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US CONFLICT RESOLUTION POLICY BACKFIRES IN YEREVAN
Vladimir Socor
Georgian Daily
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=18405&Itemid=13 2
April 29 2010
Georgia
The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised,
by Yerevan's April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish "normalization."
Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy,
finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan's decision to
suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan
would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon
as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that
such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other
[unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az
and Arminfo, April 23).
These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan's view and the
change in Turkey's view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on
opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer
linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's interior
-Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had
rallied to Baku's view last December already.
Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama's administration has
pressed for opening Turkey's border with Armenia unconditionally
Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US,
required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and
open the mutual border "without preconditions."
Washington's policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The
administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide
recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out
of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian
vote. "Normalization" of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on
the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the
unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian
genocide in Ottoman Turkey.
Washington's normalization concept, however, has also turned out to
be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia's favor at Azerbaijan's
expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in
Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly
possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an
unconditional "normalization" of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior
to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.
The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the
South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction
of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of
conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover,
it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey,
compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy
in the region.
Previous US administrations had also proposed to open
the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself,
unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as
has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions
considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia,
as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku
from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were
being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward
stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in
conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri
districts, again in contrast to Washington's recent proposals.
Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier
border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is
the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are
a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This
carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates
about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with
Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the
broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or
allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.
The logic of the administration's initiative from 2009 to date has
implied that Washington would "deliver" the re-opening of Turkey's
border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn "deliver" Azerbaijan
by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the
withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That
conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations.
However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be
separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per
the October 2009 Zurich protocols.
Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a
peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It
would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside
Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the
conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from
its strategic allies.
Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in
the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey
from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality
unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama
and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and
April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter
event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with
reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if
Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances
were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively
excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency,
April 14, 18-20).
The US administration's policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan
being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to "deliver"
Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to
revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more
carefully into account.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm
Vladimir Socor
Georgian Daily
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=co m_content&task=view&id=18405&Itemid=13 2
April 29 2010
Georgia
The US State Department seems disappointed, but not entirely surprised,
by Yerevan's April 22 suspension of Armenian-Turkish "normalization."
Assistant Secretary of State, Philip Gordon, in charge of this policy,
finds solace in Armenian President, Serzh Sargsyan's decision to
suspend, rather than terminate the effort; and hopes that Yerevan
would continue to cooperate with the US-driven process goal. Gordon
as well as State Department Spokesman, Philip Crowley, argued that
such normalization meets the interests of Armenia, Turkey, and other
[unnamed] countries in the region (press releases cited by News.Az
and Arminfo, April 23).
These statements, however, seem to ignore Azerbaijan's view and the
change in Turkey's view. Inasmuch as the normalization focuses on
opening the Turkish-Armenian border unconditionally, or no longer
linked to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's interior
-Baku deemed it to be against its interests all along. Ankara had
rallied to Baku's view last December already.
Since April 2009, US President, Barack Obama's administration has
pressed for opening Turkey's border with Armenia unconditionally
Thus, the October 2009 Zurich protocols, strongly backed by the US,
required Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and
open the mutual border "without preconditions."
Washington's policy seems driven primarily by domestic politics. The
administration hopes to remove the annual drama of Armenian genocide
recognition from the center-stage of US politics. It seeks its way out
of the dilemma of losing Turkey versus any loss of the US Armenian
vote. "Normalization" of Turkish-Armenian relations, centered on
the re-opening of that border, was offered as a substitute for the
unfulfilled electoral-campaign promises to recognize an Armenian
genocide in Ottoman Turkey.
Washington's normalization concept, however, has also turned out to
be unfulfilled. Tilting sharply in Armenia's favor at Azerbaijan's
expense, it backfired first in Azerbaijan and shortly afterward in
Turkey. Instead of de-aligning Ankara from Baku, as seemed briefly
possible, it led Turkey and Azerbaijan to close ranks against an
unconditional "normalization" of Turkish-Armenian relations, prior
to a first-stage withdrawal of Armenian troops from Azerbaijan.
The US initiative seemed unrelated to any regional strategy in the
South Caucasus. It actually coincided with an overall reduction
of US engagement in that region, downgrading the earlier goals of
conflict-resolution and promotion of energy projects. Moreover,
it risked splitting its strategic partner Azerbaijan from Turkey,
compromising the basis for a subsequent return to an active US policy
in the region.
Previous US administrations had also proposed to open
the Turkish-Armenian border, but never as a goal in itself,
unconditionally, or by some deadline in the political calendar, as
has most recently been the case. Moreover, those earlier discussions
considered opening both the Turkish and Azeri borders with Armenia,
as part of an overall settlement, without dividing Ankara and Baku
from each other on that account. Those border-opening proposals were
being discussed as one element in comprehensive negotiations toward
stage-by-stage resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict, and in
conditional linkage with Armenian troop withdrawal from inner-Azeri
districts, again in contrast to Washington's recent proposals.
Yet, there is an element of continuity between those earlier
border-opening proposals and the latest one. That common element is
the optimistic belief that open borders and freedom to trade are
a prerequisite to resolution of conflict and durable peace. This
carryover from Manchesterianism often colored US political debates
about the possibility of opening the Azeri and Turkish borders with
Armenia. Yet, the diplomatic process integrated this issue within the
broader negotiations. It did not single it out from that context or
allow it to become a currency of exchange in US domestic politics.
The logic of the administration's initiative from 2009 to date has
implied that Washington would "deliver" the re-opening of Turkey's
border with Armenia; while Turkey would in turn "deliver" Azerbaijan
by opening the Turkish-Armenian border, without insisting on the
withdrawal of Armenian troops from inner-Azeri territories. That
conditionality is a long-established one in these negotiations.
However, Washington currently insists that the two processes be
separated and that Turkey opens that border unconditionally as per
the October 2009 Zurich protocols.
Breaking that linkage would irreparably compromise the chances of a
peaceful, stage-by-stage settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. It
would indefinitely prolong the Armenian military presence inside
Azerbaijan, placing Russia in a commanding position to arbitrate the
conflict, with unprecedented leverage on an Azerbaijan alienated from
its strategic allies.
Washington had persuaded Ankara to break that conditionality in
the October 2009 protocols, which came close to splitting Turkey
from Azerbaijan. However, Turkey reinstated that conditionality
unambiguously from December 2009 onward. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, declared this repeatedly and publicly, contradicting Obama
and the US State Department on this account at the December 2009 and
April 2010 Washington summits and afterward. Following the latter
event, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, flew to Baku with
reassurances that Turkey would only open the border with Armenia if
Armenian troops withdrew from inner-Azeri districts. The assurances
were the more significant after the US White House had demonstratively
excluded Azerbaijan from the Washington summit (Anatolia News Agency,
April 14, 18-20).
The US administration's policy has now backfired on all sides, Yerevan
being the last to abandon it after the policy had failed to "deliver"
Ankara and Baku. The Obama administration can now be expected to
revert to a balanced approach by taking Azeri and Turkish views more
carefully into account.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm