Tweet
ETHNIC AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments-lr ahos15285.html
14:02:50 - 23/09/2009
Regional Imbroglio
Cultural, historical, political, territorial and economic claims and
counter-claims led to ethnic tensions and conflicts in the Southern
Caucasus even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They
exploded afterwards.
Georgia witnessed periods of internal political instability,
including violent regime changes, was engulfed into civil wars with
its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in August
2008, in a short war confrontation with Russia. These conflicts have
been frozen, but the situation remains volatile. The government of
Mikheil Saakashvili is actually internally challenged by a broad
internal opposition movement.
Periods of political instability, revolts and regime change also
in Azerbaijan, where the regime of Ilham Aliev has muzzled the
opposition, and seems in control. The Azeri-Armenian conflict over
Nagorno Karabakh is also frozen, but the no-war no-peace situation
blocks the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan, and Armenia
and Turkey. The legitimacy of the regime of Serzh Sargsyan in Yerevan
is also contested internally. The three countries experienced a
decline in their democratic development in 2008, according to the
US-based Freedom House. The worst situation is in Azerbaijan, while
the actual government systems in Georgia and Armenia are described
as "consolidated authoritarian regimes" (Freedom House, Nations
in Transit, 2009). A more adequate label in my view would be -
"authoritarian ethnocracies."
The Caucasus, both its southern part, with Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus, with its tiny autonomous republics
that are part of the Russian Federation, is a patchwork of various
ethnicities. Moscow has problems in controlling Muslim opposition
groups in the north. Although Chechnya has been mostly pacified,
political violence has recently spilled into Ingushetia and Daghestan
(BBC News, July 13, 2009). The position of ethnic minorities living in
Georgia and Azerbaijan remains extremely precarious. Living conditions
of refugees and internally displaced persons (ethnically cleansed
from conflict zones) in the three Southern Caucasus states are even
worse. These problems are contributing to internal instability.
Competing interests of external powers are complicating further the
already complicated regional imbroglio.
First, is Russia that resents the penetration of outside players
into the former Soviet space. NATO and the EU are already at its
western borders, and the three Baltic republics - Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia - have been co-opted into their structures. Moscow tries
to prevent further encroachments into what it considers of being its
"strategic depth" on its southern flanks. From Kremlin's perspective,
the whole corridor, stretching from Belarus and Moldova in the
west, with Ukraine in the south-west, to the Southern Caucasus and
Central Asia, is part of its "near abroad." That is the reason why
Russia has from the very beginning supported the Georgian breakaway
provinces, and came to the rescue of its South Ossetian (and Abkhaz)
clients last summer, recognizing afterward their self-proclaimed
"independence". Russia also contributed to the Azeri defeat in
Karabakh, and has established with Armenia a "strategic partnership",
practically a military and economic alliance.
Second are the Americans and their European allies, whose respective
moves are not always coordinated, but who have developed a keen
interest in the energy resources of the Caspian region, which are
also important to Russia. This penetration of the West into Moscow's
former backyard took, during the last decade, different forms. It
started with the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
that bypasses the Russian transit corridor (as well as the Iranian),
and carries Azeri oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean
terminal. In the same time, the West enthusiastically supported the
"colored revolution" in Georgia (as well as similar "revolutions'
in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine). Then came the active support of the Bush
administration to the Georgian application (and Ukrainian) for NATO
membership, which skeptic European allies have postponed. The EU,
however, sponsored, with US support, the "Nabucco" pipeline project,
which is supposed to pump Caspian gas via Geo!
rgia and Turkey to Europe, undermining the Russian position of major
gas provider to European customers. In the same time, the EU launched
its "Eastern Partnership" program, which includes Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, former Soviet republics
located on the southern Russian flank, along the corridor that runs
from the eastern borders of EU/NATO to the shores of the Caspian Sea.
Third are Turkey and Iran, bordering the Southern Caucasus
region. Turks supported the Azeris, their ethnic cousins, during
the Karabakh War, and Ankara imposed on Armenia an economic
blockade. Turkish siding with Baku blocked at that time Armenian
ambitions to overtake the Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan. Although
officially neutral, Iran economically supported Christian Armenia,
fearing that Baku's ultra-nationalist leaders of that time might steer
separatist troubles in Iranian Azerbaijan (the total population of
independent Azerbaijan is around 8 million, while it is estimated that
approximately 20 million Azeri Turks are Iranian citizens). Teheran
in the same time also provided and still provides a life-line
to Nakhichevan (rail/road connections with Baku). Although not
identical, Turkish and Iranian interests in the Southern Caucasus
are complementary. The two countries maintain cooperative bilateral
relations in a number of domains, among which is the issue of
Kurdish se!
paratism (the Kurdish ethnic body is spilt between the two of them,
and Iraq and Syria; a smaller Kurdish community was also living
in Karabakh). Turkey is a long-time member of N.A.T.O., but has,
during the last two years, significantly upgraded its bilateral
relations with Moscow. Beside its close ties with Azerbaijan, and
a fruitful cooperation with neighboring Georgia, it has opened a
dialogue with Armenia, hoping to find solutions to the problems that
plague their bilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran is in a
more difficult position. It is still ostracized by the United States
and the West, and is practically excluded from regional security and
energy arrangements that are supervised by Washington.
Frozen Conflicts, Uncertain Futures
Although Georgian problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and by
extension with Russia, as well as the Azeri-Armenian conflict over
Karabakh, are actually frozen, the precarious "no-war, no-peace"
situation remains potentially dangerous (Feifer 2009; ICG 2009;
Merry 2009). Armenia and Azerbaijan are continuing their arms race,
and Georgia is speeding up the reconstruction of its devastated
army. Each new border incident, and they are frequent, could spark a
new war. Without consensual solutions to the above hot-spots of crises,
the stabilization of the broader region remains out of reach. Because
of that - internal political adjustments and democratic openings in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are postponed. Their economies are
suffering and the wellbeing of their populations is neglected. The
refugees and internally displaced persons remain in limbo, and the
position of minorities groups tends to deteriorate further.
Following the five-day war with Georgia, Russia has recognized the
self-proclaimed independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It
has signed with the authorities of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali a series
of cooperation treaties, including on mutual defense and on the
stationing of its troops on their territories. Russian military bases
were set-up in both state-entities, and a naval base is constructed
on the Abkhazian coast (the latter could become in the future the
home-port for the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is actually anchored at
Sebastopol, in Ukraine). Both countries became in practice Moscow's
client-states, only formally dissimilar to the Russian autonomous
republics in the neighborhood.
Similar to the case of Kosovo independence, imposed by
the United States/ N.A.T.O., Moscow has imposed here a new
reality. Internationally mediated talks, aiming to avoid further
conflict between Russia and its clients on one side, and Georgia
on the other, initiated in October 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland,
have not produced any significant result so far. Georgian appeals
for the respect of International Law and for the restoration of its
"territorial integrity," failed to impress the Russian delegates,
who argued that this principle is "only virtual in nature" (Reuters,
July 1, 2009). They used as counter-argument the principle of
"national self-determination," which is equally embedded in
International Law. Anyway, such legal arguments are not likely
to lead to an agreement on the final status of the two breakaway
state-entities The problem is political. Presidents Obama and Medvedev
had recently in Moscow - a "frank discussion on some areas where
(they) disagree." Medvedev!
mentioned the "configuration of the global missile defense," while
Obama re-iterated his "belief in Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity," but added that "no one has interest in renewed military
conflict" (Reuters, June 6, 2009).
Meanwhile, the international mediators - the EU, UN. and OSCE. -
scheduled new talks for the near future. Definitely not helpful to
the mediation process was the N.A.T.O. military exercise organized on
Georgian soil last June, in the same time when the Saakashvili regime
was facing mass protests in the streets of Tbilisi. The Georgian
opposition was demanding, and still demands, his resignation, and
anticipated presidential and parliamentary elections. Moscow accused
N.A.T.O. of "dangerous provocation." And it reciprocated by staging
its own, equally "provocative," large-scale military exercise in the
Northern Caucasus in July. The signals sent by the two sides are far
of being constructive, and if Moscow and Washington continue to stick
to their separate agendas, the conflict will remain unresolved. Georgia
practically became hostage to their relations.
Russo-American rivalries are not playing an equally negative role in
the case of Nagorno Karabakh. Both Moscow and Washington, albeit for
different reasons, would like to see the conflict, which was frozen
in 1992 when the cease-fire was signed. Initially, when American and
Western oil companies were exploring the possibility for the building
of a pipeline for the evacuation of Azeri oil to Turkey, a swap
of territories was suggested - Karabakh would have been integrated
into Armenia, and Azerbaijan would gain direct territorial access -
a corridor to Turkey - and even more important, to its Nakhichevan
exclave. This was rejected by both Baku and Yerevan, but the idea was
remembered last summer, when advancing Russian troops approached the
BTC. pipeline in Georgia. They did not cut it, although they had the
possibility, but the vulnerability of the Georgian track was exposed.
Following 1992, the Minsk Group of the Organization on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE.), co-chaired by France, Russia and
the United States, stepped in, and, mediating between the two sides,
tabled a number of conflict-resolution proposals. The Group opened its
representative offices in Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan, and its chairs
and envoys began shuttling between the three, but all their plans
and road-maps were repeatedly rejected. However, the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan began to meet at least once a year. In November
2007, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group agreed on the "Preliminary
Principles" for the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in
a document known also as the Madrid Declaration, which envisaged:
(1) the return of territories surrounding Karabakh to Azeri control;
(2) interim status for Karabakh, guaranteeing self-governance and
security; (3) a corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia; (4) the right
of IDP and refugees to return to their f!
ormer place of residence; (5) Karabakh finally status through legally
binding expression of will; (6) international security guarantees
and international peacekeepers. These principles offered guidelines
for negotiations.
A year later, Aliev and Sargsyan met in Moscow, and, together
with Russian President Medvedev, signed a Declaration on Nagorno
Karabakh in which they committed themselves to seeking a political
solution to the conflict, "on the basis of the norms and principles of
International Law, documents adopted within that framework," and with
a stated objective "of creating a more healthy situation in the South
Caucasus" (RFE/RL, November 3, 2008; Fuller and Daneylan 2009). It
was a significant breakthrough, because Azerbaijan for the first time
publicly committed itself not to use military force. The problem is,
as in the cases of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia vs. Georgia, that
International Law includes both the principle of "territorial integrity
and sovereignty" and of the "right to national self-determination." The
suggestion of the Minsk Group to grant to Karabakh an "interim status,"
before the final solution is found, seems acceptable in principle,
but Baku insists that it sho!
uld be "within Azerbaijan," while Yerevan refuses any reference to the
would-be Azeri sovereignty over Karabakh. Other bilateral issues, such
as the return to Azerbaijan of territories outside the Karabakh enclave
that are occupied by Armenian forces, and of the refugees on both
side, are apparently negotiable and solutions could be found. Aliev
and Sargsyan are scheduled to meet again in Moscow on July 17, but
few observers believe that they could agree. Sargsyan is less likely
to accept a compromise, because of the opposition he facing at home.
Turkey is a close Azeri ally. When Ankara opened a dialogue
with Yerevan aimed at the normalization of bilateral relations,
Baku conditioned its support with the solution of the Karabakh
problem. Signing a preliminary deal with Russia on the sale of its
gas to its northern neighbor, Baku practically threatened to cut
its future supplies to the EU-sponsored "Nabucco" pipeline, which
will run through Turkey to Europe. It was not the only reason why
the deal with Armenia was postponed. More important was the Armenian
insistence that Turkey accepts the blame for the Armenian genocide of
1915. Additionally, Yerevan is reluctant to officially recognize the
existing border that separates the two countries. The first step of
the normalization process was supposed to be the opening of this border
and the end of the Turkish blockade. This would have greatly simplified
bilateral trade and travel, actually going through the Georgian detour.
Anyway, Ankara accepted Baku's argument and the Karabakh issue became
part of the package leading to the normalization of its relations
with Armenia.
In its turn, if this normalization, coupled with the normalization of
Azeri-Armenian relations (which depends on the solution of the Karabakh
knot), become reality, then a window for a possible readjustment of
interstate alliances in the region could open. Armenia is for the time
being in a "strategic partnership" with Russia, but with cooperative
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, this alliance could become
superfluous. Its public opinion, and its political parties, both
those in position and opposition, are definitely pro-Western. This
is not the case with the Azerbaijani ruling elite, which is tied to
West only because of its narrow economic interests.
The Issue of the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
The problem of refugees and IDP in the region is linked to the solution
of frozen conflicts. In 2006 there were 578,000 registered refugees and
IDP in Azerbaijan, and 234,000 in Georgia. After the August 2008 war
with Russia, the Georgian refugee/IDP population increased by 130,000,
but many have since then returned. The number of former refugees
in Armenia was estimated at 235,000 in 2004 (UNHCR website, viewed
on March 1, 2007). But these numbers are uncertain, because "by law
or by virtue of administrative practice, the (recipient) countries
tend to recognize the descendents of persons displaced in various
capacities within the region as 'refugees' or 'displaced persons',
with the result that the total number of refugees and displaced persons
never seem to decrease. The majority of refugees and IDP are in that
situation because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and deportations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or, using the term coined during the
recent Yugoslav wars - they!
have been ethnically cleansed. Many others were displaced as a result
of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not the mention the
Chechens who took refuge in the Southern Caucasus because of the
conflict in their homeland. Unable to return to the regions from
which they had been ethnically cleansed and nonintegrated into the
host communities the "situation of the refugees and displaced persons
(.) continues to be an obstacle for the development of (the host
countries/regions) in economic, socio-political and health terms"
(Council of Europe, Doc. 10835, 8 February 2006).
Additionally, there is a mass of displaced persons and refugees
from the same regions who tried to find new life in Russia and
elsewhere. For example, the Russian autonomous republics of Ingushetia
hosted in the 1990s some 60,000 Ingushs who fled conflict from South
Ossetia, and following the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia in
2009, some 34,000 South Ossetians took refuge in North Ossetia. Many
of them had Russian citizenship and it is impossible to estimate
their number. The issue of their return to the regions from which
they had been expelled or have been displaced is also one of the
major obstacles for peaceful settlements of the conflicts in the
Southern Caucasus. This is the case of the Azeris and Kurds who were
displaced by the Armenian victory in Karabakh and occupation of some
14% of additional Azeri territory, as well of the Armenians who fled
Azerbaijan. Most of them, probably, are not ready to return to the
localities of their origin, and compensations are sup!
posed to be negotiated.
One of the major hurdles on the way to the normalization of Turkish
and Armenian relations, related to the Armenian demand for the Turkish
recognition of the 1915 genocide, is the fact that the descendents of
the victims, not only Armenian citizens, but also from the Diaspora,
could later demand compensation for the suffering of their ancestors,
compensation for lost property, or even the "right to return."
The Problem Ethnic Minorities
The Caucasus Region, with more than sixty spoken native languages,
described by a Medieval Arab traveler as a "mountain of languages,"
was always an ethnic patchwork (see Matveeva 2003 and 2002; Middel
2004; ICG 2006a). South of the Caucasus Range, today's Armenia is
the most ethnically homogeneous of the three Caucasus states (and
was so among former Soviet republics), with about 2% of remaining
non-Armenians, mainly few Yezidi Kurds and Assyrians. Practically
all the Azeri Turks who represented 3% of the total population of
Armenia proper in 1989 have been expelled. Forcefully displaced were
also the Azeris from Karabakh and adjacent occupied territories,
who are actually refugees in Azerbaijan.
Although the Azeri ethnic body in Azerbaijan was enlarged following
the Karabakh War, ethnic minority groups still represent some 10%
of the total population (Lezgins, Avars and other North Caucasians,
Russians). In comparison to the situation of minority groups
in neighboring countries, they are relatively better integrated
into the mainstream society, as many of their members are bi- or
even trilingual, speaking their native languages, Azeri and often
Russian. But there was in the 1990s secessionist unrests among
the Lezgins, located on the border of Dagestan, who demanded their
unification with their ethnic siblings in Russia.
According to the 2001 census, major minority communities in Georgia
are: Azeris representing 6.5% of the total population, Armenians 5.7%
and Russians 1.5%. Most of these groups, except for the remaining
Russians, are located in remote rural and underdeveloped areas. Since
independence the general conditions of minorities, involving all
services previously offered by the Soviet state, have drastically
deteriorated.
The Azeri and Armenian communities in Georgia, respectively
concentrated in Kveno-Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions, remain
completely separated from the Georgian ethnic mainstream. They still
benefit a degree of cultural autonomy (primary and secondary schools)
inherited from the former Soviet Union, but "instruction in the schools
is inadequate, and fewer minorities are attending higher education
institution". They are "underrepresented in all spheres of public life,
especially government," which is very visible in Kveno-Kartli, where
"Georgians hold all important positions" (ICG 2006a). Because of its
interest to maintain cooperative relations with neighboring Georgia,
Baku never attempted to foment separatist sentiments among the Georgian
Azeris. There were demands among the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti
for territorial autonomy within Georgia, but these were discouraged
by Yerevan.
Perhaps the most tragic is the case of Meskhetian Turks, who have been
collectively deported in 1944, mixed with Kurds and Muslim Armenians
from the Samtskhe-Javakheti region to Central Asia. Those settled in
the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan became victims in 1989 of ethnic
pogroms and are since scattered around the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Their total number was estimated at some 120.000 in
2003. Those resettled then in the Krasnodar Kray of Russia were met
with enmity by the local Cossacks. By that time perhaps one thousand
returned to their native regions. Once resettled they were forced to
"reinstate" their Georgian surnames and to "confirm" themselves as
ethnic Georgians. Additionally, they were met with hostility by the
Armenian population of that Georgian region (Brennan 2003). More of
them were better received in Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States.
Both the refugees and members of ethnic minorities contributed
substantially during the last years to the massive voluntary emigration
from the region. Although numbers are uncertain, it seems that
especially affected are Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Georgians themselves are subdivided in several distinct clan-based
communities speaking different dialects. Additionally, the Adjarans,
who are ethnic Georgians, are in majority Sunni Muslims, while the
majority of Georgians is Christian Orthodox.
In a region where separate identities led to mutually exclusive
nationalist projects, such internal fault-lines could lead to future
conflict.
Religious Minorities
"The role of religion in the Caucasus has gained prominence in
post-Soviet times. For many it provides not only a pillar of national
identity, but also spiritual guidance and psychological comfort at
a time which has been rife with turmoil and hardship. Socially, it
serves to assert distinguished group identity and is sometimes used
as political weapon" (Middel 2004: 11).
Although the constitutions of the three independent countries
stipulate the separation of state and religion, Georgia has
reserved a privileged position to its Christian Orthodox Church, and
Armenia to its Apostolic Church. Among the biggest post-independence
investments in both countries were the monumental cathedrals in their
capitals. State-sponsored allegiance to the dominant religion is in
practice equated with patriotism. Many Soviet-days atheists, including,
for example, former Georgian President Shevardnadze, hurried to be
baptized in well-publicized public ceremonies. After the Saakshvili
government re-imposed its authority over the Autonomous Republic of
Adjara in May 2004, many Muslim Ajarans followed the lead of their
atheist co-nationals. They were not compelled by the authorities,
but they wanted to show that they loyal Georgian citizens
Other traditional religious communities in Georgia and Armenia are
formally free to practice their rites, which is not always the case
with non-traditional groups, which are refused registration.
Although the issue of religion has not irrupted into Azerbaijan's
politics, it should be noted that about 25-35% of its population is
connected to Sunni traditions, while the majority is at least nominally
Shiite (Valiyev 2005). Azerbaijan is the most "secular" of the three
countries. It has adopted a constitution inspired by the Kemalist
model, and, similarly to Turkey, the authorities strictly control
religious activities. The phenomenon of "Wahhabism," a pejorative
term used to label disparate Sunni-inspired opposition groups in the
Northern Caucasus and Central Asia, is only marginally present in
Azerbaijan. But Moscow's security forces and incumbent authorities of
the autonomous republics in the Northern Caucasus are embroiled into
localized low-scale wars with these Islamist insurgents. Trying to
counter their simplified and literal interpretation the Sunni creed,
sometimes indeed inspired by preachers educated in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf, Chechen President Kadyrov, b!
egan to promote, a "softer," Sufi version of state-sponsored Sunni
Islam. And following the example of his Christian cathedrals in the
Southern Caucasus, he built in the center of reconstructed Grozny,
his capital, a monumental mosque.
Transport Corridors and Geopolitics
As mentioned previously, important financial advantages offered to
energy-starved Armenia for the construction of a shortcut pipeline
linking Azerbaijan to Turkey through Armenian territory were
disregarded. Subsequently, pipelines that circumvent Armenia via
Georgia, were built and became operational. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline (Starr and Cornell 2005; Auty and Soysa 2006;
Devdariani and Hancilova 2007a) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE)
gas pipeline have shaped the alliance between the three countries.
Until recently the European Union played a modest political role in
the region, although it has representative offices in the capitals
of the Southern Caucasus, and the three countries are members of the
Council of Europe. Instruments such as bilateral Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements, and aid and developments programs such as
TRACECA, INNOGATE, TACIS and ECHO had rather modest outcomes. However,
this eventually began to change with the launching at the 2009 EU
Summit of the "Eastern Partnership" program (EP). This program offers
to six former Soviet republics, all located in the corridor that
goes from EU's borders do the Caspian Sea, free trade arrangements,
economic aid, and cooperation in the security and energy fields. In
fact, it is complementary to the planned 3,300 kilometer "Nabucco"
project. The pipeline will use the BTE route, which will be extended
to Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and will carry Azeri gas to Austria
(Eksi 2009; Grove 2009).
The problem is that the quota committed by Azerbaijan is not
sufficient, and that additional supplies from the Caspian region and
the Middle East are needed. Turkmenistan and Egypt have volunteered,
and Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have expressed
their interest (Kazakhstan has abstained). However, each of these
potential suppliers has problems - Turkmenistan has to establish
a link, either by an undersea pipeline to Azerbaijan, or by the
intermediary of Iran. For the time being, Iranian gas and transit
routes are blocked by Washington. The Americans are also blocking the
Syrian transit route for Egyptian gas. The presence of the U.S. special
energy envoy Richard Morningstar at the signing ceremony on July 13
in Ankara, was not only a demonstration of US's endorsement of the
project, but also of the fact that it has also a say when it comes
to the selection of new participants. Washington could eventually
help the Baghdad government and the KRG to sort out!
their differences over the deliveries of Iraqi gas to "Nabucco." The
Austrian managing director of the project Reinhard Mitschek, however,
said that "Nabucco does not exclude any potential source and will
be open for transportation of any gas meeting quality requirements
from every potential gas supplier, including Russia and Iran, to
destinations in Europe" (Today's Zaman, July 15, 2009). If at least
one additional supplier, able to deliver sufficient gas quantities,
is co-opted, then "Nabucco" would be profitable and its construction
might start. But once completed, the pipeline will not break entirely
European dependence on Russian exports. As for Turkey, she hopes that
her position as indispensable participant in the project will enhance
her chances to join the EU (Grove 2009).
Moscow, uneasy with the EU "Eastern Partnership" program, sees
"Nabucco," circumventing Russian territory, as another threat
to its interests (Babich 2009). Russia, which had problems with
its gas exports through the Ukrainian corridor, is promoting two
alternative pipeline project - the "North Stream" undersea pipeline in
cooperation with Germany, and the two-track "South Stream" combined
undersea//continental pipeline in cooperation with Italy. In order
to supply them, it needs to buy additional quantities of gas from
the same Caspian exporters - Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - who are
supposed to supply "Nabucco." Both of them are still keeping the two
options open. Turkmenistan is negotiating the renewal of its supplies
to Gazprom. Azerbaijan and Gazprom had signed a preliminary agreement
(Zaynalov 2009). Even Turkey has not excluded its future participation
in the "South Stream" project. In the same time, it is interested to
receive additional Russian gas through the "Blu!
e Stream" pipeline that runs under the Black Sea.
China is also an active player in these energy chess games. She
has concluded a number of deals for the exploration and pumping of
Kazakh oil and is rapidly building a pipeline that will connect the
two countries. She has also gained access to one giant gas field in
Turkmenistan, and has started to build the pipeline that will carry
this gas to Northern China. Her biggest energy deals are with Russia,
from where she imports oil by rail. An agreement has been also signed
for the construction of a gas pipeline.
Iran has secured a concession for exploitation of another gas field in
Turkmenistan (previously pumping gas to Russia), and the two countries
agreed to establish another pipeline link by the end of this year.
Eventually, Turkmen gas could be pumped into "Nabucco" by the
intermediary of Iran (Bhadrakumar 2009). This would be cheaper than
carrying it under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan through a would-be
pipeline that is not yet constructed.
It is a race for the access to energy resources and for gas deliveries
with far-reaching geopolitical implications.
Landlocked Armenia, bypassed by most of these transit routes, is trying
to find its place on the energy map. When the Russo-Georgian border was
closed, it began to heavily rely on Iranian supplies. Although Russian
gas continues to come transiting Georgia, another pipeline was built
in 2007, bringing-in Iranian gas across the Arax River (RIA Novosti,
March 19, 2007). At that time, speculations appeared that Russia,
in its attempts to counter the East-West transit corridor promoted
by the West, was trying to establish the North-South route by which
it will be linked to Iran.
When Moscow cut its trade relations with Georgia, the latter began
to increasingly rely on Turkey. Soon Turkey became its main trading
partner. The annual trade turnoff reached $1 billion by the end of
2008, when a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries
entered into force. Turkish construction companies additionally expect
to be awarded infrastructure contracts amounting to $1,5 billion
from the $4,5 billion aid package granted to Georgia following its
war with Russia. Besides the two functioning pipelines (BTC and BTE)
that transit Georgia, carrying Azeri oil and gas to Turkey, the two
countries and Azerbaijan are building the missing Akhalkalaki-Kars
rail link, another east-west corridor that will establish a rail
connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia (Ismayilov 2007).
Some Concluding Remarks
All local, regional and international actors, involved in one way or
another into the Southern Caucasus, claim that they are interested
in the stability of the region. But stability cannot be achieved
without the resolution of frozen conflicts. Without the solution of the
Karabakh controversy, there could not be solutions for the problem of
refugees and IDP. The same is valid for the conflicts that oppose the
Georgian government to the self-declared independent state-entities
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Of course, many of the refugees and
IDP .are not likely to return to their original home-territories,
but they should be fairly compensated in order to facilitate their
integration into receiving communities. Ethnocentric nationalist
policies, actually promoted by all Southern Caucasus ruling elites, are
additionally exacerbating the problems of ethnic minorities, especially
in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Azerbaijan (practically there
are no remaining minorities in !
Armenia and Armenian-occupied territories). Finally, constant tensions
that could escalate into new military confrontations are blocking
internal political openings and democratic reforms.
Actors external to the region could give their positive contribution
to conflict resolution, but they could, as it is still the case today,
also play less constructive and even disruptive roles. The struggle
for influence in the region, whose main protagonists are Russia and the
United States, together with competing alliances and energy axes, are
certainly destabilizing factors. The European Union, which seems now
more interested than previously, could give its positive contribution
only if it abstains of joining this power game. But, as asserted by
an objective foreign observer, "the US pursues an aggressive policy
aimed at rolling back Russian influence in the Caucasus, Caspian and
Black Sea regions. Most important it has largely succeeded in making
Russia's relationship with the European Union hostage to the fault
lines appearing in the geopolitics of the Eurasian region" (Bhadrakumar
2009). That was indeed the policy of the Bush administration, followed
by its NATO alli!
es. The Obama team has vowed to "reset" American relations with Russia,
but it is not yet clear how this readjustment, using the Russian term
of "perestroika," will affect the Southern Caucasus.
The conflicts in this region cannot be resolved without the
constructive involvement of both Russia and the United States. As
argued in this paper, frozen regional conflicts, refugee and minorities
problems, ethnic human right issues and processes of democratic reforms
are interrelated. The region badly needs cooperation, dialogue and
diplomatic engagement of all parties; confidence building steps;
not additional confrontations.
And solutions could not be isolated from each other. They cannot
be bilateral only. They have to be part o multilateral agreements,
with the participation of all regional actors and guaranteed by the
international community, not forgetting that the Southern Caucasus
is now part of the Greater Middle East regional laboratory.
_____________________________________ _________________________________
Ivan Ivekoviæ, Professor of Political Science at the American
University in Cairo, Egypt (iwek@ aucegypt.edu). Author of Ethnic
and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia. A Political
Economy of Contemporary Ethnonational Mobilization, Ravenna, Longo
editore, 2000.
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments-lr ahos15285.html
14:02:50 - 23/09/2009
Regional Imbroglio
Cultural, historical, political, territorial and economic claims and
counter-claims led to ethnic tensions and conflicts in the Southern
Caucasus even before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. They
exploded afterwards.
Georgia witnessed periods of internal political instability,
including violent regime changes, was engulfed into civil wars with
its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in August
2008, in a short war confrontation with Russia. These conflicts have
been frozen, but the situation remains volatile. The government of
Mikheil Saakashvili is actually internally challenged by a broad
internal opposition movement.
Periods of political instability, revolts and regime change also
in Azerbaijan, where the regime of Ilham Aliev has muzzled the
opposition, and seems in control. The Azeri-Armenian conflict over
Nagorno Karabakh is also frozen, but the no-war no-peace situation
blocks the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan, and Armenia
and Turkey. The legitimacy of the regime of Serzh Sargsyan in Yerevan
is also contested internally. The three countries experienced a
decline in their democratic development in 2008, according to the
US-based Freedom House. The worst situation is in Azerbaijan, while
the actual government systems in Georgia and Armenia are described
as "consolidated authoritarian regimes" (Freedom House, Nations
in Transit, 2009). A more adequate label in my view would be -
"authoritarian ethnocracies."
The Caucasus, both its southern part, with Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, and the Northern Caucasus, with its tiny autonomous republics
that are part of the Russian Federation, is a patchwork of various
ethnicities. Moscow has problems in controlling Muslim opposition
groups in the north. Although Chechnya has been mostly pacified,
political violence has recently spilled into Ingushetia and Daghestan
(BBC News, July 13, 2009). The position of ethnic minorities living in
Georgia and Azerbaijan remains extremely precarious. Living conditions
of refugees and internally displaced persons (ethnically cleansed
from conflict zones) in the three Southern Caucasus states are even
worse. These problems are contributing to internal instability.
Competing interests of external powers are complicating further the
already complicated regional imbroglio.
First, is Russia that resents the penetration of outside players
into the former Soviet space. NATO and the EU are already at its
western borders, and the three Baltic republics - Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia - have been co-opted into their structures. Moscow tries
to prevent further encroachments into what it considers of being its
"strategic depth" on its southern flanks. From Kremlin's perspective,
the whole corridor, stretching from Belarus and Moldova in the
west, with Ukraine in the south-west, to the Southern Caucasus and
Central Asia, is part of its "near abroad." That is the reason why
Russia has from the very beginning supported the Georgian breakaway
provinces, and came to the rescue of its South Ossetian (and Abkhaz)
clients last summer, recognizing afterward their self-proclaimed
"independence". Russia also contributed to the Azeri defeat in
Karabakh, and has established with Armenia a "strategic partnership",
practically a military and economic alliance.
Second are the Americans and their European allies, whose respective
moves are not always coordinated, but who have developed a keen
interest in the energy resources of the Caspian region, which are
also important to Russia. This penetration of the West into Moscow's
former backyard took, during the last decade, different forms. It
started with the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
that bypasses the Russian transit corridor (as well as the Iranian),
and carries Azeri oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean
terminal. In the same time, the West enthusiastically supported the
"colored revolution" in Georgia (as well as similar "revolutions'
in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine). Then came the active support of the Bush
administration to the Georgian application (and Ukrainian) for NATO
membership, which skeptic European allies have postponed. The EU,
however, sponsored, with US support, the "Nabucco" pipeline project,
which is supposed to pump Caspian gas via Geo!
rgia and Turkey to Europe, undermining the Russian position of major
gas provider to European customers. In the same time, the EU launched
its "Eastern Partnership" program, which includes Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, former Soviet republics
located on the southern Russian flank, along the corridor that runs
from the eastern borders of EU/NATO to the shores of the Caspian Sea.
Third are Turkey and Iran, bordering the Southern Caucasus
region. Turks supported the Azeris, their ethnic cousins, during
the Karabakh War, and Ankara imposed on Armenia an economic
blockade. Turkish siding with Baku blocked at that time Armenian
ambitions to overtake the Azeri exclave of Nakhichevan. Although
officially neutral, Iran economically supported Christian Armenia,
fearing that Baku's ultra-nationalist leaders of that time might steer
separatist troubles in Iranian Azerbaijan (the total population of
independent Azerbaijan is around 8 million, while it is estimated that
approximately 20 million Azeri Turks are Iranian citizens). Teheran
in the same time also provided and still provides a life-line
to Nakhichevan (rail/road connections with Baku). Although not
identical, Turkish and Iranian interests in the Southern Caucasus
are complementary. The two countries maintain cooperative bilateral
relations in a number of domains, among which is the issue of
Kurdish se!
paratism (the Kurdish ethnic body is spilt between the two of them,
and Iraq and Syria; a smaller Kurdish community was also living
in Karabakh). Turkey is a long-time member of N.A.T.O., but has,
during the last two years, significantly upgraded its bilateral
relations with Moscow. Beside its close ties with Azerbaijan, and
a fruitful cooperation with neighboring Georgia, it has opened a
dialogue with Armenia, hoping to find solutions to the problems that
plague their bilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran is in a
more difficult position. It is still ostracized by the United States
and the West, and is practically excluded from regional security and
energy arrangements that are supervised by Washington.
Frozen Conflicts, Uncertain Futures
Although Georgian problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and by
extension with Russia, as well as the Azeri-Armenian conflict over
Karabakh, are actually frozen, the precarious "no-war, no-peace"
situation remains potentially dangerous (Feifer 2009; ICG 2009;
Merry 2009). Armenia and Azerbaijan are continuing their arms race,
and Georgia is speeding up the reconstruction of its devastated
army. Each new border incident, and they are frequent, could spark a
new war. Without consensual solutions to the above hot-spots of crises,
the stabilization of the broader region remains out of reach. Because
of that - internal political adjustments and democratic openings in
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are postponed. Their economies are
suffering and the wellbeing of their populations is neglected. The
refugees and internally displaced persons remain in limbo, and the
position of minorities groups tends to deteriorate further.
Following the five-day war with Georgia, Russia has recognized the
self-proclaimed independent states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It
has signed with the authorities of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali a series
of cooperation treaties, including on mutual defense and on the
stationing of its troops on their territories. Russian military bases
were set-up in both state-entities, and a naval base is constructed
on the Abkhazian coast (the latter could become in the future the
home-port for the Russian Black Sea Fleet that is actually anchored at
Sebastopol, in Ukraine). Both countries became in practice Moscow's
client-states, only formally dissimilar to the Russian autonomous
republics in the neighborhood.
Similar to the case of Kosovo independence, imposed by
the United States/ N.A.T.O., Moscow has imposed here a new
reality. Internationally mediated talks, aiming to avoid further
conflict between Russia and its clients on one side, and Georgia
on the other, initiated in October 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland,
have not produced any significant result so far. Georgian appeals
for the respect of International Law and for the restoration of its
"territorial integrity," failed to impress the Russian delegates,
who argued that this principle is "only virtual in nature" (Reuters,
July 1, 2009). They used as counter-argument the principle of
"national self-determination," which is equally embedded in
International Law. Anyway, such legal arguments are not likely
to lead to an agreement on the final status of the two breakaway
state-entities The problem is political. Presidents Obama and Medvedev
had recently in Moscow - a "frank discussion on some areas where
(they) disagree." Medvedev!
mentioned the "configuration of the global missile defense," while
Obama re-iterated his "belief in Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity," but added that "no one has interest in renewed military
conflict" (Reuters, June 6, 2009).
Meanwhile, the international mediators - the EU, UN. and OSCE. -
scheduled new talks for the near future. Definitely not helpful to
the mediation process was the N.A.T.O. military exercise organized on
Georgian soil last June, in the same time when the Saakashvili regime
was facing mass protests in the streets of Tbilisi. The Georgian
opposition was demanding, and still demands, his resignation, and
anticipated presidential and parliamentary elections. Moscow accused
N.A.T.O. of "dangerous provocation." And it reciprocated by staging
its own, equally "provocative," large-scale military exercise in the
Northern Caucasus in July. The signals sent by the two sides are far
of being constructive, and if Moscow and Washington continue to stick
to their separate agendas, the conflict will remain unresolved. Georgia
practically became hostage to their relations.
Russo-American rivalries are not playing an equally negative role in
the case of Nagorno Karabakh. Both Moscow and Washington, albeit for
different reasons, would like to see the conflict, which was frozen
in 1992 when the cease-fire was signed. Initially, when American and
Western oil companies were exploring the possibility for the building
of a pipeline for the evacuation of Azeri oil to Turkey, a swap
of territories was suggested - Karabakh would have been integrated
into Armenia, and Azerbaijan would gain direct territorial access -
a corridor to Turkey - and even more important, to its Nakhichevan
exclave. This was rejected by both Baku and Yerevan, but the idea was
remembered last summer, when advancing Russian troops approached the
BTC. pipeline in Georgia. They did not cut it, although they had the
possibility, but the vulnerability of the Georgian track was exposed.
Following 1992, the Minsk Group of the Organization on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE.), co-chaired by France, Russia and
the United States, stepped in, and, mediating between the two sides,
tabled a number of conflict-resolution proposals. The Group opened its
representative offices in Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan, and its chairs
and envoys began shuttling between the three, but all their plans
and road-maps were repeatedly rejected. However, the presidents of
Armenia and Azerbaijan began to meet at least once a year. In November
2007, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group agreed on the "Preliminary
Principles" for the solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, in
a document known also as the Madrid Declaration, which envisaged:
(1) the return of territories surrounding Karabakh to Azeri control;
(2) interim status for Karabakh, guaranteeing self-governance and
security; (3) a corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia; (4) the right
of IDP and refugees to return to their f!
ormer place of residence; (5) Karabakh finally status through legally
binding expression of will; (6) international security guarantees
and international peacekeepers. These principles offered guidelines
for negotiations.
A year later, Aliev and Sargsyan met in Moscow, and, together
with Russian President Medvedev, signed a Declaration on Nagorno
Karabakh in which they committed themselves to seeking a political
solution to the conflict, "on the basis of the norms and principles of
International Law, documents adopted within that framework," and with
a stated objective "of creating a more healthy situation in the South
Caucasus" (RFE/RL, November 3, 2008; Fuller and Daneylan 2009). It
was a significant breakthrough, because Azerbaijan for the first time
publicly committed itself not to use military force. The problem is,
as in the cases of Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia vs. Georgia, that
International Law includes both the principle of "territorial integrity
and sovereignty" and of the "right to national self-determination." The
suggestion of the Minsk Group to grant to Karabakh an "interim status,"
before the final solution is found, seems acceptable in principle,
but Baku insists that it sho!
uld be "within Azerbaijan," while Yerevan refuses any reference to the
would-be Azeri sovereignty over Karabakh. Other bilateral issues, such
as the return to Azerbaijan of territories outside the Karabakh enclave
that are occupied by Armenian forces, and of the refugees on both
side, are apparently negotiable and solutions could be found. Aliev
and Sargsyan are scheduled to meet again in Moscow on July 17, but
few observers believe that they could agree. Sargsyan is less likely
to accept a compromise, because of the opposition he facing at home.
Turkey is a close Azeri ally. When Ankara opened a dialogue
with Yerevan aimed at the normalization of bilateral relations,
Baku conditioned its support with the solution of the Karabakh
problem. Signing a preliminary deal with Russia on the sale of its
gas to its northern neighbor, Baku practically threatened to cut
its future supplies to the EU-sponsored "Nabucco" pipeline, which
will run through Turkey to Europe. It was not the only reason why
the deal with Armenia was postponed. More important was the Armenian
insistence that Turkey accepts the blame for the Armenian genocide of
1915. Additionally, Yerevan is reluctant to officially recognize the
existing border that separates the two countries. The first step of
the normalization process was supposed to be the opening of this border
and the end of the Turkish blockade. This would have greatly simplified
bilateral trade and travel, actually going through the Georgian detour.
Anyway, Ankara accepted Baku's argument and the Karabakh issue became
part of the package leading to the normalization of its relations
with Armenia.
In its turn, if this normalization, coupled with the normalization of
Azeri-Armenian relations (which depends on the solution of the Karabakh
knot), become reality, then a window for a possible readjustment of
interstate alliances in the region could open. Armenia is for the time
being in a "strategic partnership" with Russia, but with cooperative
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, this alliance could become
superfluous. Its public opinion, and its political parties, both
those in position and opposition, are definitely pro-Western. This
is not the case with the Azerbaijani ruling elite, which is tied to
West only because of its narrow economic interests.
The Issue of the Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
The problem of refugees and IDP in the region is linked to the solution
of frozen conflicts. In 2006 there were 578,000 registered refugees and
IDP in Azerbaijan, and 234,000 in Georgia. After the August 2008 war
with Russia, the Georgian refugee/IDP population increased by 130,000,
but many have since then returned. The number of former refugees
in Armenia was estimated at 235,000 in 2004 (UNHCR website, viewed
on March 1, 2007). But these numbers are uncertain, because "by law
or by virtue of administrative practice, the (recipient) countries
tend to recognize the descendents of persons displaced in various
capacities within the region as 'refugees' or 'displaced persons',
with the result that the total number of refugees and displaced persons
never seem to decrease. The majority of refugees and IDP are in that
situation because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and deportations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or, using the term coined during the
recent Yugoslav wars - they!
have been ethnically cleansed. Many others were displaced as a result
of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not the mention the
Chechens who took refuge in the Southern Caucasus because of the
conflict in their homeland. Unable to return to the regions from
which they had been ethnically cleansed and nonintegrated into the
host communities the "situation of the refugees and displaced persons
(.) continues to be an obstacle for the development of (the host
countries/regions) in economic, socio-political and health terms"
(Council of Europe, Doc. 10835, 8 February 2006).
Additionally, there is a mass of displaced persons and refugees
from the same regions who tried to find new life in Russia and
elsewhere. For example, the Russian autonomous republics of Ingushetia
hosted in the 1990s some 60,000 Ingushs who fled conflict from South
Ossetia, and following the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia in
2009, some 34,000 South Ossetians took refuge in North Ossetia. Many
of them had Russian citizenship and it is impossible to estimate
their number. The issue of their return to the regions from which
they had been expelled or have been displaced is also one of the
major obstacles for peaceful settlements of the conflicts in the
Southern Caucasus. This is the case of the Azeris and Kurds who were
displaced by the Armenian victory in Karabakh and occupation of some
14% of additional Azeri territory, as well of the Armenians who fled
Azerbaijan. Most of them, probably, are not ready to return to the
localities of their origin, and compensations are sup!
posed to be negotiated.
One of the major hurdles on the way to the normalization of Turkish
and Armenian relations, related to the Armenian demand for the Turkish
recognition of the 1915 genocide, is the fact that the descendents of
the victims, not only Armenian citizens, but also from the Diaspora,
could later demand compensation for the suffering of their ancestors,
compensation for lost property, or even the "right to return."
The Problem Ethnic Minorities
The Caucasus Region, with more than sixty spoken native languages,
described by a Medieval Arab traveler as a "mountain of languages,"
was always an ethnic patchwork (see Matveeva 2003 and 2002; Middel
2004; ICG 2006a). South of the Caucasus Range, today's Armenia is
the most ethnically homogeneous of the three Caucasus states (and
was so among former Soviet republics), with about 2% of remaining
non-Armenians, mainly few Yezidi Kurds and Assyrians. Practically
all the Azeri Turks who represented 3% of the total population of
Armenia proper in 1989 have been expelled. Forcefully displaced were
also the Azeris from Karabakh and adjacent occupied territories,
who are actually refugees in Azerbaijan.
Although the Azeri ethnic body in Azerbaijan was enlarged following
the Karabakh War, ethnic minority groups still represent some 10%
of the total population (Lezgins, Avars and other North Caucasians,
Russians). In comparison to the situation of minority groups
in neighboring countries, they are relatively better integrated
into the mainstream society, as many of their members are bi- or
even trilingual, speaking their native languages, Azeri and often
Russian. But there was in the 1990s secessionist unrests among
the Lezgins, located on the border of Dagestan, who demanded their
unification with their ethnic siblings in Russia.
According to the 2001 census, major minority communities in Georgia
are: Azeris representing 6.5% of the total population, Armenians 5.7%
and Russians 1.5%. Most of these groups, except for the remaining
Russians, are located in remote rural and underdeveloped areas. Since
independence the general conditions of minorities, involving all
services previously offered by the Soviet state, have drastically
deteriorated.
The Azeri and Armenian communities in Georgia, respectively
concentrated in Kveno-Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti regions, remain
completely separated from the Georgian ethnic mainstream. They still
benefit a degree of cultural autonomy (primary and secondary schools)
inherited from the former Soviet Union, but "instruction in the schools
is inadequate, and fewer minorities are attending higher education
institution". They are "underrepresented in all spheres of public life,
especially government," which is very visible in Kveno-Kartli, where
"Georgians hold all important positions" (ICG 2006a). Because of its
interest to maintain cooperative relations with neighboring Georgia,
Baku never attempted to foment separatist sentiments among the Georgian
Azeris. There were demands among the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti
for territorial autonomy within Georgia, but these were discouraged
by Yerevan.
Perhaps the most tragic is the case of Meskhetian Turks, who have been
collectively deported in 1944, mixed with Kurds and Muslim Armenians
from the Samtskhe-Javakheti region to Central Asia. Those settled in
the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan became victims in 1989 of ethnic
pogroms and are since scattered around the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). Their total number was estimated at some 120.000 in
2003. Those resettled then in the Krasnodar Kray of Russia were met
with enmity by the local Cossacks. By that time perhaps one thousand
returned to their native regions. Once resettled they were forced to
"reinstate" their Georgian surnames and to "confirm" themselves as
ethnic Georgians. Additionally, they were met with hostility by the
Armenian population of that Georgian region (Brennan 2003). More of
them were better received in Azerbaijan, Turkey and the United States.
Both the refugees and members of ethnic minorities contributed
substantially during the last years to the massive voluntary emigration
from the region. Although numbers are uncertain, it seems that
especially affected are Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Georgians themselves are subdivided in several distinct clan-based
communities speaking different dialects. Additionally, the Adjarans,
who are ethnic Georgians, are in majority Sunni Muslims, while the
majority of Georgians is Christian Orthodox.
In a region where separate identities led to mutually exclusive
nationalist projects, such internal fault-lines could lead to future
conflict.
Religious Minorities
"The role of religion in the Caucasus has gained prominence in
post-Soviet times. For many it provides not only a pillar of national
identity, but also spiritual guidance and psychological comfort at
a time which has been rife with turmoil and hardship. Socially, it
serves to assert distinguished group identity and is sometimes used
as political weapon" (Middel 2004: 11).
Although the constitutions of the three independent countries
stipulate the separation of state and religion, Georgia has
reserved a privileged position to its Christian Orthodox Church, and
Armenia to its Apostolic Church. Among the biggest post-independence
investments in both countries were the monumental cathedrals in their
capitals. State-sponsored allegiance to the dominant religion is in
practice equated with patriotism. Many Soviet-days atheists, including,
for example, former Georgian President Shevardnadze, hurried to be
baptized in well-publicized public ceremonies. After the Saakshvili
government re-imposed its authority over the Autonomous Republic of
Adjara in May 2004, many Muslim Ajarans followed the lead of their
atheist co-nationals. They were not compelled by the authorities,
but they wanted to show that they loyal Georgian citizens
Other traditional religious communities in Georgia and Armenia are
formally free to practice their rites, which is not always the case
with non-traditional groups, which are refused registration.
Although the issue of religion has not irrupted into Azerbaijan's
politics, it should be noted that about 25-35% of its population is
connected to Sunni traditions, while the majority is at least nominally
Shiite (Valiyev 2005). Azerbaijan is the most "secular" of the three
countries. It has adopted a constitution inspired by the Kemalist
model, and, similarly to Turkey, the authorities strictly control
religious activities. The phenomenon of "Wahhabism," a pejorative
term used to label disparate Sunni-inspired opposition groups in the
Northern Caucasus and Central Asia, is only marginally present in
Azerbaijan. But Moscow's security forces and incumbent authorities of
the autonomous republics in the Northern Caucasus are embroiled into
localized low-scale wars with these Islamist insurgents. Trying to
counter their simplified and literal interpretation the Sunni creed,
sometimes indeed inspired by preachers educated in Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf, Chechen President Kadyrov, b!
egan to promote, a "softer," Sufi version of state-sponsored Sunni
Islam. And following the example of his Christian cathedrals in the
Southern Caucasus, he built in the center of reconstructed Grozny,
his capital, a monumental mosque.
Transport Corridors and Geopolitics
As mentioned previously, important financial advantages offered to
energy-starved Armenia for the construction of a shortcut pipeline
linking Azerbaijan to Turkey through Armenian territory were
disregarded. Subsequently, pipelines that circumvent Armenia via
Georgia, were built and became operational. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
(BTC) oil pipeline (Starr and Cornell 2005; Auty and Soysa 2006;
Devdariani and Hancilova 2007a) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE)
gas pipeline have shaped the alliance between the three countries.
Until recently the European Union played a modest political role in
the region, although it has representative offices in the capitals
of the Southern Caucasus, and the three countries are members of the
Council of Europe. Instruments such as bilateral Partnership and
Cooperation Agreements, and aid and developments programs such as
TRACECA, INNOGATE, TACIS and ECHO had rather modest outcomes. However,
this eventually began to change with the launching at the 2009 EU
Summit of the "Eastern Partnership" program (EP). This program offers
to six former Soviet republics, all located in the corridor that
goes from EU's borders do the Caspian Sea, free trade arrangements,
economic aid, and cooperation in the security and energy fields. In
fact, it is complementary to the planned 3,300 kilometer "Nabucco"
project. The pipeline will use the BTE route, which will be extended
to Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and will carry Azeri gas to Austria
(Eksi 2009; Grove 2009).
The problem is that the quota committed by Azerbaijan is not
sufficient, and that additional supplies from the Caspian region and
the Middle East are needed. Turkmenistan and Egypt have volunteered,
and Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have expressed
their interest (Kazakhstan has abstained). However, each of these
potential suppliers has problems - Turkmenistan has to establish
a link, either by an undersea pipeline to Azerbaijan, or by the
intermediary of Iran. For the time being, Iranian gas and transit
routes are blocked by Washington. The Americans are also blocking the
Syrian transit route for Egyptian gas. The presence of the U.S. special
energy envoy Richard Morningstar at the signing ceremony on July 13
in Ankara, was not only a demonstration of US's endorsement of the
project, but also of the fact that it has also a say when it comes
to the selection of new participants. Washington could eventually
help the Baghdad government and the KRG to sort out!
their differences over the deliveries of Iraqi gas to "Nabucco." The
Austrian managing director of the project Reinhard Mitschek, however,
said that "Nabucco does not exclude any potential source and will
be open for transportation of any gas meeting quality requirements
from every potential gas supplier, including Russia and Iran, to
destinations in Europe" (Today's Zaman, July 15, 2009). If at least
one additional supplier, able to deliver sufficient gas quantities,
is co-opted, then "Nabucco" would be profitable and its construction
might start. But once completed, the pipeline will not break entirely
European dependence on Russian exports. As for Turkey, she hopes that
her position as indispensable participant in the project will enhance
her chances to join the EU (Grove 2009).
Moscow, uneasy with the EU "Eastern Partnership" program, sees
"Nabucco," circumventing Russian territory, as another threat
to its interests (Babich 2009). Russia, which had problems with
its gas exports through the Ukrainian corridor, is promoting two
alternative pipeline project - the "North Stream" undersea pipeline in
cooperation with Germany, and the two-track "South Stream" combined
undersea//continental pipeline in cooperation with Italy. In order
to supply them, it needs to buy additional quantities of gas from
the same Caspian exporters - Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan - who are
supposed to supply "Nabucco." Both of them are still keeping the two
options open. Turkmenistan is negotiating the renewal of its supplies
to Gazprom. Azerbaijan and Gazprom had signed a preliminary agreement
(Zaynalov 2009). Even Turkey has not excluded its future participation
in the "South Stream" project. In the same time, it is interested to
receive additional Russian gas through the "Blu!
e Stream" pipeline that runs under the Black Sea.
China is also an active player in these energy chess games. She
has concluded a number of deals for the exploration and pumping of
Kazakh oil and is rapidly building a pipeline that will connect the
two countries. She has also gained access to one giant gas field in
Turkmenistan, and has started to build the pipeline that will carry
this gas to Northern China. Her biggest energy deals are with Russia,
from where she imports oil by rail. An agreement has been also signed
for the construction of a gas pipeline.
Iran has secured a concession for exploitation of another gas field in
Turkmenistan (previously pumping gas to Russia), and the two countries
agreed to establish another pipeline link by the end of this year.
Eventually, Turkmen gas could be pumped into "Nabucco" by the
intermediary of Iran (Bhadrakumar 2009). This would be cheaper than
carrying it under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan through a would-be
pipeline that is not yet constructed.
It is a race for the access to energy resources and for gas deliveries
with far-reaching geopolitical implications.
Landlocked Armenia, bypassed by most of these transit routes, is trying
to find its place on the energy map. When the Russo-Georgian border was
closed, it began to heavily rely on Iranian supplies. Although Russian
gas continues to come transiting Georgia, another pipeline was built
in 2007, bringing-in Iranian gas across the Arax River (RIA Novosti,
March 19, 2007). At that time, speculations appeared that Russia,
in its attempts to counter the East-West transit corridor promoted
by the West, was trying to establish the North-South route by which
it will be linked to Iran.
When Moscow cut its trade relations with Georgia, the latter began
to increasingly rely on Turkey. Soon Turkey became its main trading
partner. The annual trade turnoff reached $1 billion by the end of
2008, when a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries
entered into force. Turkish construction companies additionally expect
to be awarded infrastructure contracts amounting to $1,5 billion
from the $4,5 billion aid package granted to Georgia following its
war with Russia. Besides the two functioning pipelines (BTC and BTE)
that transit Georgia, carrying Azeri oil and gas to Turkey, the two
countries and Azerbaijan are building the missing Akhalkalaki-Kars
rail link, another east-west corridor that will establish a rail
connection between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia (Ismayilov 2007).
Some Concluding Remarks
All local, regional and international actors, involved in one way or
another into the Southern Caucasus, claim that they are interested
in the stability of the region. But stability cannot be achieved
without the resolution of frozen conflicts. Without the solution of the
Karabakh controversy, there could not be solutions for the problem of
refugees and IDP. The same is valid for the conflicts that oppose the
Georgian government to the self-declared independent state-entities
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Of course, many of the refugees and
IDP .are not likely to return to their original home-territories,
but they should be fairly compensated in order to facilitate their
integration into receiving communities. Ethnocentric nationalist
policies, actually promoted by all Southern Caucasus ruling elites, are
additionally exacerbating the problems of ethnic minorities, especially
in Georgia, and to a lesser extent in Azerbaijan (practically there
are no remaining minorities in !
Armenia and Armenian-occupied territories). Finally, constant tensions
that could escalate into new military confrontations are blocking
internal political openings and democratic reforms.
Actors external to the region could give their positive contribution
to conflict resolution, but they could, as it is still the case today,
also play less constructive and even disruptive roles. The struggle
for influence in the region, whose main protagonists are Russia and the
United States, together with competing alliances and energy axes, are
certainly destabilizing factors. The European Union, which seems now
more interested than previously, could give its positive contribution
only if it abstains of joining this power game. But, as asserted by
an objective foreign observer, "the US pursues an aggressive policy
aimed at rolling back Russian influence in the Caucasus, Caspian and
Black Sea regions. Most important it has largely succeeded in making
Russia's relationship with the European Union hostage to the fault
lines appearing in the geopolitics of the Eurasian region" (Bhadrakumar
2009). That was indeed the policy of the Bush administration, followed
by its NATO alli!
es. The Obama team has vowed to "reset" American relations with Russia,
but it is not yet clear how this readjustment, using the Russian term
of "perestroika," will affect the Southern Caucasus.
The conflicts in this region cannot be resolved without the
constructive involvement of both Russia and the United States. As
argued in this paper, frozen regional conflicts, refugee and minorities
problems, ethnic human right issues and processes of democratic reforms
are interrelated. The region badly needs cooperation, dialogue and
diplomatic engagement of all parties; confidence building steps;
not additional confrontations.
And solutions could not be isolated from each other. They cannot
be bilateral only. They have to be part o multilateral agreements,
with the participation of all regional actors and guaranteed by the
international community, not forgetting that the Southern Caucasus
is now part of the Greater Middle East regional laboratory.
_____________________________________ _________________________________
Ivan Ivekoviæ, Professor of Political Science at the American
University in Cairo, Egypt (iwek@ aucegypt.edu). Author of Ethnic
and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia. A Political
Economy of Contemporary Ethnonational Mobilization, Ravenna, Longo
editore, 2000.