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DOES THE SOUTH CAUCASUS NEED RECALIBRATION OF GERMANY'S AND EU`S
POLICY UPON THE PATTERN OF MR. MEISTER?
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=4989
30.07.2010
Armen Martirosyan
A.Martirosyan - Ambassador of Armenia to Germany
Recently, on July 7th the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
organized a discussion on the report presented by Mr. Stefan Meister,
during which the author introduced the outlines of his study
(Recalibrating Germany`s and EU`s policy in the South Caucasus).
Several participants, including me, approached critically some of his
assumptions and conclusions. However, later on, having read the full
document, I felt myself compelled to present some comments in written
form, which I do hope will contribute to more objective comprehension
of the issues concerned.
If bias and predisposition of diplomats could be justified, the
obvious prejudice of expert aspiring to elaborate on the multifaceted
policies of the leading international actors in any region seems
irrelevant, diminishes the value of analysis and undermines the
relevance of conclusions.
The very beginning of the paper, where the author reproaches the
European Union for `inability of its member states to develop a common
policy toward the post Soviet space' had caused my initial perplexity.
The mentioned `vice' is as old as the EU is and for very obvious
reasons it concerns not only the post Soviet space but goes far
beyond. Afghanistan and Iran, reform of UN Security Council and
membership of Turkey to the EU, the problems of Polisario and Kosovo -
are few examples of pluralism among the member states of the European
Union. But is it a flaw of the EU or a trait inherent to the Union of
independent states? I would rather choose the second option. Whether
we like it or not, quite often the legitimacy of any international
organization or union of independent states comes at the expense of
its efficiency and its ability in getting things done. In the meantime
it allows to ensure a legality of EU`s actions or inaction, thus
making the Union not only attractive for the states of the South
Caucasus but mostly welcome external actor.
The distinguished author in fact calls upon the EU in general and
Germany in particular to replace an obsolete `darling', and namely
Georgia, with a new one - Azerbaijan, because `by focusing on
relations with Azerbaijan, Europe could increase its relevance in both
the South Caucasus and in Central Asia, as well as become a more
competitive economic player within these markets, which cumulatively
represent more than 100 mln consumers'. Having read this sentence, I
involuntarily recalled the resignation of the former Federal President
of FRG Mr. Köller, whose interpretation of Germany's engagement in
Afghanistan was interpreted by the public as non consistent with
essentials of German foreign policy. One could hardly find more
irrelevant argument for the appeal to review the policies of EU than
consumer based statistics. I have no doubts that the distinguished
author is aware that various external actors put too much emphasis on
prudent geo-economic considerations which deprived these very states
of the role of honest broker in the regional affairs. To my
understanding, the author pursues the opposite role, and wants to see
the EU and Germany in particular as proactive players in various
regions worldwide. Two core elements of German foreign policy -
multilateralism and the culture of restraint, balance between interest
based and value oriented policies have allowed Germany to be viewed as
an honest international actor both in global and regional politics for
decades. The involvement of Germany in the South Caucasus, in
particular, is the best manifestation of such paradigm of German
foreign policy.
Conclusion that `EU`s ability to impact change in this region will
come mainly from engagement in economic and energy issues, as opposed
to democracy and human rights' causes my irritation. Does Mr. Meister
talk about China or the European Union!? Since the paper is rich with
this kind of comments and observations and it is impossible to comment
on all of them, I would rather concentrate on the issues directly
linked to my country, Armenia.
Armenia has never been an isolated country as the author claims by
reproducing Azeri rhetoric. Nor my country is `desperately searching
for alternative allies to avoid dependence on Russia.' Since its
inception, the independent Armenia, unlike its neighbors, has never
played on the contradictions and discords between various external
actors. It has allowed us to synchronize our interests and harmonize
our bilateral relations with Russia and the United States, with CIS
and EU, with OCST and NATO. We enjoy fruitful cooperation with our
other two neighbors - Georgia and Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore,
blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenia, while impeding
the development of the region, as a whole do not serve their goal to
isolate Armenia.
On Turkey, which is the subject of Mr. Meister`s many references, I
would like to elaborate in details. Armenia was not only `keen to
restart its negotiations with Turkey', but initiated a policy of
reconciliation. And it was not Armenia but Turkey that `abandoned this
policy', as author claims. From the very beginning, when the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs inaugurated his policy of Zero problems
with neighbors, I thought of it as either declarative and unrealistic
or demagogical. Having learnt more about Mr. Davutoglu`s academic
background, I became personally inclined towards the first option: his
plans had not taken into consideration some realities of our region,
particularly, related to the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Many
experts and practitioners of foreign policy within Armenian political
establishment and outsiders likewise still believe that the government
of Turkey was candid and sincere in its wishes to normalize non
existing bilateral diplomatic relations. The opponents claim that
Turkey being very well aware of Azerbaijan's uncompromising opposition
to the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, has intended to use
that process for its own interests.
Developments following the signing of protocols in October 2009
strengthened the arguments of the second camp. On the very same day
when the documents were signed, Turks, although unsuccessfully,
undertook the first attempt to condition openly the process of
normalization of the bilateral relations by the resolution of Nagorno
Karabagh issue, thus violating the fundamental principle of the
ongoing negotiations. Since then, the rhetoric has not changed and the
Turkish side has continued to stipulate the normalization of our
bilateral relations by the progress in NK dispute. Therefore, one can
draw two conclusions. First, either the Turkish government had made a
miscalculation, which allowed Azeris to exercise their veto right in
the domestic policies of Turkey, or, second, the government of Turkey
was cunning when it had announced its readiness to normalize the
bilateral relations with Armenia without any preconditions.
Irrespective to the causality, the process of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation has stalled and mistrust between Armenians and Turks
has deepened. (Nevertheless this did not prevent Minister Davutogly
from winning various honorary titles abroad.) In Armenian society the
authority of international brokers, which sincerely have been
mediating this thorny process for years, had staggered. Hopefully such
outcome would not have a negative effect on the whole notion of
international mediation in dispute resolution. Had Turkey conducted
its policy as a regional power in the interests of the region, we
would have a different geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus.
However, Turkey has put its ethnic affiliation with Azeris ahead of
its interests as a regional power, thereby proving unfoundedness of
its pretensions and claims for a broker in Nagorno Karabagh dispute.
The author extensively attempts to elaborate on this problem and does
not leave me a choice but to make my own comments regarding this
painful regional issue.
First, though a few years ago at a stretch one could reflect on the
Nagorno Karabagh conflict `as the key conflict of the South Caucasus',
after the August war in 2008 and the following recognition of South
Ossetia`s and Abkhazia's independence by Russia and some other states,
one could hardly regard the NK dispute as a primary one for further
resolution of other disputes in the region. Talking about the
consequences of war unleashed by Azeris in early 1990s with unexpected
outcomes for Azerbaijan itself, the author repeatedly labels one of
these outcomes as `Armenian occupation.' No doubt, such rhetoric will
please author's like-minded persons from Azerbaijan, but it would
never contribute to the peaceful solution of the problem. Instead of
courting Azeris, it would have been more productive had the author
impartially looked at the causality of the conflict. Only such deep
insight and unbiased interpretation of all fundamental principles of
international law might have presented more thorough and deep analysis
of the Nagorno Karabagh dispute. The fact that the European expert in
its attempt to approach the regional affairs in an innovatory manner
does not even mention such fundamental principles of international law
as non-use of force and the right of people to self- determination,
seriously questions the theoretical value of the paper, let alone its
practical one.
Respected author illustrates an erroneous comparison on the role that
the Armenian and Azerbaijani states play in their national economies.
In case he is not aware, I want to inform that the share of the state
in GDP of Armenia comprises less than 10%, while in Azerbaijan the
same indicator is around 16%. No doubt, neighboring Azerbaijan has
demonstrated quite impressive growth of economy, even though, as the
author admits, 60% of its GDP is produced exclusively from the export
of hydrocarbons. In the meantime, according to the latest report of
the UNDP, the Human Development Index (HDI) of Armenia is still
highest in the region, and it is a manifestation of the quality of
economic growth and institution building in Armenia.
I do not aspire in this paper to elaborate thoroughly on the role that
EU and Germany can play in the region. But I do believe that effective
realization of the Eastern Partnership initiative would bring
qualitative changes to the region. Regrettably, Mr. Meister had not
found it expedient even to mention The association agreement and The
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement aimed at strengthening
relations between the EU and South Caucasus states. Both tools indeed
require recalibration of activities of the EU as well as Germany in
the region and Armenia attaches utmost importance to the comprehensive
realization of the above mentioned European initiative.
Berlin, July 16, 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS BAD[28.07.2008]
PURPOSES OF DEVELOPMENT AND WHAT WE SHOULD CHOSE[29.05.2008]
From: A. Papazian
POLICY UPON THE PATTERN OF MR. MEISTER?
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=4989
30.07.2010
Armen Martirosyan
A.Martirosyan - Ambassador of Armenia to Germany
Recently, on July 7th the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
organized a discussion on the report presented by Mr. Stefan Meister,
during which the author introduced the outlines of his study
(Recalibrating Germany`s and EU`s policy in the South Caucasus).
Several participants, including me, approached critically some of his
assumptions and conclusions. However, later on, having read the full
document, I felt myself compelled to present some comments in written
form, which I do hope will contribute to more objective comprehension
of the issues concerned.
If bias and predisposition of diplomats could be justified, the
obvious prejudice of expert aspiring to elaborate on the multifaceted
policies of the leading international actors in any region seems
irrelevant, diminishes the value of analysis and undermines the
relevance of conclusions.
The very beginning of the paper, where the author reproaches the
European Union for `inability of its member states to develop a common
policy toward the post Soviet space' had caused my initial perplexity.
The mentioned `vice' is as old as the EU is and for very obvious
reasons it concerns not only the post Soviet space but goes far
beyond. Afghanistan and Iran, reform of UN Security Council and
membership of Turkey to the EU, the problems of Polisario and Kosovo -
are few examples of pluralism among the member states of the European
Union. But is it a flaw of the EU or a trait inherent to the Union of
independent states? I would rather choose the second option. Whether
we like it or not, quite often the legitimacy of any international
organization or union of independent states comes at the expense of
its efficiency and its ability in getting things done. In the meantime
it allows to ensure a legality of EU`s actions or inaction, thus
making the Union not only attractive for the states of the South
Caucasus but mostly welcome external actor.
The distinguished author in fact calls upon the EU in general and
Germany in particular to replace an obsolete `darling', and namely
Georgia, with a new one - Azerbaijan, because `by focusing on
relations with Azerbaijan, Europe could increase its relevance in both
the South Caucasus and in Central Asia, as well as become a more
competitive economic player within these markets, which cumulatively
represent more than 100 mln consumers'. Having read this sentence, I
involuntarily recalled the resignation of the former Federal President
of FRG Mr. Köller, whose interpretation of Germany's engagement in
Afghanistan was interpreted by the public as non consistent with
essentials of German foreign policy. One could hardly find more
irrelevant argument for the appeal to review the policies of EU than
consumer based statistics. I have no doubts that the distinguished
author is aware that various external actors put too much emphasis on
prudent geo-economic considerations which deprived these very states
of the role of honest broker in the regional affairs. To my
understanding, the author pursues the opposite role, and wants to see
the EU and Germany in particular as proactive players in various
regions worldwide. Two core elements of German foreign policy -
multilateralism and the culture of restraint, balance between interest
based and value oriented policies have allowed Germany to be viewed as
an honest international actor both in global and regional politics for
decades. The involvement of Germany in the South Caucasus, in
particular, is the best manifestation of such paradigm of German
foreign policy.
Conclusion that `EU`s ability to impact change in this region will
come mainly from engagement in economic and energy issues, as opposed
to democracy and human rights' causes my irritation. Does Mr. Meister
talk about China or the European Union!? Since the paper is rich with
this kind of comments and observations and it is impossible to comment
on all of them, I would rather concentrate on the issues directly
linked to my country, Armenia.
Armenia has never been an isolated country as the author claims by
reproducing Azeri rhetoric. Nor my country is `desperately searching
for alternative allies to avoid dependence on Russia.' Since its
inception, the independent Armenia, unlike its neighbors, has never
played on the contradictions and discords between various external
actors. It has allowed us to synchronize our interests and harmonize
our bilateral relations with Russia and the United States, with CIS
and EU, with OCST and NATO. We enjoy fruitful cooperation with our
other two neighbors - Georgia and Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore,
blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenia, while impeding
the development of the region, as a whole do not serve their goal to
isolate Armenia.
On Turkey, which is the subject of Mr. Meister`s many references, I
would like to elaborate in details. Armenia was not only `keen to
restart its negotiations with Turkey', but initiated a policy of
reconciliation. And it was not Armenia but Turkey that `abandoned this
policy', as author claims. From the very beginning, when the Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs inaugurated his policy of Zero problems
with neighbors, I thought of it as either declarative and unrealistic
or demagogical. Having learnt more about Mr. Davutoglu`s academic
background, I became personally inclined towards the first option: his
plans had not taken into consideration some realities of our region,
particularly, related to the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Many
experts and practitioners of foreign policy within Armenian political
establishment and outsiders likewise still believe that the government
of Turkey was candid and sincere in its wishes to normalize non
existing bilateral diplomatic relations. The opponents claim that
Turkey being very well aware of Azerbaijan's uncompromising opposition
to the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, has intended to use
that process for its own interests.
Developments following the signing of protocols in October 2009
strengthened the arguments of the second camp. On the very same day
when the documents were signed, Turks, although unsuccessfully,
undertook the first attempt to condition openly the process of
normalization of the bilateral relations by the resolution of Nagorno
Karabagh issue, thus violating the fundamental principle of the
ongoing negotiations. Since then, the rhetoric has not changed and the
Turkish side has continued to stipulate the normalization of our
bilateral relations by the progress in NK dispute. Therefore, one can
draw two conclusions. First, either the Turkish government had made a
miscalculation, which allowed Azeris to exercise their veto right in
the domestic policies of Turkey, or, second, the government of Turkey
was cunning when it had announced its readiness to normalize the
bilateral relations with Armenia without any preconditions.
Irrespective to the causality, the process of Armenian-Turkish
reconciliation has stalled and mistrust between Armenians and Turks
has deepened. (Nevertheless this did not prevent Minister Davutogly
from winning various honorary titles abroad.) In Armenian society the
authority of international brokers, which sincerely have been
mediating this thorny process for years, had staggered. Hopefully such
outcome would not have a negative effect on the whole notion of
international mediation in dispute resolution. Had Turkey conducted
its policy as a regional power in the interests of the region, we
would have a different geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus.
However, Turkey has put its ethnic affiliation with Azeris ahead of
its interests as a regional power, thereby proving unfoundedness of
its pretensions and claims for a broker in Nagorno Karabagh dispute.
The author extensively attempts to elaborate on this problem and does
not leave me a choice but to make my own comments regarding this
painful regional issue.
First, though a few years ago at a stretch one could reflect on the
Nagorno Karabagh conflict `as the key conflict of the South Caucasus',
after the August war in 2008 and the following recognition of South
Ossetia`s and Abkhazia's independence by Russia and some other states,
one could hardly regard the NK dispute as a primary one for further
resolution of other disputes in the region. Talking about the
consequences of war unleashed by Azeris in early 1990s with unexpected
outcomes for Azerbaijan itself, the author repeatedly labels one of
these outcomes as `Armenian occupation.' No doubt, such rhetoric will
please author's like-minded persons from Azerbaijan, but it would
never contribute to the peaceful solution of the problem. Instead of
courting Azeris, it would have been more productive had the author
impartially looked at the causality of the conflict. Only such deep
insight and unbiased interpretation of all fundamental principles of
international law might have presented more thorough and deep analysis
of the Nagorno Karabagh dispute. The fact that the European expert in
its attempt to approach the regional affairs in an innovatory manner
does not even mention such fundamental principles of international law
as non-use of force and the right of people to self- determination,
seriously questions the theoretical value of the paper, let alone its
practical one.
Respected author illustrates an erroneous comparison on the role that
the Armenian and Azerbaijani states play in their national economies.
In case he is not aware, I want to inform that the share of the state
in GDP of Armenia comprises less than 10%, while in Azerbaijan the
same indicator is around 16%. No doubt, neighboring Azerbaijan has
demonstrated quite impressive growth of economy, even though, as the
author admits, 60% of its GDP is produced exclusively from the export
of hydrocarbons. In the meantime, according to the latest report of
the UNDP, the Human Development Index (HDI) of Armenia is still
highest in the region, and it is a manifestation of the quality of
economic growth and institution building in Armenia.
I do not aspire in this paper to elaborate thoroughly on the role that
EU and Germany can play in the region. But I do believe that effective
realization of the Eastern Partnership initiative would bring
qualitative changes to the region. Regrettably, Mr. Meister had not
found it expedient even to mention The association agreement and The
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement aimed at strengthening
relations between the EU and South Caucasus states. Both tools indeed
require recalibration of activities of the EU as well as Germany in
the region and Armenia attaches utmost importance to the comprehensive
realization of the above mentioned European initiative.
Berlin, July 16, 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
WHAT IS GOOD AND WHAT IS BAD[28.07.2008]
PURPOSES OF DEVELOPMENT AND WHAT WE SHOULD CHOSE[29.05.2008]
From: A. Papazian