Greek Cypriot side would have been accepted into the European Union
anyway, with or without their acceptance of the Annan plan. So, she
contended, there was no incentive for the Greek Cypriot leadership
to accept a plan that would substantially transform the political
structure and the balance of power on the island.
Moreover, the current position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership
suggests that there is no sustainable solution to the problem in sight
in the foreseeable future, at least with the current leaders. During
his interview with the Turkish daily Milliyet, Turkish-Cypriot leader
Talat noted that the prospects of a permanent partition of the island
were becoming ever greater, the discussions with the Greek Cypriots
would not last forever and the international recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was just a pipedream. With his
apparently diminishing faith in the possibility of international
recognition of the nation he presides, Talat is increasingly
reminiscent of his predecessor, Rauf DenktaÅ~_, who infamously
commented that "the non-solution is the solution on the island,"
and as such raises questions, once again, about the Turkish Cypriot
leadership's resolve and ability to achieve an amenable long-term
solution to the Cyprus problem.
The futility of the mere talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot
leaderships is nothing new. In his "The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish
Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus," Pierre Oberling reminds us that
starting in 1968 at the initiative of then-President Archbishop
Makarios, and representing, respectively, the Greek Cypriot and
the Turkish Cypriot communities, Glafkos Klerides and DenktaÅ~_ met
on a weekly basis for six years to discuss a settlement. However,
argues Oberling, there were many on both sides who wanted the
talks to fail. For the Greek Cypriots, the establishment of a
bi-communal government for the entire island would lead to the
dismissal of hundreds of Greek Cypriots from the government and
bureaucratic posts and would bring back what they called Turkish
Cypriot "obstructionism." It was a kind of obstructionism which they
accused the Turkish Cypriots of for using their veto power within
the framework of the 1960 Constitution to prevent legislation that
would marginalize the Turkish Cypriot presence in the national and
local governments. Similarly, argues Oberling, the Turkish Cypriots
were content to have achieved a de-facto separation, thanks to Turkey,
which spared their lives from the ensuing Greek Cypriot terrorism. In
addition, Ankara's aid for food and protection against a would-be
aggressor was sufficient for the Turkish Cypriots not venture into
another round of duels with the Greek Cypriots.
So, after some 40 years, there is not much change in the dynamics
of the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots of the
island. According to the apparent mindset of the Greek Cypriots, now
as a member of the European Union, they have much more to lose with a
solution that requires them to share the government with the Turkish
Cypriots. However, the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot leadership and
the inability of its Turkish Cypriot counterpart to solve the problem
once and for all are only one part of the reason for the absence of
a solution on the island. It appears that the bitter memories of the
1960s and 1970s entrenched in the psyche of the Turkish Cypriots may
well engender a major impediment to a solution that does not address
the issue of reparation for their losses.
The necessity of addressing the losses of the past has recently
become clear once again as the Turks and Armenians have sought ways
to settle their relations. It would probably take some time for both
sides to figure out the extent of the tragedies they inflicted on each
other. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement is a first and crucial step
to take for a long-term solution. Similarly, any long-term solution
on the island requires both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to acknowledge
what they have inflicted on the other side.
The historians on both sides should shed light on their pasts no
matter how bitter the realities it may reveal. Oberling contends
that the Turkish Cypriots' exodus to the north had intensified
by the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. He writes: "Giorgio
Bocca, the correspondent of Il Giorno, an Italian daily of the time,
reported: 'Right now we are witnessing the exodus of the Turks from
their villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds;
Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of Hellenes and
the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious
behavior... Threats, shootings and attempts at arson start as soon as
it becomes dark. After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither
women nor children, it is difficult to put up any resistance'."
Moreover, the UN News Bulletin in May 1964 describes the situation
as follows: "The Greek Cypriots continued to build up their arms and
war equipment by purchasing heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and
vehicles from abroad... The Turkish communities remained surrounded
by the overwhelming Greek forces and were constantly subjected to
all kinds of abuse, vexations and pressure. Freedom of movement on
the island was totally denied to the Turks; their economic situation
continued to deteriorate rapidly, as they were not allowed to sell
their produce in the markets, to cultivate their fields, to graze
their flocks and to go to their jobs in areas dominated by Greeks.
In the villages which the Turks had abandoned in the face of Greek
attacks, the houses were put on fire, the properties looted and the
harvest confiscated. From March to June the Turkish Cypriots continued
to be murdered and the Greeks did not give up their abhorrent method
of taking hostage among the innocent people." (Oberling, 1982)
The grim reality of the island's past is probably caught best
by Archbishop Makarios' confession of his genocidal intentions
toward the Turks of the island in 1974. Oberling notes, "While the
[Turkish] air raid was in progress, Makarios, in a paroxysm of grief
and frustration, threatened that unless the Turkish Air Force left
the scene within half an hour he would order the massacre of the
entire Turkish Cypriot population."
The Turkish Cypriots have long been terrorized by such organizations
as the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriakon Agoniston -- National
Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and other smaller paramilitary
groups and victimized by such ideologies as Hellenizing the entire
island and uniting with Greece. Interestingly, however, the hitherto
Turkish Cypriot leaderships and Ankara in part have continued to
stand pathetically apologetic. What is even more problematic is that
none of the Turkish Cypriot leaders has ever voiced the Turkish
Cypriots' rightful claims over the territories in the south, from
where their forefathers were forced out. It is difficult, or maybe
not, to understand why former Turkish Cypriot leader DenktaÅ~_ had
never made the demand for reparations by the Greek Cypriots a part
of his political discourse; his very hometown was Paphos, a small
town on the western coast of southern Cyprus, where his forefathers
had been persecuted.
In the end, it is more obvious today than ever that in a conflict
involving different ethno-religious groups no long-term solution is
even possible without mutual acknowledgement of the tragedies the
parties inflicted on one another. In this regard, both Greek and
Turkish Cypriots should be bold enough to investigate their common
past and be ready to accommodate the demands of the other side for
their losses. After all, what do they have to fear if they have not
done anything wrong?
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author of
the book "A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gulen
Movement in Southeast Turkey."
MEHMET KALYONCU
Today's Zaman
Sept 23 2009
Turkey
The second round of negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cyprus,
headed by Dimitris Christofias (R) and Mehmet Ali Talat, began on
Sept. 10 under the shadow of accusatory remarks.
The second-round talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the
unification of the two sides of the island were supposed to start
on Sept. 3. However, what was hoped to be a final step toward the
resolution of one of the most troublesome conflicts of the last
century has stalled yet again.
According to news reports, the Greek Cypriot leadership "postponed" the
second-round negotiations on the pretext that some dozen Greek-Cypriots
were denied entry into the north, and that, according to Greek Cypriot
leader Dimitris Christofias, it apparently demonstrated the Turkish
Cypriot's ill will to block the progress of the negotiations.
On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister DerviÅ~_
Eroglu remarked that the Greek-Cypriots had deliberately set up
the row over the entry by sending individuals without the proper
documentation, so that they could withdraw from, or at least stall, the
negotiations. Similarly, frustrated by his Greek Cypriot counterpart's
last-minute step back, the Turkish Cypriot president, Mehmet Ali Talat,
stated that the negotiations would not last forever and that the
Turkish Cypriots would resort to alternative solutions if the Greek
Cypriots rejected the solution to be proposed in the second-round
negotiations. Talat implied that these alternative solutions might
lead to a permanent partition of the island.
Under the shadow of such tense remarks, the second-round negotiations
began on Sept. 10. Given the historical characteristics of the
relationship between the two communities, and more so the leaderships,
the negotiations are not likely to yield any substantial solutions,
or if any, one that will soon be shattered by yet another row between
the two sides of the island on a trivial issue.
The recent disruption in the negotiations is just more of the same in
the general course of the Turkish-Greek Cypriot relationship. However,
it raises a question critical to the possibility of achieving
a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem: Under the current
circumstance of disparity in political power between the two sides
of the island, is a long-term solution even possible? If not, what
is the step to take to break the vicious cycle of endless negotiations?
Is a long-term solution even possible on the island?
During a seminar on peacemaking and preventive diplomacy in Oslo, I
was asked by a prominent Greek-American expert/professor of diplomatic
negotiations whether a long-term solution in Cyprus is possible now,
given that the political leaderships on both sides of the island and
in the guarantor states (Greece and Turkey) have changed and that they
all seem resolved to move on. My answer was "no, it's not possible"
under the current circumstances, because the partition of the island
itself was illegitimate and unjustified in the first place, the Turkish
Cypriots had had legitimate territorial claims over the south, from
where they had been ethnically cleansed and forcefully evicted to the
north and because neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots seem to
be interested in a conclusive solution to the Cyprus problem.
The professor's explanation of why the Greek Cypriot leadership had
rejected the Annan plan in 2004 has only reinforced that under the
current circumstances of the unjustified partition of the island,
the prospect for a sustainable solution is quite low. She argued that
the Greek Cypriots were economically much better off compared to the
Turkish Cypriots, the Greek Cypriot government was internationally
recognized as the sole representative of the whole of Cyprus and the
Greek Cypriot side would have been accepted into the European Union
anyway, with or without their acceptance of the Annan plan. So, she
contended, there was no incentive for the Greek Cypriot leadership
to accept a plan that would substantially transform the political
structure and the balance of power on the island.
Moreover, the current position of the Turkish Cypriot leadership
suggests that there is no sustainable solution to the problem in sight
in the foreseeable future, at least with the current leaders. During
his interview with the Turkish daily Milliyet, Turkish-Cypriot leader
Talat noted that the prospects of a permanent partition of the island
were becoming ever greater, the discussions with the Greek Cypriots
would not last forever and the international recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was just a pipedream. With his
apparently diminishing faith in the possibility of international
recognition of the nation he presides, Talat is increasingly
reminiscent of his predecessor, Rauf DenktaÅ~_, who infamously
commented that "the non-solution is the solution on the island,"
and as such raises questions, once again, about the Turkish Cypriot
leadership's resolve and ability to achieve an amenable long-term
solution to the Cyprus problem.
The futility of the mere talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot
leaderships is nothing new. In his "The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish
Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus," Pierre Oberling reminds us that
starting in 1968 at the initiative of then-President Archbishop
Makarios, and representing, respectively, the Greek Cypriot and
the Turkish Cypriot communities, Glafkos Klerides and DenktaÅ~_ met
on a weekly basis for six years to discuss a settlement. However,
argues Oberling, there were many on both sides who wanted the
talks to fail. For the Greek Cypriots, the establishment of a
bi-communal government for the entire island would lead to the
dismissal of hundreds of Greek Cypriots from the government and
bureaucratic posts and would bring back what they called Turkish
Cypriot "obstructionism." It was a kind of obstructionism which they
accused the Turkish Cypriots of for using their veto power within
the framework of the 1960 Constitution to prevent legislation that
would marginalize the Turkish Cypriot presence in the national and
local governments. Similarly, argues Oberling, the Turkish Cypriots
were content to have achieved a de-facto separation, thanks to Turkey,
which spared their lives from the ensuing Greek Cypriot terrorism. In
addition, Ankara's aid for food and protection against a would-be
aggressor was sufficient for the Turkish Cypriots not venture into
another round of duels with the Greek Cypriots.
So, after some 40 years, there is not much change in the dynamics
of the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots of the
island. According to the apparent mindset of the Greek Cypriots, now
as a member of the European Union, they have much more to lose with a
solution that requires them to share the government with the Turkish
Cypriots. However, the reluctance of the Greek Cypriot leadership and
the inability of its Turkish Cypriot counterpart to solve the problem
once and for all are only one part of the reason for the absence of
a solution on the island. It appears that the bitter memories of the
1960s and 1970s entrenched in the psyche of the Turkish Cypriots may
well engender a major impediment to a solution that does not address
the issue of reparation for their losses.
The necessity of addressing the losses of the past has recently
become clear once again as the Turks and Armenians have sought ways
to settle their relations. It would probably take some time for both
sides to figure out the extent of the tragedies they inflicted on each
other. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement is a first and crucial step
to take for a long-term solution. Similarly, any long-term solution
on the island requires both Greek and Turkish Cypriots to acknowledge
what they have inflicted on the other side.
The historians on both sides should shed light on their pasts no
matter how bitter the realities it may reveal. Oberling contends
that the Turkish Cypriots' exodus to the north had intensified
by the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. He writes: "Giorgio
Bocca, the correspondent of Il Giorno, an Italian daily of the time,
reported: 'Right now we are witnessing the exodus of the Turks from
their villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds;
Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of Hellenes and
the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious
behavior... Threats, shootings and attempts at arson start as soon as
it becomes dark. After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither
women nor children, it is difficult to put up any resistance'."
Moreover, the UN News Bulletin in May 1964 describes the situation
as follows: "The Greek Cypriots continued to build up their arms and
war equipment by purchasing heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and
vehicles from abroad... The Turkish communities remained surrounded
by the overwhelming Greek forces and were constantly subjected to
all kinds of abuse, vexations and pressure. Freedom of movement on
the island was totally denied to the Turks; their economic situation
continued to deteriorate rapidly, as they were not allowed to sell
their produce in the markets, to cultivate their fields, to graze
their flocks and to go to their jobs in areas dominated by Greeks.
In the villages which the Turks had abandoned in the face of Greek
attacks, the houses were put on fire, the properties looted and the
harvest confiscated. From March to June the Turkish Cypriots continued
to be murdered and the Greeks did not give up their abhorrent method
of taking hostage among the innocent people." (Oberling, 1982)
The grim reality of the island's past is probably caught best
by Archbishop Makarios' confession of his genocidal intentions
toward the Turks of the island in 1974. Oberling notes, "While the
[Turkish] air raid was in progress, Makarios, in a paroxysm of grief
and frustration, threatened that unless the Turkish Air Force left
the scene within half an hour he would order the massacre of the
entire Turkish Cypriot population."
The Turkish Cypriots have long been terrorized by such organizations
as the EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kypriakon Agoniston -- National
Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and other smaller paramilitary
groups and victimized by such ideologies as Hellenizing the entire
island and uniting with Greece. Interestingly, however, the hitherto
Turkish Cypriot leaderships and Ankara in part have continued to
stand pathetically apologetic. What is even more problematic is that
none of the Turkish Cypriot leaders has ever voiced the Turkish
Cypriots' rightful claims over the territories in the south, from
where their forefathers were forced out. It is difficult, or maybe
not, to understand why former Turkish Cypriot leader DenktaÅ~_ had
never made the demand for reparations by the Greek Cypriots a part
of his political discourse; his very hometown was Paphos, a small
town on the western coast of southern Cyprus, where his forefathers
had been persecuted.
In the end, it is more obvious today than ever that in a conflict
involving different ethno-religious groups no long-term solution is
even possible without mutual acknowledgement of the tragedies the
parties inflicted on one another. In this regard, both Greek and
Turkish Cypriots should be bold enough to investigate their common
past and be ready to accommodate the demands of the other side for
their losses. After all, what do they have to fear if they have not
done anything wrong?
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an international relations analyst and author of
the book "A Civilian Response to Ethno-Religious Conflict: The Gulen
Movement in Southeast Turkey."