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NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION FOR TURKEY: STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D. RESIDENT SCHOLAR AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
CQ Congressional Testimony
July 28, 2010 Wednesday
COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR
AFFILIATION: AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, Honorable Members. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify.
Prime Minister Erdooan, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
have changed Turkey fundamentally. They do not simply seek good
relations with their Arab neighbors and Iran. Instead, they favor
the most radical elements in regional struggles, hence their embrace
of Syria over Lebanon and of Hamas over Fatah, and their endorsement
Iran's nuclear program.
Over the last 8 years, the AKP government has reoriented Turkey
toward the Arab and Iranian Middle East, not to facilitate bridge-
building to the West, but in an effort to play a leadership role not
only in the Middle East but also among Islamic countries more broadly.
Unfortunately, that leadership is increasingly oriented around the
most extreme elements, including Iran, Syria and the terrorist Hamas
leadership of Gaza.
In addition, Erdooan has defended Sudan's Omar Hassan al-Bashir,
who had been indicted on charges of genocide by the International
Criminal Court, and personally vouched for Yasin al-Qadi, whom the U.S.
Treasury department has labeled a "specially designated global
terrorist" for his support of al-Qaeda.
For too long, American diplomats and officials in both the Barack
Obama and George W. Bush administrations have been in denial: They
have embraced Turkey as they wished it to be rather than calibrate
policy to the reality of what Turkey has become. This is neither
realism nor the basis of sound foreign policy.
Some see Erdooan's motive in Turkish reaction to European slights and
anger at the Iraq war. However, Turkey's radical turn is not reactive.
Neither Iraq nor failure to gain acceptance to the European Union
explain Erdooan's personal endorsement of al-Qaeda financiers,
or his government's support for crude anti-American and anti-
Semitic propaganda, nor his own rejection of Western liberalism,
all of which have led Turkey to become and, according to the 2010 Pew
Global Attitudes survey, remain among the world's most anti-American
countries.
Evidence is insurmountable that Erdooan has implemented a deliberate
plan to send Turkey on a fundamentally different trajectory, both
in foreign policy and in domestic order. He tells Western diplomats
he is aggrieved by the European Union's refusal to admit Turkey,
but then chides the European Court of Human Rights for its failure
to consult Islamic scholars prior to ruling. Turkish journalists and
economists say privately that the AKP has used control of the national
banking board to channel foreign money to party coffers and has used
the security services to harass and leak with impunity illegal tapes
of private conversations.
Despite the fact that Turkey remains a nominal democracy, hope in a
revitalized opposition is misplaced. While recent polls suggest that
opposition leader Kemal Kylycdaroolu is running even with Erdooan,
the changes the AKP have made in Turkey over the past eight years
cannot easily be undone: The AKP has undermined the secular nature of
education at all levels, undercut the independence of the judiciary,
used security forces to eavesdrop on domestic political opponents,
and constrained the independence of the press. Indeed, Prime
Minister Erdooan's harassment of journalists and editors in Turkey
is reminiscent of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's treatment
of the press.
Even if the opposition forces Erdooan into a coalition, the AKP's
behavior over the past eight years should raise longterm concerns
about rapid shifts in Turkey's orientation. The alliance with Turkey,
NATO's southern and only Muslim bulwark, has become an article of faith
despite growing evidence Turkey is neither a consistently reliable ally
nor a force of moderation among Muslims. That does not mean that the
United States should dispense with its partnership with Turkey. Turkey
remains a member of NATO and conducts more heavy lifting in Afghanistan
than many of our European allies. Incirlik Air Base provides key
logistic support for U.S. forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Certainly, Turkey's residual military assistance is helpful, and the
United States should not hasten its end. At the same time, U.S.
policymakers should no longer assume Turkish goodwill. Accordingly,
the U.S. government should consider several issues relative to its
relationship with Turkey:
Precisely because the F-35 will be the fighter the U.S. Air Force
will most depend on to maintain air superiority in the decades ahead,
the decision to sell F- 35s to Turkey, whose future foreign policy
orientation is in question, should be reviewed by appropriate Defense
Department elements to assess possible loss of critical technology
to states of concern. Congress should mandate that review, specify
that it be completed within the year, and then make it available to
the appropriate committees of Congress.
While Incirlik remains a key regional base, the Turkish government
likes to make its use contingent upon the U.S. Congress not passing an
Armenian Genocide Resolution. When the Pentagon renegotiates its lease,
Ankara's enthusiasm to seek unrelated concessions and to micromanage
the missions flown from Incirlik suggests a lack of ideological
affinity on security concerns. It is strategic malpractice not to
advance contingency plans for the day when Turkey no longer allows
the U.S. Air Force to use Incirlik or seeks to extract too high a
price. The United States should develop contingency facilities in
NATO member Romania and perhaps Georgia and Azerbaijan. At the very
least, developing the U.S. presence at the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air
Base near Constanza will enhance the U.S. position during the next
round of lease renewal negotiations.
While the United States welcomes Turkish involvement in the fight to
stabilize Afghanistan, the current Turkish government has not done
enough to stop Turkish jihadists from traveling to Afghanistan to
fight for the wrong side. Taifetul Mansura, a Turkish Islamist group,
has been increasingly active in its support for the Taliban, as have
Chechen Jihadists who receive safe-haven in Turkey.
The United States should continue to support Turkey's fight against
Kurdish terrorism but, simultaneously, must pressure Ankara to
acknowledge that its willingness to legitimize foreign terrorist
groups based on the AKP's ideological affinity hampers Turkey's
own fight against terrorism and could ultimately undercut Turkey's
territorial integrity.
The Armenian Genocide issue remains a hot-button issue in Turkey and
among Armenian-Americans. Within the scholarly community, there is
no consensus: Most genocide studies scholars say that the Ottomans
committed deliberate genocide against the Armenian community, but
many Middle East scholars Bernard Lewis, Andrew Mango and military
historians like Eric Erickson find the events a tragic outgrowth
of fighting in World War I rather than genocide. Congress should not
silence debate among historians; rather it should seek to facilitate it
and demand that Turkey make its Ottoman archives open to all scholars,
regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political perspective.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to any questions you
may have.
From: A. Papazian
CQ Congressional Testimony
July 28, 2010 Wednesday
COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
TESTIMONY-BY: MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR
AFFILIATION: AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, Honorable Members. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify.
Prime Minister Erdooan, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
have changed Turkey fundamentally. They do not simply seek good
relations with their Arab neighbors and Iran. Instead, they favor
the most radical elements in regional struggles, hence their embrace
of Syria over Lebanon and of Hamas over Fatah, and their endorsement
Iran's nuclear program.
Over the last 8 years, the AKP government has reoriented Turkey
toward the Arab and Iranian Middle East, not to facilitate bridge-
building to the West, but in an effort to play a leadership role not
only in the Middle East but also among Islamic countries more broadly.
Unfortunately, that leadership is increasingly oriented around the
most extreme elements, including Iran, Syria and the terrorist Hamas
leadership of Gaza.
In addition, Erdooan has defended Sudan's Omar Hassan al-Bashir,
who had been indicted on charges of genocide by the International
Criminal Court, and personally vouched for Yasin al-Qadi, whom the U.S.
Treasury department has labeled a "specially designated global
terrorist" for his support of al-Qaeda.
For too long, American diplomats and officials in both the Barack
Obama and George W. Bush administrations have been in denial: They
have embraced Turkey as they wished it to be rather than calibrate
policy to the reality of what Turkey has become. This is neither
realism nor the basis of sound foreign policy.
Some see Erdooan's motive in Turkish reaction to European slights and
anger at the Iraq war. However, Turkey's radical turn is not reactive.
Neither Iraq nor failure to gain acceptance to the European Union
explain Erdooan's personal endorsement of al-Qaeda financiers,
or his government's support for crude anti-American and anti-
Semitic propaganda, nor his own rejection of Western liberalism,
all of which have led Turkey to become and, according to the 2010 Pew
Global Attitudes survey, remain among the world's most anti-American
countries.
Evidence is insurmountable that Erdooan has implemented a deliberate
plan to send Turkey on a fundamentally different trajectory, both
in foreign policy and in domestic order. He tells Western diplomats
he is aggrieved by the European Union's refusal to admit Turkey,
but then chides the European Court of Human Rights for its failure
to consult Islamic scholars prior to ruling. Turkish journalists and
economists say privately that the AKP has used control of the national
banking board to channel foreign money to party coffers and has used
the security services to harass and leak with impunity illegal tapes
of private conversations.
Despite the fact that Turkey remains a nominal democracy, hope in a
revitalized opposition is misplaced. While recent polls suggest that
opposition leader Kemal Kylycdaroolu is running even with Erdooan,
the changes the AKP have made in Turkey over the past eight years
cannot easily be undone: The AKP has undermined the secular nature of
education at all levels, undercut the independence of the judiciary,
used security forces to eavesdrop on domestic political opponents,
and constrained the independence of the press. Indeed, Prime
Minister Erdooan's harassment of journalists and editors in Turkey
is reminiscent of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's treatment
of the press.
Even if the opposition forces Erdooan into a coalition, the AKP's
behavior over the past eight years should raise longterm concerns
about rapid shifts in Turkey's orientation. The alliance with Turkey,
NATO's southern and only Muslim bulwark, has become an article of faith
despite growing evidence Turkey is neither a consistently reliable ally
nor a force of moderation among Muslims. That does not mean that the
United States should dispense with its partnership with Turkey. Turkey
remains a member of NATO and conducts more heavy lifting in Afghanistan
than many of our European allies. Incirlik Air Base provides key
logistic support for U.S. forces both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Certainly, Turkey's residual military assistance is helpful, and the
United States should not hasten its end. At the same time, U.S.
policymakers should no longer assume Turkish goodwill. Accordingly,
the U.S. government should consider several issues relative to its
relationship with Turkey:
Precisely because the F-35 will be the fighter the U.S. Air Force
will most depend on to maintain air superiority in the decades ahead,
the decision to sell F- 35s to Turkey, whose future foreign policy
orientation is in question, should be reviewed by appropriate Defense
Department elements to assess possible loss of critical technology
to states of concern. Congress should mandate that review, specify
that it be completed within the year, and then make it available to
the appropriate committees of Congress.
While Incirlik remains a key regional base, the Turkish government
likes to make its use contingent upon the U.S. Congress not passing an
Armenian Genocide Resolution. When the Pentagon renegotiates its lease,
Ankara's enthusiasm to seek unrelated concessions and to micromanage
the missions flown from Incirlik suggests a lack of ideological
affinity on security concerns. It is strategic malpractice not to
advance contingency plans for the day when Turkey no longer allows
the U.S. Air Force to use Incirlik or seeks to extract too high a
price. The United States should develop contingency facilities in
NATO member Romania and perhaps Georgia and Azerbaijan. At the very
least, developing the U.S. presence at the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air
Base near Constanza will enhance the U.S. position during the next
round of lease renewal negotiations.
While the United States welcomes Turkish involvement in the fight to
stabilize Afghanistan, the current Turkish government has not done
enough to stop Turkish jihadists from traveling to Afghanistan to
fight for the wrong side. Taifetul Mansura, a Turkish Islamist group,
has been increasingly active in its support for the Taliban, as have
Chechen Jihadists who receive safe-haven in Turkey.
The United States should continue to support Turkey's fight against
Kurdish terrorism but, simultaneously, must pressure Ankara to
acknowledge that its willingness to legitimize foreign terrorist
groups based on the AKP's ideological affinity hampers Turkey's
own fight against terrorism and could ultimately undercut Turkey's
territorial integrity.
The Armenian Genocide issue remains a hot-button issue in Turkey and
among Armenian-Americans. Within the scholarly community, there is
no consensus: Most genocide studies scholars say that the Ottomans
committed deliberate genocide against the Armenian community, but
many Middle East scholars Bernard Lewis, Andrew Mango and military
historians like Eric Erickson find the events a tragic outgrowth
of fighting in World War I rather than genocide. Congress should not
silence debate among historians; rather it should seek to facilitate it
and demand that Turkey make its Ottoman archives open to all scholars,
regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political perspective.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to any questions you
may have.
From: A. Papazian