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Time To Change Of 'Status Quo' In Karabakh Conflict

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  • Time To Change Of 'Status Quo' In Karabakh Conflict

    TIME TO CHANGE OF 'STATUS QUO' IN KARABAKH CONFLICT
    Zaur Shiriyev

    Hurriyet
    April 1 2010
    Turkey

    Peace talks to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been under
    way for more than a decade with virtually no tangible progress. The
    last few weeks looked like a crash course in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
    process, replete with the grandeur of talks and lofty speechmaking
    by even those most committed to the peace process.

    In Yerevan on Sunday, OSCE co-chairs met with Armenian President
    Serge Sarkisian and Foreign Minister Edward Nalbadian to further
    discuss the basic principles for the peaceful settlement of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia has so far declined to publicly
    clarify its response to the still unpublicized changes made in
    the so-called Madrid document. It seems strange that on one hand,
    Armenia states it is ready to discuss the updated Madrid principles,
    but on the other hand, it argues that the fundamental provisions of
    this package are not suitable enough.

    The Madrid principles were put forward by the foreign ministers of
    the countries of the Minsk Group at the OSCE ministerial meeting in
    Madrid in 2007. An updated version of the principles put forward in
    late 2009 has been the subject of discussions between the mediators,
    Armenia and Azerbaijan ever since. The Madrid principles include the
    return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani
    control, an interim status for Karabakh providing guarantees for
    security and self-governance, and the future determination of the final
    legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh though a legally binding expression
    of will. Azerbaijan accepts the updated principles in general. But
    there are two issues are important for the Azerbaijani side that
    Armenia doesn't accept.

    Firstly, there are the relevant decisions of the OSCE to hold
    negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the current stage, the
    Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot join the peace process
    (according to a March 1992 decision by the at the Helsinki meeting
    of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: "Elected
    and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be invited to the
    [Peace] Conference as interested parties").

    It should be noted that the controversy over the question of who
    are direct parties to the conflict and who are "interested parties"
    concerns not the substance of the conflict, but the strategic political
    calculations of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties.

    Most independent observers agree that the Karabakh conflict is an
    inter-state conflict directly involving Azerbaijan and Armenia.

    Secondly, the referendum (Madrid document does not explicitly mention
    "referendum") on the status of the disputed territory is one of the
    stages of peace settlement, as set out in the Madrid principles for
    resolving the conflict. Holding a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh
    is considered "illegal," as under Azerbaijan's constitution any
    referendum in the country must cover the entire territory of the
    country, not just one part.

    Recent developments in the peace process have challenged the perception
    that maintains the status quo is benefiting Armenia, for example
    Armenia's efforts to consolidate the status quo of occupation and
    particularly its continued illegal settlement and drug trafficking
    (according to the 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy
    Report) in the occupied territories. Meanwhile, Armenia has not
    yet implemented the U.N. Security Council's four resolutions on the
    liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the surrounding occupied
    territories. Karabakh Azeris stand out as the most obvious losers from
    the protraction of the current status quo. Karabakh Azeris believe
    the status quo harms their interests by increasingly depriving them
    of the opportunity to influence decisions directly affecting them
    and diminishing their chances of returning to their homeland.

    The three mediators of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process so far seem
    successful in pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan toward a compromise. The
    parties are expected to sign a framework document later this year as
    an initial step of a long settlement process.

    It's clear that the final deal apparently is almost within reach
    of the two sides. Nudged along by the international community, they
    need to find the courage and political will to overcome the remaining
    sticking points - including a formula on how to deal with defining
    the eventual final status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The power sharing in
    Karabakh in the initial post-conflict stage would most probably take
    the form of extreme consociationalism, as in Bosnia from 1995-1997.

    Considering the recent memories, low levels of trust, and weak
    association of the parties' interests, this arrangement would have
    a strong inclination toward elements of self-rule.

    Demographic separation of the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities
    in the initial phases is also necessary for dampening the security
    dilemma associated with intermingled settlement patterns. A middle
    ground between the need for certain ethnic partition and the right
    of the forcefully displaced Azerbaijani population to return to their
    homes can be found in forming two ethnic Armenian and Azeri zones.

    However, it is very important not to repeat mistakes of power sharing
    in Cyprus (1960-1963) and Bosnia (esp. during 1995-1997).

    The common negative feature of these power-sharing arrangements
    was that they did not provide enough incentives for the conflicting
    ethnic groups to cooperate in common governing structures. Despite
    the seemingly irreconcilable position of Armenia, a solution to the
    Karabakh problem does not necessarily imply win-lose outcomes. Common
    ground can be found even in the sine qua non positions of the parties.

    There is a historic chance of making real progress in the
    Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which is likely to make the Caucasus
    a better place to live.

    Finally, the international community needs to show it is ready to carry
    more responsibility, by making a solution to the Karabakh conflict
    a priority, and by offering continued support to the peace process.

    -----

    Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst from Azerbaijan.
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