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Qantara.de
July 30 2010
"The AKP Has No Hidden Agenda"
Interview with Gerhard Schweizer
Sabre-rattling in its foreign affairs and power struggles in its
domestic politics are prompting many observers to wonder where exactly
Turkey is heading. The cultural historian Gerhard Schweizer, an
authority on Turkish society, rejects fears of Islamification in
Turkish politics as "out of touch with reality". Christian Horbach
spoke to him about how Turkey is developing
| Bild:
"Turkey is not turning its back on the West." Gerhard Schweizer does
not regard current developments in Turkish foreign policy as a
fundamental realignment
| Since the events surrounding the Gaza aid flotilla, if not before,
the dialogue between Turkey and Israel has taken on a harsher tone.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself has said that nothing will
ever be the same again. Do you think there will be a real, deep
rupture in relations between the two countries?
Gerhard Schweizer: Turkey is the only Muslim country that maintains
close contact with both the Arab world and Israel. The Erdogan
government is continuing this Turkish political tradition. However,
most Turkish governments placed the emphasis on economic and political
ties to the West, and accordingly gave unqualified backing to the
West's Israel-friendly policies.
Erdogan, on the other hand, has intensified contacts with Turkey's
Muslim neighbours, who until recently did not receive the same degree
of attention. At the same time, however, he has declared that
relations with Israel remain absolutely indispensible. In accordance
with this strategy, Turkey has continued to supply Israel with
drinking water in exchange for technical expertise, both for military
initiatives and for development projects.
However, Erdogan has always stressed that "good relations with Israel"
did not prevent him from taking a critical position with regard to
Israeli policy in Palestine. This policy has found expression in his
forceful criticism of Israel's war in Gaza in 2009, and now in his
support for the Gaza aid flotilla. Erdogan is attempting a delicate
balancing act: he is using vehement criticism of Israel to extend
Turkish influence in the Islamic world, but he still wants to continue
to cultivate relations with both the West and Israel, because Turkey
is dependent on its economic relations with them.
In your book "Die Türkei ` Zerrei�probe zwischen Islam und
Nationalismus" ["Turkey ` Torn between Islam and Nationalism"] you
quote the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, as saying: "Better a
leading nation in the Islamic world than bringing up the rear in the
West!" Do these words indicate a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign
policy, a turning away from the West, from the EU, towards Turkey's
eastern neighbours?
| Bild:
A balancing act: Turkey is trying to extend its influence in the
Islamic world by criticizing Israel, but it wants to continue to
cultivate relations with both Israel and the West. From left to right:
Shimon Peres, Abdullah Gül, Mahmud Abbas
| Schweizer: President Abdullah Gül is seen as a staunch advocate of
Turkish entry into the EU. He proved this convincingly during his time
as Foreign Minister. His words indicate a certain disappointment that
many European countries are delaying entry talks; some are even
blocking it altogether. Germany under Angela Merkel and France under
Nicolas Sarkozy play a more ambivalent role.
But the stagnation of the entry talks is not the real reason why
Turkey is currently keen to gain more influence in the Islamic world.
And this is certainly not a complete turning away from the West.
Erdogan is trying ` as no other Turkish Prime Minister before him ` to
make use of the strategic value of being the only Muslim country to
maintain close relations with Western states and Israel on the one
hand, and Arab states and Iran on the other. This gives Turkey the
opportunity to act as a mediator, both between Syria and Israel and
between Iran and the United States.
The fact that these attempts have had little lasting success up till
now is only partly the result of Turkey's undiplomatic, indeed clumsy
behaviour; it is also the result of political mistakes by other
countries involved in the conflict. One can however also conclude from
the failure of its mediation attempts so far that Turkey is
overestimating the strength of its potential influence.
The Turkish government under Erdogan recently made very clear its
interest in increasing its political influence in the Middle East.
What is the reaction of the Arab states and Iran to Turkey's
aspirations towards dominance?
| Bild:
In his book "Turkey ` Torn between Islam and Nationalism" Gerhard
Schweizer traces the development of Turkey in the 20th century
| Schweizer: Both the Arab states and Iran are observing Turkey's
growing involvement in the Islamic realm with mixed feelings. On the
one hand they welcome the fact that Turkey, which until now has
maintained ties strictly with the West, is now also seeking to
establish contacts with its Eastern neighbours whom the West regards
with mistrust, and in doing so it is raising their international
standing. On the other hand, though, its relations with these
countries are burdened by the weight of history.
The Arabs remember only too well the ultimately oppressive foreign
rule of the Ottoman Empire, while the Iranians think of the bitter
wars with the Ottomans over supremacy in Iraq and Azerbaijan. There is
therefore a great deal of mistrust among Arabs and Iranians regarding
Turkey's aspirations to be a regional power. The tensions beneath the
surface could degenerate into open conflicts if other powers in the
Middle East and Central Asia were to feel their influence jeopardized
by an increase in Turkey's power.
Two years ago, in your book, you ascribed to Erdogan a politics of
pragmatism. Is this still an accurate assessment?
Schweizer: My assessment is still accurate. It would be completely
mistaken to believe that Turkey's greater political opening towards to
its Muslim neighbours is motivated by religion. It is not their common
religion that leads to rapprochement among the Muslim states but their
common strategic interests.
This political opening has resulted in a rise in Turkish economic
exports to the Middle East between the years 2000 and 2008 from around
2.8 billion dollars to almost 26 billion dollars ` almost ten times as
much. With the Nabucco pipeline Turkey aims to become the economic hub
for oil and gas exports between the Gulf States, Iran and Central
Asia, and the consumers in Europe. In order to achieve this Turkey has
to maintain equally good relations with its Muslim neighbours and with
the West.
| Bild:
Erdogan is a pragmatist, in Gerhard Schweizer's estimation. "The
accusation that the AKP is trying to establish an Islamist state in
Turkey is out of touch with reality"
| However, in this instance it is not only Turkey that is being
pragmatic, but also Iran. It would be impossible for Iran to form a
close alliance with the Turks for purely religious reasons. In this
context, may I remind you that Iran, a fundamentalist theocracy, did
form a close alliance with secular Syria in the early 1980s, purely
based on strategic considerations ` an alliance that has lasted to
this day.
The AKP has been in power for almost eight years, and it still has a
lot of support among the people. Nonetheless, there are many critical
voices, both in Turkey and abroad, who accuse the AKP of wanting to
turn Turkey into an Islamist state. Are these fears justified?
Schweizer: The accusation that the AKP is trying to establish an
Islamist state in Turkey is out of touch with reality. Erdogan does
have Islamist roots; his political mentor Necmettin Erbakan was an
Islamist. But Erdogan's great success in the polls and subsequent
popularity were precisely because he came to power promising to
reconcile Islam and the modern secular state, and to overcome
intolerant nationalism through the systematic cultivation of
democracy.
It is one of the paradoxes of Turkish politics that it is no longer
the strictly secular parties, those who orientate themselves towards
Atatürk, who are the most emphatic advocates of extending democratic
rights. These days it is rather the "Islamic-secular" AKP that is the
biggest champion of reforms aimed at paving Turkey's way into joining
the EU.
The fact that Erdogan also, on the other hand, has a tendency to
behave in an authoritarian manner and deviate from his publicized
goals is something he has in common with most of his secular
opponents.
Where does Turkey still fall short in consolidating itself as a
democracy that would also meet the standards of the EU?
| Bild:
"There is no consistent separation of powers." Gerhard Schweizer, an
authority on Turkish society, says that the troika of the military,
the National Security Council and the constitutional court is
hindering real democratization in the country
| Schweizer: Turkey is already fairly democratic, compared to its
Muslim neighbours. It has a parliamentary democracy; parties can be
voted out of power. But it doesn't have a consistent separation of
powers.
The National Security Council, which is strongly controlled by the
military, has almost dictatorial powers in deciding whether or not a
party is acting "in accordance with the constitution". The
constitutional court is closely bound up with this Security Council.
There have already been three military coups resulting in the
overthrow of the government that were legitimized by the Security
Council: in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In 1997 the threat alone was enough
to force the prime minister at the time, Erbakan, to resign.
This authority is particularly disastrous because it subscribes
strictly to an intolerant nationalism, and could thus also adopt a
dictatorial stance in blocking liberal reform policies concerning
ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Armenians or Greeks. Erdogan has
initiated efforts to break the power of this authority, but so far
there has not been any real structural reform.
The Kurdish problem is one of the most protracted domestic political
conflicts in Turkey. In spite of the attempts at reform instigated by
the AKP, the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK has
recently flared up again. What do you think are the chances of a true
reconciliation between the Kurds and the Turkish government led by
Erdogan?
| Bild:
The Kurdish conflict continues to cast a long shadow over Turkey. But
Schweizer believes that, unlike previous governments, the AKP under
Erdogan's leadership is genuinely interested in finding a permanent
solution
| Schweizer: This brings me back to my previous example: the fact
that the ideologies of the National Security Council and the
constitutional court are characterized by intolerant nationalism. In
December 2009 the constitutional court pronounced a ban on the Kurdish
DTP, with the official justification that the party sympathized with
the PKK. This deprived the Kurds of the only democratically-elected
representative of their interests, a party which does include
political hawks, but also political doves who are ready to engage in
dialogue and compromise.
The decisive issue is that the ban also obstructs the AKP's attempts
to instigate reform. No other Turkish prime minister to date has been
as decisive as Erdogan in attempting to establish at least cultural
autonomy for the Kurds. Now his only political partner with any
authority in this regard has been removed. We have to see the PKK's
revival of military activities in this context. The hardliners feel
confirmed in their belief that a peaceful democratic process of
evolution seems to be impossible.
The ongoing conflict with regard to the Kurdish problem is precisely
an example of the urgent need for Turkey's democracy to continue to
develop into a democracy along Western lines.
Interview: Christian Horbach
Gerhard Schweizer has a doctorate in Empirical Cultural Science and
has worked for many years as a freelance writer. He is the author of
numerous books on the Islamic world, including portraits of Syria and
Iran.
Translated from the German by Charlotte Collins
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1370/i.html
From: A. Papazian
July 30 2010
"The AKP Has No Hidden Agenda"
Interview with Gerhard Schweizer
Sabre-rattling in its foreign affairs and power struggles in its
domestic politics are prompting many observers to wonder where exactly
Turkey is heading. The cultural historian Gerhard Schweizer, an
authority on Turkish society, rejects fears of Islamification in
Turkish politics as "out of touch with reality". Christian Horbach
spoke to him about how Turkey is developing
| Bild:
"Turkey is not turning its back on the West." Gerhard Schweizer does
not regard current developments in Turkish foreign policy as a
fundamental realignment
| Since the events surrounding the Gaza aid flotilla, if not before,
the dialogue between Turkey and Israel has taken on a harsher tone.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself has said that nothing will
ever be the same again. Do you think there will be a real, deep
rupture in relations between the two countries?
Gerhard Schweizer: Turkey is the only Muslim country that maintains
close contact with both the Arab world and Israel. The Erdogan
government is continuing this Turkish political tradition. However,
most Turkish governments placed the emphasis on economic and political
ties to the West, and accordingly gave unqualified backing to the
West's Israel-friendly policies.
Erdogan, on the other hand, has intensified contacts with Turkey's
Muslim neighbours, who until recently did not receive the same degree
of attention. At the same time, however, he has declared that
relations with Israel remain absolutely indispensible. In accordance
with this strategy, Turkey has continued to supply Israel with
drinking water in exchange for technical expertise, both for military
initiatives and for development projects.
However, Erdogan has always stressed that "good relations with Israel"
did not prevent him from taking a critical position with regard to
Israeli policy in Palestine. This policy has found expression in his
forceful criticism of Israel's war in Gaza in 2009, and now in his
support for the Gaza aid flotilla. Erdogan is attempting a delicate
balancing act: he is using vehement criticism of Israel to extend
Turkish influence in the Islamic world, but he still wants to continue
to cultivate relations with both the West and Israel, because Turkey
is dependent on its economic relations with them.
In your book "Die Türkei ` Zerrei�probe zwischen Islam und
Nationalismus" ["Turkey ` Torn between Islam and Nationalism"] you
quote the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, as saying: "Better a
leading nation in the Islamic world than bringing up the rear in the
West!" Do these words indicate a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign
policy, a turning away from the West, from the EU, towards Turkey's
eastern neighbours?
| Bild:
A balancing act: Turkey is trying to extend its influence in the
Islamic world by criticizing Israel, but it wants to continue to
cultivate relations with both Israel and the West. From left to right:
Shimon Peres, Abdullah Gül, Mahmud Abbas
| Schweizer: President Abdullah Gül is seen as a staunch advocate of
Turkish entry into the EU. He proved this convincingly during his time
as Foreign Minister. His words indicate a certain disappointment that
many European countries are delaying entry talks; some are even
blocking it altogether. Germany under Angela Merkel and France under
Nicolas Sarkozy play a more ambivalent role.
But the stagnation of the entry talks is not the real reason why
Turkey is currently keen to gain more influence in the Islamic world.
And this is certainly not a complete turning away from the West.
Erdogan is trying ` as no other Turkish Prime Minister before him ` to
make use of the strategic value of being the only Muslim country to
maintain close relations with Western states and Israel on the one
hand, and Arab states and Iran on the other. This gives Turkey the
opportunity to act as a mediator, both between Syria and Israel and
between Iran and the United States.
The fact that these attempts have had little lasting success up till
now is only partly the result of Turkey's undiplomatic, indeed clumsy
behaviour; it is also the result of political mistakes by other
countries involved in the conflict. One can however also conclude from
the failure of its mediation attempts so far that Turkey is
overestimating the strength of its potential influence.
The Turkish government under Erdogan recently made very clear its
interest in increasing its political influence in the Middle East.
What is the reaction of the Arab states and Iran to Turkey's
aspirations towards dominance?
| Bild:
In his book "Turkey ` Torn between Islam and Nationalism" Gerhard
Schweizer traces the development of Turkey in the 20th century
| Schweizer: Both the Arab states and Iran are observing Turkey's
growing involvement in the Islamic realm with mixed feelings. On the
one hand they welcome the fact that Turkey, which until now has
maintained ties strictly with the West, is now also seeking to
establish contacts with its Eastern neighbours whom the West regards
with mistrust, and in doing so it is raising their international
standing. On the other hand, though, its relations with these
countries are burdened by the weight of history.
The Arabs remember only too well the ultimately oppressive foreign
rule of the Ottoman Empire, while the Iranians think of the bitter
wars with the Ottomans over supremacy in Iraq and Azerbaijan. There is
therefore a great deal of mistrust among Arabs and Iranians regarding
Turkey's aspirations to be a regional power. The tensions beneath the
surface could degenerate into open conflicts if other powers in the
Middle East and Central Asia were to feel their influence jeopardized
by an increase in Turkey's power.
Two years ago, in your book, you ascribed to Erdogan a politics of
pragmatism. Is this still an accurate assessment?
Schweizer: My assessment is still accurate. It would be completely
mistaken to believe that Turkey's greater political opening towards to
its Muslim neighbours is motivated by religion. It is not their common
religion that leads to rapprochement among the Muslim states but their
common strategic interests.
This political opening has resulted in a rise in Turkish economic
exports to the Middle East between the years 2000 and 2008 from around
2.8 billion dollars to almost 26 billion dollars ` almost ten times as
much. With the Nabucco pipeline Turkey aims to become the economic hub
for oil and gas exports between the Gulf States, Iran and Central
Asia, and the consumers in Europe. In order to achieve this Turkey has
to maintain equally good relations with its Muslim neighbours and with
the West.
| Bild:
Erdogan is a pragmatist, in Gerhard Schweizer's estimation. "The
accusation that the AKP is trying to establish an Islamist state in
Turkey is out of touch with reality"
| However, in this instance it is not only Turkey that is being
pragmatic, but also Iran. It would be impossible for Iran to form a
close alliance with the Turks for purely religious reasons. In this
context, may I remind you that Iran, a fundamentalist theocracy, did
form a close alliance with secular Syria in the early 1980s, purely
based on strategic considerations ` an alliance that has lasted to
this day.
The AKP has been in power for almost eight years, and it still has a
lot of support among the people. Nonetheless, there are many critical
voices, both in Turkey and abroad, who accuse the AKP of wanting to
turn Turkey into an Islamist state. Are these fears justified?
Schweizer: The accusation that the AKP is trying to establish an
Islamist state in Turkey is out of touch with reality. Erdogan does
have Islamist roots; his political mentor Necmettin Erbakan was an
Islamist. But Erdogan's great success in the polls and subsequent
popularity were precisely because he came to power promising to
reconcile Islam and the modern secular state, and to overcome
intolerant nationalism through the systematic cultivation of
democracy.
It is one of the paradoxes of Turkish politics that it is no longer
the strictly secular parties, those who orientate themselves towards
Atatürk, who are the most emphatic advocates of extending democratic
rights. These days it is rather the "Islamic-secular" AKP that is the
biggest champion of reforms aimed at paving Turkey's way into joining
the EU.
The fact that Erdogan also, on the other hand, has a tendency to
behave in an authoritarian manner and deviate from his publicized
goals is something he has in common with most of his secular
opponents.
Where does Turkey still fall short in consolidating itself as a
democracy that would also meet the standards of the EU?
| Bild:
"There is no consistent separation of powers." Gerhard Schweizer, an
authority on Turkish society, says that the troika of the military,
the National Security Council and the constitutional court is
hindering real democratization in the country
| Schweizer: Turkey is already fairly democratic, compared to its
Muslim neighbours. It has a parliamentary democracy; parties can be
voted out of power. But it doesn't have a consistent separation of
powers.
The National Security Council, which is strongly controlled by the
military, has almost dictatorial powers in deciding whether or not a
party is acting "in accordance with the constitution". The
constitutional court is closely bound up with this Security Council.
There have already been three military coups resulting in the
overthrow of the government that were legitimized by the Security
Council: in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In 1997 the threat alone was enough
to force the prime minister at the time, Erbakan, to resign.
This authority is particularly disastrous because it subscribes
strictly to an intolerant nationalism, and could thus also adopt a
dictatorial stance in blocking liberal reform policies concerning
ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Armenians or Greeks. Erdogan has
initiated efforts to break the power of this authority, but so far
there has not been any real structural reform.
The Kurdish problem is one of the most protracted domestic political
conflicts in Turkey. In spite of the attempts at reform instigated by
the AKP, the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK has
recently flared up again. What do you think are the chances of a true
reconciliation between the Kurds and the Turkish government led by
Erdogan?
| Bild:
The Kurdish conflict continues to cast a long shadow over Turkey. But
Schweizer believes that, unlike previous governments, the AKP under
Erdogan's leadership is genuinely interested in finding a permanent
solution
| Schweizer: This brings me back to my previous example: the fact
that the ideologies of the National Security Council and the
constitutional court are characterized by intolerant nationalism. In
December 2009 the constitutional court pronounced a ban on the Kurdish
DTP, with the official justification that the party sympathized with
the PKK. This deprived the Kurds of the only democratically-elected
representative of their interests, a party which does include
political hawks, but also political doves who are ready to engage in
dialogue and compromise.
The decisive issue is that the ban also obstructs the AKP's attempts
to instigate reform. No other Turkish prime minister to date has been
as decisive as Erdogan in attempting to establish at least cultural
autonomy for the Kurds. Now his only political partner with any
authority in this regard has been removed. We have to see the PKK's
revival of military activities in this context. The hardliners feel
confirmed in their belief that a peaceful democratic process of
evolution seems to be impossible.
The ongoing conflict with regard to the Kurdish problem is precisely
an example of the urgent need for Turkey's democracy to continue to
develop into a democracy along Western lines.
Interview: Christian Horbach
Gerhard Schweizer has a doctorate in Empirical Cultural Science and
has worked for many years as a freelance writer. He is the author of
numerous books on the Islamic world, including portraits of Syria and
Iran.
Translated from the German by Charlotte Collins
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1370/i.html
From: A. Papazian