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AZERBAIJAN: US SHOULD TAKE NOTE: A FRIEND IN NEED IS A FRIEND INDEED
EurasiaNet
http://www.eurasianet.org/depar tments/insightb/articles/eav042610.shtml
April 26 2010
NY
US officials have declared that the United States regards the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the normalization
of relations between Turkey and Armenia as separate processes. This
policy, however, ignores the interests of Washington's main partners
in the region -- Azerbaijan and Turkey. Brushing off Baku and Ankara's
objections to this policy risks further undermining US influence in
the South Caucasus.
The reason why Washington wants to keep the Turkey-Armenia
reconciliation process separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations
is clear. The White House considers that normalizing relations between
Turkey and Armenia will reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia (and
Iran) and allow Yerevan to maneuver beyond the reach of Russian
pressure. With Armenia less dependent on Russia, the entire South
Caucasus could be removed from the Kremlin's reach. Or so the reasoning
appears to go.
But this aim does not take into consideration certain realities in
the South Caucasus.
Even if Turkey's border with Armenia is opened, Armenia will not turn
its back on Russia and its face toward the West. On the contrary,
this policy further serves Russia's interests. As the United States
forces Turkey to open its borders with Armenia, Russia will gain
"an economically strengthened ally, Armenia," instead of "a weak,
dependent partner."
This scenario is what prompts Ankara and Baku's discomfort. Ignoring
that discomfort could carry a heavy price.
Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a
strategically important country located at the crossroads of East
and West. To date, Ankara has used this strategic advantage for
Washington's interests - whether by assisting with the NATO campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, or with various energy projects -- and should
expect a reaction in kind from the United States.
The same holds true for Azerbaijan. Thanks to its Caspian Sea natural
gas supplies, Azerbaijan is capable of reducing Europe's dependence
on Russian gas, and ensuring the diversification of its imported
energy resources. This is a policy that meets completely the strategic
interests of the United States.
Surrounded by Russia to the north, Iran to the south and Armenia
to the west, Azerbaijan is trying to protect its interests with a
balanced foreign policy. In keeping with that policy, Azerbaijan,
like Ankara, expects a sympathetic attitude from Washington toward
its concerns about Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.
At the very least, in response to Baku's friendship with the United
States, Azerbaijan should have been invited to join the summit earlier
this month between Turkey and Armenia in Washington.
If their expectations of the United States fail, both Azerbaijan and
Turkey could think of seeking new partners. This means weakening the
American position in the region, and ceding a place to Russia. With
recent events in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine - widely seen as revenge for US
inroads in the former Soviet Union -- Moscow has once more demonstrated
that it is in touch with the psychology of Eurasian countries.
If the United States wants to strengthen its position in the South
Caucasus, it can do it by helping to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict; not by removing Armenia from Turkey's blockade. If the
Washington takes a fair position on the conflict's resolution, it
will gain fundamental support in the region.
Azerbaijan's position is obvious. Baku will not allow any step that
denies the link between the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.
Turkey has taken a similar position. Statements by Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu show that
Turkey is trying to stay committed to this course as much as possible.
As Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated at an April 15 news conference
after his talks with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in Washington,
Azerbaijan's absence from the discussions was a "deficiency."
How will Azerbaijan respond to Washington's demands on Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation? Without detailed knowledge of the talks in Washington -
shared by Davutoglu with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev last week
-- that is impossible to predict. But the reality is that Azerbaijan
will not react positively to any step that will eliminate its advantage
in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - namely, a closed
border between Turkey and Armenia.
Editor's Note: Vusale Mahirqizi is the general director of APA, a
news agency based in Baku, Azerbaijan. The views expressed in this
commentary reflect the opinion of the author alone and do not reflect
the views or policies of EurasiaNet.org or the Open Society Institute.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
EurasiaNet
http://www.eurasianet.org/depar tments/insightb/articles/eav042610.shtml
April 26 2010
NY
US officials have declared that the United States regards the
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the normalization
of relations between Turkey and Armenia as separate processes. This
policy, however, ignores the interests of Washington's main partners
in the region -- Azerbaijan and Turkey. Brushing off Baku and Ankara's
objections to this policy risks further undermining US influence in
the South Caucasus.
The reason why Washington wants to keep the Turkey-Armenia
reconciliation process separate from the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations
is clear. The White House considers that normalizing relations between
Turkey and Armenia will reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia (and
Iran) and allow Yerevan to maneuver beyond the reach of Russian
pressure. With Armenia less dependent on Russia, the entire South
Caucasus could be removed from the Kremlin's reach. Or so the reasoning
appears to go.
But this aim does not take into consideration certain realities in
the South Caucasus.
Even if Turkey's border with Armenia is opened, Armenia will not turn
its back on Russia and its face toward the West. On the contrary,
this policy further serves Russia's interests. As the United States
forces Turkey to open its borders with Armenia, Russia will gain
"an economically strengthened ally, Armenia," instead of "a weak,
dependent partner."
This scenario is what prompts Ankara and Baku's discomfort. Ignoring
that discomfort could carry a heavy price.
Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a
strategically important country located at the crossroads of East
and West. To date, Ankara has used this strategic advantage for
Washington's interests - whether by assisting with the NATO campaigns
in Iraq and Afghanistan, or with various energy projects -- and should
expect a reaction in kind from the United States.
The same holds true for Azerbaijan. Thanks to its Caspian Sea natural
gas supplies, Azerbaijan is capable of reducing Europe's dependence
on Russian gas, and ensuring the diversification of its imported
energy resources. This is a policy that meets completely the strategic
interests of the United States.
Surrounded by Russia to the north, Iran to the south and Armenia
to the west, Azerbaijan is trying to protect its interests with a
balanced foreign policy. In keeping with that policy, Azerbaijan,
like Ankara, expects a sympathetic attitude from Washington toward
its concerns about Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.
At the very least, in response to Baku's friendship with the United
States, Azerbaijan should have been invited to join the summit earlier
this month between Turkey and Armenia in Washington.
If their expectations of the United States fail, both Azerbaijan and
Turkey could think of seeking new partners. This means weakening the
American position in the region, and ceding a place to Russia. With
recent events in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine - widely seen as revenge for US
inroads in the former Soviet Union -- Moscow has once more demonstrated
that it is in touch with the psychology of Eurasian countries.
If the United States wants to strengthen its position in the South
Caucasus, it can do it by helping to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict; not by removing Armenia from Turkey's blockade. If the
Washington takes a fair position on the conflict's resolution, it
will gain fundamental support in the region.
Azerbaijan's position is obvious. Baku will not allow any step that
denies the link between the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
and the rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.
Turkey has taken a similar position. Statements by Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu show that
Turkey is trying to stay committed to this course as much as possible.
As Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated at an April 15 news conference
after his talks with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan in Washington,
Azerbaijan's absence from the discussions was a "deficiency."
How will Azerbaijan respond to Washington's demands on Turkish-Armenian
reconciliation? Without detailed knowledge of the talks in Washington -
shared by Davutoglu with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev last week
-- that is impossible to predict. But the reality is that Azerbaijan
will not react positively to any step that will eliminate its advantage
in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict - namely, a closed
border between Turkey and Armenia.
Editor's Note: Vusale Mahirqizi is the general director of APA, a
news agency based in Baku, Azerbaijan. The views expressed in this
commentary reflect the opinion of the author alone and do not reflect
the views or policies of EurasiaNet.org or the Open Society Institute.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress