Tweet
INSTABILITY OF TURKEY DOES NOT EXONERATE IT FROM RESPONSIBILITY TO BE A PREDICTABLE AND SERIOUS PARTNER IN THE WORLD ARENA
Ashot Safaryan
ArmInfo
2010-04-19 12:05:00
ArmInfo's exclusive Interview with Karen Bekaryan, Head of European
Integration NGO
Mr. Bekaryan, what goals does Turkey pursue in normalization of
relations with Armenia and does it want a logical end to that process?
Actually, Turkey's behavior for the last months is a reason to think
over Ankara's willingness to continue the process of normalizing
relations with Armenia. If yes, so it is not clear what does Turkey
understand by that idea? After revealing Ankara's position, the steps
and possible diplomatic measures that Armenia and the mediator-states
may apply to Turkey will become more exact.
Will Ankara use the meeting in Washington to avoid the undesirable
scenario of April 24?
I think that the current activation of Turkey can be explained with
the toughened position of the USA and the EU rather than the April
24 date. And this toughening is reflected in the loss of confidence
in Turkey. Ankara no longer has the opportunity to manipulate with
the opinion of the world community. The West has demonstrated an
exact stance: the protocols should be ratified within reasonable
terms and without preconditions. Armenia's approach also necessitated
determination of reasonable terms i.e. we have sent a clear message
saying that Turkey cannot endlessly play on the normalization process
trying to derive dividends.
So why aren't the terms of ratification specified?
No deadline is determined because every country has its own internal
regulations for ratification of inter-state agreements and their
coming into effect in the line with the legislation. If one sets a
tight deadline, it already demonstrates distrust and absence of a good
will. Natural course of negotiations implies unhampered ratification
of the signed agreement and bringing it into effect. The problem of
the Armenian-Turkish process is that the parties do not fall within
the natural course of events. Although the mediators did not endeavor
to specify the date of ratification before signing of the Protocols
in Zurich, now the experience shows that it is necessary to set a
deadline because of Turkey's manipulations.
May the Armenian-Turkish process suffer the same fate as the unsettled
Karabakh conflict?
I do not think so. Toughening their positions from time to time the
parties to the Karabakh conflict, especially Azerbaijan, are well aware
that the process must have a final result. The Armenian-Turkish process
is specific from this point of view. Suspension of negotiations is
in favor of Turkey only. And I think that Armenia will not allow such
state of affairs. The Armenian party is now studying the possibility of
terminating the process through recalling the signature from under the
protocols. Therefore, I do not think that the Armenian-Turkish process
will become a peculiar analogue to the Karabakh peace process. The
Armenian-Turkish process suggests two possible outcomes: either
ratification and logical continuation or refusal from the process in
certain period of time. However, considering the internal problems
of Turkey, in particular, the possible tension inside the country
before the parliamentary elections scheduled for the next years,
the prospect of protracting ratification is becoming more real.
Protraction of the process is becoming real also considering the
negative attitude of the Turkish public to the Protocols, isn't it?
There is one problem here: I am note sure that the public has a
negative attitude to the Protocols. I have no ground to trust in the
results of various public opinion polls. The Turkish authorities often
say that their society is against ratification of the protocols. But
I don't know what is bluff and what is true, since I have never seen
the results of public opinion polls, which would present the real
attitude of the society to the documents. And one cannot but cast
doubts on reality of democratic processes in Turkey. In addition, the
domestic political and inter-ethnic problems of Turkey also affect the
foreign policy course of that country. Ankara will undoubtedly try to
manipulate with ratification of the Protocols signed in Zurich taking
advantage of the parliamentary elections scheduled for the next year.
But these endeavors will have a negative impact on reputation of the
ruling Justice and Development Party. In case of ratification, the
opposition will blame the authorities for betraying the interests of
"fraternal Azerbaijan", whereas failure of ratification will lead to
more external pressure and Erdogan's party will be again accused of
short views and inconsistent policy. In fact, Ankara has found itself
between two fires, for both the scenarios will aggravate domestic
political tension in Turkey.
How should official Yerevan respond to Erdogan's statements against
Diaspora?
I have not seen any adequate response by the Armenian party to such
statements by the Turkish prime minister by present. Anyway, I hope
Armenia's harsh response will be at the diplomatic level, though I am
not sure. Eventually, all this should be at the public level. Turkish
Prime Minister's behavior over the last months is extremely problematic
and unstatesmanlike. Erdogan's statements are full of populism but
at the same time they are vulnerable inside the country and outside
it. This fact is also conditioned by the domestic political instability
of our neighbor. But this does not exonerate Ankara from responsibility
to be a predictable and serious partner in the world arena.
What will the new strategic arms reduction treaty signed by Russia
and USA in Prague give the world and will it change the balance of
forces in our region?
The new strategic arms reduction treaty between Russia and the USA
will significantly ease the situation not only in the South Caucasus,
but also in the world. Since the end of the "cold-war" the relations
between the two nuclear super-powers had not been as tense as under
Bush Jr. Administration. The world was on the verge of a new division
into two opposite blocs. Fortunately, we have become witnesses of
some easing of that tension. The best evidence of this is the START-3
(strategic arms reduction treaty). Nevertheless, the treaty will
not change the balance of forces. The two signatories have their own
spheres of influence. Nothing will change from this point of view.
How would you explain Ilham Aliyev's absence from the Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington?
The Azerbaijani president was not invited to the Summit to demonstrate
to the world community that the Armenian-Turkish normalization and
settlement of the Karabakh conflict are not linked. All the attempts
to put them into the same bunch are inadmissible. In fact, Aliyev's
presence at the Summit would create certain imitation of linking of
the two processes.
Ashot Safaryan
ArmInfo
2010-04-19 12:05:00
ArmInfo's exclusive Interview with Karen Bekaryan, Head of European
Integration NGO
Mr. Bekaryan, what goals does Turkey pursue in normalization of
relations with Armenia and does it want a logical end to that process?
Actually, Turkey's behavior for the last months is a reason to think
over Ankara's willingness to continue the process of normalizing
relations with Armenia. If yes, so it is not clear what does Turkey
understand by that idea? After revealing Ankara's position, the steps
and possible diplomatic measures that Armenia and the mediator-states
may apply to Turkey will become more exact.
Will Ankara use the meeting in Washington to avoid the undesirable
scenario of April 24?
I think that the current activation of Turkey can be explained with
the toughened position of the USA and the EU rather than the April
24 date. And this toughening is reflected in the loss of confidence
in Turkey. Ankara no longer has the opportunity to manipulate with
the opinion of the world community. The West has demonstrated an
exact stance: the protocols should be ratified within reasonable
terms and without preconditions. Armenia's approach also necessitated
determination of reasonable terms i.e. we have sent a clear message
saying that Turkey cannot endlessly play on the normalization process
trying to derive dividends.
So why aren't the terms of ratification specified?
No deadline is determined because every country has its own internal
regulations for ratification of inter-state agreements and their
coming into effect in the line with the legislation. If one sets a
tight deadline, it already demonstrates distrust and absence of a good
will. Natural course of negotiations implies unhampered ratification
of the signed agreement and bringing it into effect. The problem of
the Armenian-Turkish process is that the parties do not fall within
the natural course of events. Although the mediators did not endeavor
to specify the date of ratification before signing of the Protocols
in Zurich, now the experience shows that it is necessary to set a
deadline because of Turkey's manipulations.
May the Armenian-Turkish process suffer the same fate as the unsettled
Karabakh conflict?
I do not think so. Toughening their positions from time to time the
parties to the Karabakh conflict, especially Azerbaijan, are well aware
that the process must have a final result. The Armenian-Turkish process
is specific from this point of view. Suspension of negotiations is
in favor of Turkey only. And I think that Armenia will not allow such
state of affairs. The Armenian party is now studying the possibility of
terminating the process through recalling the signature from under the
protocols. Therefore, I do not think that the Armenian-Turkish process
will become a peculiar analogue to the Karabakh peace process. The
Armenian-Turkish process suggests two possible outcomes: either
ratification and logical continuation or refusal from the process in
certain period of time. However, considering the internal problems
of Turkey, in particular, the possible tension inside the country
before the parliamentary elections scheduled for the next years,
the prospect of protracting ratification is becoming more real.
Protraction of the process is becoming real also considering the
negative attitude of the Turkish public to the Protocols, isn't it?
There is one problem here: I am note sure that the public has a
negative attitude to the Protocols. I have no ground to trust in the
results of various public opinion polls. The Turkish authorities often
say that their society is against ratification of the protocols. But
I don't know what is bluff and what is true, since I have never seen
the results of public opinion polls, which would present the real
attitude of the society to the documents. And one cannot but cast
doubts on reality of democratic processes in Turkey. In addition, the
domestic political and inter-ethnic problems of Turkey also affect the
foreign policy course of that country. Ankara will undoubtedly try to
manipulate with ratification of the Protocols signed in Zurich taking
advantage of the parliamentary elections scheduled for the next year.
But these endeavors will have a negative impact on reputation of the
ruling Justice and Development Party. In case of ratification, the
opposition will blame the authorities for betraying the interests of
"fraternal Azerbaijan", whereas failure of ratification will lead to
more external pressure and Erdogan's party will be again accused of
short views and inconsistent policy. In fact, Ankara has found itself
between two fires, for both the scenarios will aggravate domestic
political tension in Turkey.
How should official Yerevan respond to Erdogan's statements against
Diaspora?
I have not seen any adequate response by the Armenian party to such
statements by the Turkish prime minister by present. Anyway, I hope
Armenia's harsh response will be at the diplomatic level, though I am
not sure. Eventually, all this should be at the public level. Turkish
Prime Minister's behavior over the last months is extremely problematic
and unstatesmanlike. Erdogan's statements are full of populism but
at the same time they are vulnerable inside the country and outside
it. This fact is also conditioned by the domestic political instability
of our neighbor. But this does not exonerate Ankara from responsibility
to be a predictable and serious partner in the world arena.
What will the new strategic arms reduction treaty signed by Russia
and USA in Prague give the world and will it change the balance of
forces in our region?
The new strategic arms reduction treaty between Russia and the USA
will significantly ease the situation not only in the South Caucasus,
but also in the world. Since the end of the "cold-war" the relations
between the two nuclear super-powers had not been as tense as under
Bush Jr. Administration. The world was on the verge of a new division
into two opposite blocs. Fortunately, we have become witnesses of
some easing of that tension. The best evidence of this is the START-3
(strategic arms reduction treaty). Nevertheless, the treaty will
not change the balance of forces. The two signatories have their own
spheres of influence. Nothing will change from this point of view.
How would you explain Ilham Aliyev's absence from the Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington?
The Azerbaijani president was not invited to the Summit to demonstrate
to the world community that the Armenian-Turkish normalization and
settlement of the Karabakh conflict are not linked. All the attempts
to put them into the same bunch are inadmissible. In fact, Aliyev's
presence at the Summit would create certain imitation of linking of
the two processes.