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KARABAKH STATUS REMAINS 'MAIN PROBLEM'
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
April 27 2010
Azerbaijan
Stephan H. Astourian News.Az interviews Stephan H. Astourian, Ph.D.,
executive director of the Armenian Studies Program at the University
of California, Berkeley.
Are you satisfied with President Obama's speech to the Armenian
community on 24 April?
In view of the current international efforts to bring some form
of understanding and communication between Armenia and Turkey, I
did not expect that President Obama would use the word 'genocide'
to characterize the 1915-23 events. In this sense, I was not
disappointed. In substance and as a person, however, he is already
referring implicitly to the Armenian Genocide.
What are the prospects for the ratification of the two protocols
between Armenia and Turkey?
As the Republic of Turkey has now made the ratification of the
protocols contingent on substantial progress with regard to the
Mountainous Karabakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] issue, by which it means that
control of some of the provinces surrounding Mountainous Karabakh
should be handed over to Azerbaijan, I do not foresee ratification in
the short to medium term. I doubt such progress will take place soon.
Armenia says it intends to normalize relations with Turkey without
any preconditions and at the same time tries to have the 1915 events
recognized as genocide. Don't you see a contradictions in this?
The protocols do not mention that Armenia should not pursue recognition
of the Armenian Genocide internationally. As a result, I do not see
any contradiction. What the protocols mention is the creation of a
'sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue
with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations,
including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records
and archive to define existing problems and formulate recommendations,
in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international
experts shall take part.' This statement does not negate the occurrence
of the Armenian Genocide.
How do you explain Armenia's rejection of Iranian mediation on the
Karabakh settlement?
I am not quite sure there is a definitive and authoritative Armenian
position regarding Iranian mediation. If there is, I am not privy to
the reasons why Armenia might not favour Iranian mediation. However,
the Mountainous Karabakh issue has such implications that it is
unlikely any single regional power can solve it. This is why the
co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk Group are up to now the main conduit for
negotiations. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Iran has good
reasons to be interested in any resolution of the Karabakh conflict,
since some of the provinces surrounding Mountainous Karabakh are
contiguous to its territory, since any deployment of international
peacekeepers might affect its own security, and since it was involved
in conflict resolution as early as 1992. If Turkey, a party to the
conflict of course, wishes to join the co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk
Group, there is no reason, from Iran's perspective naturally, that
it should not be involved in the resolution of this issue.
There is an opinion that it would be easier to solve the Karabakh
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia if there were no interruption
from the Armenian diaspora, who do not accept any compromises. How
would you comment on this point of view?
The Armenian diaspora is in no position to determine the policies of
Armenia and of the 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh' [the inverted commas
here have been included by News.Az] with regard to this conflict. The
dichotomy between a 'reasonable' Armenia and an 'extremist' Armenian
diaspora is a theme that emerged in both Armenia and Turkey in the
mid-1990s. The then Armenian leadership wished to dissociate itself
from the diaspora. Turkey has been using this theme until now.
Overall, this dichotomy has little analytic relevance and it is my
sense that the possibility of resolving the Karabakh problem has
little to do with the diaspora.
How realistic is progress on the Karabakh settlement any time soon?
Progress in solving the Karabakh issue appears to depend on a number of
problems. The status of the 'Nagorno- Karabakh Republic' [the inverted
commas here have been included by News.Az], and how and when it will be
determined, seems to me to be the main problem. Linkage with Armenia
through the Kelbajar and Lachin corridors appears to be the second
problem. What will be the size and status of these corridors? Will
there be international peacekeepers and, if so, which peacekeepers? The
overall sustainability of the settlement and the security of whatever
entity is formed in Mountainous Karabakh is another important issue. In
other matters, whereas the question of the Azerbaijani refugees seems
to have been treated, I am a bit unclear about the issue of the more
than 350,000 Armenian refugees from Soviet Azerbaijan, as I do not know
whether the pogroms and losses they faced are part of the negotiations.
At this point, the bellicose statements coming from President Aliyev
and his administration do not contribute to building trust. In the same
vein, statements to the effect that Zangezur is Azerbaijani territory,
that Yerevan is the capital of Western Azerbaijan and that Armenia is
actually Western Azerbaijan might not be helpful, even if they were to
amount to nothing but psychological operations. In this context, and
without knowing the details of the ongoing negotiations, I am not sure
the Azerbaijani government wants to settle this issue quickly. I wonder
if focusing the attention of the Azerbaijani masses against Armenia is
a way of deflecting from their concerns about social, economic, and
political difficulties. In this same context, I also wonder why the
'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh' [the inverted commas here have been
included by News.Az] would relinquish a buffer zone that ensures its
survival and gives it some strategic depth and time to better protect
its territory in case of war. Bar significantly new arrangements
among the Minsk Group co-chairs that I cannot predict at this time,
I am not overly optimistic about a quick resolution of this conflict.
Stephan H. Astourian, Ph.D., is executive director of the Armenian
Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley and assistant
adjunct professor at the Department of History.
Leyla Tagiyeva
news.az
April 27 2010
Azerbaijan
Stephan H. Astourian News.Az interviews Stephan H. Astourian, Ph.D.,
executive director of the Armenian Studies Program at the University
of California, Berkeley.
Are you satisfied with President Obama's speech to the Armenian
community on 24 April?
In view of the current international efforts to bring some form
of understanding and communication between Armenia and Turkey, I
did not expect that President Obama would use the word 'genocide'
to characterize the 1915-23 events. In this sense, I was not
disappointed. In substance and as a person, however, he is already
referring implicitly to the Armenian Genocide.
What are the prospects for the ratification of the two protocols
between Armenia and Turkey?
As the Republic of Turkey has now made the ratification of the
protocols contingent on substantial progress with regard to the
Mountainous Karabakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] issue, by which it means that
control of some of the provinces surrounding Mountainous Karabakh
should be handed over to Azerbaijan, I do not foresee ratification in
the short to medium term. I doubt such progress will take place soon.
Armenia says it intends to normalize relations with Turkey without
any preconditions and at the same time tries to have the 1915 events
recognized as genocide. Don't you see a contradictions in this?
The protocols do not mention that Armenia should not pursue recognition
of the Armenian Genocide internationally. As a result, I do not see
any contradiction. What the protocols mention is the creation of a
'sub-commission on the historical dimension to implement a dialogue
with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations,
including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records
and archive to define existing problems and formulate recommendations,
in which Armenian, Turkish as well as Swiss and other international
experts shall take part.' This statement does not negate the occurrence
of the Armenian Genocide.
How do you explain Armenia's rejection of Iranian mediation on the
Karabakh settlement?
I am not quite sure there is a definitive and authoritative Armenian
position regarding Iranian mediation. If there is, I am not privy to
the reasons why Armenia might not favour Iranian mediation. However,
the Mountainous Karabakh issue has such implications that it is
unlikely any single regional power can solve it. This is why the
co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk Group are up to now the main conduit for
negotiations. On the other hand, there is no doubt that Iran has good
reasons to be interested in any resolution of the Karabakh conflict,
since some of the provinces surrounding Mountainous Karabakh are
contiguous to its territory, since any deployment of international
peacekeepers might affect its own security, and since it was involved
in conflict resolution as early as 1992. If Turkey, a party to the
conflict of course, wishes to join the co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk
Group, there is no reason, from Iran's perspective naturally, that
it should not be involved in the resolution of this issue.
There is an opinion that it would be easier to solve the Karabakh
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia if there were no interruption
from the Armenian diaspora, who do not accept any compromises. How
would you comment on this point of view?
The Armenian diaspora is in no position to determine the policies of
Armenia and of the 'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh' [the inverted commas
here have been included by News.Az] with regard to this conflict. The
dichotomy between a 'reasonable' Armenia and an 'extremist' Armenian
diaspora is a theme that emerged in both Armenia and Turkey in the
mid-1990s. The then Armenian leadership wished to dissociate itself
from the diaspora. Turkey has been using this theme until now.
Overall, this dichotomy has little analytic relevance and it is my
sense that the possibility of resolving the Karabakh problem has
little to do with the diaspora.
How realistic is progress on the Karabakh settlement any time soon?
Progress in solving the Karabakh issue appears to depend on a number of
problems. The status of the 'Nagorno- Karabakh Republic' [the inverted
commas here have been included by News.Az], and how and when it will be
determined, seems to me to be the main problem. Linkage with Armenia
through the Kelbajar and Lachin corridors appears to be the second
problem. What will be the size and status of these corridors? Will
there be international peacekeepers and, if so, which peacekeepers? The
overall sustainability of the settlement and the security of whatever
entity is formed in Mountainous Karabakh is another important issue. In
other matters, whereas the question of the Azerbaijani refugees seems
to have been treated, I am a bit unclear about the issue of the more
than 350,000 Armenian refugees from Soviet Azerbaijan, as I do not know
whether the pogroms and losses they faced are part of the negotiations.
At this point, the bellicose statements coming from President Aliyev
and his administration do not contribute to building trust. In the same
vein, statements to the effect that Zangezur is Azerbaijani territory,
that Yerevan is the capital of Western Azerbaijan and that Armenia is
actually Western Azerbaijan might not be helpful, even if they were to
amount to nothing but psychological operations. In this context, and
without knowing the details of the ongoing negotiations, I am not sure
the Azerbaijani government wants to settle this issue quickly. I wonder
if focusing the attention of the Azerbaijani masses against Armenia is
a way of deflecting from their concerns about social, economic, and
political difficulties. In this same context, I also wonder why the
'Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh' [the inverted commas here have been
included by News.Az] would relinquish a buffer zone that ensures its
survival and gives it some strategic depth and time to better protect
its territory in case of war. Bar significantly new arrangements
among the Minsk Group co-chairs that I cannot predict at this time,
I am not overly optimistic about a quick resolution of this conflict.
Stephan H. Astourian, Ph.D., is executive director of the Armenian
Studies Program at the University of California, Berkeley and assistant
adjunct professor at the Department of History.