ARMENIA AND TURKEY NOT READY FOR QUICK RESET
Sergei Markedonov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
April 27, 2010 Tuesday
The decision of President Serzh Sargsyan to take a break in the
process of normalizing the Armenian-Turkish relations has yet again
clearly demonstrated that any peace process progresses in a nonlinear
fashion. The difficult search for compromise solutions always faces
ups and downs, disappointments and even setbacks.
The parliamentary ratification of the two protocols signed by Ankara
and Yerevan last October in Zurich proved to be a barrier that neither
country could overcome. And the prospects for clearing this hurdle
are becoming slimmer with each passing day, writes Sergei Markedonov,
a political analyst.
First, far from everyone in Armenia and Turkey was prepared to cast
aside the prevailing myths, stereotypes and attitudes. Secondly,
both Ankara and Yerevan failed to realize the goals they pursued when
launching the "reset" process.
It would be naive to assume that diplomats initiated the process for
the sake of abstractions. Each party pursued very specific pragmatic
goals. Armenia was trying to drive a wedge between Ankara and Baku and
was successful to a certain point. However, in November 2009, Turkey
once again linked the progress in relations with Armenia with the
resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh. Turkey
was hoping to distance Yerevan from the Armenian diaspora, which is
demonized in Ankara and Baku. Just as their Armenian counterparts,
Turkish diplomats failed to isolate Armenia, which, as they hoped,
would have made it more compliant.
As the parties got further away from their goals, they lost interest
in the peace process. The result was the slowdown of the ratification
process and reiteration of the old claims and accusations. Therefore,
Sargsyan just called a spade a spade. It appears that the parties
have no new breakthrough ideas or resources to realize a transition
from normalization to reconciliation, the analyst writes.
However, a halt in the peace process does not mean its complete
cessation. The president of Armenia is not going to void Yerevan's
signature on the Armenian-Turkish protocols, and does not intend to
freeze bilateral contacts. Despite the slowdown in the parliamentary
ratification, both parties remain interested in reconciliation. The
geopolitical isolation of Armenia objectively compels the country's
elite to seek ways to normalize relations with Turkey. At the same
time, Turkey, which continues moving towards the EU, is interested in
having "zero problems with neighbors" (the formula of Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu). Hence, a new "reset" is forthcoming.
However, in anticipation of the new process, Yerevan and Ankara
should seek to minimize the costs of the current stalemate, Markedonov
concludes.
Sergei Markedonov
RusData Dialine - Russian Press Digest
April 27, 2010 Tuesday
The decision of President Serzh Sargsyan to take a break in the
process of normalizing the Armenian-Turkish relations has yet again
clearly demonstrated that any peace process progresses in a nonlinear
fashion. The difficult search for compromise solutions always faces
ups and downs, disappointments and even setbacks.
The parliamentary ratification of the two protocols signed by Ankara
and Yerevan last October in Zurich proved to be a barrier that neither
country could overcome. And the prospects for clearing this hurdle
are becoming slimmer with each passing day, writes Sergei Markedonov,
a political analyst.
First, far from everyone in Armenia and Turkey was prepared to cast
aside the prevailing myths, stereotypes and attitudes. Secondly,
both Ankara and Yerevan failed to realize the goals they pursued when
launching the "reset" process.
It would be naive to assume that diplomats initiated the process for
the sake of abstractions. Each party pursued very specific pragmatic
goals. Armenia was trying to drive a wedge between Ankara and Baku and
was successful to a certain point. However, in November 2009, Turkey
once again linked the progress in relations with Armenia with the
resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh. Turkey
was hoping to distance Yerevan from the Armenian diaspora, which is
demonized in Ankara and Baku. Just as their Armenian counterparts,
Turkish diplomats failed to isolate Armenia, which, as they hoped,
would have made it more compliant.
As the parties got further away from their goals, they lost interest
in the peace process. The result was the slowdown of the ratification
process and reiteration of the old claims and accusations. Therefore,
Sargsyan just called a spade a spade. It appears that the parties
have no new breakthrough ideas or resources to realize a transition
from normalization to reconciliation, the analyst writes.
However, a halt in the peace process does not mean its complete
cessation. The president of Armenia is not going to void Yerevan's
signature on the Armenian-Turkish protocols, and does not intend to
freeze bilateral contacts. Despite the slowdown in the parliamentary
ratification, both parties remain interested in reconciliation. The
geopolitical isolation of Armenia objectively compels the country's
elite to seek ways to normalize relations with Turkey. At the same
time, Turkey, which continues moving towards the EU, is interested in
having "zero problems with neighbors" (the formula of Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu). Hence, a new "reset" is forthcoming.
However, in anticipation of the new process, Yerevan and Ankara
should seek to minimize the costs of the current stalemate, Markedonov
concludes.