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TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS AND AZERBAIJAN
news.az
April 23 2010
Azerbaijan
Novruz Mammadov News.Az reprints from Today's Zaman an article by
Novruz Mammadov, foreign relations department head at Azerbaijan's
presidential administration.
Recently, the Turkish media have widely discussed Azerbaijan's role
in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Many commentators argue that in order to become a global player
Turkey must mend ties with Armenia, and they accuse Azerbaijan
of thwarting this process. Some even claim that Turkey has made
its foreign policy hostage to Azerbaijan's demands. Most of these
arguments do not reflect reality.
Over the last two decades, the major impediments in Turkish-Armenian
relations have been the Armenian campaign for the recognition of the
genocide claims and Armenia's refusal to publicly recognize the Turkish
border. Turkey's decision to close its border with Armenia in 1993 in
response to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces set another milestone in
relations. On the other hand, under the influence of their Armenian
lobbies, the US and European countries have made significant efforts
to help Armenia, ignoring its continuing occupation of Azerbaijani
territories. Recently, the US has been using the possible recognition
of the Armenian genocide claims as a threat to pressure Turkey to
open the border without any preconditions.
Three main arguments are used to compel both Turkey and Azerbaijan
to accept a plan that would benefit only Armenia. Firstly, the
Turkish-Armenian problem has nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh,
and hence these two issues should be treated separately. Secondly,
the opening of the border will eliminate the genocide issue, which
is a major problem in US-Turkish relations. Thirdly, both Turkey and
Azerbaijan will benefit from the opening of the border because this
will contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
First of all, we believe that as two states with the same people,
Turkey and Azerbaijan bear the moral responsibility to defend
each other's interests. Those who demand that Turkey ignore the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be reminded that many Armenian
fighters in the conflict, by their own account, were driven by the
desire to 'settle scores with the Turks' and expelled close to a
million people from their lands by undertaking massacres such as
the one in Khojaly. These people were victims of ethnic cleansing
because they were Turks, and naturally they expected support from
Turkey. The Turks' desire to consider the most important problem of
their Azerbaijani brethren should be clear to American officials who
prepare genocide recognition bills and pressure countries across the
ocean in order to satisfy their relatively minor Armenian population.
On the other hand, it is not plausible that the opening of the
border will relieve Turkey of the genocide problem. The Armenian
diaspora considers the genocide issue its lifeline and an important
political tool. Armenian officials have also embraced the recognition
of the genocide claims as a national cause and continue to support
it. This issue has been used as a political tool both within US
domestic politics and in its relations with Turkey. It is ironic
that those who use the genocide card to pressure Turkey to open the
border today argue these claims will be shelved with the improvement
of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkey's major concern should be the
scenario lurking behind the recognition campaign, as it is well known
that the other two pillars of the Armenian cause are reparation and
territorial claims.
Those who claim the opening of the border might contribute to
the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by leading to a
moderation in Armenian politics or argue that Turkey's support for
Azerbaijan strengthens our position and makes us irreconcilable in the
negotiations are apparently not well informed on this issue. In order
to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Azerbaijan has closely
cooperated with the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); however, so far the negotiations have
been futile because of Armenia's intransigence. Armenia's track record
in the negotiations creates the impression that it wants to keep the
conflict unresolved as an excuse for an indefinite occupation. If the
expected concession from the Azerbaijani side is our acknowledgment of
the occupation, it will not happen under any conditions. The closed
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain a major factor that might
compel Armenia to take a constructive step for the resolution of the
conflict. Opening the border before Armenia takes any steps in this
direction would be a major blow to the peace prospects and Azerbaijan.
Lastly, it is simply not true that Azerbaijan has not supported
Turkey. Azerbaijan was not with Turkey in the recent nuclear security
summit because it was not invited, and in fact, the media interpreted
this as yet another manifestation of US efforts to exclude Azerbaijan
from Turkish-Armenian relations. Azerbaijani officials consider
raising and defending issues important to Turkey a responsibility,
and our countries have consistently taken a unanimous position on
almost every issue in international forums. Since its independence,
Azerbaijan had to fight against the use of the Armenian genocide
claims as a political instrument because we have suffered most from
these claims. Armenia has successfully overshadowed its occupation and
ethnic cleansing in Azerbaijani territories with an active genocide
campaign in the West, and today, it is painful to observe that this
tactic has started to succeed even in Turkey.
The relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are based on strong
traditions and mutual interests. Over the last 20 years, Turkey has
been Azerbaijan's gate to the West, and Azerbaijan has played the
same role in Turkey's relations with Central Asia. Notwithstanding
great pressures, Azerbaijan insisted on building its major oil and
gas pipelines through Turkey toward the West. Standing by Azerbaijan
during difficult times, Turkey has earned the esteem and sympathy of
the Azerbaijani people. We consider the current external pressures
another test that will further strengthen the ties between our peoples
and countries.
news.az
April 23 2010
Azerbaijan
Novruz Mammadov News.Az reprints from Today's Zaman an article by
Novruz Mammadov, foreign relations department head at Azerbaijan's
presidential administration.
Recently, the Turkish media have widely discussed Azerbaijan's role
in Turkish-Armenian relations.
Many commentators argue that in order to become a global player
Turkey must mend ties with Armenia, and they accuse Azerbaijan
of thwarting this process. Some even claim that Turkey has made
its foreign policy hostage to Azerbaijan's demands. Most of these
arguments do not reflect reality.
Over the last two decades, the major impediments in Turkish-Armenian
relations have been the Armenian campaign for the recognition of the
genocide claims and Armenia's refusal to publicly recognize the Turkish
border. Turkey's decision to close its border with Armenia in 1993 in
response to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
Azerbaijani territories by Armenian forces set another milestone in
relations. On the other hand, under the influence of their Armenian
lobbies, the US and European countries have made significant efforts
to help Armenia, ignoring its continuing occupation of Azerbaijani
territories. Recently, the US has been using the possible recognition
of the Armenian genocide claims as a threat to pressure Turkey to
open the border without any preconditions.
Three main arguments are used to compel both Turkey and Azerbaijan
to accept a plan that would benefit only Armenia. Firstly, the
Turkish-Armenian problem has nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh,
and hence these two issues should be treated separately. Secondly,
the opening of the border will eliminate the genocide issue, which
is a major problem in US-Turkish relations. Thirdly, both Turkey and
Azerbaijan will benefit from the opening of the border because this
will contribute to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
First of all, we believe that as two states with the same people,
Turkey and Azerbaijan bear the moral responsibility to defend
each other's interests. Those who demand that Turkey ignore the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be reminded that many Armenian
fighters in the conflict, by their own account, were driven by the
desire to 'settle scores with the Turks' and expelled close to a
million people from their lands by undertaking massacres such as
the one in Khojaly. These people were victims of ethnic cleansing
because they were Turks, and naturally they expected support from
Turkey. The Turks' desire to consider the most important problem of
their Azerbaijani brethren should be clear to American officials who
prepare genocide recognition bills and pressure countries across the
ocean in order to satisfy their relatively minor Armenian population.
On the other hand, it is not plausible that the opening of the
border will relieve Turkey of the genocide problem. The Armenian
diaspora considers the genocide issue its lifeline and an important
political tool. Armenian officials have also embraced the recognition
of the genocide claims as a national cause and continue to support
it. This issue has been used as a political tool both within US
domestic politics and in its relations with Turkey. It is ironic
that those who use the genocide card to pressure Turkey to open the
border today argue these claims will be shelved with the improvement
of Turkish-Armenian relations. Turkey's major concern should be the
scenario lurking behind the recognition campaign, as it is well known
that the other two pillars of the Armenian cause are reparation and
territorial claims.
Those who claim the opening of the border might contribute to
the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by leading to a
moderation in Armenian politics or argue that Turkey's support for
Azerbaijan strengthens our position and makes us irreconcilable in the
negotiations are apparently not well informed on this issue. In order
to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, Azerbaijan has closely
cooperated with the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); however, so far the negotiations have
been futile because of Armenia's intransigence. Armenia's track record
in the negotiations creates the impression that it wants to keep the
conflict unresolved as an excuse for an indefinite occupation. If the
expected concession from the Azerbaijani side is our acknowledgment of
the occupation, it will not happen under any conditions. The closed
borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain a major factor that might
compel Armenia to take a constructive step for the resolution of the
conflict. Opening the border before Armenia takes any steps in this
direction would be a major blow to the peace prospects and Azerbaijan.
Lastly, it is simply not true that Azerbaijan has not supported
Turkey. Azerbaijan was not with Turkey in the recent nuclear security
summit because it was not invited, and in fact, the media interpreted
this as yet another manifestation of US efforts to exclude Azerbaijan
from Turkish-Armenian relations. Azerbaijani officials consider
raising and defending issues important to Turkey a responsibility,
and our countries have consistently taken a unanimous position on
almost every issue in international forums. Since its independence,
Azerbaijan had to fight against the use of the Armenian genocide
claims as a political instrument because we have suffered most from
these claims. Armenia has successfully overshadowed its occupation and
ethnic cleansing in Azerbaijani territories with an active genocide
campaign in the West, and today, it is painful to observe that this
tactic has started to succeed even in Turkey.
The relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are based on strong
traditions and mutual interests. Over the last 20 years, Turkey has
been Azerbaijan's gate to the West, and Azerbaijan has played the
same role in Turkey's relations with Central Asia. Notwithstanding
great pressures, Azerbaijan insisted on building its major oil and
gas pipelines through Turkey toward the West. Standing by Azerbaijan
during difficult times, Turkey has earned the esteem and sympathy of
the Azerbaijani people. We consider the current external pressures
another test that will further strengthen the ties between our peoples
and countries.