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KNOT OF INDEPENDENCE
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1280342832
July 28 2010
The Partial Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Means Academic
Analysis of the "Kosovo Precedent" Is No Longer Abstracted
The UN International Court last week effectively recognized
the legality of the Kosovo authorities' 2008 decision to declare
independence from Serbia. But the significance of this problem goes
far beyond the limits of formal jurisprudence. The "Casus Kosovo"
has a bearing on the formation of the basic principles of world
order. And if ethnic nationalism is allowed in the Balkans, why
shouldn't it be allowed in the mountains of the Caucasus or in the
deserts and tropics of Africa?
After the Kosovo Parliament approved the declaration of independence
of the former autonomous province of Serbia (which was examined at
the UN International Court), both Russian and Western experts began
to talk about the opening of a new chapter in history - of "the world
after Kosovo." At the same time, to speak of the event as some kind
of sensation would be misleading. It had been long expected.
For two decades the Kosovo question has been one of the most difficult
and entangled ethno-political problems on the Balkan peninsular. In
1991 Kosovar Albanian leaders declared their independence, but the
problem did not go beyond the scope of the Balkans. And that is why
Albania was the only country supporting Kosovo 19 years ago, although
later the idea of uniting the two Albanian states was withdrawn from
the agenda.
The new generation of Kosovar-Albanians, involved in the political
conflict against Belgrade, began to view independence not as an
intermediate stage, but as the ultimate goal. If anything, as an
end in itself. After NATO's operation "Allied Force," (the 78-day
bombing campaign from March 24 to June 10, 1999) ended in the de-facto
secession of the former Serbian autonomous province, much became
absolutely clear. Belgrade did not (and does not) have either the
power or the practical, political-ideological, or moral-psychological
resources to "Serbianize" the province.
However, to limit its impact to only the Balkans would be false. The
Kosovo Casus is a subject of intense study in the countries of
the "parallel Commonwealth of Independent States" (Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr). In August 2008 two of the
four republics of "CIS-2" compared their status with Kosovo's. They
had become semi-recognized. The difference was only in the number of
states which recognized that independence. The former Serb province was
recognized by 69 countries, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia received
only 4 nuanced recognitions. But the UN has recognized neither Kosovo,
nor the two former Georgian autonomies. And the chances of Kosovo
receiving such recognition in that famous building in New York is
precisely nil, taking into account not so much the widely publicized
position of Russia, but also the role played by China. Moscow can
theoretically recognize the independence of the former Serb autonomous
province if it betrays Belgrade. Beijing can afford itself the luxury
of ignoring the Serb position since its celestial interests (Taiwan,
Tibet) are in fact much more important than the political-psychological
problems of distant Serbia.
In this way, the 2008 political decision and the 2010 legal decision
have led to (and will to lead to) a situation where the principle
of ethnic self-determination comes to the foreground. This is
how it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, the
right of a nation to "self-determination" between the two variants
(Woodrow Wilson's liberalism and Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevism) became
the cornerstone of the global system. There was one problem. All of
the various national elites had their own images of what constituted
"their land" and "their country," and these did not correspond with
those of the other elites. That's why the Czechs looked fearfully at
the Germans and Poles, the Poles at the Germans and the Czechs, and the
Romanians at the Hungarians. The years 1938 to 1939 led to territorial
integrity becoming the new political principal (which would later be
formalized in the Helsinki agreement in 1975). The land surveying of
postcolonial Africa was carried out according to this model.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ethnic
nationalism acquired new youth and vigor. In February 2008 the United
States and its allies took responsibility for legitimizing a new state,
and half a year later it was Russia that did so. In the first instance
the politicians who made the decision believed that a multinational
Kosovo within Serbia was impossible, and those in the second case
believed the same thing about "reintegration of Georgia."
Since in the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr the positions
of the Russian Federation and the West do not differ dramatically, no
one is shouldering the onus of responsibility for determining these
"shards of empires." In Nagorno-Karabakh there are "strong" parties
interested in maintaining the status-quo, and in the other case
Moscow does not have a common border with the unrecognized republic,
which is why it is not unnecessarily charging the situation.
The problem is not about who is right and who is wrong. The Serbs
and the Albanians, the Abkhaz and the Georgians, the Armenians and
the Azeris could all draw up a long list of claims against each other
(including on their historical right to territory). The ethnic groups
are not to blame (even more so as they don't have legal personalities),
but rather the principles and the approaches. Ethnic nationalism in
its extreme forms leads to the appearance of the "Kosovo casus," in
which in there appears in Europe a fairly lame state, the government
of which is run by an old fighter called Hashim Tachi and nicknamed
"the Snake." To what extent the Snake is able to solve the social
and daily problems of his compatriots is debatable.
Before, everything could be blamed on the evil will of Belgrade. Today
it necessary to take responsibility, regulate the judicial system,
bring into line corrupt officials, and the old comrades-in-arms of
the Kosovo liberation army. There remains the question of the Kosovo
precedent. And whoever wants to, of course, will see a precedent
without any formal jurisprudence.
Now, the question surrounding the recognition of Kosovo has become a
matter of interpretation. To the benefit of such interpretations there
has appeared a starting point in the form of the partly recognized
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And that is why all the
discussions and arguments about the precedent of Kosovo are not
abstracted academic analyses, as was the case before 2008.
The event can be considered an evil, or a "triumph for democracy,"
but the independence of Kosovo did not unite the great powers. The
event didn't even unite Europe (as had been planned in many
strategies concocted in Brussels). Five EU countries (Greece, Spain,
Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) do not recognize the result of the
self-determination of the former Serb autonomy. But then the whole
of Europe united in a stance toward the recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Here Greece, Romania, France and Britain spoke with one
voice. But, be that as it may, Kosovo will never be a part of Serbia,
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia will hardly return to the care of
"mother Georgia."
In addition we shouldn't exclude the conflicts (or at the very
least serious confrontations) between partly recognized republics
and their military-political patrons. Just as yesterday's Kosovar
field commanders are not ready to embrace the standards of Western
democracy, the leaders of Abkhazia are not pleased about the arrival
there of "colossal Russian business" (which is prepared to buy up
their energy at source, take total control of tourist facilities,
and take over the administrative business of the local authorities).
However, these conflicts will not entail a growth in sympathy toward
Belgrade or to Tbilisi. The political agenda will simply change
slowly. Besides, this is all ahead. And in any case, it will be a
different history for these post-Serbian and post-Georgian countries.
Sergei Markedonov is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program Washington, DC
From: A. Papazian
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=International&articleid=a1280342832
July 28 2010
The Partial Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Means Academic
Analysis of the "Kosovo Precedent" Is No Longer Abstracted
The UN International Court last week effectively recognized
the legality of the Kosovo authorities' 2008 decision to declare
independence from Serbia. But the significance of this problem goes
far beyond the limits of formal jurisprudence. The "Casus Kosovo"
has a bearing on the formation of the basic principles of world
order. And if ethnic nationalism is allowed in the Balkans, why
shouldn't it be allowed in the mountains of the Caucasus or in the
deserts and tropics of Africa?
After the Kosovo Parliament approved the declaration of independence
of the former autonomous province of Serbia (which was examined at
the UN International Court), both Russian and Western experts began
to talk about the opening of a new chapter in history - of "the world
after Kosovo." At the same time, to speak of the event as some kind
of sensation would be misleading. It had been long expected.
For two decades the Kosovo question has been one of the most difficult
and entangled ethno-political problems on the Balkan peninsular. In
1991 Kosovar Albanian leaders declared their independence, but the
problem did not go beyond the scope of the Balkans. And that is why
Albania was the only country supporting Kosovo 19 years ago, although
later the idea of uniting the two Albanian states was withdrawn from
the agenda.
The new generation of Kosovar-Albanians, involved in the political
conflict against Belgrade, began to view independence not as an
intermediate stage, but as the ultimate goal. If anything, as an
end in itself. After NATO's operation "Allied Force," (the 78-day
bombing campaign from March 24 to June 10, 1999) ended in the de-facto
secession of the former Serbian autonomous province, much became
absolutely clear. Belgrade did not (and does not) have either the
power or the practical, political-ideological, or moral-psychological
resources to "Serbianize" the province.
However, to limit its impact to only the Balkans would be false. The
Kosovo Casus is a subject of intense study in the countries of
the "parallel Commonwealth of Independent States" (Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr). In August 2008 two of the
four republics of "CIS-2" compared their status with Kosovo's. They
had become semi-recognized. The difference was only in the number of
states which recognized that independence. The former Serb province was
recognized by 69 countries, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia received
only 4 nuanced recognitions. But the UN has recognized neither Kosovo,
nor the two former Georgian autonomies. And the chances of Kosovo
receiving such recognition in that famous building in New York is
precisely nil, taking into account not so much the widely publicized
position of Russia, but also the role played by China. Moscow can
theoretically recognize the independence of the former Serb autonomous
province if it betrays Belgrade. Beijing can afford itself the luxury
of ignoring the Serb position since its celestial interests (Taiwan,
Tibet) are in fact much more important than the political-psychological
problems of distant Serbia.
In this way, the 2008 political decision and the 2010 legal decision
have led to (and will to lead to) a situation where the principle
of ethnic self-determination comes to the foreground. This is
how it was at the beginning of the twentieth century. Then, the
right of a nation to "self-determination" between the two variants
(Woodrow Wilson's liberalism and Vladimir Lenin's Bolshevism) became
the cornerstone of the global system. There was one problem. All of
the various national elites had their own images of what constituted
"their land" and "their country," and these did not correspond with
those of the other elites. That's why the Czechs looked fearfully at
the Germans and Poles, the Poles at the Germans and the Czechs, and the
Romanians at the Hungarians. The years 1938 to 1939 led to territorial
integrity becoming the new political principal (which would later be
formalized in the Helsinki agreement in 1975). The land surveying of
postcolonial Africa was carried out according to this model.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ethnic
nationalism acquired new youth and vigor. In February 2008 the United
States and its allies took responsibility for legitimizing a new state,
and half a year later it was Russia that did so. In the first instance
the politicians who made the decision believed that a multinational
Kosovo within Serbia was impossible, and those in the second case
believed the same thing about "reintegration of Georgia."
Since in the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr the positions
of the Russian Federation and the West do not differ dramatically, no
one is shouldering the onus of responsibility for determining these
"shards of empires." In Nagorno-Karabakh there are "strong" parties
interested in maintaining the status-quo, and in the other case
Moscow does not have a common border with the unrecognized republic,
which is why it is not unnecessarily charging the situation.
The problem is not about who is right and who is wrong. The Serbs
and the Albanians, the Abkhaz and the Georgians, the Armenians and
the Azeris could all draw up a long list of claims against each other
(including on their historical right to territory). The ethnic groups
are not to blame (even more so as they don't have legal personalities),
but rather the principles and the approaches. Ethnic nationalism in
its extreme forms leads to the appearance of the "Kosovo casus," in
which in there appears in Europe a fairly lame state, the government
of which is run by an old fighter called Hashim Tachi and nicknamed
"the Snake." To what extent the Snake is able to solve the social
and daily problems of his compatriots is debatable.
Before, everything could be blamed on the evil will of Belgrade. Today
it necessary to take responsibility, regulate the judicial system,
bring into line corrupt officials, and the old comrades-in-arms of
the Kosovo liberation army. There remains the question of the Kosovo
precedent. And whoever wants to, of course, will see a precedent
without any formal jurisprudence.
Now, the question surrounding the recognition of Kosovo has become a
matter of interpretation. To the benefit of such interpretations there
has appeared a starting point in the form of the partly recognized
republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And that is why all the
discussions and arguments about the precedent of Kosovo are not
abstracted academic analyses, as was the case before 2008.
The event can be considered an evil, or a "triumph for democracy,"
but the independence of Kosovo did not unite the great powers. The
event didn't even unite Europe (as had been planned in many
strategies concocted in Brussels). Five EU countries (Greece, Spain,
Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia) do not recognize the result of the
self-determination of the former Serb autonomy. But then the whole
of Europe united in a stance toward the recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Here Greece, Romania, France and Britain spoke with one
voice. But, be that as it may, Kosovo will never be a part of Serbia,
and Abkhazia and South Ossetia will hardly return to the care of
"mother Georgia."
In addition we shouldn't exclude the conflicts (or at the very
least serious confrontations) between partly recognized republics
and their military-political patrons. Just as yesterday's Kosovar
field commanders are not ready to embrace the standards of Western
democracy, the leaders of Abkhazia are not pleased about the arrival
there of "colossal Russian business" (which is prepared to buy up
their energy at source, take total control of tourist facilities,
and take over the administrative business of the local authorities).
However, these conflicts will not entail a growth in sympathy toward
Belgrade or to Tbilisi. The political agenda will simply change
slowly. Besides, this is all ahead. And in any case, it will be a
different history for these post-Serbian and post-Georgian countries.
Sergei Markedonov is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), Russia and Eurasia Program Washington, DC
From: A. Papazian